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ABSTRACT 
Major railway stations in England and Wales are highly networked and open locations, 
frequently crowded, and are vulnerable to criminal and terrorist activities. Successive 
Government policies and agendas have sought to lessen this susceptibility, by promoting 
the understanding of and the application of resilience and security measures. Thus, the 
complex stakeholders are ‘responsibilised’ (Garland, 1996) and urged to integrate and 
merge resilience, crime prevention and counter-terrorism measures into their governance, 
and operational policies and agendas. The aim of this research is to determine and 
examine the interdependencies and boundaries of the multiple stakeholders within St 
Pancras International Railway Station (SPIRS), and to analyse how their governance, 
operational and legislative requirements, and agendas influence current and future 
resilience of complex Category A railway stations to human malign security threats. Through 
a unique single case study of SPIRS, qualitative data was collected from thirty-two 
stakeholder participants, sampled for their expert opinion and experience. Data was also 
collected via documents and observations. SPIRS’ interconnected and complex 
stakeholders were represented using stakeholder analysis and mapping to create an 
original and innovative map highlighting those who can influence and impact the 
resilience of the space to human malign security threats. From the thematic analysis of the 
data, the overarching themes exposed the resilience within SPIRS operates in an uncertain 
legal space, competing with disparate institutional processes creating a gulf between 
reality and rhetoric of the responsibilisation of resilience and security strategies. The blurred 
boundaries of responsibility and understanding of the resilience and security agendas 
within SPIRS created tension between the national and local level stakeholders. The 
research adds an original and novel contribution to knowledge, as through contemporary 
empirical evidence it has established the political rhetoric of ‘responsibilisation’ (Garland, 
1996) for resilience and security policies are inconsistent and contradictory with the reality 
of how these transpire in an ambiguous operational and legal space such as SPIRS. 
Regardless of the mapped interdependencies between the multiple stakeholders and their 
interconnecting operational and legislative obligations, there is a definite absence of a 
clear and united approach to resilience, with concerns being dealt with by multiple 
stakeholders and policies. The research has revealed the complications and disparities the 
complex and multiple stakeholders face implementing policy and subsequently 
institutional changes in a cohesive manner. The findings of the research necessitate 
transformations in established organisational procedures, thus ensuring these 
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interdependencies are dealt with now to make certain the effectual incorporation and 
integration of agendas and strategies are unified, and which maintain the resilience of 
Category A railway stations and SPIRS for future generations.  
Key words: Resilience; railway stations; security threats; counter-terrorism; crime prevention 
measures; responsibilisation; stakeholders; governmentality 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0 Research Context 
Awareness has grown during the last two decades of the increased vulnerability and 
interconnectedness of the UK’s Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) to the risk of human 
malign threats, such as criminal activity and terrorism, and to natural hazards, such as 
flooding and storm damage. Events such as the 2005 terrorist attack on the London transport 
system and the floods of 2007 and 2015 in the North of England can have a significant social, 
political, and economic impacts on society if the country’s CNI is unable to or must operate 
at a reduced capacity. Given the increased recognition of vulnerabilities and 
interdependencies, there is a significant body of research which has developed and 
examines the resilience of CNI to such risks. However, over time and with its increased usage, 
the concept of resilience (Chandler and Coaffee, 2017, Joseph, 2013, Bourbeau, 2013) has 
become a “buzz” word being frequently used by politicians, the media and academia, yet 
the term is highly contested, ambiguous, conflicting, and inconsistent in its application 
regarding CNI.  
 
Moreover, a number of interconnected dynamics determine the shifting understanding of 
the concept of resilience, for instance from the primary purpose or the field of speciality, for 
instance ‘security risk or natural hazard studies’ and to the form of ‘infrastructure…as well as 
national differences including…scale (e.g. regional, national or local)’ (Kimmance and 
Harris, 2013, p.8). Thus, CNI can be broken down into interconnected system components, 
for instance in the case of transport infrastructures such as the railway network, railway 
stations are dependent on their size, location and function and can be both critical national 
and local infrastructure. The railway station is recognised as a fundamental part of the 
railway network in any location. The Cabinet Office deals with natural hazards and security 
threats posed to the resilience of infrastructure in the UK collectively in a combined all-
encompassing hazard methodology. However, this research is only concerned with human 
malign security threats to CNI, railway stations, and not natural hazards. Consequently, the 
research will examine the unique single case study of St Pancras International Railway 
Station (SPIRS), which is a complex major international multi-modal transport hub and termini 
in London. The justification and contextual discussion of the unique case study station are 
expanded on in Chapters Five and Six of the thesis. 
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1.1 Research Problem 
Significantly located Category A railway stations in England and Wales, such as SPIRS, are 
exceptionally complicated and multifarious systems, which are unrestricted, and at times 
during the working week is a crowded space, making them particularly vulnerable to 
terrorism and other forms of criminal activities. Consequently, as railway stations are 
refurbished or newly built there is an evident need to recognise and categorise the sizeable 
and complex range of stakeholders, policies, strategies and individual organisational 
agendas that influence the resilience of these spaces to human malign security threats. This 
knowledge and information are not presently accessible to the complex and multiple 
stakeholders who plan, build, legislate, and operate railway stations throughout England 
and Wales. The research examines and unpacks how these elements currently affect the 
resilience of such spaces to human malign security threats, and how to incorporate these 
perspectives into the governance, legislative and daily operational requirements to meet 
future resilience demands. Hence, to deal with this research problem, the following research 
question, and aim and objectives have been devised. 
 
1.2 Research Question 
How do the interdependencies and governance of the complex operational, and 
policy boundaries of SPIRS’ stakeholders influence and impact the space’s current 
and future resilience to human malign security threats?  
The research question and the subsequent thesis covers a unique and exploratory area of 
research. This is to establish and to drill down into the numerous interdependencies and 
interfaces of the multiple and complex stakeholders specifically within the unique case 
study of SPIRS, and to analyse how their governance, operational and legislative 
requirements, policies, and agendas influence both the existing and future resilience of the 
space to human malign security threats.  
 
1.3 The Aim and Objectives of the Research 
The research has been developed in accordance with a systematic abductive process (see 
Chapter Five). Hence, the aim and objectives of the research have altered accordingly 
during the stages of the PhD. The initial aim of the research during the first year was to inform 
stakeholders how to mitigate future security threats to the railway station. However, as the 
research progressed it became apparent that understanding how to mitigate against 
human malign security threats in the future was a too simplistic aim for the research and 
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there is much existing research on target hardening of spaces. As with the aim of the 
research, the objectives have altered. Initially, the objectives were based upon developing 
and testing a framework of how to implement security measures within a railway station 
environment. However, as the research progressed it was decided that this would not be 
achievable or welcomed by Governmental departments and Network Rail. 
 
Hence, given the complexities of the stakeholder interfaces and governance in SPIRS and 
other Category A railway stations in England and Wales, and how these can impact on the 
resilience these spaces to human malign security threats, the following aim and objectives 
have been developed. 
 
The aim of the research is to  
determine and examine the interdependencies and boundaries of the multiple 
stakeholders within St Pancras International Railway Station, and to analyse how their 
governance, operational and legislative requirements, and agendas influence both 
current and future resilience of complex Category A railway stations to human 
malign security threats.  
 
Consequently, a single unique case study of SPIRS which is a highly complex Category A 
railway station has been undertaken to address the four research objectives: 
1. To critically examine the current literature and policy concerning resilience, 
governance, security, and prevention measures within the context of Category A 
railway stations in England and Wales 
2.  To identify those stakeholders within the case study railway station, SPIRS, who (in) 
directly influence the current and future resilience to human malign security threats, 
and to develop a unique and innovative stakeholder map of the space 
3. To examine the SPIRS stakeholder’s security, resilience, and operational policies, 
strategies, and agendas which (in) directly affect the current and future resilience of 
the space to human malign security threats 
4. To analyse the tradeoffs, (un)intended consequences, and impacts of security and 
resilience policies and agendas which operate in the space of SPIRS, and to make 
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recommendations to address the emerging themes from the research 
 
1.4 Statements of Contribution 
As discussed above, SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and Wales are 
vulnerable to human malign security threats because they are extremely open locations that 
are frequently congested with passengers, members of the public and those who are 
employed by the rail industry. Yet, a comprehensive analysis of the existing academic 
literature has highlighted this is an under-researched area and there is little known about 
the multiple stakeholders, their complex interdependencies within the railway station and 
how their resilience and security policies and strategies are enacted in the space. 
Furthermore, there is a paucity of knowledge surrounding how the complicated stakeholder 
interfaces and the rafts of Governmental and organisational security policies and strategies 
affect crime and counter-terrorism prevention measures in the railway station. Therefore, 
the research will significantly contribute to knowledge by confronting this dearth of 
knowledge and under-researched area by identifying the broad range of strategic 
stakeholders, policies and agendas that influence the security and resilience of Category A 
railway stations, and assessing how these can challenge at a local and national level their 
current and future governance, operational and policy requirements. This research is timely 
and relevant given the level of existing and future investment in the railway network in 
England and Wales. The Government over the next three decades is investing heavily in a 
prominent and high-value modernisation programme of the ageing railway infrastructure.   
 
1.4.1 Conceptual and Theoretical Contributions 
The research will present an original and novel contribution to knowledge, as through 
contemporary empirical evidence it seeks to establish the reality, rather than an academic 
and political rhetoric and idealism of the resilience and security policies and how they 
operate within the space of a complex Category A railway station. Below is a succinct 
appraisal of how the research has exposed gaps in the knowledge surrounding the concept 
of resilience and Stakeholder Theory specifically in relation to a significantly important 
Category A railway station such as SPIRS. These conceptual and theoretical positions are 
examined in greater detail in Chapter Two. 
 
This research will contribute to the concept of resilience by examining how resilience and 
security policies and agendas are conceptualised and operationalised in the everyday 
reality, and not merely within the realm of Governmental discourse, of SPIRS and how these 
26  
impact on current and future resilience to human malign security threats. This research 
supports the stance that resilience is not ‘a grand or unifying theory, it should be seen (and 
used) as a middle-range theory compatible with some but not all ontologies’ (Geels, 2010, 
cited in Olsson et al., 2017, p.58). 
 
The concept of resilience (Chandler and Coaffee, 2017, Joseph, 2013, Bourbeau, 2013) has 
become increasingly and widely used with UK security and CNI national policies (Coaffee 
et al., 2009, p.111). Yet, the researcher argues resilience is a ‘shallow concept’ (Joseph, 
2013, p.51), shifting and unstable, with it being enacted in spaces such as SPIRS through a 
process of governance and governmentality, progressing from ‘a state based to a society-
based understanding of security practices’ (Chandler, 2013, p.217). When examining how 
current UK policy deals with human malign security threats, resilience has transformed into a 
fundamental political rhetorical statement used as an appropriate response by the 
government for the UK institutions, businesses, and citizens to resist and recover from acts of 
crime and terrorism (Coaffee et al., 2009, p.111). However, the numerous definitions of 
resilience are frequently contradictory and inconsistent, and which are open to 
manipulation to suit the writer’s/policy agenda (Joseph, 2013, p.51). Thus, the concept of 
resilience is being progressively employed to imply a specific position ‘of being, or set of 
processes to bring about a state of being…it is increasingly mobilised to represent and/or 
to justify a cause of action’ (Chmutina et al., 2016, p.71).  
 
Moreover, in recent years the discourse surrounding the concept of resilience has 
acknowledged the built environment is unable to be ‘future-proofed to be totally resistant’ 
(Bosher and Dainty, 2011, p.2) against human malign security threats. When considering the 
resilience of SPIRS or other Category A railway stations to such threats, commentators such a 
Coaffee (2008, p.463) maintain the concept can be operationalised through their 
‘embedded security and risk management’ and the capacity ‘to absorb or recover from 
a…attack’ (Schulman and Roe, 2007, p.42). Nevertheless, Chandler (2013, p.217) proposes 
there is a ‘continuum of resilience’ and thus all spaces such as SPIRS are ‘in need of enabling 
to become more resilient’. Consequently, the standpoint of the research is that the concept 
of resilience within the space of SPIRS is an aspirational vehicle of ‘governance which 
emphasise[s] responsible conduct’ (Joseph, 2013, p.40) of the stakeholders, and it is not an 
absolute ‘state… it therefore can only be measured or calculated as a comparative or 
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relative quality’ (Chandler, 2013, p.217). Thus, when this thesis examines the resilience of 
SPIRS to human malign security threats, it will move away from ‘fixed definitions of resilience’ 
(Chandler and Coaffee, 2017, p.7) and consider it as the foundation for ‘a range of policy 
discussions in a number of fields that seek to rethink traditional policy approaches’ 
(Chandler and Coaffee, 2017, p. 7). 
 
Furthermore, the research will provide a current and innovative contribution to Stakeholder 
Theory, through the unique analysis of how SPIRS’ complex and multiple stakeholders 
operationalise resilience and security strategies and policies. A conventional classification 
of a stakeholder is given by Freeman (1984, p.46) as ‘any group or individual who can affect 
or is affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives’. Thus, when examining 
the stakeholders within SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and Wales, 
the research will develop a holistic stance of Stakeholder Theory, building on the classic 
theories of Freeman (1984). By adopting this stance, the research will widen an established 
view of strategic stakeholders in the railway station beyond their relationships based on 
contractual and fiscal associations. The research considers the strategic stakeholders within 
SPIRS as ‘moral actors…[and] relationships include social characteristics such as 
interdependence’ (Hendry, 2001 cited in Friedman and Miles, 2006, p.8).  
 
Moreover, the research will develop the debate surrounding the legitimacy of stakeholders 
(Phillips, 2003 and Freeman, 1984). Within the context of SPIRS, there will be some 
stakeholders who will not be considered as ‘legitimate in the sense they will have vastly 
different values and agendas for action’ (Freeman, 1984, p.53), for instance, those 
determined on human malign threats to the space. However, the research will 
demonstrate that SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and Wales need 
to acknowledge in their management strategies that illegitimate stakeholders such as 
terrorists and other criminals do have an interest and as such a stake in the organisation 
(Freeman, 1984 and Phillips, 2003).  
 
1.4.2 Empirical Contribution 
To fully address the gaps in the knowledge, the research will collect unique qualitative data, 
semi-structured interviews, documentation, and observations, on how the multiple and 
interdependent strategic stakeholders, through their operationalisation of both corporate 
and Governmental strategies can influence the resilience of SPIRS to current and future 
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security threats. Thus, the findings of the research will create an empirical knowledge, which 
unpacks the complex, numerous stakeholders, and their influences, governance, and 
operational agendas and policies in SPIRS and is applicable to other Category A railway 
stations in England and Wales. This will be germane to the strategic stakeholders who are 
accountable for the railway station’s resilience to security threats, through the planning and 
construction or operational stages of the project. 
 
Moreover, a further key empirical contribution of the research is the creation of the unique 
SPIRS Stakeholder Map. By following and building on the recommendations of Freidman 
and Miles (2006), the research will categorise the strategic stakeholders within SPIRS through 
Stakeholder Mapping and it will visualise the stakeholder’s authority and impact within the 
railway station (Bourne and Walker, 2005). The procedure of Stakeholder Mapping of SPIRS 
can play a key part in designing and operationalising other Category A railway stations in 
England and Wales by identifying the strategic stakeholders who have an impact on the 
resilience of the space to existing and future security threats. The creation and analysis of a 
unique map of the strategic stakeholders and the examination of security policies and 
strategies within SPIRS that can affect or be affected by security threats, will also provide an 
original empirical contribution to the concept of Resilience and Stakeholder Theory, and 
the understanding of the complexities of multiple stakeholder interdependencies in the 
space. 
 
1.4.3 Practical Contribution 
In addition to increasing academic knowledge, the research will enhance and improve 
practical knowledge. The practical beneficiaries of the research are the policy makers and 
the multiple strategic stakeholders, such as Network Rail, the British Transport Police (BTP), 
emergency services, security consultants, and regulators, in SPIRS and other Category A 
railway stations in England and Wales. It is anticipated that a practical contribution and 
subsequent impact of the research will be the development of the SPIRS Stakeholder Map 
and the research recommendations they will be able to attain an in-depth knowledge and 
an applied understanding of the processes and dynamics that influence and regulate the 
resilience of railway stations to security threats. The process of Stakeholder Analysis and 
Mapping being developed by the researcher for the unique single case study of SPIRS has 
the potential to be transferable to other Category A railway stations in England and Wales, 
who share a similar network of complex and multiple stakeholders. Moreover, the practical 
process of Stakeholder Analysis and Mapping could also be applicable to other pseudo-
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public spaces. Particularly those which operate with multiple stakeholders, such as shopping 
centres and who need to be aware of the sizeable and complex range of stakeholders, 
policies, strategies and individual organisational agendas that influence the current and 
futures resilience of such spaces to human malign security threats. 
 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
The thesis comprises of nine chapters and contains supplementary information in the 
appendices. Chapter One has offered an introductory outline of the standpoints and 
arguments are examined throughout the thesis. Chapter Two presents the conceptual and 
theoretical positions of the research, Resilience and Stakeholder Theory and how they are 
interconnected within the body of this thesis. The underpinning argument of this chapter is 
the concept of Resilience and Stakeholder Theory are both capable of providing the lens 
to examine the research data and to make a valuable contribution to the knowledge base 
of how the multiple strategic stakeholders within SPIRS through resilience and security policies 
and agendas impact on existing and future resilience of the space to security threats. 
 
Chapters Three and Four provide an extensive and critical review of the appropriate literature 
and policies surrounding the railway station and the prevention of security threats (crime and 
terrorism). Therefore, these two chapters are considerable given that examining the resilience 
of railway stations to current and future security threats combine three separate areas of 
literature; railway stations and their functions; the concept of resilience; and the security 
threats posed to them. Both Chapters analyse the policies which are applicable and 
contextual to the resilience of railways stations to security threats, which are inextricably 
interconnected and are reliant on the other to achieve the desired results. The policies 
examined will include railway station specific and general transport policies, CONTEST 
Strategy, Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and SIDOS (Security in Design of Stations). As discussed 
in the above chapter, the aim and the objectives of the research have been strategically 
devised to address the significant gaps in the literature, which are needed to answer the 
research question. 
 
Chapter Five presents the research design, the single unique case study of SPIRS, and the 
subsequent qualitative methodology. This chapter provides a comprehensive, reliable, and 
valid research design. The research data gathering phase is explained and the analytical 
technique of thematic analysis used in the analysis of the collected qualitative data. 
Also, presented in this chapter is the process of strategic Stakeholder Mapping of SPIRS and 
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its subsequent methodology. 
 
Chapter Six presents an in-depth and relevant contextual examination of the unique case 
study Category A railway station, SPIRS. Moreover, during the research collection phase, a 
proportion of the presented information and data was gathered for this chapter. Chapters 
Seven and Eight subsequently illustrate the findings of the research while discussing these 
collectively and simultaneously with the two theoretical standpoints of the thesis. Chapter 
Nine presents and examines the conclusions drawn by the research findings and 
operational and policy recommendations that can be made, and provides proposals for 
further research. 
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CHAPTER TWO –THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL POSITIONS 
 
2.1 Chapter Introduction 
The following chapter presents Stakeholder Theory and the concept of Resilience within the 
context of the unique single case study railway station, SPIRS, will be expanded upon in this 
chapter and later in Chapters Seven and Eight. Consequently, throughout the thesis these 
positions are examined contextually in terms of the stakeholders and resilience within SPIRS 
and other Category A railway stations in England and Wales, and the role they have in 
ensuring the current and future resilience of the space to human malign security threats. 
 
2.2 Stakeholder Theory 
SPIRS and other Category A stations in England and Wales provide a unique space for the 
setting of political and operational agendas, which is enacted by complex and multiple 
stakeholders. Since the privatisation of the railway industry in the 1990s, the stakeholders 
who are involved in the legal and operational processes of the railway station have vastly 
increased in numbers, leading to an extremely complex and disparate group. Bowie (2008, 
p.15) maintains Stakeholder Theory is unusual as it has ‘transcended the realm of academic 
discourse and taken hold amid a much broader population’. This research proposes by 
using Stakeholder Theory as one of the frameworks for the conceptualisation of SPIRS, it will 
both aid and increase the understanding of the complex and interconnected of both 
compulsory and voluntary relationships and the diverse forms of relationships that exemplify 
the Category A railway station in England and Wales and how this will affect the 
subsequent resilience of the spaces to security threats. 
 
Many commentators, both political and academic discuss the concept of stakeholders 
within their work and yet fail to define what constitutes a stakeholder and the theory that binds 
them. Therefore, it is the purpose of this thesis to research and examine who the many and 
complex stakeholders are in a Category A railway station and their interconnected and 
often blurred relationships. Stakeholder Theory is a multidisciplinary concept and its origins 
can be traced to ‘sociology, organisational behaviour, the politics of special interests’ 
(Jensen, 2001, p.4), and consequently has multiple meanings. A traditional definition of a 
stakeholder is proposed by Freeman (1984, p.46) as ‘any group or individual who can affect 
or is affected by the achievement of the institution’s objectives’. However, as with the other 
theories and concepts used within the body of this research, for instance, resilience which 
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is discussed in Chapter One, Stakeholder Theory is contested and one such area of criticism is 
it is applicable to too many frameworks (Friedman and Miles, 2006). 
 
Moreover, it can be argued it is an ambiguous term, which can represent anything, the 
creator wishes and can be manipulated to further specific agendas (Weyer, 1996, p.35, 
Stoney and Winstanley 2001, p.650, cited in Friedman and Miles, 2006, p.4, and Jensen, 2001, 
p.1). Friedman and Miles (2006), who list fifty-five versions of the definition, present the array 
of definitions that surround the concept. Laplume et al., (2008, p.1152) propose given the 
breadth of research areas which utilise Stakeholder Theory, it has a ‘broad appeal’ with which 
to examine organisations.  
 
When examining the complex and multiple stakeholders within SPIRS, the research and 
thesis advocates a holistic stance of Stakeholder Theory, building on the seminal theories of 
Freeman (1984) and the more radical ones of Starik (1994). By adopting this stance, the 
research will widen an established view of the stakeholders in the case study railway station 
beyond their relationships based on traditional contractual and fiscal associations. Thus, the 
complex and multiple stakeholders within the space must be considered as ‘moral 
actors…relationships include social characteristics such as interdependence’ (Hendry, 2001 
cited in Friedman and Miles, 2006, p.8). 
 
Furthermore, the research builds on a more radical position of Stakeholder Theory which will 
be incorporated into those presented by Freeman (1984), the theories presented by Starik 
(1994, p.92) proposes the stakeholders within an institution can be ‘any natural occurring 
entity which affects or is affected by institutional performance’. This encompasses the 
environment and goes as far as to include ‘future generations and environmental impacts’ 
(Friedman and Miles, 2006, p.9). Moreover, the Stakeholder Theory framework adopted will 
endorse illegitimate stakeholders such as terrorists and criminals must be included in some 
stages of analysis and decisions. This is justified in the below section of this chapter. 
 
2.3 Who is a Stakeholder within a Railway Station? 
As discussed in the above section, it is important to understand what constitutes a 
stakeholder within the context of SPIRS and other Category A railway stations. Thus, in the 
broadest theoretical sense, stakeholders can be defined as a group who have a stake in 
an institution (Freeman, 1984). Freeman’s (1984) theory built on earlier work of the Stanford 
Research Institute and highlighted the significance of institutions and organisations to carry 
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out Stakeholder Analysis to establish which stakeholders are critical to its continued 
existence and critical functions. Taking this a stage further, Freeman (1984) proposed 
institutions and organisations should value the opinions of stakeholders and use these to 
inform strategies, this concept is used within the data collection and analyse phase of the 
research to unpack how it impacts on current and future resilience of SPIRS to human 
malign security threats. 
 
Moreover, stakeholders can additionally be part of the process of ‘social inclusion in a 
community in which every citizen is a valued member who contributes and benefits’ 
(Anderson and Nielson, 2009, p.309). However, in terms of a pragmatic approach, 
‘stakeholders may adopt active participation in the processes of account-ability; and 
financially speaking a material interest in the well-being of an enter-prise is what legitimates 
such participation’ (Clarke 1997, p.211, cited in Anderson and Nielson, 2009, p.309). 
 
Phillips (2006, p.25) proposes central to the traditional definition of a stakeholder, is they can 
be ‘any individual or group of individuals that is the legitimate object of managerial or 
institutional attention’, thus suggesting that not all stakeholders are valid recipients of 
consideration. It is worth acknowledging the legitimacy of stakeholders is highly subjective 
and extremely dependent on individual institutions/organisations. Therefore, an institution 
will not consider some stakeholders as ‘legitimate in the sense they will have vastly different 
values and agendas for action’ (Freeman, 1984, p.53). Moreover, Phillips (2003, p.25) 
contends there are two forms of legitimate stakeholders, normative and derivative. 
Normative stakeholders are considered to be entitled to a ‘moral obligation’ from other 
stakeholders and derivative stakeholders have the power to damage or aid the institution. 
These stakeholders can have different consequences in decision making processes. Freeman 
(1984, p.45) supports this view of legitimate stakeholders given ‘legitimacy’ is assumed when 
specific groups have the power ‘to affect the direction’ of the institution...regardless of the 
appropriateness of their demands’. 
 
Furthermore, Stakeholder Theory suggests institutions and organisations must recognise all 
the interests of the stakeholders including ‘financial claimants…employees, customers, 
communities, Governmental officials, and under some interpretations the environment, 
terrorists, and blackmailers’ (Jensen, 2001, p.1). Commentators such as Starik (1995) have 
broadened the traditional concept of stakeholder legitimacy to include the current and 
future environment and generations as legitimate stakeholders who should be considered 
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in projects and strategies. Therefore, it is proposed that SPIRS and other Category A railway 
stations must acknowledge in their design, operational management and security and 
resilience strategies that illegitimate stakeholders such as terrorists and other criminals do 
have an interest and as such an illicit stake in the institution (Freeman, 1984). 
 
Furthermore, the term illegitimate stakeholder, according to Phillips (2006), describes 
stakeholders if they can negatively impact on the institution and therefore, they should, be 
recognised as legitimate. Interestingly, at certain points illegitimate stakeholders do also 
have legitimate stakes in the railway station, given its open and pseudo-public nature, they 
can consequently use the space as passengers or consumers of the retail facilities. However, 
Phillips (2006, p.28) offers a cautionary note, a stakeholder definition which is too broad, 
‘threatens the meaningfulness of the term’. Furthermore, if a normative definition of a 
stakeholder is utilised this can lead to a very narrow definition of a stakeholder. 
 
Moreover, when individuals or groups of individuals of their own accord recognise the 
advantages of a reciprocal system of collaboration on their part, there is the opportunity of 
the ‘obligations of fairness…created among the participants in the co-operative scheme in 
proportion to the benefits accepted’ (Phillips, 1997, p.57). Phillips (2006, p.26) further argues 
‘voluntary acceptance’ creates responsibilities which can be compared to ‘consent, 
contract, or promise’. However, if following this principle of fairness, it can lead to a very 
restricted perception of Stakeholder Theory. 
 
Thus, criminals and terrorists are legitimate stakeholders in an institution if they can harm the 
institution. Therefore, the of Phillips (2006, p.27) contends criminals and terrorists are 
stakeholders as their intentions and actions merit managerial consideration. Hence, these 
relationships can be managed through specific actions such as prevention strategies and 
co-ordinated multiagency working; this is discussed in more detail in the subsequent 
chapters of this thesis. 
 
2.4 Stakeholder Analysis 
As mentioned in the above section, Freeman’s (1984) Stakeholder Theory expanded the prior 
studies of the Stanford Research Institute and stressed the significant implication of 
institutions implementing Stakeholder Analysis to establish which stakeholders are essential to 
its continued existence and critical functions. Furthermore, by taking these assertions further 
Freeman (1984) proposed institutions must respect the points of view of its stakeholders and 
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use them to advise strategies. Consequently, this research proposes for any policy or strategy 
changes, it is critical for the institution or organisation within SPIRS proposing the alterations to 
create an account of all the stakeholders concerned to evaluate their co-operation or 
resistance and to draw attention ‘to …the inter institutional linkages’ which exist (Aligica, 2006, 
p.79). 
 
Subsequently, Stakeholder Analysis should be used for specific security projects or strategies 
within SPIRS and other Category A railway stations as it can distinguish the relevant 
‘stakeholders and map out their relative power, influence, and interests’ (Aligica, 2006, p 80). 
Moreover, Stakeholder Analysis should be used to denote the significance of the stakeholder’s 
interests and how these will influence the completion of the project within the space of SPIRS 
or other Category A railway stations. Stakeholder Mapping is an integral part of Stakeholder 
Analysis and Aligica (2006, p.80) proposes it is a method which should be utilised to recognise 
the stakeholders concerned in a specific policy or strategy and ‘for identifying potential 
coalitions for support…and for assessing the relative risks entailed’. Therefore, Stakeholder 
Mapping has played an integral and critical process within this research; it is detailed further 
in Chapters Five and Six. 
 
Jepson and Eskerod (2008) present a similar stance to Freeman (1984) and maintain the use of 
Stakeholder Analysis is an important process in project management and this research 
contends in the operational management of Category A railway stations. This stance will 
ensure all stakeholders are accounted for when considering the resilience of the space to 
current and future security threats and therefore, it can be a valuable tool in maximising 
decision making in projects and operational activities. Jepson and Eskerod (2008) maintain 
Stakeholder Analysis should be carried out at the start of a project so issues and 
opportunities can be identified. This is a critical element in the planning stage of either 
building or retrofitting existing railway stations, and all the stakeholders who can affect the 
resilience of space to security threats should be consulted from the outset of a project. 
 
2.5 Further Defining Stakeholders 
Projects that are refurbishing existing or building new railway stations will have a ‘coalition of 
temporary stakeholders’ (Anderson, 2005, cited in Jepson and Eskerod, 2008, p.335). 
Whereas, the operation and the responsibility for security and resilience of SPIRS and other 
Category A railway stations, the stakeholders involved are more likely to have a permanent 
nature. Consequently, temporary, or permanent stakeholder relationships are important for 
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project management and operational strategies are vital as they in theory for successful 
delivery and outcomes (Jepson and Eskerod, 2008). Stakeholders whether temporary or 
permanent do hold control and power over projects and day-to-day running of operations. 
This is due to stakeholders having the power in some way and level whether through conflict 
or increasing control and influence by collaborating with further stakeholders, thus 
combining agendas and power. According to Mitchell et al. (1997), it is possible to organise 
stakeholders in terms of their power, legitimacy, and urgency. The power of stakeholders can 
be defined as 'the ability of those who possess the power to bring about the outcomes they 
desire' (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1974, p.3, cited Mitchell et al., 1997, p.865). When considering 
the power of stakeholders, it should be viewed in terms of how it is exercised and therefore it 
can be regarded as a 
coercive power, based on the physical resources of force, violence, or restraint; 
utilitarian power, based on material or financial resources; and normative power, 
based on sym-bolic resources. 
(Mitchell et al., 1997, p.865) 
 
Moreover, the legitimacy of stakeholders can be regarded in simplistic terms of behaviours, 
which are considered socially normative and conventional for the institution or organisation, 
and it is often linked to power when stakeholder associations are appraised (Mitchell et al., 
1997). However, Mitchell et al. (1997) suggest that legitimacy and power can be perceived 
as an authority and it is incorrect to presume that stakeholders who are considered as 
legitimate should also be regarded as powerful and vice versa. Additionally, stakeholders 
and urgency can be organised and considered in terms of two characteristics 
time sensitivity-the degree to which managerial delay in attending to the claim or 
relation-ship is unacceptable to the stakeholder, and (2) criticality-the importance of 
the claim or the relationship to the stakeholder. 
(Mitchell et al., 1997, p.867) 
 
Furthermore, the stakeholders of SPIRS can be divided into primary and secondary categories 
(illustrated in Chapter Six) (Freeman, 1984) depending on the importance of the stakeholder 
to the institution’s overall welfare and existence (Jepson and Eskerod, 2009). 
• Primary stakeholders are directly affected positively or negatively, by a project or 
operations 
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• Secondary stakeholders have a transitional function and can have a key impact on 
the project or operations 
• External stakeholders do not directly participate, yet can be impacted on by a 
project or operations 
 
The process of refining stakeholders in an institution such as SPIRS or for an issue such as security 
threats that can specifically affect an individual issue has both advantages and 
disadvantages. One advantage of having very precisely defined groups of stakeholders is 
‘they are more likely to embrace homogeneous groups of people’ (Friedman and Miles, 
2006, p.14). Whereas, such precision in categorisation of stakeholders can lead to confusion 
as responsibilities can ‘overlap and actions will be greater’ (Friedman and Miles, 2006, p.14) 
for some stakeholders. 
 
Jensen (2001) states it is important to recognise the process of Stakeholder Analysis can be 
the product of institutional/organisational agendas, which does need to be considered 
when undertaking this for SPIRS and other Category A railway stations. Therefore, the 
complexity of the stakeholders and their potential involvement in a project must be managed 
by the analysing institution or organisation by acknowledging that not all stakeholders will be 
treated equitably, and they will need to make compromises for changes in policy, strategy, 
operational processes to be effective. It must be noted whichever process of refining of 
stakeholders is used, whether looking at them in terms of power, legitimacy, and urgency or 
if they are considered as primary, secondary, and external, these are fluid and dynamic, 
and temporal and spatial and therefore must be considered as social constructs. 
 
2.6 Stakeholder Power and Social Control 
As discussed in section 2.1 Stakeholder Theory can further delineate the stakeholders into 
normative or strategic roles. Normative stakeholders can amalgamate all forms of 
stakeholders from all entities and ‘reflect social norms, such as that of legitimacy or validity’ 
(Friedman and Miles, 2006, p.11) for the specific space such as SPIRS. However, strategic 
stakeholders further reflect the power over an institution which stakeholders can have, and 
can have a considerable influence over its survival (Friedman and Miles, 2006, p.11). At this 
point it is important to recognise Stakeholder Theory, and the concept of Resilience and 
Social Control are connecting and intersecting and support each other when applying 
them to the stakeholders in SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and 
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Wales. Yukl (1998, cited in Bourne and Walker, 2005, p.653) classifies stakeholders into areas 
of power: 
• Position power derived from statutory or institutional authority: formal authority; 
control over rewards; control over punishments; control over information; and 
ecological (physical/social environment, technology, and institution) control. 
• Personal power derived from human relationship influences or traits: expertise; 
friendship/loyalty; and charisma. 
• Political power derived from formally vested or conveniently transient concurrence 
of objective and means to achieve these: control over decision processes; coalitions; 
co-option; and institutionalisation. 
 
Social control is a collection of social procedures and actions which function as a method, 
by which the populace is manipulated and regulated in the way they ‘think, act and 
behave’ (Erskine, 2002, p.227). However, regardless of this simplicity, the concept of social 
control can be perceived as either negative or positive. Moreover, it argued it can be 
‘directly coercive’ (Blakemore, 2003, p.101) and can control an individual’s or a society’s 
liberty, autonomy and behaviour or it can be ‘subtly oppressive’ (Blakemore, 2003, p.101) 
by persuading individuals to conform to society’s norms or restrain their individualism in less 
evident ways. 
 
The legitimacy of many institutions, such as the railway station is intrinsic to the control of the 
actors within it. March and Olsen (1996, p.99, cited in Peters, 2005) further suggest institutions 
are legitimised and demarcated by their permanence and robustness, an ability to sway 
and control the actions of ‘individuals for generations’ (March and Olsen, 1996, p.99, cited 
in Peters, 2005). Institutions can effectively control the behaviour of actors and or 
stakeholders, whether it is informal or formal. However, Shearing and Stenning (1987, cited 
in Newburn, 2007, p.238) maintain rather than the explicit methods of social control, 
institutions such as the railway station can instigate the control of individuals by using ‘moral 
discipline’. 
 
Moreover, the railway station is a ‘hybrid’ (Newburn, 2007, p.321) public space, thus meaning 
it is a privately-owned space, which to operate must permit access to the public. Other 
comparable spaces are retail shopping centres and sports stadiums for instance. This 
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research proposes the concept of social control is entrenched within the physical building 
of the railway station and its routine and practices, therefore it is virtually imperceptible to 
the individual (Newburn, 2007). Actors and or stakeholders within the institution of the railway 
station are labelled, assigned a role, for instance an employee, passenger, enforcer, or 
deviant, and then controlled through means of individual surveillance (Foucault, 1977). 
Hence, institutions such as the railway station have a dual purpose, to ‘order, manage and 
facilitate as well as constrain and oppress’ (Newburn, 2007, p.323). For instance, CCTV can 
regulate individual’s behaviour within railway stations, if they are aware of the constant 
surveillance. Additionally, the non-coercive system of social control is ‘consensual’ 
(Newburn, 2007, p.329), as all those individuals who use the station are unconsciously 
agreeing to the control mechanisms. SPIRS and other Category A railway station’s security 
relies heavily on formal social control, CCTV, barriers, and restrictions and informal social 
control, where passengers are requested to be vigilant of suspicious behaviour, items, thus 
they become informal guardians of the space. Passengers are/do feel obliged for their own 
and the safety of other users while in the railway station environment. However, surveillance 
can also be viewed as an instrument of those who are in possession of power as it separates 
out the abnormal, those displaying criminal tendencies from those perceived as normal 
individuals (Foucault, 1977, p.199). CCTV, surveillance, and security in the railway station are 
examined in greater detail in Chapter Four of the thesis. 
 
Moreover, the research contends within railway stations such as SPIRS, the behaviour of 
individuals is shaped and altered by institutions just as the institutions themselves are 
moulded and changed by the actors within them (Jones, 2001, p.22, cited in Peters, 2005, 
p.30). The institutional norms are its ‘dominate...values’ (Peters, 2005, p.30) and will sway the 
decisions of the actors within. Nonetheless, whatever the institutional norms are; they are 
open to interpretation by actors (Peters, 2005). Hence the requirement for institutions to 
control the behaviour of their members, through the reinforcement of the 
‘dominate...values’ (Peters, 2005, p.30) of the institution. If actors participate in deviant 
behaviour, in most institutions there is an ‘enforcement mechanism’ (Peters, 2005, p.30) to 
handle the deviation from the expected normative behaviour within the institution (Peters, 
2005). Hence, some institutions can be criticised for disproportionately distributing control 
among ‘social groups’ (Raitio, 2011, p.2). Moreover, North (1996, p.20) puts forward an 
especially scathing criticism of institutions stating they ‘are not always or even usually 
created to be socially efficient, rather they...are created to serve the interests of those with 
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the bargaining power to create new rules’. 
 
The second part of this Chapter looks at the concept of resilience within the context of 
Category A railway stations in England and Wales and it will examine the how the multiple 
and complex stakeholders can affect this space, in terms of how it can counter, challenge, 
and defy human malign security threats. 
 
2.7 The Contested Concept of Resilience 
Over the past decade to confront human malign security threats, the concept of resilience 
in the built environment has ‘become a dynamic field of research’ (Bourbeau, 2013, p.3). 
Thus, it has become increasingly and widely used with UK Critical National Infrastructure 
(CNI) and national security policies (Coaffee et al., 2009, Joseph, 2013, Bourbeau, 2013, 
Chandler and Coaffee, 2017). Furthermore, the concept of resilience is used in numerous 
disciplines, for instance, ecology, physical, human, and social sciences Despite the 
widespread use and research of the concept by the Government and academics ‘there is 
little coherence and consensus as to the nature and substance of resilience’ (Bourbeau, 
2013, p.3). Moreover, it is well recognised by commentators, such as Bosher (2014), Coaffee 
et al. (2009), White and O’Hare (2014), Coaffee and Fussey (2015 and 2017), Chmutina et 
al. (2016), the concept of resilience is extremely hazy and blurred, and thus making it highly 
contentious. Yet the majority definitions do highlight the ability of a system; organisation; 
community or individual to effectively modify in the case ‘of disturbance, stress or adversity’ 
(Norris et al., 2007, p.129). Furthermore, the sheer number of academic disciplines and 
Government agencies who espouse and modify the concept for their own purposes and 
agendas further exacerbates this issue. White and O’Hare (2014, p.1) propose the use of the 
concept has been undertaken without question and ‘this servile acceptability and 
burgeoning normalisation have proven instrumental to its rapid incorporation into the 
contemporary lexicon of academics and policy makers’. Coaffee et al. (2009) and White 
and O’Hare (2014) contend within British policy, the definition of resilience is not completely 
standardised, yet the UK Cabinet Office has offered the following definition. 
Resilience is the ability of assets, networks and systems to anticipate, absorb, adapt 
to and/or rapidly recover from a disruptive event 
(Cabinet Office, 2011, p.15). 
 
The below table illustrates the evolution of the definition of resilience through the different 
academic disciplines over the last four decades. 
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AUTHOR YEAR DEFINITION TYPE OF ANALYSIS 
Holling 1973 The persistence of 
relationships within a 
system; a measure of the 
ability of systems to 
absorb changes of state 
variables, driving 
variables, and 
parameters, and still 
persist 
Ecological 
Gordon 1978 The ability to store strain 
energy and deflect 
elastically under a load 
without breaking or 
being deformed 
Physical 
Masten 1990 The process of, capacity 
for, or outcome of 
successful adaptation 
despite challenging or 
threatening 
circumstances 
Individual 
Egeland 1993 The capacity for 
successful adaptation, 
positive functioning, or 
competence…despite 
high-risk status, chronic 
stress, or following 
prolonged or severe 
trauma 
Individual 
Brown 1996 The ability to recover 
from or adjust easily to 
misfortune or sustained 
life stress 
Community 
Sonn 1998 The process through 
which mediating structures 
(schools, peer groups, 
family) and activity 
settings moderate the 
impact of oppressive 
systems 
Community 
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Adger 2000 The ability of 
communities to 
withstand external 
shocks to their social 
infrastructure 
Social 
Paton 2000 The capability to 
bounce back and to 
use physical and 
economic resources 
effectively to aid 
recovery following 
exposure to hazards 
Community 
Waller 2001 Positive adaptation in 
response to adversity; it is 
not the absence of 
vulnerability, not an 
inherent characteristic, 
and not static 
Ecological 
Ganor 2003 The ability of individuals 
and communities to deal 
with a state of 
continuous, long-term 
stress; the ability to find 
unknown inner strengths 
and resources to cope 
effectively; the measure 
of adaptation and 
flexibility 
Community 
Klein 2003 The ability of a system 
that has undergone 
stress to recover and 
return to its original state; 
more precisely (i) 
Ecological 
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  the amount of 
disturbance a system 
can absorb and still 
remain within the same 
state or domain of 
attraction and (ii) the 
degree to which the 
system is capable of 
self-organisation (see 
also Carpenter et al. 
2001) 
 
Godschalk 2003 A sustainable network of 
physical systems and 
human communities, 
capable of managing 
extreme events; during 
disaster, both must be 
able to survive and 
function under extreme 
stress 
City 
Bruneau 2003 The ability of social units to 
mitigate hazards, 
contain the effects of 
disasters when they 
occur, and carry out 
recovery activities in 
ways that minimise social 
disruption and mitigate 
the effects of future 
earthquakes 
Social 
Bodin 2004 The speed with which a 
system returns to 
equilibrium after 
displacement, 
irrespective of how many 
oscillations are required 
Physical 
Ahmed 2004 The development of 
material, physical, 
socio-political, socio- 
cultural, and 
Community 
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  psychological resources 
that promote safety of 
residents and buffer 
adversity 
 
Kimhi 2004 Individuals’ sense of the 
ability of their own 
community to deal 
successfully with the 
ongoing political 
violence 
Community 
Coles 2004 A community’s 
capacities, skills, and 
knowledge that allow it 
to participate fully in 
recovery from disasters 
Community 
Longstaff 2005 The ability by an 
individual, group, or 
organisation to continue 
its existence (or remain 
more or less stable) in the 
face of some sort of 
surprise…. Resilience is 
found in systems that are 
highly adaptable (not 
locked into specific 
strategies) and have 
diverse resources 
Ecological 
Pfefferbaum 2005 The ability of community 
members to take 
meaningful, deliberate, 
collective action to 
remedy the impact of a 
problem, including the 
ability to interpret the 
environment, intervene, 
and move on 
Community 
Resilience Alliance (Retrieved 
10/16/2006 from 
http://www.resalliance.org/564.php) 
2006 The capacity of a 
system to absorb 
disturbance and 
reorganise while 
undergoing change so 
Ecological 
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  as to still retain 
essentially the same 
function, structure and 
feedbacks—and 
therefore the same 
identity 
 
Butler 2007 Good adaptation under 
extenuating 
circumstances; a recovery 
trajectory that returns to 
baseline functioning 
following a challenge 
Individual 
Table 2.0 The evolution of the definition of resilience. Source Norris et al. (2008, p.1290) 
 
Furthermore, when considering the resilience of the railway station to human malign 
security threats, the concept can be considered in terms of their ‘embedded security and 
risk management’ (Coaffee, 2008, p.4633) and ‘their ability to absorb or recover from a 
shock or attack’ (Schulman and Roe, 2007, p.42). Norris et al. (2007, p.130) describe 
resilience as ‘a process linking a set of adaptive capacities to a positive trajectory of 
functioning and adaptation after a disturbance’. It is suggested to increase the resilience 
in a transport infrastructure such as a Category A railway station; the organisational 
administration (Norris et al., 2007, p.130) should be improved rather than redesigning 
security and ‘technical systems’ (Schulman and Roe, 2007, p.42). If an institution can 
improve its organisational administration of resilience, it promotes ‘a more organic 
capacity to deal with rapid onset shock’ (Australian Government, 2010, p.13). This 
contemporary organic concept of resilience can be defined as ‘third generation 
resilience’; and in terms of the railway station, it would envisage the probability of a 
malicious act and through embedded resilience can adapt their operations (Birmingham 
University, 2012). 
 
Moreover, Bosher (2008, p.13) takes a holistic perspective on maintaining a resilient built 
environment and in cases such as SPIRS and other Category A railway station, they 
should be designed, located, built, operated and maintained in a way that 
maximises the ability of built assets, associated support systems (physical and 
institutional) and the people who reside or work within the built assets, to withstand, 
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recover from, and mitigate for, the impacts of extreme natural hazards and human-
induced threats. 
However, it can be argued the built environment has arisen due to neo-liberal philosophy 
and practices, through the intentionally reduced capacity of the state as the overseer of 
resilience and a decline in building controls (Johnson et al., 2013). Thus, it is contended the 
state through the processes of Governmentality has devolved the responsibility for the 
security of the built environment to the forces of a free market. Therefore, resilience is a 
medium of ‘governance which emphasise[s] responsible conduct’ (Joseph, 2013, 
p.40). Furthermore, the concept of resilience and the operations of SPIRS and other 
Category A railway stations in England and Wales exemplifies Governmentality as defined 
by Foucault (1991) where the Government endeavours to mould and influence the 
management of behaviours of seemingly unrestricted institutions, organisations and people 
(Dean, 1999). Governmentality is discussed in further detail in Chapter Four of the thesis. 
 
Commentators such as Bosher (2014) and Bosher and Dainty (2012) state the concept of 
resilience to security threats and more importantly as an operational practice cannot be 
considered in isolation. It should be a pre-emptive, combined, and united concern by the 
frequently multiple stakeholders who are both ‘responsible for the delivery, operation and 
maintenance of the built environment’ (Bosher, 2014, p.240). Furthermore, Sircar et al. (2013) 
support this standpoint and propose involving the multiple stakeholders in discussions around 
the issues of resilience can enhance and develop a mutual understanding resilience. The 
physical and intangible aspects of resilience can be described as ‘structural and non- 
structural approaches’ Bosher (2014, p.240) and can be attained if they are built in from the 
conceptual stages of a project (Bosher et al., 2007 and Bosher and Dainty, 2011). However, it 
can be argued that all spaces require assistance to ‘become more resilient’ (Chandler, 
2013, p.217) and resilience should be viewed as a continuum (Chandler, 2013, p.217). Thus, 
this research contends resilience in terms of SPIRS and other Category A railway stations is 
not definitive as  
‘the process can never be fully completed; the process is inherently dynamic and 
always in movement. Furthermore, resilience is always normatively open, depending 
on the conceptualisation of both the referent system and the crisis or shock to it.”  
(Bourbeau, 2013, p.11) 
 
The resilience of Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) is examined in Chapter Three. While 
47  
Chapter Four discusses UK resilience and security policies and how this is inextricably 
entangled with the concept of resilience. 
 
2.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has introduced the theoretical and conceptual frameworks of Stakeholder 
Theory and Resilience that underpin the research and the subsequent thesis. These theories in 
the context of the research findings from the case study railway station, SPIRS, will support the 
understanding understand how the space can be impacted on by the multiple and 
complex stakeholders through governance and operation resist, confront, and defy security 
threats. This thesis will anchor itself in the appropriate and important literature and 
demonstrate there is a substantial justification for this research. Moreover, the chapter has 
demonstrated that Stakeholder Theory is well documented. However, there is a significant 
gap in the knowledge given there is insufficient literature that examines Stakeholder Theory, 
and which can be conceptualised in relation to Category A railway stations in England 
Wales. The concept of Resilience has been examined and without a doubt, it is an 
ambiguous and highly contested position. However, the following two chapters 
demonstrate there is little research that examines the complex stakeholder relationships 
and the resilience of Chapter A railway stations in England and Wales to human malign 
security threats. 
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CHAPTER THREE- THE RAILWAY STATION, CRITICAL NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE (CNI) RESILIENCE AND POLICIES 
 
3.1 Chapter Introduction 
This third chapter of thesis comprises of three interconnected parts and it commences by 
looking at the function and role of Category A railway stations in England and Wales, 
examining the interrelated nature between the size of a railway station and the potential 
operational complexities. The second part of the chapter examines what role the railway 
station plays within the UK’s CNI and the concept of resilience within the context of the case 
study railway station, SPIRS and other Category A stations in England and Wales. The 
practicalities of resilience to human malign security threats are examined in further detail in 
Chapter Four specifically in terms of crime and terrorism. The third part of this chapter 
reviews the policies and drivers, which affect SPIRS and other Category A railway stations 
and the subsequent resilience to security threats. 
 
The railway station, especially those classified as a Category A is a complex facet of the 
railway infrastructure in England and Wales. They sit within an extremely multifaceted 
intricate and fragmented railway infrastructure, and from its outset in the 1800’s, some 
commentators have viewed it as ‘a quasi-state’ (Wolmar, 2003, p.49). As mentioned in 
Chapter One, depending on the location, the correlated size, and complexity of the railway 
station it can be either defined as a part of the CNI or critical local infrastructure. It is 
contended the chosen unique case study station of SPIRS is a vital part of the CNI, given its 
size, location and multiple functions as a railway terminus and international hub. Moreover, 
it part of the underground network, there is a five-star hotel, which also houses luxury 
apartments and flats. Additionally, it is a retail and leisure destination for the public and uses 
of the railway network. In such a case, the complexity of the space is compounded due to 
the numerous and divergent stakeholders responsible for the physical, operational, and 
legal functions of the railway station. The decision to conduct the research around this 
unique case study is discussed in Chapter Five. The vast complexities of the railway network 
in England and Wales present a lack of distinction and ambiguity in terms of the 
accountability for its operations and the legal framework that surrounds it (Hawkins, 2008). 
The repercussions of this involved and complex component of the railway infrastructure are 
discussed in the context of the railway stations current and future resilience to human malign 
security threats. 
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PART ONE:  THE FUNCTION OF THE RAILWAY STATION 
3.2 Definition of the Railway Station 
From the outset, the emphasis of this thesis focuses on the complex and multiple 
stakeholders, resilience to human malign security threats within SPIRS and with the 
experiences and findings being replicable in other Category A railway stations in England 
and Wales, most of which are Network Rail operated. The research and subsequent thesis 
do not focus the railway network infrastructure such as tracks, signalling and bridges. 
Therefore, the research focus mirrors the UK official Governmental definition of the railway 
station under Section 83(1) of the Railways Act 1993 
any land or other property which consists of premises used as, or for the purposes of, or 
otherwise in connection with, a railway passenger station or railway passenger 
terminal (including any approaches, forecourt, cycle store or car park), whether or not 
the land or other property is, or the premises are, also used for other purposes 
(Legislation.Gov.UK, 2013) 
 
However, the research argues in later sections of this chapter and further demonstrates in 
Chapter Six, that to define the space of the railway station is far more complex than the 
above simplistic definition. 
 
3.3 The Function and Role of the Modern Railway Station 
The historical origins of the railway network and stations in England and Wales are discussed in 
Chapter Six and demonstrate just how complicated the developments in the railway 
network over the last two centuries have been. Therefore, this will provide some background 
and a contextual indication of how the current responsibilities and operations of railway 
stations have come about. Thus, today railway station has numerous roles, a macro 
approach (Bertolini, 1996 and 1995) can be used to define the usage of the railway station, 
which can be seen ‘in terms of node (the connectedness with other places) and place 
(possible activities around the station)’ (Reusser et al., 2008, p.191). Similarly, the spatial 
‘urban development potentials’ (Zemp et al., 2011, p.447) further demarcates the role of the 
railway station as such environments where ‘high value activity are recognised as having a 
positive impact on the city’ (Bruinsma et al., 2007, p.2). This spatial value is discussed in 
Chapter Six in terms of SPIRS and its neighbouring railway station of Kings Cross. 
 
Moreover, Zemp et al. (2011) findings highlight the operational complexities are amplified 
with increasing size and importance of the railway station. Given the lack of research into 
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the functionality of Category A railway stations in England and Wales, it is proposed through 
Zemp et al. (2001) analysis of Switzerland’s 1600 railway stations, the role of these Category A 
railway stations today can be defined through a framework of five functions, which are 
1. linking catchment area and transport network 
 
2. supporting transfer between modes of transport 
 
3. facilitating commercial use of real estate 
 
4. providing public space 
 
5. contributing to the identity of the surrounding area  
     (Zemp et al., 2011, p.446) 
 
For this thesis and the subsequent research findings, the five highlighted functions are highly 
transferable and applicable to examining SPIRS. Moreover, Zemp et al. (2011) have 
indicated the size and location of the railway station is a crucial factor linked to the 
increasing operational and security complexities for the multiple stakeholders who are 
located within the space of the station. These essential five functions of the railway station 
in relation to SPIRS are discussed in detail in Chapter Six. Moreover, what is constituted as a 
security threat to the railway station and SPIRS is examined in the following chapter. 
 
Network Rail defines the physical space of the Category A railway stations in England and 
Wales, and SPIRS into three specific zones, each with its own function. However, in some 
smaller railway stations, the zones, in fact, intersect in their function, and the access, facilities 
and platform zones are all located in the same area, Network Rail (2011, p.5 and p.34) 
demarcates the zones as follows: 
 
3.3.1The Access Zone 
This is the area of (and surrounding) the station is where departing rail travellers arrive at the 
station, or where people who have just arrived by train commence the next leg of their journey, 
includes access to: 
• Public transport 
 
• Pick-up/drop off 
 
• Car parks 
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• Walking routes 
 
• Cycle storage 
 
3.3.2 The Facilities Zone 
This is the area of the station (typically, but not exclusively, the concourse or booking hall) 
where users gather information, make purchases, or otherwise avail themselves of the 
facilities on offer. In many stations, the Facilities Zone may also include a waiting area. 
Includes facilities such as: 
• Ticket retailing 
 
• Waiting facilities 
 
• Information 
 
• Tickets 
 
• Retail units 
 
3.3.3 The Platform Zone 
In this area, users alight from trains, wait for, and board trains, or interchange between trains, 
it can include facilities such as: 
• Waiting facilities 
 
• Information 
 
• Access to/from 
 
• Platforms 
 
• Boarding/alighting 
 
Source (Network Rail, 2011, p.5 and p.34). 
 
The functional zones of SPIRS are examined in Chapter Six. As discussed in the previous 
sections of this chapter, the thesis, and the research focus on SPIRS, with the theories and 
research being generalisable to other Category A railway stations in England and Wales. At 
the time of writing, Network Rail classified their two thousand five hundred plus railways 
stations into six categories, A through F. SPIRS is classified as a Category A railway station. 
The classification of the railway station relates to its size, location and role in the railway 
network and it subsequently has an impact on the level of security that is required by the 
Department for Transport (DfT). The classification of categories and number of railway stations 
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are explained in the section below. 
Category A – 28 stations 
National Hubs – these are the largest stations in the UK, serving the most important cities. They 
provide the highest number of facilities for passengers and the public. For instance, these are 
railway stations such as SPIRS, London Kings Cross, Bristol Temple Meads, Liverpool Lyme Street, 
and Birmingham New Street. 
 
Category B – 67 stations 
Regional Hubs – are stations that generally serve important cities and towns. These are large 
stations providing a gateway to the rail network from a large area. More than one Train 
Operating Company (TOC) with a mix of service types often serve them. These stations may 
be a terminus for some services. For instance, railway stations such as Cardiff Central, Liverpool 
Central and Newcastle. 
 
Category C – 248 stations 
Important Feeder – these are significant ‘feeder’ stations, on a busy trunk route or as a subsidiary 
hub station. These railway stations often provide services from more than one TOC and a 
regular long- distance service, such as Cardiff Queen Street and Southampton Airport 
Parkway. 
 
Category D – 298 stations 
Medium Staffed – These are medium-sized, staffed railway stations, with a core interurban 
business or high-volume inner suburban business. 
 
Category E – 679 stations 
Small Staffed – Are small, staffed station often with just one member of staff at any one 
time, or for only part of the day. 
 
Category F – 1200 stations 
Small Unstaffed – These are defined as small, unstaffed stations.  
(Adapted from Network Rail 2012 and Network Rail, 2011, p.17) 
 
3.4 The Pseudo-Public Space and Control 
In terms of providing a public space, railway stations in England and Wales are privately 
owned spaces which the public has apparent free and unrestricted access. Subsequently, 
they cannot be considered as public spaces; they are described as ‘pseudo-public spaces’ 
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(Copper et al., 2007, p.14), or as a hybrid area (Raco, 2003 and Newburn, 2007). For instance, 
SPIRS and the other significant Category A city based stations in England and Wales are 
becoming extremely 
commodified and newly regenerated spaces, which are seen as important and 
valued, and thus individuals and corporations fight for a presence there. 
(Massey, 2011, p.191) 
 
Moreover, Category A railway stations in England and Wales are constantly under measures 
of surveillance, prevention, and governance, to ensure their smooth operation and security. 
Therefore, not everyone using or passing through is greeted warmly in these rejuvenated 
and frequently gentrified spaces, stakeholders such as Network Rail and the British Transport 
Police (BTP) actively dissuade street people and substance users from loitering in or around 
the margins of the railway station. Thus, reiterating and supporting the statement that 
railway stations are ‘pseudo-public spaces’ (Copper et al., 2007, p.14). Redeveloped 
Category A railway stations such as SPIRS are conceived and designed for more affluent 
members of the public do not cater for the local community, who according to Raco (2003, 
p.1871) are frequently ‘culturally and even physically excluded’. Therefore, legitimate 
citizenship of such spaces is centered on being a consumer of services and goods (Atkinson, 
2003, p.1834). Thus, the boundaries of the Category A and SPIRS whether it is a public or private 
space is fuzzy and contestable. 
 
3.5 Stakeholders and the Railway Station 
As discussed in Chapter One, there is a significant gap in the knowledge surrounding the 
multiple stakeholders within a complex Category A railway station in England and Wales. 
These railway stations and the case study railway station SPIRS sit within an extremely 
multifaceted complex and fragmented railway infrastructure. This is without doubt due to the 
numerous levels of public and private sector stakeholders who are responsible for the 
physical, operational, and legal functions of the station and even from its outset some 
commentators have viewed the railway station as ‘a quasi-state’ (Wolmar, 2007, p.49). The 
history of these developments and complexities are discussed in Chapter Six. As discussed 
already in this chapter, the greater the size, location, and importance of the railway station 
thus the operational complexities increase (Zemp et al., 2011). 
 
Therefore, SPIRS and as such other Category A railway station in England and Wales have 
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numerous key organisations, stakeholders, and forums that are involved in deciding on 
policy, strategies, and the subsequent current and future resilience of the railway station to 
human malign security threats. The concept of resilience and its actual application to the 
railway station is examined in section 3.7 of this chapter. 
 
Stakeholders within the railway station can be seen in terms of organisations with an interest 
in the institution, but also in a wider context of ‘any group of people, organized or 
unorganized, who share a common interest or stake in a particular issue or system’ (Grimble 
and Wellard, 1997, p.75). There is a clear difference between organisations and institutions, 
as conventions are set by institutions, the railway station, and these are acted out in 
organisations, the stakeholders (North, 1990, cited in Raitio, 2011, p.2). It is the critical 
elements of an organisation, such as the ‘actors and role, structures and goals’ (Hasselbladh 
and Kallinikos, 2000, p.698), which determine efficient plans and systems. These are social 
processes, ‘embedded in complex networks of beliefs, cultural schemes and conventions 
that shape their goals and practices’ (Meyer and Rowan (1977/1991, cited in Hasselbladh 
and Kallinikos, 2000) 
 
To fully understand the role and resilience of SPIRS, the complex and multiple stakeholders 
within must be identified and ‘reference to their goals and requirements is made’ (Zemp et al., 
2011, p.447). Grimble and Wellard (1997) propose this understanding can be achieved 
through the utilisation of Stakeholder Analysis; this is discussed in greater detail in Chapters 
Five and Six. However, to introduce Stakeholder Analysis, it presents a method of analysis by 
understanding a system, changes in it, by identifying key actors or stakeholders and 
assessing their respective interests in that system. 
(Grimble and Wellard, 1997, p.173) 
 
Therefore, it is critical when operating, retrofitting, or when building new railway stations, for 
the complex relationships between multiple stakeholders to be fully understood and 
accounted for in these projects by the construction industry, operators, and providers of 
security for the stations (Zemp et al., 2011). It is critical to research and examine the highly 
complex mix of both public and private stakeholders in the railway station and the 
significant level of organisation to ‘legislate, regulate, implement, and police’ (Loukaitou-
Sideris et al., 2006, p.737) effectively the space against existing and future security threats. 
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Therefore, it is the multiple stakeholders with differing and frequently conflicting agendas 
and standpoints, which can create considerable difficulties from both the perspectives of 
the operation of the infrastructure to the social implications of their decisions (Zemp et al., 
2011). The complex and multiple stakeholders of SPIRS are examined in further detail in 
Chapter Six, where they are discussed and visually mapped using Stakeholder Analysis. 
 
PART TWO: THE RAILWAY STATION, CRITICAL NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE (CNI) AND RESILIENCE 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the concept of resilience is increasingly prevalent in Critical 
National Infrastructure (CNI) policy, becoming inextricably interwoven in the UK’s ‘security 
and civil contingencies policy’ (Coaffee et al., 2009, p.111). This is the case when looking at 
how current UK policy deals with security threats, resilience has evolved into ‘a key policy 
metaphor underpinning the reaction of the state’ (Coaffee et al., 2009, p.111). The security 
policies which are relevant to the railway station are examined in Chapter Four. 
 
The majority of CNI in the UK is owned and operated by the private sector. The railway 
network and infrastructure are operated and managed, apart from Category A stations, by 
Network Rail. Therefore, the national resilience, security policies and prevention measures 
and individual organisation policies are operationalised by private sector companies, which 
have their own definitions of the concept and how Governmental policy and initiatives are 
interpreted. However, to further reinforce the complexities of SPIRS’ stakeholders and 
control, it is owned by High-speed One, which in turn is funded by a foreign pension fund, 
and subsequently operated by Network Rail High-speed. These complexities are examined 
in Chapter Six, Seven and Eight.  
 
3.6 Critical National Infrastructure (CNI)  
For SPIRS and other Category A railway stations, the wider railway network, and other 
transport systems to operate effectively and efficiently, the interdependencies between 
transport and other forms of CNI must be analysed. CNI’s are defined as critical because if 
they were to be devastated or severely disrupted it ‘would cause major disruption to the 
service being provided’ (Institution of Civil Engineers, 2009, p.5). The Government describes 
CNI as 
those facilities, systems, sites and networks necessary for the functioning of the country 
and the delivery of the essential services on which daily life in the UK depends. 
(Cabinet Office, 2010, p.4) 
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Infrastructure can also be described as either ‘national or local assets’ (Cabinet Office, 
2010b, p.8), thus meaning 
 
CNI, that is, infrastructure which is deemed critical on a national scale; and other 
critical infrastructure which may be critical within a local area. 
(Cabinet Office, 2010b, p.8) 
 
Within the UK CNI is delineated by The Cabinet Office into nine key sectors and further sub-
sectors where applicable: 
Communications, 
Broadcast 
Post 
Telecoms 
Emergency-5 services, 
Ambulance – The health sector manages this sub-sector 
Coastguard – The transport sector manages this sub-sector 
Fire 
Police 
Energy, 
Electricity 
Gas 
Oil 
Financial services 
Food 
Government 
Health care 
Transportation 
Aviation 
Highways 
Ports 
Rail 
Water 
Table 3.0 UK CNI. Source: (The Cabinet Office 2010, p.5) 
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3.7 Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) and Resilience 
The Government accepts that CNI, such as the railway network must be prepared to 
increase their resilience to criminal activities and acts of terrorism, given it is 
fundamental to everyday life, from the social to the economic aspects of it (Schulman 
and Roe, 2007). Hence, CNI has crucial components, which the interruption, failure, or 
destruction of would have a critical bearing on the availability or integrity of essential 
services leading to severe economic or social consequences or to loss of life in the UK. 
These critical elements make up the CNI (Cabinet Office, 2010, p.4). As discussed 
above, the UK Government defines resilience of CNI as ‘the ability of a system or 
organisation to withstand and recover from adversity’ (Cabinet Office, 2011, p.5). This 
further demarcation of the function of CNI fails to acknowledge the role the railway 
station can be critical at international, national, and local levels. The Government 
contends because of the railway networks ‘structure and varied nature; it has an inbuilt 
overall resilience but can be affected at a local level across all sub-sectors’ (Cabinet 
Office, 2010, p.20). Therefore, railway stations which fall into the E to F Network Rail 
Categories would be classed as critical local infrastructure as they would have an impact 
on the lives of people and the economy at a local level if they were to be disrupted. 
However, Category A to D railway stations in England and Wales can be classified as CNI 
as the impacts would be felt nationally if they were to be disrupted and even 
internationally when considering the case of SPIRS and the Eurostar. 
 
The resilience of the UK’s CNI is reliant on the weaknesses created by its interdependency 
being recognised and improved on. The operations of many CNI’s frequently rely on a 
‘chain of dependencies’ (The Parliament Office of Science and Technology, 2010, p.3) from 
other CNI. For instance, the high-speed railway, both currently and in the future, is reliant on 
the National Grid for the electricity to power the overhead cables for the trains. In turn, both 
infrastructural sectors rely on the communication infrastructure for the organisation and 
management of their operations. If one element of the infrastructural interdependent 
sequence is disrupted it has a knock-on effect on the other elements. This effect is described 
as ‘cascade failure’ of a ‘single point of failure’ (The Parliament Office of Science and 
Technology, 2010, p.3) and can be described as numerous infrastructural sectors being 
localised in one region/area. Furthermore, much of the core CNI in the UK is under private 
ownership, and as such, the resilience of these assets is reliant on the financial investment 
of their owners (The Parliament Office of Science and Technology, 2010). There have been 
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objections to this disparate multiagency approach and endeavours have been undertaken 
to reduce the vulnerability of CNI to both current and future human malign security threats. 
 
Furthermore, the Government recognises the resilience of CNI and as such Category A 
railway stations in England and Wales must not merely rely on target hardening and 
protection measures (this is examined in the following chapter). Resilience should be a 
holistic concept that incorporates a ‘good design of infrastructure networks, effective 
emergency response, business continuity planning, and recovery arrangements’ (Cabinet 
Office, 2010, p.5). The role of resilience can be viewed as a decentralised and shared 
process of ‘responsibilisation’ (Garland, 1996), from Governmental offices and departments, 
the devolved Governments, the regulators, and the operators of infrastructures all 
establishing the ‘standards, determining priorities, and meeting costs of improving resilience 
for that sector’ (The Cabinet Office, 2010, p.6). Resilience and security strategies both at a 
national and a local level are entangled, and both often rely on the other form of policy to 
achieve their end goal. 
 
PART THREE – POLICY AND DRIVERS SURROUNDING THE RAILWAY STATION AND NETWORK 
3.8 Policies and Strategies 
As noted in the above sections, the complex and disparate nature of SPIRS and other 
Category A railway stations in England and Wales is not only mirrored by its history, which is 
examined in Chapter Six, and the current system of complex and multiple stakeholders, but it is 
further seen in the patchwork of policies and agendas which surround it. Therefore, these 
policies cannot be viewed in isolation from the multiple, complex, and often seemingly 
disparate stakeholders who enact and operationalise policies and strategies within the 
space of the railway station. Chapter Four examines the often-entangled security 
prevention measures and policies such as the CONTEST Strategy, Crime and Disorder Act 
1998 and SIDOS (Security in Design of Stations). that are enacted within the space of the 
SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and Wales. 
 
The strategic decisions and the operations of the railway network and stations in England 
and Wales are administered through numerous levels of Government, national, regional, 
local, European, and then the privately-owned stakeholders (Cabinet Office, 2010), these 
levels of stakeholders are discussed in more detail in Chapter Six. The process of policymaking 
is decided at different political and legal levels and is a set of logical and rational decisions, 
which centers on a goal of solving specific societal challenges and quandaries (Kaufmann 
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et al., 2008). Firstly, the issue must be politicised by the stakeholders/actors; secondly, 
solutions are sought, and resolution is legitimised; thirdly, the policy is put into operation and 
enforced ‘at different institutional and territorial levels’ (Kaufmann et al., 2008, p.12-13). 
 
Legislations which surround the development and operation of the railway network are not 
a modern phenomenon. In fact, the obsession and frenzy which surrounded the 
development and growth of railway network in Britain during the nineteenth century can be 
judged when over a four-year period, between 1844-8, over ‘600 railway acts’ (Biddle, 1986, 
p.16) were passed through Parliament. Subsequently, in Chapter Four contends the 
resilience of railway station to human malign security threats cannot be disconnected from 
security policies, strategies, and various political agendas, as it cannot be considered in 
isolation without taking into consideration the multiple and complex stakeholders play a 
role in the railway station. 
 
Appendix 1 indicates the complexity of the multiple policies that are currently enacted 
within the space of the railway station. However, to summarise some of the critical policies 
that affect the operation and subsequent resilience to security threats are discussed briefly. 
One of the primary acts that affect the railway stations and the wider railway network in 
England and Wales is the Railways Act 2005. The Act is to deal with historic structural issues 
of the railway. It gives the power from the state to devolved administrative organisations 
such the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) to issue the Train Operating Companies (TOCs) with 
their franchise and operating licenses. This act also covers the access contracts such as the 
Station and Light Maintenance Services. However, the Treasury has the power to impose 
financial controls over the ORR to control how the public subsidy for the railway industry is 
allocated. The Secretary of State provides monetary aid for any purpose regarding railways 
grants.   
 
Moreover, the Railways Act 2005 superseded the Transport Act 2000 that granted the ORR 
power to request the TOCs or Network Rail to upgrade or build new railway stations or 
facilities. A further devolution of power to the local level can be seen in the Act as it permits 
the TOCs, subject to the approval by the Secretary of State, to create bylaws that aid them 
and the BTP to control the actions and behaviour of the public using the rail system. The Rail 
Passengers' Rights and Obligations Regulations 2010 is a statutory regulation that demands 
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that the TOCs and Network Rail have acceptable security measures in place, such as 
having a formal agreement with the BTP regarding the policing of assets and services. 
Again, the ORR was tasked with taking this devolved requirement and ensuring it is enforced 
at a local level. 
 
Furthermore, there is a raft of safety legislation which is also pertinent to the railway station 
(see Appendix 1), again with the ORR being given primary responsibility for many of these. 
For instance, the Railway and Transport Safety Act 2003 in section 31 outlines the BTP’s 
jurisdiction and permits them the power to pursue suspects or handle crimes related to the 
railway away from the boundaries of the railway infrastructure. The Health and Safety at 
Work etc. Act is responsibilised in terms of safety for the railways by the ORR. The crime and 
terrorism policies and strategies which affect the resilience of the railway station to human 
malign security threats are examined in Chapter Four. 
 
3.9 Levels of Policy Making Impacting on the Railway Station 
Within the confines of English and Welsh railway stations, it is the responsibility of the 
numerous and often private sector stakeholders to enact and enable the transport policies 
that are set by the Government and the European Union. Butcher et al. (2010, p.9) propose that 
many of the stakeholders create their own company policies which sit within the transport 
policy structure. This proposition is discussed in further detail in Chapters Seven and Eight. 
 
3.10 Government and the European Union 
Transport policy presently falls under the domain of the DfT, and the Secretary of State for 
Transport heads it up. However, other Governmental departments do have policy leads 
which impact the area of transport, these departments are: 
The Treasury is responsible for deciding on taxes and budgets which affect transport areas 
• The Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, make decisions 
concerning the inland waterways and environmental policies 
• Communities and Local Government, decide on planning policy 
 
• The Home Office are responsible for transport related offences  
     (Butcher et al., 2010, p.8) 
Furthermore, the European Union has legislative powers over UK transport policy, for 
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example, interoperability for the Eurostar, which operates through both the UK and Europe. 
It should also be noted that within the UK there are four devolved Governments, London, 
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland that have responsibility for their own transport policies 
(Butcher et al., 2010). 
 
3.11 Regional bodies 
The decentralisation and the devolution of Governmental powers are high on the current 
Conservative Government’s political agenda. Regional bodies at present have a greater 
influence over how Governmental funds are allocated on transport priorities in their areas. 
The regional bodies that are accountable for put into operation transport policies and 
strategies are structured as follows: 
• Government Office 
• Regional Assembly 
• Regional Development Agency  
Source: Butcher et al. (2010, p.12) 
 
The 2009 the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act, a section 
was established to amalgamate each regional transport strategies into a Regional Spatial 
Strategy, which states how employment, land usage and housing policies are impacted and 
benefited by local transport infrastructure (Butcher et al., 2010, p.12). 
 
3.12 Local Authorities 
The next level of policymaking and implementation are the Local Authorities; it is their duty to 
enact the transport strategies set out by the regional bodies. Within two tier councils are 
accountable for local transport as follows: 
• County Councils should generate local transport strategies and operational plans. 
• District Councils are accountable for passing planning permission for transport 
projects. 
(Butcher et al., 2010, p.13) 
 
However, single tier or Metropolitan or Unitary councils have sole responsibility for all local 
transport strategies and operational plans, and local planning resolutions (Butcher et al., 
2010). 
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3.13 Integrated Transport Authorities 
In 2009, the Integrated Transport Authorities (ITAs) were established in the metropolitan 
regions in England and were granted control over transport governance in these areas 
(Butcher et al., 2010, p.3). ITAs are composed of local council representatives. Their 
objective is to encourage better public transport across UK regions. ITAs are funded through 
the taxpayer, Government, EC grants and the private sector. 
 
3.14 Passenger Transport Executives 
The Passenger Transport Executives (PTEs) are accountable to the ITAs. PTEs are regional 
agencies and accountable for local integrated public transport plans, and they publish 
strategies on how to improve the local transport system. PTEs work in partnership with the 
DfT to plan and manage local rail services. Furthermore, they may also provide investment 
towards local stations. There are six PTEs in England; West Yorkshire; South Yorkshire; Tyne and 
Wear; Merseyside and Greater Manchester. They have a combined budget of £700m per 
annum and provide a service to over eleven million passengers. Funding for the PTE's is 
provided by Governmental grants, revenue from council taxes. 
 
3.16Non-Departmental Public Bodies and other organisations 
The Non-Departmental Public Bodies (NDPBs), do not belong to Government departments, 
however, they do have input into ‘the processes of national Government’ (Butcher et al., 
2010, p.13). The NDPBs and other organisations which are sponsored by the DfT and which 
are relevant to the railway station are as follows: 
• BTP, Railway Heritage Committee, and Transport Focus are classified as an executive 
NDPB 
• The ORR is classified as a DfT sponsored organisation. 
• The ORR regulates the twenty-four TOCs and the seven freight operating companies 
(FOCs), which operate on the railway network. Their allied industry groups often lobby 
the Government. 
(Butcher et al., 2010) 
 
3.17 General Transport Policy in the UK 
To understand the policies that, impact on the current and future resilience of railway 
stations to human malign threats it is essential to examine how it sits within the general 
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transport policies for the UK. Ever since people have used mass transport for their journeys, 
successive Governments have had to contend and address the conundrums of the mass 
transit of passengers, namely ‘where they have come from, where they are going and 
perhaps most vexingly, how they get there’ (Butcher et al., 2010, p.6). It is recognised future 
demographical changes in the population, especially in the South East of England and 
London will affect transport infrastructure, demand and the capacity of the railway network 
will be stretched. The ageing population transport needs in these areas must be considered 
now, for example, what type of transport they will need and the areas they will be living in 
(The Parliament Office of Science and Technology, 2010). 
 
Growth in travelling by train has grown significantly in comparison to the number of journeys 
made by car, ‘between 1998 and 2008 the number of passenger kilometres made by train 
in Great Britain increased by 17%; from 44 billion passenger kilometres (bpkm) to 51 bpkm.’ 
(Butcher et al.,2010, p.31). With changes in technology and improvements in all modes of 
transport, it has allowed for increasing numbers of people to be transported. However, it is 
recognised that as transport services, such as the railway network have become more 
efficient, the charging of these to the public has increased rather than reduced (Butcher et al., 
2010). 
 
It is widely acknowledged that using public transport has less of a harmful impact on the 
environment than using a car. However, older diesel trains do impact on the environment 
by the pollution they produce, yet because they are transporting masses of passengers ‘they 
are generally held to be green’ (Butcher et al., 2010, p.31). Moreover, travelling on the 
railway network can reduce congestion on the roads and thus result in fiscal benefits (Shaw 
and Farrington, 2003). Furthermore, the railway is the ‘most space and energy efficient way 
of moving large volumes of people and freight’ (Shaw and Farrington, 2008, p.108). Cars 
driven in an urban setting are four times less ‘energy efficient per passenger kilometre’ 
(Shaw and Farrington, 2003, p.108) than trains and suburban railway uses thirteen times less 
space than a road to transport an equal number of people (Shaw and Farrington, 2003, 
p.108). However, regardless of the proposed future environmental benefits of the rail 
network, it can also be argued that the railway network and ageing infrastructure currently, 
‘uses non-renewable fuels and ‘takes’ land in the same way as roads’ (Shaw and Farrington, 
2003, p.108). 
 
The 1992 white paper titled the New opportunities for the railways: the privatisation of British 
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Rail recognised the cost and energy benefits which transporting passengers and freight by 
the railway network. Regardless of the privatisation of the railway one objective which had 
to be met was to ‘continue developing the environmental benefits of rail and to maintain 
its existing high environmental standards’ (Butcher et al., 2010, p.28). Docherty (2003) 
contends the Labour Government’s agenda of improving transport was implemented 
through ‘economic, environmental and social sustainability’ (Docherty, 2003, p.3). A public 
transport network, including the railway, which was deemed unreliable, was challenging 
economic growth and sustainability. Issues surrounding environmental sustainability was 
being threatened by increased greenhouse gases through ‘transport-related pollution’ and 
community sustainability was being tested through a deficiency in equal ‘access to 
transport’ (Docherty, 2003, p.3), which could lead to people experiencing an exacerbation 
of social exclusion.  However, according to Docherty (2003) to achieve these goals would 
have called for a radical vision and the transport white paper, 1998 A New Deal for 
Transport: Better for everyone transport, was regarded by a number of critics as Docherty 
and Hall (1999) and Glaister (2001) as a ‘poorly focused and indecisive document’ 
(Docherty,2003, p.13). The ‘Third Way’ rhetoric came to the foreground as ‘integration 
transport’ (Docherty, 2003, p.13) rather than sustainable transport, leading to what were 
considered ‘less radical, more business...friendly policies’ (Docherty, 2003, p.14). 
 
The development and improvement of the railway network key in decreasing ‘the 
dominance of the car’ (Docherty, 2003, p.3). After the reflecting on the objectives of the 
2010 Transport Plan, the Government and various lobbying groups are still committed to the 
promotion to the general public of the environmental benefits of using public transport and 
relying less on using the car for journeys (Butcher et al., 2010). This is demonstrated through 
several reforming measures targeting the railway network. However, Network Rail must 
have greater answerability to the TOCS and the public; the agreement of a high-speed rail 
up to the North of England at a minimum; rail franchise lengths so be increased; allowing 
other agencies to make minor improvements. Butcher et al. (2010, p.25) suggest rail policy 
has moved towards trying to manage existing infrastructure with improved and greater 
efficiency, rather than the ‘predict and provide model’. A recognised current issue, which 
must be addressed by the Government, is how to evaluate the contribution which transport 
infrastructure makes to the economy against the effects they have on the environment 
(Butcher et al., 2010). The level importance placed on improving the railway network is 
demonstrated below in the CNI in which the Government envisages major infrastructure 
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investment in the UK: 
• maximising the potential of existing road and rail networks; 
 
• transforming energy and transport systems to deliver a low carbon 
economy; 
• transforming the UK’s strategic rail infrastructure; 
 
• meeting future challenges in providing sustainable access to water for 
everyone; 
• protecting the economy from the current and growing risk of floods and 
coastal erosion; 
• reducing waste and improving the way it is treated; and 
 
• providing the best superfast broadband in Europe. 
(HM Treasury, 2010, p.9) 
 
3.19 Future Rail Expansion Policies and Strategies 
CNI must meet the needs of current and future generations in the UK and The National 
Infrastructure Plan 2013 recognises this. Arguably, this is applicable to the wider railway 
network as many parts of it are  
many decades old, means that maintenance and upgrades are essential to 
ensuring that current and future generations can continue to benefit from it; 
upgrading infrastructure also keeps running costs low and ensures smooth and 
efficient operation with minimal disruptions. 
(HM Treasury 2013, p.13) 
 
The Government acknowledges the vital role in which effective modes of transport will aid 
the economy to develop and expand in the future. SPIRS and other Category A railway 
stations in England and Wales can be considered as part of ‘nationally significant 
infrastructure’ (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2009, p.20). Therefore, 
they cannot function in isolation and to operate it must engage the services of other CNI. The 
Government is adamant ‘these networks are integrated and resilience is vital... not only for 
growth but also the UK’s international competitiveness’ (HM Treasury, 2010, p. 7). 
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Consequently, the impact of globalisation is recognised by the British Government, with other 
countries such as USA and China investing billions in either building or improving their railway 
networks (HM Treasury, 2010). The Government does not wish to be seen as failing to 
improve and develop the CNI of the UK and therefore envisages that the following future 
major infrastructure investments will be specifically relevant to the railway station: 
• maximising the potential of existing road and rail networks 
• transforming energy and transport systems to deliver a low carbon economy 
• transforming the UK’s strategic rail infrastructure 
• protecting the economy from the current and growing risk of floods and coastal 
erosion 
(HM Treasury, 2010, p.9) 
 
These major infrastructure projects must be achieved to meet the future demand of the 
growing population, given that ‘the Office for National Statistics forecasts that the UK 
population will grow to over 73 million people by 2035’ (HM Treasury, 2013a, p.14). The 
Government states that from 2014-2019 thirty-eight billion pounds will have been invested in 
such projects, which not only increase the capacity of the railway network but additionally 
upgrading the existing railway infrastructure (Gov.UK, 2014a). The Government will be 
investing in the below major railway projects between 2014-2019: 
• CrossRail – currently the largest infrastructure project in Europe 
• Thameslink improvements in London 
• Stronger east to west links from Liverpool to Newcastle through the 
• Northern Hub 
• Opening the Bedford to Oxford line 
• Electrifying the network on the Great Western line 
• A new ‘Electric Spine’ between Yorkshire, the Midlands and the south 
• Replacing diesel trains with faster, more reliable electric trains on the Great Western 
Line to Wales and East Coast 
(HM Treasury, 2013b, p.19). 
 
Furthermore, the Government’s commitment to the modernisation programme of the 
railway infrastructure is demonstrated in the investment in projects such as the Thameslink 
and CrossRail Projects and the High-speed Rail 2 (HS2) project. The Thameslink project, 
approximately £5.5 billion, will create further capacity in the Home Counties and London. 
During peak hours, it is estimated that Thameslink will operate up to twenty-four trains per 
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hour. The project is due to be fully completed by 2018 (First Capital Connect, 2011). 
Additionally, the CrossRail project, approximately £16.6 billion will connect East and West 
London (Department for Transport, 2009). The estimated completion date for the project is 
2018 (CrossRail, 2011). HS2 will create a high- speed route from London to eventually 
Scotland, with the first stages of the route being ‘planned from London to the West 
Midlands’ (Department for Transport, 2009, p.8). The projected costs of the project are £32 
billion, and it is anticipated the first part of the route will be fully operational in 2026. It is 
interesting to note that a potential HS2 was not mentioned in the published 2000 ten-year 
travel plan, Transport 2010, rather than building new routes the report focused on the 
existing routes and infrastructure requiring upgrading (Gourvish, 2010). 
 
What is apparent from the Governmental literature reviewed around the railway station and 
CNI is that there are discrepancies between the Governmental departments as to whether 
the railway station is part of the CNI or whether it must be considered as critical local 
infrastructure. As discussed in the previous sections, this is dependent on the size, location, 
and function of the railway station. It suggested regardless as to whether the railway station 
is considered to be critical ‘local’ or ‘national’ infrastructure, it is a component part of this 
system (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2009, p.20), and cannot 
function in isolation. Therefore, them to operate, they must engage the services of other 
CNI. The Government is adamant ‘these networks are integrated and resilience is vital... not 
only for growth but also the UK’s international competitiveness’ (HM Treasury, 2010, p.7). 
 
Therefore, the role of the railway station is critical to the current and future sustainability of 
the urban environment (Conticellia, 2011). The complex and interconnected physical, 
operational, and legal functions of the railway station and the concept of resilience need 
to be seen in current and future terms of a ‘balance between economic, social, and 
environmental priorities’ (Banister, 2005, p.3). However, potential conflicts between the 
differing agendas and targets of the railways ‘physical and functional’ (Conticellia, 2011, 
p.1097), and sustainable urban redevelopment must be established to ensure effective 
assimilation of policies. It is important to realise a ‘resilient and sustainable future for the built 
environment’ (Bosher et al., 2007, p.236), particularly for minimising the effects of emergencies 
at the design stage of projects, rather than an as an add-on or retrofit measure. Hence, 
decisions, which are made now concerning the construction of major infrastructure 
projects, will have an undoubted effect on future generations. 
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At present, the building of new railway stations is deemed a ‘nationally significant 
infrastructure project’ (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2009, p.20) 
and is covered by Chapter 29 of the Planning Act 2008, established by the Infrastructure 
Planning Commission. Along with conforming to the Planning Act 2008, for railway stations 
to be constructed they must also gain planning permission for ‘permitted development’ as 
stated in the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) Order 1995) 
(Department for Communities and Local Government, 2009, p.29). The importance of the 
sustainability political agenda can be seen in section eight, part ten of the Planning Act 
2008, which stipulates the Secretary of State has a responsibility to ensure that new railway 
station projects contribute ‘to the achievement of sustainable development’ (Department 
for Communities and Local Government, 2009, p.17). This should be achieved through a 
high-quality design that mitigates and adapts to climate change (Department for 
Communities and Local Government, 2009, p.17). From reviewing this policy, it is clear to 
see the sustainability agenda is considered critical when building new or refurbishing railway 
stations. However, there is a policy disconnect which fails to consider security measures and 
ensuring public safety in the Planning Act 2008. In the following chapter, security measures 
are discussed in the policy section, yet these also show significant disconnections in policy 
and much to do with security is guidance, rather than legislation. 
 
As discussed in section 2.6 of this chapter, the railway station in England and Wales is 
interdependent on numerous CNI’s; these interdependencies will produce unintentional 
tensions with other political agendas. Within the Infrastructure Plan 2010, the Government is 
quite clear that energy infrastructure should be progressing towards achieving the 
objective that by 2020, fifteen percent of the energy generated in the UK will originate from 
renewable sources of energy. These sources of renewable energy will also aid the 
Government in achieving a reduction of ‘greenhouse gas emissions by 34 percent relative 
to 1990 levels’ (HM Treasury, 2010, p.9). This directly affects the railway infrastructure in the 
UK, specifically in terms of energy for powering trains and within the railway station, as it will 
be targeted to reduce its emissions. 
 
Within the 2010 National Infrastructure Plan, the Government quite clearly mentions that the 
political agenda surrounding the issues of climate change is a driver towards upgrading 
and investing in Britain’s CNI and estimate by 2015 to have invested £200 billion pounds 
during this undertaking (HM Treasury, 2010, p.7). However, they are very ambiguous when 
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acknowledging ‘other threats and hazards’ (HM Treasury, 2010, p.7). The railway station is 
not mentioned as an individual part of the railway infrastructure within the confines of the 
National Infrastructure Plan 2010. Therefore, it can only be assumed the railway station 
currently is regarded by the Government as part of the railway infrastructure. 
 
3.20 Meeting Future Policy Challenges for the Railway Network 
The railway network and therefore inevitably the railway station will continue to feature 
prominently in the future transport programmes within the UK. It has been proposed that by 
2055 intelligent transport infrastructure systems will require minimum investment but will be able 
to produce efficiently a maximum return (Curry et al., 2005, p.6). Furthermore, it is highly 
probable that the role of the railway station will be impacted on by changes in the way we 
live and work, which could see people having to commute less for work and thus allowing 
the railway network to operate with more efficiency (Curry et al., 2005). Therefore, these 
intelligent transport infrastructure systems will utilise developments in technology and 
science to create a system, which is ‘robust, sustainable and safe’ (Curry et al., 2005, p.5). 
 
Moreover, when considering either the short or long-term future of resilience of the railway 
network to both natural and malicious threats policy makers and stakeholders cannot fail to 
acknowledge the problems ‘of climate change and global warming’ (Curry et al.,2005, 
p.5). To develop a sustainable infrastructure with environmental responsibility, the 
Government and the railway sector should be aspiring to three long-term goals; capacity is 
increased, a quality service for passengers and realising the full environmental capability of 
the railway infrastructure. 
 
3.21 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has examined the function and nature of SPIRS and other Category A railway 
stations in England and Wales. It has discussed the size, complexities of the railway station and 
the intrinsic link in the nature of the railway station to the increased complexities in the 
multiple stakeholders involved in the design and operation of the railway station. The current 
diverse functions of the railway station are vital in securing its place in the future in the urban 
environment as a crucial element of a ‘multilayered integrated transport network’ (Bruinsma 
et al., 2007, p.5). However, SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and Wales 
are extremely disparate and complex in its governance, with both public and private sector 
stakeholders charged with its physical, operational and legal functions including upholding 
the current and future resilience to security threats. The following chapter investigates the 
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existing and potential security threats, which can impact on the resilience of the railway 
station, the prevention measures and resilience and security policies that can be utilised to 
increase the resilience of the space to such threats.
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CHAPTER FOUR SECURITY THREATS 
 
4.1 Chapter Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with examining the potential human malign security threats to 
SPIRS and other Category A railway station. Chapter Two has detailed the complexities of the 
function and operation of the railway station, which combined with the knowledge in this 
chapter, presents areas of explanation of how the multiple stakeholders in such a multifaceted 
and entangled space currently plan, prevent, and manage human malign security threats. 
 
SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and Wales, due to their function are 
essentially open access spaces, as discussed in Chapter One, at certain points during the 
day, such as peak rush hours in the morning and the evening can be considered as crowded 
spaces. Therefore, a greater number of passengers and other members of the public are 
channeled within a comparatively constricted area, which both historically and presently 
means railway stations can be considered as prime targets for both terrorist and criminal 
activities (Gregson-Green, et al., 2103 and Kimmance and Harris 2013). 
 
Furthermore, the space at these peak times is favourable to crime and disorder issues such 
as ‘pickpocketing, indecent assaults, robbery and vandalism’ (Morgan and Cornish, 2006, 
p.1). Thus, this chapter will examine these two forms of human malign activity separately, while 
looking at how fear affects passengers and the public perception of both terrorism and 
crime. Crime prevention measures (CPMs) and counter-terrorism measures (CTMs) will be 
analysed. The first part of the chapter will examine the definitions and theories that surround 
the concepts of crime and terrorism. 
 
PART ONE – THE DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS OF CRIME AND TERRORISM 
 
4.2 Definition of Security Threats 
It is critical to understand how security threats are defined, thus the research and the 
subsequent thesis defines security threats to the railway stations ‘as any human malign action 
from terrorist activity to low level crime such as anti-social behaviour’ (Gregson-Green et al., 
2013, p.35). The distinction between crime and terrorism is exceedingly disputed; they have 
extremely heterogeneous drivers and objectives (Gregson-Green et al., 2013). Cochrane 
and Talbot (2008, p.2) suggest that ‘the search for security and the threat of insecurity’ have 
become critical and entangled concepts today. 
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Terrorism should be recognised as a crime given the actions of both ‘cannot be morally 
condoned’ (Stevens, 2005, p.525). It should be noted that the cornerstone of many CTMs, 
such as target hardening are based essentially on existing crime prevention strategies 
(Fussey, 2007, p.174). These measures should be individually considered but it does not 
necessarily denote ‘they are-or should-be used in the same way’ (Fussey, 2007, p.187). 
Chapter Seven will examine the duality of prevention measures (Fussey, 2011) within the 
context of SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and Wales. 
 
4.3 Definition and Theory of Crime 
To discuss crime within the context of the railway station, it is important to understand the key 
arguments of what is meant by crime and why it happens. However, as with numerous other 
theories, the definition of crime is contested, its disposition being governed by temporal 
and spatial dynamics and by the conjectural standpoint of whoever is delineating the 
concept (Henry, 2006). Therefore, the question of ‘what is crime?’ is profoundly reliant on 
which of those essential principles are being highlighted or adhered to (Henry, 2006). 
However, Tilley (2002) asserts that crimes are interdependent and are influenced by the 
socially constructed emotions of, risk, fear, and insecurity. Moreover, ‘crime’ is defined 
depending on ‘the historical and cultural contexts in which it is embedded’ (Hughes, 1998, 
p.56). Hillyard and Tombs (2004, cited in Newburn, 2007) argue a more radical line that ‘crime 
has no reality beyond the application of the term to particular acts’ (Newburn, 2007, p.6). 
Furthermore, it is the powerful actors in society who delineate an act as criminal, ‘through 
social and cultural processes that are...played out separate from the essence of the act 
itself’ (Presdee, 2000, p.16). 
 
Nonetheless, regardless of the disparities between the definitions of crime, there are inherent 
factors, which are located in the temporal and spatial dynamics, which do establish whether 
an action is considered a crime. These are detailed below; 
• Harm – refers to the type of victim, injuries obtained, the extent of them and the 
severity and nature of them 
• Social agreement or consensus – considers whether society as a whole sets the 
constituent norms on whether harm has occurred 
• Official society response – legislative consensus on what actions and any subsequent 
harm can be determined as a crime. This also encompasses law enforcement 
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against those committing the predefined harms. (Adapted from Henry, 2006, p.79) 
 
4.4 Definition and Concept of Terrorism 
As with the theory of crime, terrorism is extremely contested and per se, there is not a 
definitive fixed definition of the term (Laqueur, 1999). It is this lack of an unqualified definition 
which some commentators have argued has led to the definition becoming polymorphic 
(Gregory, 2003, p.19), and interchangeable ‘according to political necessity’ (Brennan, 
2003). This transposable and ‘polymorphic’ requirement is demonstrated by the three-
different state’s legal definitions of what represents acts of terrorism in these specific 
countries. 
 
In the UK, section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 offers a legal state definition of what constitutes 
acts of terrorism and ‘the prosecution of certain offences, the preservation of peace and 
the maintenance of order’ (UK Parliament 2000, p.6). The Act defines terrorism as 
the use or threat of action which is designed to influence the government or to 
intimidate the public or a section of the public, and the use or threat is made for the 
purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. 
(UK Parliament 2000, p.6 and Roach et al., 2005, p.7) 
  
In the United States, the United States Code, Title 22, Chapter 38 defines terrorism as 
premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant 
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents. 
(National Counterterrorism Centre, 2011) 
 
However, the Dutch Government defines terrorism as follows; 
terrorism is (...) threatening, making preparations for, or perpetrating, for ideological     
reasons, acts of serious violence directed at people, or other acts intended to cause 
property damage that could spark social disruption, for the purpose of bringing 
about social change or creating a climate of fear among the general public, or 
influencing political decision-making. 
(van de Linde and van der Duin, 2010, p.2) 
 
What can be seen from the above extracts is the definition and concept of terrorism are 
extremely challenging, and as such, it is probable a ‘definitive’ definition will be perpetually 
contested. Thus, it can be rationalised that the only givens in the numerous definitions of 
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terrorism are all acts of terrorism implicate and contain ‘violence or threats of violence’ 
(Laqueur, 1999, p.6). 
 
4.5 Crime and Terrorism Contested 
Security threats to SPIRS are presented by both criminal and terrorist activities. Yet again, 
the demarcation between crime and terrorism is extremely contested. Fussey (2007) 
maintains the divisions between those considered as terrorists or criminals have become 
indistinct and traditional CPMs are being deployed to combat the risk of terrorist attacks. 
Fussey (2007) further argues the lower levels of criminal activities will have a reduced level 
of incentive and motivation in comparison to a terrorist, yet many CPMs will deter or hinder 
their activities. Moreover, Clarke and Newman (2006) state, that regardless of the rationale 
and purposes which lie behind any act of terrorism, it should still be perceived as a type of 
crime. However, it is the underlying motivations of terrorism, which can weaken prevention 
methods of ‘reducing opportunities for attack’ (Clarke and Newman, 2006, p.vii). Equally, 
Stevens (2005, p.525) proposes acts of terrorism should be perceived as a crime given both 
actions ‘cannot be morally condoned’. Conversely, Jones (2011, p.352) contends that acts 
of crime and terrorism have very diverse purposes and goals, ‘terrorism...is to inflict the 
greatest number of casualties and achieve maximum publicity and psychological impact.’  
The debate of how prevention strategies are operationalised within the railway station will 
be examined in subsequent sections of this chapter. 
 
4.6 The Fear of Security Threats in the Railway Station 
Public concerns surrounding the problems of security in the built environment can lead to 
an increase in the fear of security threats, and CTMs and CPMs can be used to lessen this 
apprehension. Katz (2004, cited in Graham, 2004, p.17), puts forward the argument that 
terrorism, leads the public to experience a ‘pervasive crisis in feelings of safety in everyday 
life’ (Graham, 2004, p.17). This fear of terrorism is exemplified when incidents occur, such as 
power outages, failures in telecommunication networks, and aviation accidents are 
instantly questioned as potential terrorist attacks. 
 
The fear of crime can be defined as ‘a rational or irrational state of alarm of anxiety 
engendered by the belief that one is in danger of criminal victimization’ (McLaughlin, 2006, 
p.164). The fear of crime has become normalised within society and even if people are not 
the victims of an actual crime, they are still victimised by the ‘threat and some of us live in 
fear of it’ (Furedi, 2006, p.2). Moreover, this fear can be amplified by the physical 
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environment of the railway station and issues such being a crowded space at peak times 
during the day and a lack of physical presence or supervision by members of staff (Morgan 
and Cornish, 2006, p.1). This can be outside of peak hours and can be seen to ‘contribute 
to vandalism, graffiti, robbery of staff and passengers, assaults of staff and passengers…fare 
evasion’ (Morgan and Cornish, p.3). 
 
The fear of crime is spatialized and temporal, altering with the locations and times people find 
themselves in (Taylor, 2001 and Waters, 2006). Hence, the fear of security threats is a social 
construction, and the multiple stakeholders regardless of their position and function in the 
railway station must account for how and where the public consider the issue of crime to 
be situated (McLaughlin, 2006). It is contended ‘the search for security and the threat of 
insecurity’ (Cochrane and Talbot, 2008, p.2) are entangled concepts that are social 
constructs. This pursuit occurs on a broad continuum, from national to global issues, which 
are construed and interpreted temporally ‘into national and local policy initiatives relating 
to…crime control’ (Cochrane and Talbot, 2008, p.2). For instance, the issue of ‘personal 
security (feeling safe from threats of violence or incivility)’ (Cochrane and Talbot, 2008, p.3) 
is positioned in the personal and localised space of the individual and can be viewed in 
terms of local policies, such as CPMs to keep the public safe from crime. 
 
In recent years, the media has portrayed railway stations as places rife with crime, which 
strike fear and concern for passengers (Cozens et al., 2004). This coverage through 
amplification can raise the public’s awareness of issues within the railway to be 
disproportionate. It is recognised in passenger surveys that the fear of crime being 
committed while in a railway station in Britain is a key worry for passengers. Much of the 
research into the railway station and crime has been centered on the fears and concerns 
of passengers over their personal safety while waiting or passing through it. The research of 
Cozens et al. (2004) focused on these fears, specifically in terms of visibility, of passengers 
waiting on railway station platforms in Wales. Platform shelters often provided passengers 
with reduced visibility, which could lead to fears of personal safety, resulting in passengers 
feeling less secure (Smith, 2011). Passengers and customers using railway stations have 
expressed dissatisfaction with their perceived personal safety within both the railway station 
and the associated car parking facilities (Smith, 2011). Additionally, there is a level 
apprehension and fear articulated by passengers regarding a lack of staff presence and 
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their availability at railway stations (Smith, 2011). Indeed, 46% of passengers, who 
frequented unstaffed/partly staffed stations, regarded their personal security as poor (Smith, 
2011, p.14). 
 
However, the danger and fear of terrorism can be viewed as ‘national security (protects the 
nation from internal and external threats)’ (Cochrane and Talbot, 2008, p.3), and this is 
positioned in distant space of uncertainty and insecurity. Yet, without a doubt, the concepts 
of security and insecurity are intrinsically interconnected in the everyday and specifically 
when considering the resilience of SPIRS. Therefore, the pervasive implementation and 
operation of prevention measures in a railway station, ‘from CCTV…to security 
announcements…may serve to remind us continually of the threat, paradoxically making 
us feel more insecure’ (Cochrane and Talbot, 2008, p.7). 
 
Cozens et al. (2004) and Waters (2006, p.249) suggest the fear of crime can be reduced by 
‘manipulating the physical environment to improve perceptions of personal safety’. Railway 
stations should have money invested in their prevention measures to break the ‘vicious 
spiral’ that can develop from a lack of investment which ‘will not only harm the transport 
system but also the communities that depend on them’ (Morgan and Cornish, 2006, p.3). 
Therefore, the organisational multiple stakeholders of the railway station must undertake 
initiatives to reduce and minimise these worries over security threats, crime, and terrorist 
(Cozens et al., 2004). However, there are differences in the perception of being a victim of 
crime and the actual empirical data of becoming one (Taylor, 2001). There are 
discrepancies between the actual and the seeming chances of being a victim of crime 
(Innes, 2011). For instance, in the period 2010-11 the Crime Survey reported the number of 
actual reported violent crimes as three percent, whereas those taking part in the survey, 
thirteen percent ‘thought that they were very likely or fairly likely to be a victim’ (Innes, 2011, 
p.84) of this type of crime. The below table highlights the ‘factors contributing to fear’ 
(Morgan and Cornish, 2006, p.8) among passengers and the public. 
 
Table 4.0 Factors leading to increased fear in passengers and the public (Source: adapted 
from Morgan and Cornish, 2006, p.8) 
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Lack of visibility Inappropriate or inadequate lighting 
Poor lines of clean sight 
Recesses allowing hiding places for potential 
offenders 
Overgrown vegetation around the boundaries 
Perceived lack of protection or assistance Lack of other passengers 
Lack of visible rail staff 
Lack of CCTV surveillance 
Insecurity caused by poor design features – 
corridors and long flights of stairs 
Passenger uncertainty Lack of familiarity with the space 
Inadequate or confusing signage 
Perceived lack of control or care Badly maintained space – litter or graffiti 
Presence of perceived disorderly people – drunks, 
beggars, homeless people, and rowdy young 
people 
Overcrowded spaces 
Lack of boundaries between the station and 
surrounding area 
Previous victimisation or awareness of others being 
victimised 
Having been a victim of crime previously in the 
space or similar 
Observing others being the victims of 
crimes 
 
Network Rail is endeavouring to address these concerns, by proposing during the period 
of 2014-2019, through a programme of refurbishments and improvements, the National 
Stations Improvement Programme (NSIP). It is anticipated these refurbishments and 
improvements will help to enhance the security of passengers, for instance; 
• enhancing the ambience of railway stations 
• increasing levels of lighting 
• “open” architecture 
• parking amenities are enhanced 
• upgrading and improved CCTV  
(Network Rail, 2011f, p.104) 
 
The merits and disadvantages of these measures are discussed in further detail in 
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Chapter Seven. 
 
4.7 The Railway Station and Crime 
Acts of terrorism are not the only threat posed to the railway station. In fact, passengers and 
the public who use the station are more likely to be the victims of criminal activities, rather than 
the victim of a terrorist attack (Powell and Fletcher, 2010). The Association of Train Operating 
Companies (ATOC), the trade association for the TOCs, state a primary factor to the 
increase passenger numbers on the railway will be the continued improvement and 
investment in the security and policing of the railway network (ATOC, 2010). Therefore, 
ATOC argues the continued visibility of the BTP to rail passengers, is a critical part of reducing 
the anxieties and concerns towards crime on the railway networks. 
 
Since 2003/2004, reported crime figures for the railway network have dropped by 21,000 
cases (ATOC, 2010). In the period 2010/11, there was a consecutive seventh annual 
reduction in reported crimes on the British railway network. Reported figures for violent crime 
and robberies decreased by 2.8% and 1.6% respectively for the period (British Transport 
Police, 2011). However, an acquisitive crime such as the theft of copper cabling on the 
railway network, according to the BTP increased by 70% between 2009/10 and 2010/11 
(Chaplin et al., 2011). It can be speculated that at the time there were sudden high rises on 
the world markets for copper, which could well have spurred this rise in the theft of copper 
cabling from the railway network (Chaplin et al., 2011). 
 
Reported crime figures from the BTP are excluded from the Crime Survey, these annual figures 
are comprised of Home Office only police forces. Furthermore, a considerable number of 
crimes committed on public transport are not reported. Cozens et al., (2004) propose there 
are many reasons why victims do not report crimes to the BTP such as lack of time, no 
appropriate authority figure, and believe perpetrator will not be apprehended. The 
definition of crimes and anti-social behaviour recorded by the BTP for the railway and 
underground networks are as follows: 
Robbery – is defined in common law as taking the property of another, with the intent to 
permanently deprive the person of that property by means of force or fear. 
Violence against the person – is the act of intentionally causing injury. 
Staff assaults – are a specific violence against the person crime, targeted at staff of transport 
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operators. 
Sexual offences – includes rape, serious sexual assault and assault where a person intentionally 
touches another person, the touching is sexual, and the person does not consent. 
Hate crime – is any criminal offence that is motivated by hostility or prejudice based on the 
victim’s disability, race, religion or belief, sexual orientation or gender. 
Theft and handling – is the dishonest appropriation of property belonging to another person 
with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it. 
Criminal damage – crimes where a person intentionally or recklessly destroys or causes 
permanent damage to another person’s property. 
Disturbance – in its simplest form is an interruption of a state of peace or quiet, including public 
disorder and bylaw regulation breaches. 
Fraud and forgery – is an intentional deception made for personal gain. 
Line of route – formerly known as trespasses and vandalism. It includes putting obstructions 
in front of trains, trespassing, and vandalising the railway infrastructure. 
Drugs – includes distribution, purchase, sale, and delivery of controlled substances. 
Pedal cycle thefts – the dishonest appropriation of a pedal cycle. 
(Greater London Authority, 2010, p. 85-86) 
 
PART TWO – TERRORISM AND THE RAILWAY STATIONS 
 
4.8 The Risk of Terrorism 
There is no certain or singular method of evaluating the risk of terrorism, just as there is not an 
uncontested definition of terrorism. However, it is possible to consider terrorist risks to the 
railway station as consisting of three elements ‘threat, vulnerability and consequences’ 
(Willis et al., 2005, p.xvi). Individuals or groups who wish to ‘advance a political, religious, or 
ideological cause of action’ (Townshend, 2002, p.3) can use the threat of deadly acts of 
violence against the state, citizens or organisations. Threats of attacks on the railway station 
can be considered in terms of ‘the probability’ (Willis et al., 2005, p.xvi) of them being the 
target of a terrorist attack. It is contended the operationalisation of prevention measures 
has two implications ‘it reduces the probability that the attacker will target the...site and it 
reduces the probability that an attack will succeed’ (Meyer, 2011, p.2). The Cabinet Office 
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(2010) has produced the ‘National Risk Assessment’, which endeavours to predict ‘the most 
significant emergencies that the United Kingdom…could face over the next five years’ (The 
Cabinet Office, 2010, p.2). Nevertheless, the actual risk level of terrorist attacks in the UK is 
complicated to calculate and it extremely difficult to model every current and probable 
act of terrorism scenario (Bosher et al., 2007, p.242). Moreover, Borrion et al, (2014) propose 
that railway systems worldwide are under threat of terrorist action against them. 
 
Arguably, acts of terrorism generally only have a limited impact on the public, infrastructure, 
and economy (Bosher et al., 2007, p.239). The vulnerability of the railway station can be 
considered in terms of the actual damaged caused if it were to be attacked, loss of 
life/injury and damage to buildings/economic consequences (Willis et al., 2005). Therefore, 
the consequences of a threat can be viewed in terms of extent and destruction/disruption 
of a ‘successful terrorist attack’ (Willis et al., 2005, p.xvi). If the railway station is resilient to an 
act of terrorism, it should ‘only have short term consequences’ (Greenberg et al., 2007, p.732, 
cited in Coaffee, 2008, p.4633). 
 
4.9 The Railway Station and Security Threats 
As previously discussed, railway stations are locations for criminal activities at all levels, from 
acts, which are deemed as anti-social behaviour to terrorist attacks (Gregson-Green, et al., 
2013). Acts of terrorism can ‘impose some of the most serious direct and indirect costs’ 
(Cornish and Smith, 2006, p.195) to railway stations not just in England and Wales but 
internationally. Due to the open nature the railway network in England, it is vulnerable to 
criminal and terrorist activities and as such, it must be recognised that ‘railways ... cannot be 
protected against all...attacks’ (Wolmar, 2007, p.50). This has presented and still presents 
the police with a challenge of countering attacks, such as explosive devices and ‘the 
marauding shooter scenario’ (Dwyer, 2011, p.10), which was exemplified by the 2008 terrorist 
attacks in Mumbai, India. CTMs against such attacks on the railway network and stations 
are extremely limited given 
• the authorities are not given prior notice of the threat 
• targets are crowded places 
• target hardening measures such as CCTV do not act as a deterrent 
• the type of attack, suicide, generally means terrorists do not have to be concerned 
over capture 
(Dwyer, 2011) 
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The consequences of a terrorist attack on a railway station can 
 
result in deaths and injuries to passengers, staff, and members of the public; damage 
to vehicles and infrastructure; massive disruptions to services; and the further costs 
incurred on repairs to the system, medical expenses and enhancing security against 
further attacks’  
(Cornish and Smith, 2006, p.195) 
 
Acts of terrorism which have taken place in the UK, Europe and USA, in the main have been 
against ‘soft’ (non-military) targets’ (Bosher et al., 2007, p.242). Past terrorist attacks on this 
type of target have shown the methods chosen by terrorists are unpredictable and variable. 
This has been demonstrated throughout Europe during 2015, 2016 and 2017, with bombs, 
mass shootings, groups and lone wolf attacks at airports, music venues, sports venues, 
gatherings, and attacks against individuals. There have been numerous threats from 
different terrorist groups, with differing political agendas, and objectives, from extremely 
large groups to groups consisting of only a few members and to just the individual (Laqueur, 
1999, p.5). It has been proposed the fewer number in membership a terrorist group consists 
of, the more likely the group is to be ‘radical...and the more difficult to detect’ (Laqueur, 
1999, p.5). Furthermore, the Government acknowledge the threat of terrorism to the UK is 
and for the near future are from 
• Islamic terrorism (considered to be the greatest threat) 
• Residual terrorist groups associated with Northern Ireland 
• Cyber attack 
• Lone terrorism – variable motivations 
• Extreme Right-Wing terrorism 
(Adapted from Home Office, 2011d, p.17 and Home Office, 2011c, p.29-32) 
 
The potential terrorist threats to the UK are defined as both state and ‘non-state actors: 
terrorists, homegrown or overseas; insurgents; or criminals’ (Home Office, 2011d, p.3). The 
Government maintains the current and indeed the future terrorist threats faced by the 
country are not the traditional hazards of war and invasion, rather the threats of modernity, 
such as conventional terrorist attacks, cyber terrorism, terrorist actions using weapons which 
are chemical, nuclear or biological, and natural hazards and accidents (Home Office, 
2011d). 
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The greatest threat railway stations and passenger trains face currently is being the target of 
a terrorist bombing (Borrion et al., 2014 and Powell and Fletcher, 2008). However, the 
infrastructure of the railway network is less of a target than trains or railway stations - 
‘crowded places’ (Kappia, et al., 2009). Many larger city and international railway stations, 
such as SPIRS, during the rush hour periods, can be classified as ‘Crowded Places...with a 
transient population often unaware of the unfamiliar environment in which they find 
themselves in’ (Jones, 2011, p.352) and as such they present an appealing target for terrorist 
attacks (Jones, 2011, p.352). Historically, in the UK when the Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
targeted railway stations their aims were to cause maximum fiscal and social disturbance, 
rather than the loss of life (Powell and Fletcher, 2008, p.12). The attacks on the railway networks 
and infrastructure both nationally and internationally railway infrastructure have highlighted 
the ability of the terrorists to inflict mass causalities in crowded places. Contemporary acts 
of terrorism against the railway station, national and international, have demanded the 
concept of resilience and security measures within the confines of the station are 
reconsidered and based on ‘more proactive’ (Coaffee and Rogers, 2008, p.104) rather 
than reactive strategies.  
 
4.10 Historic Terrorist Threats to the Railway Station: The IRA 
To understand current threats and CTMs, it is important to understand a little of the history of 
terrorist threats faced by the railway station being the target of criminal transgressions, the 
phenomenon of terrorists targeting the railway station is not a contemporary risk (Powell and 
Fletcher 2008). This is demonstrated when considering the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and 
their approach and methods of carrying out acts of terrorism against British railway stations. 
Lacquer (1999, p.33) proposed the objective of the IRA in their campaigns was ‘not the total 
destruction of their enemy but merely a united Ireland’. 
 
An example of a historic IRA terrorism campaign against British railway stations was the 
1939 S Plan, which was a series of rapid attacks against targets. The objective of the 
campaign was to fiscally impact on Britain by swiftly launching numerous small-scale 
attacks on the CNI such as power stations, the London Underground and the railway 
network. During the campaign, a total of nine stations were bombed, causing significant 
damage to stations in London and Birmingham, with one fatality and several people were 
seriously injured (Bowyer Bell, 1997). 
 
However, Powell and Fletcher (2008) argue the IRA 1991 bombing of Paddington and 
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Victoria railway stations in London and the threat of bombs being planted in the 
remainder of mainline railway stations in the capital was a more momentous terrorist drive 
by the IRA against British railway stations. The importance of this specific attack can be 
seen in the decision to evacuate the capital’s mainline railway stations ‘for the first time in 
London’s history’ (Cherry et al., 2008). Yet, more commonly, the IRA created fiscal 
disruption in cities in the UK by making hoax threat telephone calls, for example in 1991, five 
hundred stations in London were closed for five hours after a hoax bomb threat was called 
into the authorities. This hoax bomb threat approximately cost forty-nine million pounds and 
caused the maximum disturbance, with minimum risk to the perpetrators of capture and 
with no loss of life. Thus, this hoax was equally as effectual in causing fiscal and social 
disruption to the capital as an actual bomb being detonated (Powell and Fletcher, 2008, 
p.12). These attacks demonstrate how terrorist attacks have progressed from causing 
disruption, the IRA bombing campaigns in the UK, to presently where the aim of terrorist 
attacks against railway stations is to ‘indiscriminately kill and injure as many people as 
possible’ (Powell and Fletcher, 2008, p.7). 
 
PART THREE: PREVENTION MEASURES IN RELATION TO THE RAILWAY STATION 
 
4.11 Crime Prevention Measures 
To minimise the opportunities for security threats to take place, a variety of procedures and 
practices need to be in position and activated. Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) is based 
on this principle which locates ‘physical barriers between the opportunistic criminal and the 
object of the crime’ (Cochrane and Talbot, 2008, p.16). The building of new railway stations or 
the refurbishment of existing stations aim to from the planning stage to design out crime, this is 
demonstrated in the SIDOS (2012) guidance, which is discussed in detail in this chapter and 
Chapter Seven. 
 
The prevention measures, which are appropriate to the railway station, will be examined in 
the greatest depth will be those based on Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design 
(CPTED) and SCP measures. These forms of prevention measure are founded on altering ‘the 
immediate conditions in which crimes are committed’ (Tilley, 2009, p.103), rather than 
concentrating on tackling societal causes of crime (Tilley, 2009, p.103). Prevention measures 
are founded on ‘altering the physical and social environment so as to influence behaviours’ 
(Cochrane and Talbot, 2008, p.16). CPMs became increasingly popular during the 1980s 
when they were perceived to complement existing policing strategies and could potentially 
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offer a reduction in crime figures and the penal population (Tilley, 2002). Furthermore, the 
cornerstone of many CTMs, such as target hardening are based fundamentally on existing 
crime prevention strategies (Fussey, 2007, p.174) and are discussed as such within this 
review. Additionally, there is a lack of research which considers the duality of these 
measures (Fussey, 2011). These measures should be individually considered in terms of 
potential impact, conflict and benefits (Kappia, et al., 2009), this is because duality of 
function does not necessarily mean they ‘should-be used in the same way’ (Fussey, 2007, 
p.187). 
 
CPMs as with the definition of crime are temporal, spatial, as shifting threats and targets 
shape discourse, and political agendas surrounding prevention measures. CPMs can be 
defined under the broad terminology of the ‘geographies of crime’ (McLaughlin, 2006, 
p.185), which aim to understand the multifaceted and intricate connections which are 
‘constructed through crime, space and place’ and how individuals behave in public and 
their connection with city spaces (McLaughlin, 2006). Undoubtedly, crime rates within cities 
are higher than other environments, thus cities 
bring together large numbers of people, some of whom wish to commit crime, large 
numbers of crime targets of various kinds, and a relatively high level of anonymity. 
(Tilley, 2009, p.8) 
 
Given the nature, size, and location of many larger railway stations, the above observation 
is highly significant and appropriate to SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in 
England and Wales and the risk of security threats. 
 
For a crime to occur the following elements are required, ‘space, time, victims, targets and 
offenders’ (Tilley, 2009, p.8), thus by removing or limiting one of these elements reduces the 
opportunity for crimes to occur (Tilley, 2009, p.8). Routine Activity Theory (RAT) is also based 
on similar principles, for a crime to happen, three elements need to be in place, a target, 
an offender, and the lack of a capable guardian. Rational choice perspective is based on 
similar principles and argues criminals make reasoned decisions and can ‘use offenders’ 
accounts of their criminal activities to build step by step descriptions of how offenders 
commit their crimes’ (Morgan and Cornish, 2006, p.13). Therefore, the theories claim to 
prevent crimes from occurring, one these elements need to be addressed to reduce the 
opportunity for a crime to occur (Hopkins Burke, 2005). Consequently, CPMs are relatively 
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simple to initiate once patterns of crime have been established, given crime ‘is not 
randomly distributed’ (Tilley, 2009, p.8) and these patterns have been acknowledged. 
However, CPMs are advocated for crimes committed in the public sphere and not those 
committed in the private sphere, for example, child or domestic abuse (Walklate, 1996). 
Consequently, for this literature review and subsequent chapters within the thesis, CPMs will 
be considered only in terms of deterrence and protection, and not the reformation of 
criminal (Hughes, 1998, p.18) behaviours or qualities. 
 
Nevertheless, within in the discipline of criminology, there are many conflicting frameworks 
and typologies concerning crime prevention, frequently based on targets of successes 
(Hughes, 1998, p.18). Therefore, the concept of crime prevention is extremely obscure, with 
diverse meanings for different sections of society, and at different points in time. 
Consequently, as new crimes evolve, so too CPMs must develop and progress to face these. 
Hughes (1998, p.13) claims crime prevention is ‘a chameleon concept’. Walklate (1996, 
p.297) endeavours to encapsulate the nature of crime prevention by proposing they are 
based on ‘predicting an outcome and intervening in that process to change this predicted 
outcome’. Concomitantly to this, Hughes (1998, p.24) endeavours to summarise a crime 
prevention as 
 
the specific and changing institutional practices and ideological components of 
changing discourses of crime control structured around the symbolic and politically 
useful notion of prevention. 
 
According to McLaughlin (2006, p.186), CPMs stem from geographical criminology and that 
the built environment through appropriate and adequate planning and usage, and the 
utilisation of surveillance systems can benefit from ‘a reduction in the fear and incidence of 
crime and improvement in the quality of urban life’. As already discussed in this chapter, 
the fear of crime impacts on passengers and the public’s perception of the railway station. It 
is recognised in relation to the railway station, designers and planners should be challenged to 
have a greater and more detailed appreciation of ‘environmental criminology and 
patterns and trends in crime as they relate to the built environment’ (Cozens, 2011, p.482 
and Brantingham and Brantingham, 1998, p.53). 
 
Moreover, the Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB) propose a comparable stance when 
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responding to crime, disorder, and fear in the railway station, based on their four ‘Es’ principles: 
1. Engineering (similar to SCP) 
2. Enforcement 
3. Education 
4. Enabling 
(Morgan and Cornish, 2006, p.12) 
 
These can be seen as implementation processes, ‘with the need to develop avenues of co-
operation and partnerships with the community and its agencies’ (Morgan and Cornish, 2006, 
p.12-13). 
 
4.12 Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) 
CPMs, which consider and strive to design out crime (Cozens, 2011) through the 
understanding of how the environment affects the behaviour of potential offenders, are 
known as Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). CPTED measures were 
developed by Jeffery (1971, cited in Tilley, 2009) who advocated the environment could be 
planned and constructed to pre-empt human malign acts. Furthermore, the concept of 
‘defensible space’ which is incorporated within the many CPTED measures was coined by 
Newman (1972) who maintained crime could be influenced and managed by creating 
and developing defensible spaces, through ‘increasing difficulty and risk for prospective 
offenders’ (Tilley, 2009, p.123) which utilise 
 
a range of mechanisms; real and symbolic barriers, strongly defined areas of 
influence and improved opportunities for surveillance; that combine to bring an 
environment under the control of its residents 
(Newman, 1973, p.3, cited in Cozens, 2011, p.482). 
 
The aim of CPTED is to reduce perpetrators opportunities to commit crimes and 
consequently reduce the fear of being a victim of crime. Therefore, the built environment 
does not have to suffer from crime and the populace to be afraid. However, this can be 
only achieved through ‘the proper design and effective use of the...environment’ (Crowe, 
2000, p.1, cited in Cozens, 2011, p.482). A community which is ‘both safe and perceived by 
its populace to be safe from crime’ (Cozens, 2011, p.481) is acknowledged to be 
sustainable. Cozens (2011) proposes CPTED measures which have been enacted in 
numerous countries, through policies, recommendations and approaches are an ideal 
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vehicle to achieve this sustainability. 
 
However, CPTED measures are only valid and successful when they are considered in 
conjunction with ‘spatial and temporal dynamics of the immediate and local crime 
problems’ (Cozens, 2011, p.483). Cozens (2011) further suggests the restrictions of CPTED such 
as the fear of crime in an urban space are not fully acknowledged. Schneider and Kitchen 
(2007, cited in Cozens, 2011) advocate to reduce crime and the interrelated fear of crime, 
designers must design out crime by incorporating various ‘academic disciplines..., theories 
and evidence from the field of criminology’ (Cozens, 2011, p.485). Thus, by acknowledging 
evidence from academic research, the experiences of the multiple stakeholders within the 
railway station, the perception of the public concerning crime, planners can utilise a CPTED 
approach which is ‘more holistic...beyond a simplistic, formulaic approach’ (Cozens, 2011, 
p.490). Regardless of the merits of CPTED, crimes are too numerous, temporal and spatial in 
their nature, hence within the railway station, it is not possible to ‘identify with reasonable 
certainty, any specific tactic against specific crimes’ (Eck, 1997, p.16 cited in Cozens et al., 
2004, p.25). 
 
4.13 Situational Crime Prevention 
Over the last four decades, SCP has become at the forefront of CPMs and CTMs. It proposes 
crimes can be averted by designing out the opportunities and provocations in the 
environment, systems or products that permit criminal behaviour. Therefore, SCP stresses the 
importance of ‘the immediate features of the environment (or situation) in which an act might 
be committed’ (Hughes, 1998, p.60). SCP endeavours to answer the question of how a crime 
can be prevented rather than why is a crime committed. Within the railway station, SCP 
can comprise of two fundamental principles, surveillance, and target hardening, again 
these can be applied to both the prevention of crime and terrorism. The former can be 
implied or explicit, public or private control measures, such as informal guardianship by 
individuals or formal measures such as CCTV cameras. The latter’s objective is to make the 
committing of crime harder, frequently this can entail ‘strengthening and... securing’ 
measures in the immediate environment (Hughes, 1998, p.60). 
 
Moreover, Tilley (2009) views SCP measures as endeavouring to seek systems to lessen and 
ease issues caused by crime, through modifying the opportunity structure. However, Clarke 
(1997, p.4, cited in Tilley, 2009, p.106) affords a formal explanation of SCP measures which 
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comprises opportunity-reducing measures that (1) are directed at highly specific forms 
of crime; (2) involvement management, design or manipulation of the immediate 
environment in a systematic and permanent way as possible; (3) make crime more  
difficult and risky, or less rewarding and excusable as judged by a wide range of 
offenders. 
 
Furthermore, Morgan and Cornish (2006, p.14-15) propose that SCP can aim to reduce criminal 
opportunities by 
• increasing the effort required to commit the offence in question 
• increasing the risks of offending 
• reducing the rewards of committing the crime 
• reducing pressures and provocation to offend 
• removing the excuses for offending 
 
According to Mayhew et al. (1976, cited in Tilley, 2009, p.108) there are possibilities of utilising 
SCP for providing security and solutions through the use innovative low-profile measures, 
exploiting advances in technology, the architecture of buildings, and to ‘take advantage 
of the natural supervision of the environment by ordinary individuals’. Specifically, within the 
space of the railway station, Jones (2011, p.353) advocates the following design principles 
should be applied to reduce the criminal opportunities: 
 
Measure Location Rational 
Natural 
Surveillance 
Perimeter and 
interior of the 
station 
Need to reduce 
areas where items 
and people can be 
obscured 
Clear lines of sight Perimeter and 
interior of the 
station 
Reduced 
passengers fear of 
crime, permits easier 
monitoring of 
individuals  
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Zoned areas Perimeter and 
interior of the 
station 
Areas should be 
divisible to control 
public access and 
to converge 
resources 
Restricted areas Perimeter an 
interior of the 
station 
Should be 
adequately 
secured and 
monitored for 
unauthorised 
access 
Table 4.1 Jones’ design principles to reduce criminal opportunities in the railway station. 
 
These measures are very similar to those delineated by Clarke’s (2005, cited in Tilley, 2009) 
twelve methods of SCP. 
Impact on potential offender behaviour/actions 
Increasing the risk Increasing the risk Reducing the reward 
Target 
Hardening 
Entry/exit screening Target removal 
Access Control Formal 
surveillance 
Identifying property 
Deflecting 
Offenders 
Surveillance 
by employees 
Removing 
inducements 
Controlling 
Facilitators 
Natural 
Surveillance 
Rule setting 
Table 4.2 Clarke’s twelve methods of SCP (Source: Clarke, 1995, p.109, cited in Tilley, 2009, 
p.112) 
 
However, the concept of SCP has expanded further than criminal opportunities and 
currently accounts for ‘temptations, inducements and provocations’ (Cozens, 2011, p.488). 
Four further aspects of the direct environment could lead to probable criminal actions; 
• Environmental cues can prompt criminal behaviour 
• Social forces can exert pressure on individuals and encourage offending 
• Situational factors can weaken moral prohibitions and permit criminal behaviour 
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• Immediate environment can also provoke criminal behaviour 
(Cozens, 2011, p.488) 
 
A practical illustrative example of a SCP scheme and guidelines, which are utilised in railway 
stations in England, Wales, and Scotland to minimise the fear of security threats, is the Secure 
Station Scheme (SSS). It is an example of multi-partnerships/stakeholder partnership work, 
‘including Local Authorities, local transport operators…local police’ (Morgan and Clarke, 
p.21) and the BTP. Prevention measures are designed to reduce fear and crime and can 
include 
• The installation of CCTV 
• Refurbishment and redecoration of facilities 
• Improved lighting and signage used in stations 
• Landscaping works by…community service offenders 
• Removal of graffiti 
• Introduction of customer service offices 
• The improvement of lighting around stations 
• The closing of redundant areas 
• The installations of security mirrors  
(Morgan and Cornish, 2006, p.21-22) 
It is a national accreditation scheme for every railway station in England, Wales, and 
Scotland, and underground stations in London. This scheme is discussed in further detail in 
Chapter Seven. 
 
4.13 Issues with Prevention Measures 
Guerette (2008) established there are over two hundred studies, which observe and note the 
successes of SCP. However, CPMs are not without their critics, Tilley (2002, p.29) provides a 
comprehensive critique of CPMs, a summary of which are below: 
• The issues of crime are overestimated, and that tolerance is required 
• Risk is decreased by creating a “fortress society” 
• Urban areas and communities are divisible by safe and unsafe area labels 
• Individuals and groups considered at risk of committing crimes are excluded from 
areas of society 
• CCTV and other forms of surveillance are an invasion of privacy and led or heighten 
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discrimination towards certain communities/individuals 
• Crime is displaced into locations which cannot access CPMs or unable to implement 
prevention strategies 
• Social inequalities and tensions are overlooked with CPMs, thus the potential of 
exacerbating existing crime levels or inducing new crimes 
• Societal / moral problems cannot be quantified, through target setting 
• Underestimation of ‘social forces producing crime’ 
• Greater social control through ‘inclusive policy’ prevention measures is the only 
way to reduce crime figures 
 
The criticisms of CPMs are also applicable to CTMs. A major criticism of SCP is that it does not 
account for aetiology, the internal predilection and dispositions or the external situation and 
positions, which influence the behaviour of individuals (Hughes, 1998). Young (1994, cited in 
Hughes, 1998, p.61) contends that SCP measures fail to deal with aetiology by implying the 
causations of crime ‘are either relatively unimportant or politically impossible to tackle’. 
 
Furthermore, CPMs fail to account for the historical and cultural contexts in which crimes are 
committed or the rationale and incentives that influence the behaviour of would be 
offenders (Hughes, 1998). Hence, Young (1994, cited in Hughes, 1998), advocates the value of 
social crime prevention, which accounts for and strives to alter for societal factors, such as 
poverty, inadequate housing and unemployment, which can be could be attributed to the 
causation of crime (Hughes, 1998). It can be contended as well as SCP; social crime 
prevention additionally needs to be considered. Both, crime prevention frameworks have 
the propensity to be operationalised through multi-agencies, such as in the railway station, 
rather than just the reliance on the law enforcement of the police (Hughes, 1998). The 
fundamental objective of social crime prevention is to ‘strengthen socialization agencies 
and community institutions to influence those groups that are most at risk of offending’ (Bright, 
1991, p. 64, cited in Hughes, 1998, p.20). 
 
Moreover, CPMs can be conflicted, a space such as the smaller railway station can be vital 
to a local community. However, the socioeconomic status of the community (Taylor, 2001) 
and that of the railway station may not have access to the full range of CPMs which larger 
railway station garner due to their dominance in terms of economic and political status and 
92  
actors. This is illustrated by CPMs which lead to crime being displaced. For example, if CCTV 
is operationalised to combat graffiti within and on the exterior of the railway station, if 
successful graffiti may reduce in these areas, but may become more prevalent on buildings, 
walls, fences or other areas of the community a further distance from the station. 
 
Some prevention measures are crime specific, even being broken down into further sub-
categories of crime, for instance in a commercial setting, SCP often focuses only on the 
theft of high-value items only (Taylor, 2001). Nonetheless, in the defence of SCP, Tilley (2009, 
p.106) maintains, while it is not a prevention for all crimes in the targeted area, the measure 
of success is achieving ‘the balance of effort, risk and reward are sufficiently altered that 
they decide not to commit the offence’. Hayward (2007) does recognise the contribution 
that SCP has made to influencing and reducing acquisitive or property crimes, however, he 
argues that in relation to ‘expressive’ crimes, for instance, graffiti, fighting and acts of 
terrorism, it is restricted. Namely, many current crimes are appearing to circumvent the 
process of rational choice and are 
the by-product of a series of subjectives and emotions that reflect the material values 
and cultural logic associated with late modern consumerism. 
(Hayward, 2007, p.232) 
 
CPMs are based on an economic and utilitarian objective formula, and as such ignore 
human emotions and ‘existential meanings of crime’ (Hayward, 2007, p.233). Thus, suggesting 
CPMs are ‘micro-preventative strategies’ and are a temporary form of prevention as they 
overlook ‘macro-level policy intervention’ (Hayward, 2007, p.234) which are considerably 
costlier than CPMs. Therefore, prevention measures are not a cure for all crimes. 
 
4.14 Counter-Terrorism Measures 
The majority of CTMs deployed within the railway station are based on traditional CPMs 
(Fussey, 2007). Jones (2011, p.353) defines the rationale behind CTMs as ‘security measures 
must always be to decrease the vulnerabilities and mitigate the identified threat and 
credible risk’, thus increasing the resilience of spaces to terrorism threats. Furthermore, 
Grosskopf, (2006, p.1) labels CTMs as ‘those physical, technological and operational 
measures intended to devalue, deter, deny and defend against acts of terrorism’. Many of 
CTMs are interconnected and interdependent on each other for the maximum resistance 
against terrorist attack (Jones, 2011). Moreover, Borrion et al. (2014, p.176) state when 
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looking at the security measures which need to be deployed in a railway station they must 
be considered in terms of three functions; ‘prevention’ (of attacks) by some, ‘deterrence’ 
(of offenders) by others, ‘detection’ (of offenders)’. They further define the ‘security 
functionality of a system is its capability to influence the state of the world in a specific way 
which contributes to one or more security objectives’ (Borrion et al., 2014, p.176). 
 
CTMs and their resilience have evolved in relation to the changing threat of terrorism, as well 
as hardening the physical properties of the urban environment. The ‘fast recovery of the 
system’ (Kappia et al., 2009, p.2) is a primary concern, as the Government and security 
experts now widely accept it is not possible to design in or adapt CTMs that will guarantee 
100% resilience/protection against a terrorist attack. Clarke and Newman (2006, p.vii) 
advocate that their approach to counter-terrorism endeavours to keep one-step ahead of 
terrorists and to ‘act quickly to close the new opportunities they have discovered...” 
outsmarting terrorists”’. They further maintain that terrorism can be combated by applying 
the same principles as which form the basis of SCP, by identifying opportunities for attack 
and then determining ‘economical and acceptable’ (Clarke and Newman, 2006, p.vii) 
methods to obstruct such actions. However, CTMs must account for the ‘psychological 
dimension to terrorism that is not always found in other types of violence’ (Silke, 2011, p.1). 
Thus, acts of terrorism are not just founded on causing fatalities and wounding, they also 
encompass the psychology of fear and how society reacts and enacts these emotions 
(Silke, 2011, p.1) 
 
The majority of CTMs which are currently in place British railway stations follow the SCP 
formula of the four d’s; ‘delay, detect, deter and deflect’ (Jones, 2011, p.351). Thus, by 
utilising these principles it is anticipated the vulnerability of the railway station to acts of 
terrorism is lessened by 
aiming to make a station more difficult or unwelcoming to terrorists to operate within, or 
reducing the impact of an incident, should it occur. 
(Jones, 2011, p.351) 
 
Jenkins (2004) suggests an effective security system can provide passenger reassurance 
and lessen panic if an attack does happen. There are a number of factors, which affect 
the decisions made to instigate the installation/improvement of CTMs within certain railway 
stations: 
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• Whether there has been a recent terrorist attack on the UK transport infrastructure 
• The official governmental threat level to terrorist attack 
• The role of the media in portraying terrorist attacks globally 
• How up to date the CTMs are 
• The power and sway of stakeholders  
(Kappia et al., 2009, p.5) 
 
In Singapore, the Mass and Light Rapid Transit systems through the adoption of best practice 
measures from the UK, France, Japan, USA and France (Dolnik, 2007) have two goals for 
their security strategy. Firstly, minimising causalities through deterrence, prevention, and 
mitigation measures and secondly, to reducing interruption of operations through stakeholder 
communication and robust contingency plans are in place (Dolnik, 2007, p.16). 
 
Furthermore, the financial commitment to railway station CTMs in the USA are demonstrated 
by over $450 million being spent on improved and increased security measures during the 
renovation of New York City’s Pennsylvania railway station, some of the increased and more 
advanced measures implemented are as follows: 
• Greater levels of policing 
• The utilisation of dog bomb team 
• Chemical, biological and radioactive substance sensors 
• Trace scanners to detect materials used in the manufacture of bombs 
• Bins which are blast resistant 
• Alarm systems to detect interlopers 
• Barricades to prevent vehicle access  
(Marcuse, 2004, p.264) 
 
CTMs which are, balanced, appropriate, and financially viable can be accomplished 
through risk assessment, which can be used jointly to fully understand the likelihood of an attack 
on the railway station in question (Jones, 2011). However, to evaluate the cost benefits and 
efficacy of counter-terrorism is complex to measure and commentators such as Powell and 
Fletcher (2008) propose a framework, which considers the management of risk, is a more 
appropriate measure to determine efficacy and adequacy. 
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4.15 Active and Passive CTMs in the Railway Station 
There are differences between CTMs, which can be employed in the railway station and 
can be described as ‘active’ or ‘passive’ (Kappia et al., 2009). Active forms of CTMs require 
human operation and interventions, for instance, CCTV cameras are an active CTM since 
they require an operator, who if notes suspicious behaviour or an incident, is required to inform 
a security agent or the police to intervene. These forms of CTMs incur ongoing financial 
costs, for labour and equipment (Kappia et al., 2009, p.2). However, ‘passive’ CTMs within 
the railway station will generally incur one off costs as they are by and large retrofitted or 
built into the fabric of the building (Kappia et al., 2009, p.3). By considering both active and 
passive CTMs during the planning stages of new builds or the retrofitting of railway stations, 
it can aid to ‘make an attack more difficult, minimise damage from an attack and recover 
quickly...’designing-in resilience’ (Kappia et al., 2009, p.4). 
 
CTMs can also be referred to as ‘target hardening’ and many are founded on the principles 
of Newman’s ‘defensible space’, ‘to deter...through real and symbolic features’ (Coaffee 
et al., 2009, p.8). The fortification of spaces can be overtly executed, aiming to reassure the 
public’s fears over their personal safety and that potential terrorist activities are ‘likely to be 
in vain or at least will require a significant degree of effort’ (Coaffee et al., 2009, p.8). In one 
sense Dwyer (2011, p.5) reinforces that target hardening measures used to combat terrorism 
within the railway station are of value as they restrict the ‘freedom of movement’ of 
potential attackers. Effective target hardening of the railway station does not just rely on 
physical measures but also the education and co-operation of railway station staff and 
passengers. Dwyer (2011, p.5) describes how passenger information on terrorism moved 
from the emotive ‘look out for bombs’ to more reassuring and specific instructions of ‘Keep 
your belongings with you’ and to be aware of unattended bags and to report them to 
members of staff. Additionally, the BTP trained railway station staff to establish whether an 
object was suspicious by operationalising the proactive approach of ‘HOT’; 
• Hidden – is the object concealed? 
• Obviously suspicious  
• Typical of the environment  
(Dwyer, 2011, p.5) 
However, as with lesser crimes on the continuum, target hardening a vulnerable part of the 
built environment against the potential threat of a terrorist attack, could merely spatially 
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displace that threat to a ‘softer’ target (Fussey, 2007). Additionally, it can be further 
contended the concept of displacement not only becomes spatial but also tactical, as 
terrorist alter and modify their targets and modus operandi to correspond with CTMs (Fussey, 
2007). However, lower levels of criminal activities will have a lower level of incentive and 
motivation in comparison to a terrorist, and thus many prevention measures in the railway 
station will deter their activities (Fussey, 2007). 
 
4.16 Airport Style Screening Security Measures in the Railway Station 
By increasing and hardening airports to terrorism, it has displaced the threat to softer and 
more open forms of mass transport systems (Dolnik, 2007). Given the railway station must have 
open access as an operational necessity to function, the hardened airport style security 
measures are not effective forms of prevention (Dolnik, 2007 and Jones, 2011). Security 
measures, which are in place in airports, are practical as they operate on a restricted access 
for passengers. It is not only the cost implications of endeavouring to retrofit scanners in 
historical railway stations, which do not have the capacity to accommodate such 
measures, it is also the implications on the flow of passengers trying to navigate and utilise 
the network (Jenkins, 2004). Therefore, it is expected for the foreseeable future this form of 
security will not become a common measure in English railway stations. However, airport 
style security screening of passengers has proved to be successful in those railway stations in 
England, which are international hubs, allowing rail travel to Europe (Jones, 2011). Moreover, 
Kappia et al. (2009) propose CTMs would achieve greater acceptability from the public and 
the TOCs if they do not obstruct or hinder the transfer flow of the journey through the railway 
station to either entering the trains or exiting the building. The acceptability of CTMs in the 
railway stations to the public must gain acceptability with the multiple stakeholders in terms of 
operational and fiscal viability (Kappia, et al., 2009). 
 
Hence, the implications of CTMs, the ‘acceptability...cost and performance’ (Kappia, et al., 
2009, p.2) must not be considered in isolation rather as a whole. Jones (2011) furthers this 
argument by advocating there are ‘acceptable’ security processes, which can be 
integrated within the railway station, which is balanced, appropriate, and financially viable. 
However, Loukaitou-Sideris et al. (2006) contend within the cities: London, Paris, Tokyo, and 
Madrid, counter-terrorism strategies within the railway station are frequently in conflict with 
the aesthetics and openness of the network, leading to trade-offs between the differing 
agendas of stakeholders. One potential trade-off is that the stakeholders in the railway 
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station may put passenger reassurance before ‘actually improving security when they view 
the existing risk’ (Meyer, 2011, p.1). 
 
4.17 Securing the Railway Station 
Therefore, within the railway station, all hierarchical levels of stakeholders must ask what 
criminal behaviours within the space are ‘socially and economically acceptable limits and 
around an average that will be considered as optimal for…social functioning’ (Foucault, 
1978, p.5). A prohibitive law is made up of interrelated elements, what should not happen, 
the ethical maxims, the punishment, processes of deterrence, and methods of surveillance 
(Foucault, 1978, p.2). The problem of theft can be examined by the ‘apparatus of security’ 
(Foucault, 1978, p.6) and he described it as 
security inserts the phenomenon in question, namely theft, within a series of probable 
events. Second, the reactions of power to this phenomenon are inserted in a 
calculation of cost. Finally, instead of binary division between the permitted and the 
prohibited, one establishes an average considered as optimal on the one hand, and, 
on the other, a bandwidth of the acceptable that must not be exceeded. 
(Foucault, 1978. p.6) 
 
Foucault (1978) discussed the security of planned urban developments, which it is proposed 
is applicable to SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and Wales. As 
examined in Chapter Three, historically, the railway station, like the urban area, was built 
within a vacant space, and security would try to capitalise on ‘the positive elements, for 
which…provides the best possible circulation, and of minimising what is risky and 
inconvenient, like theft…knowing they will never be completely suppressed’ (Foucault, 1978, 
p.19). The location of the building of railway stations during the 19th century and the impacts 
on crime in the area are discussed in Chapter Six of the thesis. 
 
Additionally, the functions of the space of the railway station need to be planned and 
controlled in terms of their ‘poly-functionality’ (Foucault, 1978, p.19), as discussed in Chapter 
Three and Six, SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and Wales have 
multiple functions, which increase in complexities in relation to the size and location of the 
railway station. Moreover, Foucault (1978, p.20.) also maintains that future considerations 
must be accounted for when the function of the space is devised and constructed. 
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However, the future function and requirements of the space are uncontrollable, not 
accurately measured (Foucault, 1978, p.20) and yet, the security plans of space should allow 
for future occurrences and needs. Therefore, the approximating of these unknown future 
possibilities, ‘is…the essential characteristic of the mechanisms of security’ (Foucault, 1978, 
p.20). Thus, the resilience and security of SPIRS are fluid and dynamic, and spatial, with its 
functions having to account for these improbabilities. 
 
PART FOUR: SECURITY STRATEGIES AND THE RAILWAY STATION 
This next section will discuss security policies and strategies that influence the current 
resilience of the railway station to security threats. As already discussed in Chapter Three, in 
respect to the railway station, resilience and security policies are interconnected and 
cannot be considered in isolation in terms of the spaces resilience to human malign security 
threats. 
 
4.18 UK Resilience Strategies 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the decisions which are made now concerning the 
construction of major infrastructure projects will have an undoubted effect on future 
generations. However, commentators such as Bosher and Chtmutina (2017) and Coaffee 
and Fussey (2017) acknowledge this interconnection yet argue both agendas are 
‘responsibilised’ (Garland, 1996) by different levels of actors. The threats of terrorism and 
events such as 7/7 have pushed the resilience agenda from a top level down, with the state 
being ‘a ‘facilitator’ instead of a ‘builder’ of resilience’ (Bosher and Chtmutina, 2017, p. 
268). Local level stakeholders are ‘responsibilised’ (Garland, 1996) and ‘the security agenda 
[is] centralised’ (Bosher and Chtmutina, 2017). Coaffee and Fussey (2017, p.293) maintain 
the rhetoric of resilience and its enactment is through explicit security measures are now 
becoming narrower forms of ‘security-driven resilience’. Therefore, creating numerous 
consequences for governance, ‘scaling and coercive implications’ (Coaffee and Fussey, 
2017, p. 293).   
 
Moreover, Bosher et al. (2007, p.236) present an argument of a co-ordinated ‘and proactive 
multi-stakeholder approach’ to potentially reduce the vulnerability of CNI to both these and 
natural disaster threats. Designing new and the retrofitting of railway stations to increase 
resilience to security threats relies on the construction industry attaining ‘an in-depth 
understanding of the expertise and knowledge on avoiding and mitigating the effects of the 
99  
hazard’ (Bosher, 2008, p.3). This could be augmented practically by engaging and creating 
cross sector, public and private stakeholder relationships (Rogers, 2017 and Sircar et al., 
2013) with the intention of enhancing ‘the quality and flow of communication…as well as 
the interoperability and resilience of best practice’ (Rogers, 2017, p.21-22). Thus, 
stakeholders in complex spaces like SPIRS could be made aware of the causes of disasters 
and fully participate in a ‘negotiated census’ (Bosher et al., 2007, p.245) of which losses are 
considered acceptable and those which are not. However, there are issues with this 
approach being undermined by conflicting resilience agendas arising between the 
complex stakeholders and the Government, with tensions being caused by threats being 
miscalculated, the burden of resilience implementation expenditure, and the burden of 
obligated regulations on the private sector (Schneider, 2002, p.14, cited in Bosher et al., 
2007, p. 237). 
 
The UK’s political stance on the resilience of the CNI of the UK is defined by the Critical 
Infrastructure Resilience Programme as ‘the ability of a system or organisation to withstand 
and recover from adversity’ (Cabinet Office, 2010, p.5). The Government states regardless 
of difficulties, resilience methods and plans in CNI and businesses should mean central aims 
and operations should be attainable and realisable (Cabinet Office, 2010). The 
Government proposes resilience should be a holistic concept, which incorporates a suitable 
amalgamation ‘of infrastructure networks, effective emergency response, business 
continuity planning, and recovery arrangements’ (Cabinet Office, 2010, p.5). Yet, it is must 
be questioned whether this form of bridging resilience as a form of ‘organising principle’ 
can constructively beneficially unite ‘whatever needs to be bridged’ (Randalls and Simon, 
2017, p.40). 
 
The Sector Resilience Plan for Critical Infrastructure 2010 concedes the high level of 
dependencies and interconnections between the UK’s CNI. However, resilience strategies 
within the UK are disconnected and are treated as two distinct political agendas, as 
resilience to natural hazards and to human malign security threats are dealt with by 
separate Governmental departments and policies and strategies (White and O’Hare, 2014). 
This is evident in the 2010 Sector Resilience Plan for Critical Infrastructure, its core aims are to 
create resilience plans for each of the nine defined sectors and their respective sub-sectors 
by ‘setting out the current level of resilience of critical infrastructure and essential services to 
natural hazards’ (Cabinet Office, 2010, p.4). Moreover, Rogers (2017, p.17) contends the 
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concept of resilience in policies such as the Civil Contingences Act (CCA) (2004) which deal 
with disasters has not overlooked the division ‘between security threats and ecological or 
technological disasters’ it has more accurately been motivated ‘by comprehensive 
capability across all hazards’.  
 
However, despite this cross sector and multi-hazard recognition and the recommendations 
of the 2007 Pitt Report concerning the floods of the same year, to date, there is not a 
coalesced or multi-hazard approach to reducing the vulnerability against these risks (White 
and O’Hare, 2014). The Sector Resilience Plan claims in subsequent plans ‘other types of 
hazard, will be included’ (Cabinet Office, 2010, p.4), yet it is proposed this statement is 
ambiguous as to whether human malign security threats will be incorporated into future 
resilience plans. Thus, the concept of the resilience in terms of the railway station is currently 
a two-tiered approach, which deals with natural and human malign security threats 
through separate policies. 
 
A key policy that was triggered into action by natural occurring incidents is the Civil 
Contingencies Act (CCA) (2004). The CCA 2004 is the emergency planning policy for 
England is divided into two parts, emergency powers, and civil protection at a local level. 
Through this piece of legislation, the concept of resilience is presented through 
Governmentality through ‘empowering local responders, whilst also providing opportunities 
to attempt restructuring, imposing economies of scale on a number of key agencies’ 
(Rogers, 2011, cited in Rogers, 2017, p.18) 
 
At this level, the Act states there are two forms of responders, category one and two, who 
are considered as frontline and which defines their responsibility and role in disasters to 
situations at a local level (Bosher 2014), see Table 4.3 below. 
 
Category one Category two 
Emergency services Private sector stakeholders, 
including voluntary agencies 
Primary local Government 
authorities, 
Network Rail and other 
transport operators 
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National Health Service 
(NHS) 
National Grid 
Strategic Government 
agencies 
Utility companies 
Table 4.3 Source Bosher (2014, p.245) Emergency planning in the UK 
 
The political view of the concept of resilience in policies such as the CCA 2004 and Critical 
Infrastructure Resilience Programme advocate the position of ‘governmentality from a 
distance’ (Joseph, 2013, p.43), with the Government not taking ‘a direct role in the process’ 
(Joseph, 2013. P43). 
 
4.19 Governmentality and its impact on resilience and security policies 
When exploring how UK policy deals with human malign security threats, resilience has 
transformed into a fundamental political rhetorical statement used as an appropriate 
response by the government for the UK institutions, businesses and citizens to resist and 
recover from acts of crime and terrorism (Coaffee et al., 2009, p.111). Moreover, the 
upsurge ‘of resilience has…coincided with a greater global focus on the impact of crisis, 
disaster and security’ (Rogers, 2017, p.16). Yet, there is not one definitive ‘security resilience’ 
(Randalls and Simon, 2017, p.39) There are many policies which coalesce elements of 
security and resilience ‘aimed at cyber systems, critical infrastructure, and so on’ (Randalls 
and Simon, 2017, p.39), which signify varied consequences and governmental 
repercussions. Resilience and security are acted out in spaces such as SPIRS and other 
Category A railway stations and hence it has moved forward from being ‘a state based to 
a society-based’ (Chandler, 2013, p.217) responsibility for security and prevention measures. 
Consequently, the role of resilience and security is becoming a decentralised/shared 
responsibility, from Governmental offices and departments, the devolved Governments, 
the regulators, and the operators of infrastructures all establishing the ‘standards, 
determining priorities, and meeting costs of improving resilience for that sector’ (The 
Cabinet Office, 2010, p.6).  
 
Governmentality deals with the decentralisation of policies and responsibility of these from 
central Government. It questions and confronts the normalised model of top-down 
approaches to power by endorsing and emphasising diffused and decentralised policies 
such as CPMs and CTMs within spaces such as SPIRS. Moreover, Governmentality allows 
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‘social order and socially approved conducts [to] be promoted by extending the ‘reach’ 
of the state’s powers’ (Fergusson and Muncie, 2008, p.119). Governmentality has been 
examined by post-Foucauldian commentators such as Joseph (2013) and Dean (2007) who 
are critical of liberal forms of governance, paying particular attention to the concept of the 
state withdrawing and allowing the prominence of a laissez-faire strategies to model and 
influence political agendas surrounding public institutions, the concern in terms of this 
research surrounds the responsibility of securing pseudo-public spaces, which the case 
study railway station of SPIRS falls into that specific category. The growing responsibility for 
organisational and individual awareness, readiness and ‘adaptability…’bounce back’…fit 
with neoliberal approaches…[for] the responsibility of the individual to govern themselves 
in appropriate ways’ (Joseph, 2013, p.41).  
 
Foucault (1991a, p.96) proposes that Governmentality is located in the divisions of the 
fundamental functions of the everyday private and public institutions such as the ‘family, 
economy, education, hospitals, prisons’. The intentions of these common and everyday 
institutions create a state discipline ‘through neo-liberal values and customs’ (Mythen and 
Walklate, 2005, p.385) and control through creating frames of knowledge. However, 
governments rely on both influencing through legitimate entitlement of explicit and implicit 
‘expressions of power’ (Mythen and Walklate, 2005, p.385). Therefore, it is the power of the 
government and institutional knowledge, which control and normalize acceptable 
behaviour in a given society (Mythen and Walklate, 2005, p.385) 
 
Governmentality has developed from ‘the governmental practices constitutive of a 
particular regime of power…but ‘the way in which one conducts people’s conduct’ 
(Senellart, 2009, p.388). Therefore, the concept of Governmentality is intrinsic ‘to the micro-
powers, whatever the level of analysis being considered (…individual-public power)’ 
(Senellart, 2009, p.388). Foucault (1978, p.2) maintains a series of methods play a part in 
safeguarding processes of power. Consequently, these processes of power are not ‘self-
generating’ (Foucault (1978, p.2), but an inherent and central part of relationships. Foucault’s 
apparatuses of security are operationalised by Governmentality by incorporating policing; 
the armed forces and any other institution which endeavours to achieve the ideal and 
correct operation of the economy, ‘vital and social processes’ (Dean, 2010, p.29). It is argued 
that these relationships of power exist today in the space of the railway station and the 
stakeholders who interact with each other. Passengers, TOCs, BTP, Network Rail, the 
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Government, regulators, criminals all exert some form of power over other stakeholders. It is 
possible to examine these processes of power in SPIRS to identify what is specific about them 
at a given moment, for a given period, in a given field’ (Foucault, 1978, p.2). Foucault’s 
perception of governance helps us to discover ‘what the concept of resilience is actually 
doing’ (Joseph, 2013, p.40).  Resilience can be seen in terms ‘of the changing organisational 
structure of the advance liberal societies’ (Zebrowski, 2008, cited in Joseph, 2013, p.40) and 
not just by means of ‘the changing nature of security threats’ (Joseph, 2013, p.40). Thus, 
resilience through governmentality should endeavour to evolve past reactive ‘bounce 
backability’ to be a vehicle which generates ‘adaptable subjects capable of adapting to 
and exploiting situations of radical uncertainty’ (O’Malley, 2010, p.12, cited in Joseph, 2013, 
p.40). 
 
Within spaces such as SPIRS, governmentality through the enactment of resilience and 
security policies and strategies, ‘responsibilisation’ (Garland, 1996) is at the heart of crime 
and terrorism prevention measures. The control of prevention measures in SPIRS has 
‘devolv[ing] responsibility for crime prevention onto agencies, institutions, and individuals 
which are quite outside the state and to persuade them to act appropriately’ (Garland 1996, 
p.452). Consequently, as more of the complex and multiple stakeholders are responsibilised 
and given the power to secure a railway station, thus ‘so are the powers of Government are 
extended to how [the stakeholders] conduct themselves’ (Fergusson and Muncie, 2008, 
p.119). However, paradoxically, the more responsibility and control that is dispersed to the 
multiple stakeholders in the railway station, the power of the state is tempered as they 
‘cannot monitor and control’ (Fergusson and Muncie, 2008, p.119) their actions. 
 
4.20 Resilience and Security Responsibilisation Strategies 
Thus, there has been a development of a new mode of political regulation concerning 
security strategies, which Garland (1996) described as a ‘responsibilisation strategy’. The 
Government has sought to enhance overt methods of state agencies crime control such as 
the police and the judicial system, by operating covert methods ‘to activate action on the 
part of non-state agencies and institutions’ (Garland, 1996, p.452). This strategy is the 
cornerstone of the devolution of the Government’s crime prevention strategies, with 
discourses of “'partnership', 'inter-agency co-operation', 'the multiagency approach', 
'activating communities', creating 'active citizens', 'help for self-help’ (Garland, 1996, p.452) 
being at the forefront. Responsibility for the control of crime has shifted to ‘agencies, 
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organizations and individuals which are quite outside the state and to persuade them to act 
appropriately’ (Garland, 1996, p.452). 
 
With respect to the resilience of SPIRS and other Category A railway stations to human 
malign security threats, this overt method of crime control has become prevalent in the UK, 
with a number of stakeholders charged with tasks of prevention, from Network Rail, retailers, 
TOCs, passengers and public. The Government operationalises responsibilities and 
strategies by ensuring non-state agencies conform to these new duties through statutory 
changes and or encouraging modifications or innovative behaviour or halting existing 
practices (Riley and Mayhew, 1980, p.15, cited in Garland, 1996). The BTP, Network Rail, 
TOCs and retailers are all expected at a local level to unify and implement their corporate 
(often national) resilience and security policies alongside national Governmental resilience 
and security policies. Thus, private sector key stakeholders and even the public within SPIRS 
and other Category A railways stations in England and Wales are and have intersecting 
responsibilities for controlling and preventing crime and terrorism. The public and passengers 
alike, except when they are in the railway station to be in a safe and secure environment.  
Rogers (2017, p.20-21) maintains in terms of resilience, on the whole, the public has a 
‘passive role…recipients of warning and informing information…not directly consulted or 
engaged…governance fulfils its obligation to protect by providing generic information on 
dangers’.  
 
Contrary to Rogers’ (2017) position of a passive public in terms of governance and 
resilience, there is a very strong reliance on the public to be the informal eyes and ears in 
railway stations today. The BTP and Network Rail use campaigns to increase and maintain 
passenger/public vigilance to security threats, with the objective of such strategies ‘to raise 
consciousness, create a sense of duty, and thus change practices’ (Garland, 1996, p.452). 
Moreover, Fergusson and Muncie (2008, p.119) maintain the state has become a 
‘dispersed, decentralised [form] of governing’. Hence, organisations and agents of security 
control have ‘become self-managing and Governments ‘govern at a distance’ through 
them’ (Fergusson and Muncie, 2008, p.119). Thus, the concept of resilience can be 
described as a neoliberal vehicle for governmentality, with ‘the opening up of new 
areas…of private enterprise and individual initiative’ (Joseph, 2017, p.162) with stakeholders 
such as designers and planners, Network Rail and retailers within spaces such as SPIRS 
responsibilised to make their own choices regarding CPTED and SCP and they are 
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‘expected to follow competitive rules of conduct’ (Joseph, 2017, p.162). An example of 
such a scheme is the Secure Station Scheme (SSS) which is a practical example of a crime 
prevention scheme for railway stations in England and Wales which governed by the state 
through the DfT, governed at a local level by the BTP and implemented by the TOCs and or 
Network railway within the stations. 
 
Furthermore, at a state level, the Government executed through the DfT protects transport, 
its infrastructure and the public through a policy called ‘Managing the risk to transport 
networks from terrorism and other crimes’ (Gov.UK, 2012). The overarching remit of this 
security policy purports that security protection should not come at the cost of effectiveness 
and efficiencies of transport systems should be proportionate, and risked based (Gov.UK, 
2012). There is a suite of policies and strategies that are applicable to the resilience of SPIRS 
to human malign security threats, which are part of the wider counter-terrorist strategy 
CONTEST 2011 (Gov.UK, 2012). However, it is argued that the Government stance regarding 
CONTEST is considerably less laissez-faire then crime prevention strategies, with CONTEST 
being openly ‘guaranteed by the state and the apparatuses of security’ (Joseph, 2017, 
p.162).  
 
4.21 CONTEST Strategy 
The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) provides protective security 
advice aimed at reducing the vulnerability of CNI to national security threats but has no 
such role in relation to natural hazards (Cabinet Office, 2010b). At present, a wide-ranging 
strategy is charged with the protection of the UK’s CNI from terrorism, this forms part of the 
UK’s principal counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST), where the area sponsor departments, 
such as the DfT, are responsible for determining the appropriate security methods for their 
areas and CPNI supports this programme of work. The CONTEST strategy is an example of a 
policy that straddles the interwoven aspects of resilience and security (security-driven 
resilience, Coaffee and Fussey, 2017, p.294). It has provided the Government with a strategy 
which fits a neo-liberal model of ‘responsibilisation ‘for a powerful top-down, state driven 
logic for ‘resilience’ ‘(Coaffee and Fussey, 2017, p.295). There is also a strategic framework 
is in place (CNI Protection in the UK: Framework and Guidance) which provides a common 
foundation for activity by all those involved in national infrastructure protection from 
counter-terrorism and other national security threats. Chmutina et al. (2016, p.71) remind us 
that ‘the resilience agenda goes hand in hand with the security agenda in the UK’. 
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Furthermore, the prepare strand and work under CONTEST are being taken forward by The 
Cabinet Office to build capabilities within the resilience community to respond to threats 
and hazards identified in the National Risk Register. The Critical Infrastructure Resilience 
Programme will seek to align with the CONTEST strategy and existing processes and 
procedures will be adopted where possible to provide a coherent and consistent approach 
to building resilience across sectors to all risks and threats, including natural hazards’ 
(Cabinet Office, 2010b, p.11). 
The aim of CONTEST is to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from 
terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence. 
(Gov.UK, 2011) 
 
Therefore, the primary objectives of CONTEST appear to holistically deal with terrorism, 
through the detection and capture of terrorists and supporting local communities to 
confront and challenge grass-roots extremism (Silke, 2011). Consequently, endeavouring to 
lessen the threat of acts of terrorism occurring and to lessen the effect of such incidents 
(Mottram, 2006, cited in Fussey, 2007, p.176). The concept of resilience is advocated in the 
strategy as Government maintains ‘resilience best enables communities to adapt to new 
security risks, withstand threats and show continuity in the face of adversity’ (Joseph, 2017, 
p.163) 
 
Below are the four P’s strands of the 2011 CONTEST Strategy: 
• Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks; 
• Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism; 
• Protect: to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack; and 
• Prepare: to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack. 
(Home Office, 2011b) 
 
However, the CONTEST strategy does not guarantee to eradicate the threat or the impact 
of acts of terrorism and this reflects ‘the impossibility of entirely preventing terrorist attacks’ 
(Fussey, 2007, p.176), given the principal of the strategy is ‘to reduce the risk to the UK’ (Gov.UK, 
2011). Nonetheless, under the Protect strand, there has been a sustained effort to lessen the 
susceptibility of the railway station to terrorist attack, consisting of ‘protective physical 
measures, selective screening and better security for transport infrastructure’ (Home Office, 
2011c, p.82). Such measures in major railway stations have incorporated putting in place fixed 
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vehicle barriers, retrofitting security systems when railway stations are being redeveloped 
and the recognition of potential forms of screening technologies for passengers (Home Office, 
2011c). Randalls and Simon (2017, p.45) maintain security policies and strategies for 
infrastructure in the UK overtly aspire ‘for self-healing systems and security that is emergent, 
inherent and ‘designed in’’. However, Gregory (2009) proposes that operationalising the 
Protect strand of CONTEST through planning and design is subject to discord among 
architects. However, the Royal Institute of British Architects maintains architects do have a 
function to play in designing out terrorism (Gregory, 2009). 
 
Between 2011 and 2015, the following elements relevant for the protection of the railway 
station fell under the Protect strand of CONTEST: 
• Strengthen UK border security (Relevant to Eurostar Hubs); 
• Reduce the vulnerability of the transport network; 
• Increase the resilience of the UK’s infrastructure; and 
• Improve protective security for crowded places.  
(Home Office, 2011c, p.80) 
 
The CONTEST strategy already has a role in the protection of CNI from threats and acts of 
terrorism, with each of the nine CNI sectors sponsoring departments being accountable for 
determining the ‘appropriate security approach to be taken for their sector’ (Cabinet 
Office, 2010b, p.11). Moreover, the Government proposes the alignment of the CONTEST 
strategy and the Critical Resilience Program will endeavour to ‘provide a coherent and 
consistent approach to building resilience across sectors to all risks and threats, including 
natural hazards’ (Cabinet Office, 2010b). 
 
The operationalisation of the CONTEST strategy is the responsibility of numerous 
Governmental departments, secret services, police forces, other public agencies, at both 
regional and local levels of Government, the private sector, and community groups 
(Gregory, 2009, p.1). It can be argued that resilience and security are ‘responsibilised’ 
(Garland, 1996) through multi-agency partnerships between organisations and also the 
public, yet in truth the Government is advancing a specific agenda when acts of terrorism 
advance the legitimacy of resilience and security policies and strategies. 
‘The government is constructing a sphere of governance which it oversees from a 
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distance through the use of powers… Policy emphasises that individuals, 
communities and the private sector take responsibility for their welfare and 
economic and social well-being. These ‘stakeholders’ are required to familiarise 
themselves with possible risks and learn how to make informed decisions’. 
(Rogers, 2017, p.44) 
The CONTEST strategy is an example of how through Governmentality that the concept of 
resilience has become a vehicle to address security issues and as such develop ‘the growth 
of security-driven resilience’ (Coaffee and Fussey, 2017, p.294). 
 
4.22 Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 specifically concerns the involvement of police 
crime prevention officers at the design stages of building and refurbishment projects of 
railway stations in England and Wales. The Act builds on the theoretical stance that if 
community safety programmes and CPMs and strategies are to co-exist and efficiently then 
it would need to be carried out as holistic multiagency and stakeholder work (Nacro, 2002). 
The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 is a critical piece of legislative evolution as it recognises that 
Home Office Police Forces could no longer be considered the ‘primary crime prevention 
agents’ and provides a statutory duty through ‘a framework for partnership working at a 
local level’ (Nacro, 2002, p.6) for Local Authorities and the police. This partnership must 
through the framework: 
 
identify, through local crime and disorder audits and consultation, key local crime 
and disorder priorities, formulate strategies to assist in tackling these key priorities 
and reduce crime at the local level monitor and evaluate those strategies. 
(Nacro, 2002, p.6) 
 
Therefore, it should be noted that Home Office Police Forces must be involved from the 
design stage of building projects, and to work with a range of responsible stakeholders to 
ensure CPMs are viewed as critical as other legislative obligations. Conversely, when new 
railway stations are designed or refurbished, the BTP and their crime prevention officers or 
ALO’s are not covered by this legislation or by any other legislation that provides them with 
power to be consulted in the design stage of the building or redesign of such projects 
(Gregson-Green et al., 2013). In terms of inclusivity, this disconnect between the BTP and 
Home Office police force is discussed further in Chapter Seven. 
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4.23 Security in Design of Stations (SIDOS) 
In 2012, the Government published a guidance only document called the Security in Design 
of Stations (SIDOS) to be used by consultants, designers, contractors, and security 
professionals when considering and incorporating physical security measures into major 
railway station redevelopments and the building of new railway stations. While the 
guidance recommends using a generic checklist to ensure the early consideration of 
security measures suitable for the specific space, and the inclusion groups of stakeholders are 
involved from the earliest stages of projects, it is only guidance. ‘The document suggests 
CTSA/ALOs are involved at the early stages of projects, it is not a statutory requirement and 
therefore does not guarantee their involvement.’ (Gregson-Green, et al., 2013, p.37) 
 
4.24 Other Security Policies Relating to the Railway Station 
Other policies which protect the infrastructure of SPIRS and other Category A railway 
stations in England and Wales from human malign security threats are briefly detailed 
below: 
•Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act, 2001 
 
Amends the Terrorism Act 2000; making further provision about terrorism and security; 
the provision of freezing of assets; immigration and asylum; amend or extend the 
criminal law and powers for preventing crime and enforcing that law; to make 
provision about the control of pathogens and toxins; to provide for the retention of 
communications data; to provide for implementation of Title VI of the Treaty on 
European Union; and for connected purposes. 
(Source www.legislation.gov.uk, 2015a) 
 
•Railways Act 1993/2005 
 
An Act to provide for the appointment and functions of a Rail Regulator and a 
Director of Passenger Rail Franchising and of users’ consultative committees for the 
railway industry…; to make new provision with respect to the provision of railway 
services and the persons by whom they are to be provided or who are to secure their 
provision;…the grant and acquisition of rights over, and the disposal or other transfer 
and vesting of, any property, rights or liabilities by means of which railway services are, 
or are to be, provided;…to make provision with respect to the safety of railways and the 
protection of railway employees and members of the public from personal injury and other risks 
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arising from the construction or operation of railways; to make further provision with respect to 
transport police;…to make provision for and in connection with the payment of grants 
and subsidies in connection  with   railways…; to make provision in  relation to 
tramways and other guided transport systems; and for connected purposes. 
(Source www.legislation.gov.uk, 2015b) 
 
•Channel Tunnel (Security) Order 1994 
 
This security order covers offences and the subsequent protection of the Channel 
Tunnel trains and the subsequent tunnel system in the UK. It defines areas such as 
the hijacking of Channel Tunnel trains and the sentence for such offences. It also 
highlights the power of the Secretary of State  
(Legislation.Gov, 2015c) 
 
4.25 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has discussed the human malign security threats which SPIRS and other 
Category A railway stations in England and Wales must currently deal with. It has examined 
how the complex multiple stakeholders within the space endeavour to minimise crimes and 
threats of terrorism through prevention measures, strategies, and policies. The theories and 
measures of CPTED and SCP have allowed the reader to attain a greater understanding of 
the variety of ‘opportunity reduction techniques and how these are currently being 
deployed’ (Morgan and Cornish, 2006, p.27) within the space of the railway station in England 
and Wales. It has been proposed that prevention measures can be utilised for a dual 
purpose of crime and terrorism prevention, given the ‘similarities between the different forms 
and methods of terrorist activity and the more mundane forms…of crime’ (Cornish and 
Smith, 2006, p.196). Furthermore, this Chapter has examined Resilience and Security policies 
which impact on SPIRS and other Category A railway stations.  It has demonstrated the 
concept of resilience and security within discourse and policy cannot be treated as 
separate concerns. The concept of resilience and subsequent security within the policies 
discussed demonstrate ‘governmentality from a distance’ (Rogers, 2017, p.43) and 
‘introduces a market of logic of competitiveness and initiative’ (Joseph, 2017, p.163). 
‘Responsibilisation’ of public and private sector, community and public stakeholders are 
obliged to acquaint ‘themselves with the possible risks and learn how to make informed 
decisions…[taking] responsibility for their welfare and economic and social wellbeing’ 
(Rogers, 2017, p.44). The next chapter looks at the methodology and research design that 
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has been undertaken to collect the research findings. 
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CHAPTER FIVE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
 
5. Chapter Introduction 
This chapter examines the processes undertaken in researching the current and future 
resilience of SPIRS to security threats, while at the same time endeavouring to understand 
how the numerous stakeholders presented methodological complexities. The first part of the 
chapter examines research philosophies, design, and strategies. It examines the 
philosophies used to inform the research methodologies in this thesis. Also, discussed is the 
research design and the rationale behind choosing a single unique case study and the 
associated research methods. Subsequently, the second part of the chapter explains and 
justifies the form of analysis chosen. The rationalisation and methodology of undertaking 
Stakeholder Mapping are discussed in terms of the case study railway station, SPIRS, and 
the multiple stakeholders who operate within the space. The limitations of the research are 
discussed, and the impact of the researcher in terms of potential biases is explored. 
 
PART ONE: POSITIONS, RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
 
5.1 Epistemological and Ontological Positions 
Social research problems rely on not only the research methodology but also the philosophical 
conjectures which are required to form the basis of the research, which in turn can be seen to 
impact on methods utilised to gather, examine, and understand the research data (Dainty, 
2008, p.3). Therefore, the research methodology is interrelated to the epistemological and 
ontological stances and in this thesis, will not be considered in isolation (Dainty, 2008, p.3). 
Table 5.1 highlights this relationship and it is examined in further detail in the following 
sections to allow a greater appreciation of their interconnections and how exploiting these 
relationships allowed the researcher to build a research design around the unique case 
study of SPIRS which provided reliable, valid, and robust data and findings concerning the 
current and future resilience of the space to security threats. 
 
5.1.2 Epistemological Positions 
Epistemological issues question ‘what is (or should be) regarded as acceptable knowledge 
in a discipline’ (Bryman, 2004, p.11). 
 
An epistemological position of interpretivism accepts the researcher must understand ‘the 
subjective meaning of social action’ (Bryman, 2004, p.540). Therefore, it looks at people’s 
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actuality and behaviours thus, 
it has meanings for them and they act on the basis that they attribute to their 
acts and the acts of others. 
(Bryman, 2004, p.14) 
 
The researcher wished to understand the resilience and security thinking of the SPIRS 
stakeholders, unravel, and explain their behaviours and their everyday reality from their 
standpoint (Bryman, 2004). Therefore, with this perspective in mind, the epistemological 
position of this research took the form of interpretivism, given the research question looked ‘for 
culturally derived and historically situated interpretations of the social-life world’ (Crotty, 
1998, p.67), in the chosen case study railway station of SPIRS.  
 
If the research had been based upon the epistemological positions of positivism or realism 
the research methodologies would have been different. Positivism ‘advocates the 
application of the methods of the natural sciences to the study of social reality’ (Bryman, 
2004, p.11). It supports the creation of theories and thus the formation of theories, which can 
be assessed and verified and permits the clarification ‘of laws… (the principle of 
deductivism)’ (Bryman, 2004, p.11). Additionally, laws can be based on information, truths, 
and realities that are collected, ‘(the principle of inductivism)’ (Bryman, 2004, p.11). 
Positivism ascribes to the principle that ‘there is an external reality that is separate from our 
descriptions of it’ (Bryman, 2004, p.12). 
 
Moreover, an epistemological position of realism shares many of the above characteristics 
of positivism. Bryman (2004, p.12) describes two forms of realism, critical and empirical. 
Critical realism acknowledges that our reality can be understood and thus altered if we 
understand the formations ‘that generate those events and discourse’ (Bhaskar, 1989, p.2, 
cited in Bryman, 2004, p.12). Empirical realism states that by utilising suitable ‘methods, 
reality can be understood’ (Bryman, 2004, p.12).  
 
5.1.3 Ontological Stances 
Dainty (2008, p.3) proposes that in philosophical terms, ontology can be defined as the 
‘conceptions of reality’. 
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Constructionism as an ontological position is based on social occurrences and their 
significance being constantly being realised and undertaken by individuals, these are 
produced by individuals and are continuously being adjusted and modified (Bryman 2004). 
Moreover, it is important to recognise that the researcher will offer their personal construction 
of the reality they encounter and not a specific account. Therefore, constructionism is a 
philosophical perspective where it can be contended ‘that all knowledge – not just that of 
the research participants – is socially created’ (Seale, 2004, p.108). Creswell (2009, p.6) 
maintains constructionism is based on the principles of 
• Understanding 
• Multiple participant meanings 
• Social and historical construction 
• Theory generation 
 
Therefore, constructionism has formed the basis of the ontological position of the research. 
Constructionism as an ontological perspective permitted the researcher to understand how 
temporally and spatially the complex and multiple stakeholders in SPIRS constructed their 
understanding of human malign security threats and resilience and the differences in these 
meanings (Crotty, 1998). Moreover, the ontological position of constructionism is related to 
the subsequent thematic analysis of the research data and this is examined in detail in 
section 5.7.1. 
 
However, the ontological position of objectivism refers to social occurrences, a common 
discourse, and their significance, which has ’an existence that is independent of social 
actors’ (Bryman, 2004, p.16). This can be exemplified when considering organisations, 
which are operated on frameworks of regulated and normalised practices, where roles are 
divided among the workforce, controlling them through order and encouraging their belief 
in corporate values.  
 
5.2 Methodological Paradigms 
A methodological paradigm provides the researcher with a structure of principles, which 
guides them how to use a method to determine ‘what should be studied, how research 
should be done, and how the result should be interpreted’ (Bryman, 2004, p.542). Table 5.1 
illustrates the differences between the methodological paradigms. Moreover, it also 
highlights the complementary relationships between epistemological and ontological and 
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research strategies 
 
The unique case study of SPIRS was chosen as the research design in which to mobilise an 
abductive position. An abductive stance is an iterative process which utilises an approach 
of systematic combining. Thus, meaning that each step of the case study involved the 
development of ideas and influenced further data collection and emergent theories 
(Spicer, 2004). In some areas of findings, the data collected can inform a ‘new research 
focus’ (Dubois and Gadde, 2002, p.553). The process of data collection within a case study 
design alters and creates a ‘new view of reality’ (Dubois and Gadde, 2002, p.553) for the 
researcher. Abduction allowed for the exploration of causal links within SPIRS, which were 
too complex and competing to be collected through quantitative data.  Consequently, for 
the research programme, qualitative data was collected via documentary analysis and 
semi-structured interviews. Table 5.1 illustrates the key differences and similarities between 
the three methodological paradigms examined in this section. 
 
There are two other methodological paradigms which can be considered when looking at 
social science research, induction, and deduction. Induction is a process of collecting data 
about facets of social life and making connections between them to arrive at a theory (May, 
1997). Bryman (2004, p.9) states ‘an inductive stance, theory is the outcome of the 
research…drawing generalisable inferences out of observations’. An inductive approach is 
normally associated with qualitative data, this is because this approach is fluid and flexible 
which allows the researcher to be iterative and move to and from the theory and data 
collected (Bryman, 2004, p.10). The process of deduction is where the theories are set out 
before the research (May, 1997). Therefore, the researcher with a prior knowledge of a field 
will determine a hypothesis (ses) to be researched (Bryman, 2004). An approach which is 
deductive is related to quantitative research but frequently does not always follow the 
above strict linear process, ‘a researcher’s view of the theory…may have changed as a 
result of the collected data’ (Bryman, 2004, p.8).   
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Table 5.1 The differences between the methodological paradigms. 
Methodological 
Paradigm 
Deduction Induction Abduction 
Epistemological Stance Positivism Interpretivism Interpretivism 
Ontological Stance Objectivism Constructionism Constructionism 
Research Strategy Quantitative Qualitative Mixed methods can 
be used 
Research Methods Surveys, 
experiments 
Interviews, focus 
groups, 
observations, visual 
and audio data 
Interviews, focus 
groups, 
observations, visual 
and audio data 
Analytical Approaches Content 
analysis 
Thematic analysis, 
grounded theory 
Analysis of the 
continual 
interfaces between 
the data and 
theory 
 
Thematic analysis, 
grounded theory 
 
5.3 Research Strategies and Methods 
Research strategies comprise of diverse methods of ‘data collection, analysis and 
interpretation’ (Creswell, 2009, p.233). This thesis uses the epistemological position of 
interpretivism, the ontological stance of constructionism and the methodological paradigm 
of abduction. Hence, the research strategy chosen to meet the aim and objectives of the 
research were multiple and qualitative research methods. The rich and in-depth qualitative 
data provided by participants permitted the researcher an understanding of ‘their 
subjective meaning’ (Lazar, 2004, p.14), which is not afforded by quantitative statistical 
information (Lazar, 2004, p.14).  
 
5.3.1 Qualitative Research Methods 
Qualitative research methods were used in this research to examine SPIRS’ stakeholders ‘in 
naturally occurring settings’ (Spicer, 2004, p.295). The qualitative research methods provided 
‘diverse strategies of inquiry’ (Creswell, 2009, p.173), with being data drawn from a variety of 
written and visual sources. The researcher used the following qualitative methods; semi-
structured interviews, observations, and documentation to collect the research data. 
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5.3.2 Semi-structured interviews 
A principle method used for the collection of research data was semi-structured interviews, 
which were used to gather information and data from thirty-four participants (Table 5.3). The 
open-ended questions of the semi-structured interviews enabled the participants to 
‘produce a narrative…of their own…experience[s]’ (Wengraf, 2001, p.5) around SPIRS’ 
resilience to current and future security threats. They were a valuable method of collecting 
data from the participants as they illustrated how the SPIRS stakeholders made ‘sense of 
their social world and act within it’ (May, 1997, p.129). Consequently, producing a 
purposeful dialogue (Bryman, 2004, p.181) as the open-ended questions permitted the 
expression their opinions and to discuss their experiences (Byrne, 2004, p.182) about how the 
current and future resilience of SPIRS to security threats are impacted by the complex 
stakeholders and policies within the space.  The length of the interviews was not limited. The 
typical length of the interviews was an hour and a half to two hours long. 
 
Ironically, the main benefits of the flexible collection of data, can have a negative impact 
on the participants (Fielding and Thomas, 2001, p.133). The socio-demographic qualities of 
the interviewer can affect the answers given by participants, to ‘the extent where 
the…responses [can] be seen as socially acceptable to the interviewer’ (Fielding and 
Thomas, 2001, p.133). The researcher can be offered false or disingenuous responses to the 
interview questions (Seale, 2004). Thus, the researcher acknowledged in the analysis of the 
data that the interviews were ‘contextually situated practices’ (Rapley, 2004, p.29) and the 
location of the interview and the proximity of the interviewer would have impacted on the 
dialogue produced by the participant.  
 
5.3.3 Observations 
As well as the research data gathered from qualitative semi-structured interviews and 
documentation, direct observations of SPIRS were collected and used in the analysis of the 
data. As the researcher had spent over eighteen months visiting SPIRS for interviews and 
travelling via the station to other interviews, it gave the opportunity for providing another 
source of evidence for the case study, through direct observations of the environment (Yin, 
2009). 
 
Direct observations were made of SPIRS and the meeting spaces where the interviews were 
held, whether they were external stakeholders or carried out in SPIRS. By making 
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observations as part of the research, the researcher became aware of the participant’s 
status within the organisation (Yin, 2009). However, most of the interviews were either carried 
out in meeting rooms in the stakeholder’s offices or in coffee shops in SPIRS or in 
neighbouring establishments. The direct observations and photographs used in Chapters Six 
and Seven of SPIRS provide additional understanding of prevention measures such as CCTV 
and hostile vehicle mitigation. Therefore, the ‘photographs will help to convey important case 
characteristics to outside observers’ (Yin, 2009, p.110).  
 
5.3.4 Documentation 
The collection of documentation was another method used to collect data. Various forms 
of documentation were collected for the policy review and which validated the semi-
structured interview data. The term document covered the ‘official documents deriving 
from the state…private sources’ and ‘mass media outputs’ (Bryman, 2004, p.386). State 
documents were available for public scrutiny such as official press releases; memos; white 
and green papers and archived documents (Creswell, 2009). Given the sensitive nature of 
Category A railway stations in England and Wales security documents, such as the National 
Railway Security Programme (NRSP) were not publicly accessible. These documents were 
discussed in some of the interviews, but have not been examined due to the confidential 
contents. The data gathered from the documentation was examined using qualitative 
thematic analysis to understand its ‘significance within the document’ (May, 1997, p.172). 
Thematic analysis is examined in further detail in section 5.10.1. 
 
5.3.5 Literature Review 
The literature review played a key role in scoping the of and the context of the case study. 
It facilitated in highlighting the entangled physical, legal, and operational boundaries of 
SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and Wales. Furthermore, the 
conducted literature review examined resilience, security, Stakeholder Theory, which 
shaped and steered the initial semi-structured interview schedules for the data collection. 
The literature review also assisted in the initial draft of the Stakeholder Map, the methodology 
of which is examined in section 5.9.1. 
 
The researcher accessed a wide range of electronic and traditional media sources. Using 
the keywords “resilience”, “railway stations”, “crime”, “terrorism”, “crime and counter-
terrorism measures”, and “Stakeholders”, the researcher searched for peer-reviewed journal 
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articles published from 1980 until 2016. The preliminary searches produced many articles and 
were thus screened by title and then by abstract. Through this process, only articles and 
chapters considered relevant to the research aim were included in the body of articles to be 
reviewed. 
 
5.3.6 Multiple data sources and triangulation 
Rather than being dependent on a single type of data, the research utilised qualitative 
methods which gathered multiple sources of data such as documents, observations, and 
interviews. This research strategy supports Yin (2009) who maintains multiple sources of data for 
a case study help to strengthen the robustness and quality of the research. Triangulation takes 
the multiple methods of data collected to answer, ‘the research question in order to 
crosscheck results for consistency and to offset any bias of a single research method’ 
(Spicer, 2004, p.297). Therefore, the researcher triangulated the SPIRS data collected, thus 
permitting a more credible set of findings (Yin, 2009) by using diverse types of data.  
 
5.3.7Quantitative research methods 
However, the research could have employed quantitative research methods which offer a 
complementary methodology for the philosophical traditions of positivism and addressing 
hypotheses through structured questionnaires and experiments.  The ontological position of 
the thesis (see Table 5.1), constructionism, does not position itself well to data collection via 
quantitative research methods, as the purpose of this ontological position is to understand 
how the participants construct their everyday experiences and working practices of 
resilience and security in SPIRS. 
 
Methods such as questionnaires could have been used to collect quantitative data. This 
would have involved fixed questionnaires being delivered to a sample population to make 
generalisations to that population (Creswell, 2009). The purpose of the generalisation would 
make deductions regarding the actions, individualities, and opinions of the population 
sampled.  However, it would not have been possible to select a random sample of 
stakeholders in SPIRS, as the data required for answering the research question did not 
require a stratification of ‘specific characteristics of individuals’ (Creswell, 2009, p.148) such 
as gender, age, education etc. are not necessary for the analysis of the data. Crucially, it 
is the depth of information gathered by qualitative methods which aided answering the 
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research question. Nevertheless, it should be recognised that if data had been collected 
via quantitative methods, it would have produced different results from those collected by 
qualitative methods. The data collected would have been interrogated via statistical 
methods, such as variances according to the stratified variables.  
 
5.3.8 Mixed methods of data collection 
Moreover, it would have also been possible for the researcher to combine both 
quantitative and qualitative research methods to facilitate the data collection. Spicer 
(2004, p.299) proposes using a mix method approach rather than just one method, it allows 
for the investigation of ‘a broader range of issues to be addressed’. Therefore, this method 
can take quantitative data such as questionnaires or census data and then utilise 
qualitative methods to elucidate wider ‘patterns emerging from quantitative analysis’ 
(Spicer, 2004, p.299). 
 
5.4 Research Design-The Case Study 
The above section has discussed the research design which defines the methods of data 
collection and analysis undertaken by the researcher to address the research question and 
to offer a structure for carrying out the research (Dainty, 2008). A single case study was chosen 
as the design to carry out the research, an explanation and justification of which is discussed 
in the following subsections. 
 
5.4.1Case Study 
A ‘case study is a research strategy which focuses on understanding the dynamics present 
within single settings’ (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.534). Regardless of the type and nature of the case 
study, at their core is the fundamental propensity to attempt to clarify a situation, 
organisation, process or institution (Yin, 2009, p.17). A case study is ‘an…all-encompassing 
method-covering the logic of design, collection techniques and specific approaches to 
data analysis’ (Yin, 2009, p.18). The research question posed, and the subsequent PhD 
covers a new area of research, and the aim of the thesis is to 
 
determine and examine the interdependencies and boundaries of the multiple 
stakeholders within St Pancras International Railway Station, and to analyse how their 
governance, operational and legislative requirements, and agendas influence both 
current and future resilience of complex Category A railway stations to human 
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malign security threats.  
 
This research is unique and exploratory; given the evaluation of current and future 
resilience of SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and Wales to security 
threats does not have an established set of conclusions.  
 
From the outset, the unique case study of SPIRS followed a justified and ‘methodological 
path’ (Yin, 2009, p.3). The rationale behind choosing a case study, the protocol followed and 
the issues around the choice of research design are discussed in detail in the subsequent 
section. However, case studies do have criticisms, with issues of rigour being an area of 
concern (Yin, 2009). Criticisms are often aimed at case studies which lack a formalised 
protocol and letting ‘equivocal evidence or biased views to influence the direction of the 
findings’ (Yin, 2009, p.14). More criticism case studies face is they cannot be used for 
‘statistical generalisation’ (Yin, 2009, p.15). Yet, in-depth learning from a specific case study 
‘should be considered strength rather than a weakness’ (Dubois and Gadde, 2002, p.554), 
and its purpose is the ‘analysis of a number of interdependent variables in a complex 
structure’ (Dubois and Gadde, 2002, p.557). There are many forms of case studies, single 
and multiple cases, with either holistic or embedded design; using quantitative or 
qualitative data, or a mixture of the two. The type of case study chosen to examine SPIRS is 
discussed in the below section. 
 
5.4.2 Multiple case studies design 
A multiple case study comprises of more than one case study. There are ‘analytic benefits 
from having two or more cases’ (Yin, 2009, p.61) rather than utilising a single case study 
design. However, a disadvantage of conducting a multiple case study is the amount of 
‘resources and time beyond the means of a single student’ (Yin, 2009, p.53). The researcher 
must also consider when using multiple cases, there are issues of replication and sampling. 
This research could have taken the research question posed and used several Category A 
railway stations as a multiple case study. However, the justification for the decision to 
undertake a single case study is examined in the below sections. 
 
5.4.3 Single case study design 
A single case study was chosen as it complements the epistemological position of 
interpretivism and the ontological stance of constructionism. SPIRS’ multiple stakeholders 
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make it an ideal subject for a single case study. Furthermore, a single case study design for 
SPIRS can be rationalised as it is ‘an extreme…or unique case’ (Yin, 2009, p.47). The 
justification for choosing a single case study design is discussed in the below section. By 
carrying out single case study for SPIRS, the data obtained was rich and in-depth, it 
additionally increased the understanding of the temporal and spatial elements of a 
complex Category A railway station, and how it’s stakeholder practices and policies 
impacted on the current and future resilience of the space security threats. It is the in-depth 
nature of a single unique case study, which allowed the researcher ‘to understand 
complex phenomena…and to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life 
events (Yin, 2009, p.4) in SPIRS. 
 
5.4.4 Justification of the single case study 
To answer the research question posed it is the exploratory in-depth nature of the unique 
single case study, which permitted the researcher to examine and comprehend the 
complex phenomena of SPIRS’ stakeholders and the resilience of the space while 
preserving the significant attributes of actual everyday occurrences and practices. SPIRS 
was chosen as a single case study to represent an extreme and unique case (Yin, 2009) of a 
Category A Railway Station in England and Wales. SPIRS is England’s most unique and 
complex Category A railway station, with no other station in England or Wales housing such 
complex functions. In the overall space, there is an international travel hub, a national 
terminus, an underground station, a retail, and leisure destination, it has a five-star hotel with 
homes above it, and it is an iconic building in the capital of the country. Given the 
complexity, and unique and critical nature of the space it offered the researcher the 
chance to study examples of innovative and up-to-date security and resilience policies and 
strategies. By studying of SPIRS it revealed the extreme uniqueness and intricacies of the 
multidimensional of resilience and security governance due to the highly multifarious 
structure of the space and its stakeholders.  
 
Consequently, SPIRS is ‘eminently justifiable’ (Yin, 2009, p.52) as an extreme and a unique 
single case study. This is because it has acted as a magnifying lens to concentrate on the 
converging interdependencies of the political, legal, and operational boundaries of the 
stakeholders in a Category A railway station, and how this influences the current and future 
resilience of the space against security threats. Furthermore, the choice of SPIRS as a single 
extreme and unique case was to investigate one case in- depth and not attain statistical 
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significance. Therefore, the aim of the unique single case study of SPIRS is one of ‘theory 
development…the refinement of existing theories than inventing new ones’ (Dubois and 
Gadde, 2002, p.559).  
 
5.4.5 Unit of Analysis 
Central to the SPIRS case study was the unit of analysis which was “typically a system of 
action rather than an individual or group of individuals” (Tellis, 1997, p.2). Case studies, either 
single or multiple have either a holistic or an embedded design. The holistic design case 
study takes a single unit of analysis as the focus of the case study. However, the embedded 
case comprises of one or more units of analysis. This is where the case study will focus on 
more than one element of investigation, the embedded units of analysis ‘can often add 
significant opportunities for extensive analysis, enhancing the insights into the single case’ 
(Yin, 2009, p.52). 
 
Thus, SPIRS was chosen as a single case embedded study.  
• The context of the case study was the concept of resilience to security threats.  
• The case to be studied was SPIRS.  
• The embedded units of analysis were the policies and stakeholders in SPIRS.  
 
These two units of analysis provided the researcher with the chance ‘for extensive analysis, 
enhancing the insights into the single case’ (Yin, 2009, p.52-53). This allowed policies, 
strategies, measures, agendas, user/actor perspectives, the overall complex governance 
of SPIRS to be considered when examining how these affected the current and future 
resilience of the space to security threats.  The diagram below depicts the case study design. 
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Figure 5.1 The SPIRS case study design 
 
5.4.6 Systematic Combining 
The SPIRS case study and the collection of the data were developed and conducted by 
using systematic combining in line with an abductive approach, meaning it was ‘a process 
where theoretical framework, empirical fieldwork, and case analysis evolve[d] 
simultaneously’ (Dubois and Gadde, 2002, p.554). Systematic combining allowed the 
researcher to go ‘constantly back and forth from one type of research activity…to 
expand…understanding of both theory and empirical phenomena’ (Dubois and Gadde, 
2002, p.555).  
 
5.5. The Case Study Protocol 
The SPIRS case study was conducted by using a four-stage case study protocol. This guided 
the researcher in the process of collecting, analysing, and interpreting data. Moreover, it 
provided a critical framework for the reliability of the research findings, as it provided a 
logical model of proof through a blueprint of the research design. Yin (2009) recommends 
a case study protocol is designed and followed throughout the research process, and this 
is relevant for all types of t h e  case study. The case study protocol developed and utilised 
for the research, facilitated the management of a complex research problem space, as 
there were multiple sources of data to handle and control. This allowed for the data 
collected to be triangulated which again increased the quality and reliability of the 
research.  
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The case study protocol consisted of four sections (Yin, 2009, p80-81): 
1. The case study overview, objectives, literature review, design the study 
2. Field practices, collection plan for the data, sources of data ethical procedures 
and data protection 
3. Questions for the case study, and which sources of information will answer the 
question and objectives 
4. Outline of the case study write up, analyse the case study evidence and develop 
the conclusions, recommendations, and implications 
 
Importantly, by following the case study protocol, it kept the researcher on track with the 
research and as mentioned above it increased the robustness and quality of the research 
and its findings. 
 
5.6 Section one of the case study protocol 
Section one of the case study protocol has been addressed by the following Chapters and 
Table: 
• The case study overview and design – Chapter 5 
• Literature review and context – Chapter 3, 4 and 6 
• Research objectives, Table 5.2 presents the forms of data collection and analysis 
which were utilised to meet the research objectives. 
 
Table 5.2. Research objectives and data collection methods and analysis. 
Research Objective Method Analysis 
To critically examine the current literature and policy concerning 
resilience, governance, security, and prevention measures within the 
context of Category A railway stations in England and Wales. 
Documentary 
analysis 
Archival analysis 
Literature review 
and thematic 
analysis 
To Identify those stakeholders within the case study railway station, 
SPIRS, who (in) directly influence the current and future resilience to 
human malign security threats, and to develop a unique and 
innovative stakeholder map of the space. 
Documentary 
analysis 
Archival analysis 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Stakeholder 
Mapping and 
thematic 
analysis 
126  
To examine the SPIRS stakeholder’s security, resilience, and 
operational policies, strategies, and agendas which (in) directly affect 
the current and future resilience of the space to human malign 
security threats. 
Semi-structured 
Interviews 
Documentary 
Analysis 
Direct 
Observations 
Thematic 
analysis 
and 
qualitative 
analysis 
To identify the trade-off’s, (un)intended consequences, and impacts 
of security and resilience policies and agendas which operate in the 
space of SPIRS. and to make recommendations to address the 
emerging themes from the research. 
 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Documentary 
analysis 
Archival analysis 
Stakeholder 
Mapping  
Findings and 
discussion 
chapter, 
informed via 
thematic 
analysis  
 
5.7 Section two of the case study protocol 
The SPIRS case study was structured and informed by an abductive approach where the data 
and the evidence were collected from multiple sources. This approach can reduce 
potential issues with the research findings by ‘establishing the construct validity and reliability 
of case study evidence’ (Yin, 2009, p.114). Hence, the researcher collected data from semi-
structured interviews, observations, documentation, and archival records.  
 
5.7.1 Purposive Sampling 
To collect the qualitative data for the research, the participants were sampled. The 
researcher took a portion of the population for the collection of data. ‘Population’ was not 
the public; rather it was specific to the population involved in SPIRS, security, and 
infrastructure. The findings of the research are not generalisable to all railway stations in 
England, the aim was to develop and generalise concepts and theories (Yin, 2009). 
Therefore, participants were chosen on the premise of their significance to, and knowledge 
of, SPIRS, the problem area of resilience and security issues, and thus they ‘produce[d] the 
most valuable data’ (Denscombe, 2010, p.35).  
 
Some were sampled from several relevant stakeholders who took part in the Resilient Futures 
project due to their involvement or interest in the resilience of transport infrastructures in the UK. 
Consequently, in terms of sampling the participants, the researcher had strong gatekeepers 
in place for accessing participants within SPIRS. The gatekeeper’s connections were 
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extremely significant to the sourcing of relevant participants to the research. The research 
sampling captured the ‘diversity as well as relations and tensions between’ (Saukko, 2003, 
p.20) SPIRS’ different stakeholders. Another method of recruiting research participants 
occurred through snowballing sampling. The participants were asked if they were aware 
of other people or colleagues who would be appropriate to contact for the research. 
Moreover, the initial Stakeholder Map created from the preliminary literature and policy 
review assisted with the primary round of purposive sampling. The Stakeholder Mapping 
methodology is examined in section 5.11.1.  
 
5.7.2 The research participants 
The researcher interviewed thirty-four participants, between 2011 and 2012 for the data 
collection stage of the research (data from two interviews 5 & 6 was not analysed). These 
participants came from a broad range of stakeholder groups applicable to SPIRS. Table 
5.3 illustrates the participants, their organisation, the date of the interview, and how it was 
recorded. As per the ethical considerations and the Data Protection Act 1998 (section 5.7.3), 
the participants have been anonymised.  In addition, to minimise researcher bias and to 
mobilise the principles of researcher reflexivity, the location of the interviews and how they 
were recorded was documented for each interview. 
 
Table 5.3. Participant Table.  
 Stakeholder Role Conducted Location and how interview was undertaken 
1 BTP Senior Policy Advisor MAY 2011 BTP headquarters, meeting room, digitally 
recorded (R Futures research) 
2 BTP Senior Policy Advisor MAY 2012 Loughborough University, meeting room, 
digitally recorded 
3 BTP CTSA and ALO JUNE 2012 Loughborough University, meeting room 
digitally recorded 
4 BTP Senior Manager JULY 2012 BTP station office at St Pancras International 
Railway Station. Notes taken by hand 
5 LOUGHBOROUGH 
UNIVERSITY 
Professor of Criminology  May 2012 Loughborough University, office, notes taken by 
hand. Data not used in research 
6 CHINA STATE POLICE Policing Expert CT Beijing – 
Crowded Places 
May 2012 Loughborough University, office, notes taken by 
hand 
7 CAMDEN BOROUGH 
COUNCIL 
Civil Servant MAY 2012 Camden Borough Council offices, meeting 
room, digitally recorded 
8 BTP Inspector JAN 2012 St Pancras International Railway Station, East 
Midland Trains First Class Lounge, notes taken 
by hand 
128  
9 BTP Inspector JULY 2012 BTP station office, St Pancras International 
Railway Station, digitally recorded 
10 NETWORK RAIL Retail Manager June 2012 St Pancras International Railway Station coffee 
shop, notes taken by hand 
11 NETWORK RAIL Security Manager September 
2012 
Network Rail Offices, St Pancras International 
Railway Station, meeting room, digitally 
recorded 
12 ARUP Principal Consultant  June 2012 ARUP Offices, London, meeting room, digitally 
recorded 
13 NACTSO/BTP Detective Inspector July 2012 BTP headquarters, Camden, notes taken by 
hand 
14 TPS CARILLION Director June 2012 Telephone interview, notes taken by hand 
15 GALLIFORD Operations Manager October 
2012 
Leicester Marriot Hotel, coffee lounge, notes 
taken by hand 
16 HS1 Security Manager.  June 2012 St Pancras International Railway station, coffee 
shop, notes taken by hand 
17 CROSSRAIL Security Consultant  August 2012 St Pancras International Railway Station, coffee 
shop, notes taken by hand 
18 PASSENGER FOCUS  Policy Advisor October 
2012 
Telephone interview, notes taken by hand 
19 BTP SARGENT  Sargent December 
2012 
British Library, coffee shop, notes taken by 
hand 
20 EUROSTAR Security Manager December 
2012 
Eurostar London Office, meeting room, 
digitally recorded 
21 NETWORK RAIL Security and Emergency 
Planning Specialist 
November 
2012 
Network Rail York offices, break out area in an 
open plan office, notes taken by hand 
22 LONDON FIRE BRIGADE Planning Officer December 
2012 
London Fire Brigade Headquarters, 
Southwark, coffee lounge, digitally 
recorded 
23 SERCO Security Manager December 
2012 
British Library, coffee shop, notes taken by 
hand 
24 MARKS AND SPENCER Multi Retail Store Manager February 2013 Marks and Spencer St Pancras International 
Railway Station, back office, digitally 
recorded 
26 NETWORK RAIL National Resilience and 
Continuity Manager 
February 2013 Network Rail London Offices, coffee bar, 
digitally recorded 
27 LOUGHBOROUGH 
UNIVERSITY 
Emeritus Professor October 
2012 
Telephone interview, notes taken by hand. 
Data not used in thesis 
28 TRANSPORT FOR LONDON Community and Crime 
Prevention Manager 
April 2013 Transport for London Offices, St James Park, 
meeting room, digitally recorded 
29 TRANSPORT FOR LONDON Infrastructure manager April 2013 Transport for London, St James Park, staff 
room, digitally recorded 
30 S015 CTSA May 2013 New Scotland Yard, Coffee area, digitally 
recorded 
31 BTP Liaison Officer October 
2013 
St Pancras International Railway Station, East 
Midland Trains First Class Lounge, notes taken 
by hand 
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32 RSSB Senior Manager April 2013 Rail Security Strategy Board London offices, 
coffee area, digitally recorded 
33 NETWORK RAIL  2012 Interview took place under the RFutures 
interview schedule, it was digitally recorded, 
and the interview was a team member of the 
RFutures project 
34 CPNI  2012 Interview took place under the RFutures 
interview schedule, it was digitally recorded, 
and the interview was a team member of the 
RFutures project  
 
Those stakeholders who were contacted to take part in the research but either declined or 
those who did not respond can be found in Appendix 5.3. The potential reasons behind the 
lack of participation by some of the stakeholders is examined in section 5.13. Furthermore, 
section 5.13 discusses the impact and biases of the researcher which could have affected 
the participants and their responses given in the interviews. 
 
5.7.3 Ethical Considerations and Data Protection 
The SPIRS research data was collected from human participants and potential issues 
surrounding ethics were considered. The researcher ensured the ‘dignity, rights and welfare 
of research participants’ (ESRC, 2010) and protected their professional reputation by 
following ethical guidelines. The ethical checklist devised by Loughborough University’s 
Ethical Advisory Committee was followed and the appropriate approval was sought if 
required. Th e  researcher considered the SPIRS participants, because of the research topic, 
not to be at risk of any significant harm by taking part in the research. Within the remit of the 
ethical protocol, the researcher considered the safety and confidentiality of the SPIRS 
participants. This was achieved through an information sheet and a transparent and 
unambiguous agreement called an informed consent form. The participant information 
sheet stated how the data would be collected, used and how the research findings would 
be disseminated. It delineated the research boundaries by highlighting the case study 
station and the type of stakeholders who would be interviewed as part of the data collection 
process. 
 
Furthermore, the informed consent form has enhanced the reliability and confidence of the 
research (Creswell, 2009). Informed consent is ‘central to most ethical guidelines’ 
(Silverman, 2006, p.323) and because the researcher obtained the participants informed 
and signed permission, their rights were protected. Copies of the templates for the 
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participant information sheet and informed consent form are located in Appendix 5.4.  
The participant’s confidentiality was effectively managed ‘at all stages of the process’ 
(Ward, 2004, p.345), from approaching participants, data collection, safekeeping, and 
analysis, and the dissemination of the results (Ward, 2004, p.345). This research is compliant 
with the Data Protection Act 1998 and Human Rights Act 1998, so the rights of participants 
have been fully respected. The Data Protection Act 1998 provides a code of ethical 
practice surrounding the storage of personal data and thus covers the data collected for 
this research (see Appendix 5.2). 
 
5.7.4 The Robustness and quality of the research 
The multiple methods of data collection discussed in sections 5.3 illustrate and distinguish the 
types of qualitative research methods. By using documentation and archival records as 
evidence in the SPIRS case study it was key ‘to corroborate and augment evidence from 
other sources’ (Yin, 2009, p. 103). As part of the abductive systematic combining process, 
documentation was sourced through interview recommendations and vice versa, 
interviews were used to collect data and corroborate documentations. The multiple 
sources of evidence have strengthened the quality of the SPIRS case study as ‘data will be 
less prone to the quirks deriving from any single source, such as an inaccurate interviewee 
or biased document’ (Yin, 2003, p.83). Another strength of using multiple sources of 
information was the ability to triangulate the sources of evidence to corroborate the 
research findings (Yin, 2009).  
 
It was critical the research design and the SPIRS case study protocol (detailed in the above 
section) was well-defined, developed and followed so the findings are reliable and 
dependable. The scientific origins of reliability and validity are not necessarily or should be 
applicable to qualitative research, particularly as constructionism has formed the basis of 
the ontological position of the research (Bryman, 2004). For a constructionist position, the 
research should be credible, transferable, dependable, and confirmable for it to be robust 
and reliable (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). A traditional ‘truth value’ (Seale, 2004, p.77) was 
exchanged for credibility through in-depth interviews, observations, and triangulation.  The 
transferability of the research is found in the thick and rich descriptions and analysis of the 
SPIRS data which ‘give the reader…the vicarious experience of ‘being there’’ (Seale, 2004, 
p.78). The dependability of the research is based on the case study protocol and auditing 
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of the methods used in the SPIRS case study. Auditing along with reflexivity established the 
confirmability of the research. To enhance the confirmability of the research the below 
verification approaches recommended by Creswell (2009, p.199-200) have been followed: 
 
Table 5.4. Verification strategy adapted from Creswell (2009, p.199-200). 
Triangulation Multiple types of information, interviews, 
documentation, and observations are 
collected. This reinforces the internal 
validity and reliability of the research 
Observations of SPIRS Repeated observations of SPIRS, over a 
two-year period. This allowed for 
contextual observations to be 
triangulated with interview data and 
documentation 
Clarification of data collection limitations Limitations of the data collection is 
articulated and explained. 
Where stakeholders have not 
participated in the research this will be 
elucidated and public domain 
documentation will be sought 
Clarification of researcher bias The biases of the researcher to ensure 
external validity 
 
5.8 Section three of the case study protocol 
The type of questions devised to answer the overall research question and the sources of 
information used to answer this and the research objectives are detailed in Table 5. 5. A full 
semi-structured interview schedule can be found in Appendix 5.5 
 
Table 5.5. Research question/area, data source and objective. 
Question Data Source/Method Research Objectives 
Role and Responsibility Semi-structured interview 2,4, 
Personal/role understanding of 
resilience 
Semi-structured interview 3,4 
What did resilience mean to the 
railway station  
Semi-structured interview 3,4 
The key strategies and policies in their 
role 
Semi-structured interview 
Documentation 
1,2,3,4 
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Policy document 
Responding to security policy initiatives 
(work with policy makers) 
Semi-structured interview 
Documentation 
Policy document 
1,2,3,4 
Aware of national security strategies, 
impact on role 
Semi-structured interview 
Documentation 
Policy document 
1,3,4 
Consultation (stages) of stakeholders 
accounted for when stations are 
design and retrofitted 
Semi-structured interview 
Documentation 
Policy document 
Observations 
1,3,4 
Length of horizon that Network Rail 
security strategies look to 
Semi-structured interview 
Documentation 
3,4 
The impact of these security strategies 
on stakeholders 
Semi-structured interview 3,4 
Recommended and or used 
prevention measures to protect the 
station 
Semi-structured interview 
Documents 
Observations 
1,3,4 
Greatest fear of public safety (crime or 
terrorism) 
Semi-structured interview 3,4 
Stakeholder opinion impact on crime 
prevention and counter-terrorism 
station agendas 
Semi-structured interviews 
Documentation 
3,4 
Reconciliation of crime prevention 
and counter-terrorism agendas 
Semi-structured interview 3,4 
Stakeholders within station dealt with, 
and not on the map 
Semi-structured interview 
Stakeholder Map 
Documentation 
2,4 
Communication with stakeholders on 
the map 
Semi-structured interview 
Stakeholder Map 
3,4 
Other stakeholders who would like to 
deal with 
Semi-structured interview 
Stakeholder Map 
2,3,4 
Improvement/greatest threats to 
future resilience of station 
Semi-structured interview 3,4 
 
PART TWO: DATA ANALYSIS AND STAKEHOLDER MAPPING 
 
5.9 Section four of the case study protocol 
The second part of this Chapter looks at the analysis of the SPIRS case study data.  
Chapters Seven and Eight present the discussion and findings of the evidence, while 
Chapter Nine presents the conclusion, recommendations, and implications of the research. 
 
5.10. Data Analysis 
As with collection of the research data, it was critical the analysis of the data was of an 
133  
appropriate and high standard. The researcher followed Yin’s (2009, p.160) ‘four principles’ 
which ‘underlie all good social science research’: 
1 Pay attention to all the data The research question must be covered by the analysis, 
including elaborating on opposing theories. 
Research findings are strengthened if all the data has 
been accounted for in the analysis 
2 Rival interpretations Account and address counter interpretations of the 
findings. Could these be expanded into rival theories? In 
turn, these could be the basis of future study 
recommendations 
3 Key aspects of the case study Analysis focuses on the key point of the case study, 
strengthens findings 
4 Expert knowledge The literature and policy review and published paper 
will demonstrate expert knowledge and awareness 
Table 5.6. Yin’s four principles of analysis. Adapted from (Yin, 2009, p.160- 161). 
 
The four principles of analysis were applied to the process of thematic analysis, which is 
examined below. The analysis of the data was a continual process throughout the collection 
phase of the research. It followed an abductive process and systematic combining, 
discussed in section 5.4.6, where the researcher constantly analysed the data, and the 
multiple methods of data were used to inform new areas of investigation. These, in turn, 
informed the revised semi-structured interview schedules and the sourcing of new 
documents for analysis. 
 
5.10.1Thematic Analysis 
The most appropriate form of analysis for the research findings was thematic analysis as it 
provided a clear and ‘theoretically flexible approach to analysing qualitative data’ (Braun 
and Clarke, 2006, p.77). It is a valid method of analysis in relation to the thesis’ ontological 
constructionist position, given its flexible and adaptable nature. Consequently, thematic 
analysis enabled the researcher to ‘provide a rich and detailed, yet complex account of 
data’ (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.70) within SPIRS. Thematic analysis can be defined as 
a method for identifying, analysing, reporting patterns (themes) within data. It 
minimally organises and describes your data set in (rich) detail. 
(Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.70) 
 
The process of initial coding was based on the overarching theoretical concepts of the 
literature review, which had guided the initial, objectives, aim and semi-structured 
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interviews. However, as the analysis progressed to a more in-depth position, a thicker analysis 
of the data occurred by pulling out more obscure underlying and unspoken themes and 
codes. This was an inductive thematic analysis ‘a process of coding the data without trying 
to fit it into a pre-existing coding frame, or the researcher’s analytic preconceptions’ (Braun 
and Clarke, 2006, p.80). Themes were developed from the data which were analysed using 
NVivo, the software used for the management of the research and for analysing and 
presenting findings from the data. 
 
5.10.2 NVivo - Computer software aided analysis 
NVivo software was chosen as the tool for the project management and data analysis of 
the research. It is an example of ‘computer qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS)’ 
(Yin, 2009, p.128). As the SPIRS case study was a qualitative research project, it produced 
vast quantities of significant data. Therefore, NVivo was used as a storage facility, and for 
retrieval and analysis of data. NVivo was critical in maintaining the ‘chain of evidence’ (Yin, 
2009, p.123). It did not transcribe the audio files, automatically code and analyse the 
subsequent data. NVivo aided the process of coding, it permitted the researcher to create 
memos about the initial and more in-depth coding, and allowed the chain of evidence to 
be maintained and strengthened. Moreover, it permitted sources of data to be cross-
analysed, meaning codes were compared between sources, patterns and emerging 
outcomes were visually presented.  
 
5.10.3 The thematic analysis process 
The analytic process in line with abductive stance began after the first set of semi-structured 
interviews were carried out; a continuous process of ‘moving back and forth between the 
entire data set’ (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.92). During the transcription process, the researcher 
started to observe items of interest, which in turn informed the revised interview schedule 
and documentation collection strategy. Braun and Clarke’s (2006) six principles of thematic 
analysis, seen in the below table, was followed to examine and code the research data. 
 
Table 5.7. Six Principles of thematic analysis, adapted from Braun and Clarke (2006). 
Stage Required Action 
Stage one Data 
familiarisation 
and immersion 
The literature and policy review provided familiarisation 
with the resilience of railway stations to security threats. 
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 Transcription Transcription allowed the researcher to immerse and 
familiarise themselves with the data collected. The data 
was transcribed verbatim and stored in NVivo.  Ideas on 
parent coding began to form during this process.  
Memos were created in NVivo to record the researcher’s 
thoughts on initial coding (Table 5.8). 
Stage two Preliminary 
coding 
Coding was an important part of the analysis and 
ascertained specific broad features of interest. The 
data set from the 32 interviews, observations and 
policy documents were coded. The preliminary 
parent codes can be seen in Table 5.7. 
These codes developed the next stage of interpretative 
analysis. These codes were theory based and came from 
the initial literature review and were data driven. 
Stage three Exploring themes For this research, the initial themes were preliminary 
based on theory (Table 5.8) but as further analysis 
revealed data driven themes.  Child coding emerged 
with analysis and was placed under the parent 
overarching themes. 
Stage four Evaluating 
themes 
The researcher acknowledged inconsistencies in 
coding, deviant codes in data. 
The data was reviewed, and the themes corresponded 
and there were distinguishable differences between 
themes.  Where themes were closely linked these were 
merged into one node for coding. 
The overarching parent themes/nodes were reviewed to 
ensure data fitted within them. 
136  
Stage five Definition of themes A thematic matrix was created via NVivo, which helped 
to define and refine themes, and further analysis. The full 
coding matrix generated in NVivo can be found in 
Appendix 5.7.  Each theme had a detailed analysis. 
Stage six Writing up The findings were written up in Chapters Seven and 
Eight to persuade the reader of the validity of the 
analysis. 
 
Thematic analysis was carried out on the data collected from the thirty-two semi-structured 
interviews, and direct observations from expert meetings gathered in 2012 and 2013. 
Moreover, the policy review was also thematically analysed. Thereafter, the process of 
thematic analysis developed, using the theoretical analysis to guide topic areas for further 
investigation and thus creating parent and child codes.  
 
Table 5.8 shows the overarching parent nodes for the coding of the research data, with 
how many transcriptions and documents (sources) had been coded. These parent nodes 
map against the research objectives two, three and four: 
RO 2: Identify those stakeholders within the case study railway station, SPIRS, who (in) 
directly influence the current and future resilience to human malign security threats, 
and to develop a unique and innovative stakeholder map of the space 
RO 3: Examine the SPIRS stakeholder’s security, resilience, and operational policies, 
strategies, and agendas which (in) directly affect the current and future resilience of 
the space to human malign security threats 
RO 4: To analyse the tradeoffs, (un)intended consequences, and impacts of security 
and resilience policies and agendas which operate in the space of SPIRS, and to 
make recommendations to address the emerging themes from the research 
 
Tables 5.8 details how the parent coding structures for themes of resilience, crime and 
terrorism were structured when undertaking the analysis in NVivo. Appendix 5.7 details the 
full list of nodes used and how many times the interview data had been coded to the 
nodes.   
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Name Sources References 
BARRIERS FOR RESILIENCE 26 293 
BUILT ENVIRONMENT 11 53 
COMMUNICATION 28 321 
DESIGN STAGE 18 271 
EMERGENCY 15 167 
FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS 18 114 
FUTURES 12 58 
INFRASTRUCTURE 14 60 
OPERATIONAL COMPLEXITIES 26 378 
POLICY & GUIDANCE 30 446 
RAILWAY STATION 25 300 
RESILIENCE 20 249 
SECURITY THREATS 25 698 
STAKEHOLDERS 30 772 
Table 5.8 Overarching parent nodes for thematic data analysis 
 
Through the creation of the emergent codes collected from the interview data, the 
accounts of the participants during the interviews were at that point in time producing their 
own ‘version of reality shaped through language’ (Bryman, 2004, p.539). The data 
produced from the interviews, observations, and documentation, and thus the codes and 
subsequent analysis and findings are to be viewed in terms of how social and historical 
knowledge has informed the participant’s opinions. Therefore, their language has been 
influenced by ‘characteristic terminology and underlying knowledge base’ (Seale, 2004, 
p.507), of the culture which surrounds the rail industry and its history has set as the dominant 
discourse pertinent to the research participants who work within the environment of the 
railway station. An example of an interview transcript can be found in Appendix 5.6. 
 
5.11 Stakeholder Mapping 
A key contribution to the knowledge concerning how the multiple stakeholders influence the 
current and future resilience to security threats in SPIRS, was the Stakeholder Map. While 
conducting the literature and policy review, the researcher had not been able to source a 
document that mapped the key stakeholders who impacted on the security of the space 
to security threats. Therefore, the researcher took the decisions that one of the research 
objectives would be to create and use a Stakeholder Map to understand the relationships 
and power of the stakeholders within SPIRS. The below section examines how the 
methodology was devised and used to create a comprehensive map of the stakeholders 
in SPIRS who could impact the resilience of the space to security threats. 
 
The process of Stakeholder Mapping allowed the researcher to visualise the SPIRS 
stakeholder’s authority and impact within the space (Bourne and Walker, 2005). For an 
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organisation like SPIRS to be efficient in terms of policy changes, strategies and projects, or 
day-to-day operations, it is critical the stakeholders are mapped (Freeman, 1984). 
Therefore, the SPIRS Stakeholder Mapping portrayed the critical stakeholders when looking 
at the resilience of the station to security threats and their interdependencies and concerns 
(Aliciga 2006). This became a comprehensive and precise listing of all the SPIRS 
stakeholders. They were categorised when considering alterations to policy, strategy, or 
operational processes. Therefore, the SPIRS Stakeholder Map encapsulated ‘the essential 
elements of the strategic space: the actors, the rules of the game, the processes set into 
motion within those rules’ (Aliciga, 2006, p.82-83). 
 
However, as with all forms of analysis, Stakeholder Mapping can be subjected to the 
creator’s biases and therefore it can be considered as subjective, dependent on who 
is devising the map and the policy, strategy, or operation being considered. The multiple 
SPIRS stakeholders considered the issues resilience of space to security threats subjectively. 
What and who was considered important to the issue was affected by differing business and 
personal agendas. Therefore, the SPIRS Stakeholder Map must be viewed in terms of the 
creator and it was generated from the choices made by their interpretation of the 
circumstances involved (Aliciga, 2006, p.82). It can be argued ‘the measure of validity of an 
institutional map is given by its ability to guide the strategic decision-making’ (Aliciga, 2006, 
p.82). The Stakeholder Map of SPIRS stakeholders has been used by the BTP for franchising 
decision making and the London Fire Brigade for resilience planning. 
 
5.11.1 Stakeholder Mapping Methodology 
The initial process took the stakeholders who could or be impacted on by security threats and 
mapped them in relation to SPIRS. The behaviours of stakeholders historical and future were 
examined to see how these could affect positively or negatively on specific goals of SPIRS 
(Freeman, 1984). This allowed for external influences, pressures, and susceptibilities of the 
SPIRS stakeholders to be recognised (Freidman and Miles, 2006, p.85). The SPIRS Stakeholder 
Map through participant verification allowed the stakeholders to be characterised as 
1. primary stakeholders who are impacted constructively or adversely, by a project 
or operations, 
2. secondary stakeholders have a transitional function and can have a key 
impact on the project or operations, 
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3. and external stakeholders do not directly participate, yet can be impacted on 
by a project or operations 
(Jepson and Eskerod, 2009). 
 
Coalitions and interconnections were also mapped as these can have a significant impact 
on the stakeholders’ agendas and strategies. 
 
The multiple stakeholders within SPIRS were researched via the internet, sourcing relevant 
information from websites such as the DfT, Network Rail, and the ORR and from the literature 
and policy documentation sourced for the literature review. Often the process of finding 
information concerning one stakeholder led the researcher to find out information and 
collaborations, responsibilities to/with other stakeholders within the boundaries of SPIRS. This 
led to the creation of a broad category stakeholder table, below is this first stage basic 
version of the SPIRS stakeholder map. 
 
Figure 5.2 A simple stakeholder table of SPIRS 
 
Subsequently, as more information was gathered through the literature and policy review, and 
semi-structured interviews, it was then entered to create a digital visual map in Microsoft 
Visio. This Stakeholder Map detailed the interconnections and complex stakeholder 
relationships within SPIRS and is examined in Chapter Six. 
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The map was empirically validated by the participants. They were SPIRS stakeholders who 
were responsible for or impacted on security measures and resilience strategies in the space or 
other Category A railway stations. This gave the participants the opportunity to make 
suggestions about other stakeholders who they thought should be included on the map. It 
should be noted, there is no one definitive or correct way to map stakeholders of a space, 
rather the map can be created from diverse standpoints ‘inspired by different objectives 
and employing different techniques’ (Aligica, 2006, p.81). 
 
5.12 The Role of the Researcher 
Social science researchers must accept that some form of bias in producing research is 
inevitable (Lazar, 2004). However, in the qualitative research process, the researcher cannot 
be removed (Lazar, 2004, p.25); rather a reflexive approach was adopted by the researcher 
to ‘understand the political implications of our location as researchers’ (Lazar, 2004, p.25). 
Reflexivity was exercised by the researcher to examine the value and efficiency of their 
research methods on the robustness of their results and debate the 
influence…that their enquiry has had on the phenomena that they have sort to 
observe. 
Dainty, 2008, p.8 
 
Lincoln and Denzin (2000, p.1049, cited in Seale, 2004, p.64) assert 
 
the qualitative researcher is not an objective, authoritative, politically neutral 
observer standing outside and above context…Qualitative inquiry is properly 
conceptualised as a civic, participatory, collaborative project. This joins the 
researcher and the researched in an on-going moral dialogue. 
 
To avoid researcher bias, the researcher had a level of awareness ‘of the reactive affect 
that…her presence’ (Seale, 2004, p.104) which could have impacted the participant’s 
actions and replies. Therefore, when the interview questions and the subsequent research 
thesis were written, the researcher acknowledged these documents were socially 
constructed versions of reality.  
 
5.13 Barriers to Data Collection 
During the data collection phase of the research, the researcher experienced some barriers 
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to collecting data. The greatest barrier to data collection was trying to overcome issues of 
stakeholder support. Therefore, not all the stakeholders who were involved or impact on the 
current and future resilience of SPIRS to security threats had wanted to participate; for 
instance, the DfT proved to be one such critical stakeholder. Despite the researcher being 
provided with numerous contact details for potential research participants within the DfT, 
they were unable to secure the participation of any of them during the data collection 
phase of the research. One explanation for the lack of participation from some of the 
stakeholder groups was the lack of incentives to take part in the research. If the research 
had been a Government sponsored project, then it is anticipated the research would have 
received a more positive response from some stakeholders especially the civil service and 
the TOCs. Another contributing factor which may have influenced the lack of participation 
from the DfT is because there is often a quick turnaround of staff posts and contacts and 
experience is lost. Appendix 5.3 highlights the number of participants contacted to 
participate in the research, and who either declined or did not respond to the request for 
assistance. 
 
These barriers to participation have been accounted for in the case study protocol. 
Therefore, to obtain the Government’s position on the resilience of SPIRS to current and 
future security threats, publicly accessible reports, papers, and documents were retrieved 
as part of the interconnected archival analysis. These archival records have produced 
evidence that is not specific to SPIRS rather it is ‘at the collective level’ (Yin, 2009, p.12), 
which forms the centre of public transport policy aims. 
 
Moreover, other than Eurostar, the other three TOCs who operate out of SPIRS, did not accept 
the invitation to participate in the research. This was the case for the St Pancras Marriott 
hotel, and as with the DfT publicly accessible documentation were sourced to offer some 
corporate opinion on the resilience of SPIRS to current and future security threats. This lack 
of participation was accounted for during the analysis stage of the research and is 
discussed in detail in the findings and discussion chapters of the thesis. 
 
The researcher was aware when analysing and drawing findings from the research data 
that some participants had presented a corporate opinion when answering the interview 
questions. Moreover, the participant’s responses were considered in a temporal and spatial 
framework, thus meaning their answers were shaped by the time and events at the point of 
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the interview. Therefore, these responses would not be replicated exactly if the research was 
carried out again at a future point in time, thus addressing issues of validity of the findings. 
 
5.14 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has discussed the how the research design and data collection strategies 
have been chosen to answer the research question posed. Furthermore, this chapter has 
examined the methodological position which was mobilised to carry out the research and 
the subsequent qualitative case study design and methods that were utilised to 
accomplish and realise the aim and objectives of the research.  
 
The justification of SPIRS as a unique single embedded case study was presented. The case 
study protocol was depicted ensuring the research design and subsequent research 
findings were robust and valid. Reflexivity was considered when looking at where the thirty-
two interviews took place and how they were recorded, and any researcher or participant 
biases. The chapter also discussed the how the data would be analysed by thematic 
methods. The methodology of how the Stakeholder Map was devised and developed was 
discussed within the chapter. Conceptually the aim of Stakeholder Map was to aid in 
understanding that SPIRS is a complex space, with a web of interconnected relationships. 
 
If different research strategies had been used, they would have created distinct types of 
results. This research used qualitative research strategies and methods which supported 
the epistemological position of interpretivism and the ontological stance of 
constructionism. Thus, the qualitative research strategy selected met the aim and 
objectives of the research. Principally because the thick data provided by the SPIRS 
participants allowed a greater understanding of ‘their subjective meaning’ (Lazar, 2004, 
p.14), and which is not afforded by quantitative statistical information (Lazar, 2004, p.14). 
 
If an epistemological position of positivism had been chosen, a quantitative research 
strategy would have provided a methodology that would have addressed a set hypothesis 
by using structured questionnaires and statistical analysis. The barriers to participation have 
been discussed and accounted for in the case study protocol. Therefore, to obtain those 
stakeholder’s viewpoints, who did not take part in the data collection process on the 
resilience of SPIRS to current and future security threats, publicly available reports, papers, 
and documents have been retrieved as part of the interconnected documental analysis. 
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The following chapter will examine the contextual boundaries of the SPIRS case study, with 
subsequent chapters discussing the research findings. 
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CHAPTER SIX:  CONTEXTUAL STUDY OF ST PANCRAS INTERNATIONAL RAILWAY STATION (SPIRS) 
 
6.0 Chapter Introduction 
The previous chapters of the thesis have examined and discussed the theoretical and 
methodological perspectives and standpoints that together underpin this thesis. The 
justification of choosing SPIRS as the single unique case study railway station has also been 
referred to in the previous chapter. However, it is necessary to develop a background 
comprehension of the complexities of SPIRS, to attain an understanding in Chapters Seven 
and Eight of how security threats, prevention measures and resilience are recognised and 
discussed within the boundaries and context of the space and other Category A railway 
stations in England and Wales. Section 6.9 presents the findings of the Stakeholder Mapping 
during the data collection phase. Therefore, this chapter will offer a contextual appreciation 
of the temporal, social, and political dynamics of SPIRS in advance of the findings and 
discussions of the qualitative research undertaken. 
 
6.1 The History of the Railway Station, St Pancras (International) Railway Station (SPIRS) and the Rail Network 
SPIRS is one of the major termini railway stations in London and England, its uniqueness is 
determined as it is an international and multimodal transport hub. Moreover, it is the location 
of an extravagant five-star hotel, prestigious apartments and it is a luxury retail and leisure 
destination. It is the importance, size, and international function of the station which 
determines that Network Rail classifies SPIRS as a Category A railway station, the category 
of railway stations is examined in Chapter Two. However, to understand how SPIRS functions 
and is operated currently, it is important to understand historically how and why our railway 
stations were constructed and operated. 
 
Undoubtedly, the history of railway routes is very well documented, as with the railway 
infrastructure of today, the progress and expansion have been entrenched in a continuous 
‘series of technological, economic, and political changes’ (Wolmar, 2003, p.2). However, 
the documentation of the development and evolution of the railway station has lacked any 
real recognition ‘for its contribution...to culture and society in general’ (Richards and 
MacKenzie, 1986, p.3). Yet, Biddle (1986) counters that the importance of the railway station 
was recognised by the Victorians, as it was seen by them as a significant institution, symbolic of 
the nation’s wealth and it crucially epitomised ‘the new age of power and speed’ (Biddle, 
1986, p.14). Additionally, it should be remembered the Victorian era saw the construction of 
numerous municipal buildings within British cities, but it can be argued these did not exert 
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the same influence as the location of the new railway stations in cities, which could have a 
direct influence on city centre development...it could become the core of a new 
commercial area of a city, yet equally it could...become surrounded by a seedy 
district of mean streets and small businesses. 
(Biddle, 1986, p.21) 
 
Many of the first railway stations, apart from those on the Liverpool and Manchester routes, 
built in circa 1830, were little more than improvised sheds, without platforms and little in the 
way of keeping passengers safe from the dangers of rolling stock and locomotives (Biddle, 
1986 and Wolmar, 2003). Latterly, it was recognised that the role of the railway station was to 
offer a space where passengers could be controlled; tickets would be purchased in the halls, 
waiting rooms kept passengers safe from track dangers, some city stations, such as SPIRS, had 
hotels attached to them which were also owned and operated by the railway companies. 
The railway station also provided office space for staff and a place of administration for the 
railway companies. 
 
The early methods of purchasing tickets at the Liverpool and Manchester railway stations 
would rival some of the security measures currently in place in the aviation sector when 
purchasing tickets for travel. Hale (1980, cited in Wolmar, 2003, p.43) maintained ‘it was 
more of a passport than a ticket’, as passengers had to purchase tickets for rail travel a day 
in advance, and provide the following details; ‘name, address, age, place of birth, 
occupation and reason for travelling’ (Wolmar, 2003, p.43). However, as the number of 
passengers grew with the new routes this method was replaced by tickets only requiring the 
passenger’s names for the issue (Wolmar, 2003). The railway station not only controlled the 
ingress and egress of passengers but also it was felt necessary by the train companies to 
regulate through statute to control the actions and behaviours of passengers to ensure their 
safety in the station (Wolmar, 2003). The first police officers on the railways were responsible 
for signalling, the tracks, and the safety of passengers within the station (Wolmar, 2003). 
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Figure 6.1 St Pancras Railway Station in the 1920s (Source: Carrier, 2012) 
The station, as today, was a place where different classes, employees and vendors mingled; 
it was ‘an agent of social mixing. Unquestionably, in the ‘Victorian era, its position was at the 
center of cities and in most suburban...and rural communities’ (Richards and MacKenzie, 
1986, p.137). Furthermore, the British railway station influenced engineering and 
architecture, as engineers had to resolve difficult architectural features, again this is 
exemplified by SPIRS, with feature such as 
double-span roofs...they boldly utilised the new materials, iron and glass to construct 
the naves and transepts of the cathedral stations. 
(Richards and MacKenzie, 1986, p.3) 
 
It is easy to understand why the Victorians believed their stations were comparable to 
‘medieval abbeys’ (Biddle, 1986, p.14).  However, it would be inaccurate to think that all the 
stations built in the nineteenth century were built with redundancy and forethought in mind; 
rather some were built on a small scale, and their size and capacity only increased over 
time with numerous extensions (Biddle, 1986). Interestingly, the below quote from 1850 
recognised the investment in, the size and dependencies of large terminal stations in cities 
and the impact on their operations. 
It is impossible to regard the vast buildings and their dependencies, which constitute 
a chief terminal station of a great railway line, without feelings of inexpressible 
astonishment at the magnitude of the capital and the boldness of the enterprise, 
which are manifested in the operations of which they are the stage. Nothing in the 
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history of the past affords any parallel to such a spectacle. 
Source: Dionysius Lardner, Railway Economy (1850) cited in Simmons (1968) 
 
William Barlow in 1863 designed St Pancras Railway Station and it was opened five years 
later in 1868. At the time, it ‘was the largest enclosed space in the world’ (St Pancras 
International, 2013a). Additionally, at that point in time, it was also, ‘the largest iron 
structure in the world’ (Lansley et al., 2008, p.12). Moreover, Sir George Gilbert Scott 
designed the Midland Grand Hotel within the ‘gothic front facade’ (Lansley et al., 2008, 
p.12) which was opened in1876.
 
Figure 6.2: Entrance to what was the Midland Grand Hotel, now the St Pancras Renaissance 
Hotel. Note the hostile vehicle mitigation bollards in front of the entrance, a heritage design 
to be in keeping with the exterior of the hotel. (Source: Gregson-Green, 2012) 
 
St Pancras Railway Station played a significant role in the war effort, as a convening place 
for troops to be transported to war; it was also used as a departure railway station for the 
capitals evacuated children to the safer rural locations (St Pancras International, 2013a). 
During the First World War, five bombs were dropped on the station in 1918, with twenty 
people being killed and twenty-three sustaining injuries when one of these bombs dropped 
on glass roof near the booking office (Simmons, 1968, p.117). The railway station came under 
fire during the blitz of the Second World War and it was hit causing damage to the platforms; 
however, engineers repaired the damage quickly to ensure service continued. 
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The mid-1960s saw the most significant risk to the continuation of the station that was the 
proposal to merge St Pancras and its neighbouring station, Kings Cross. This was a cause for 
concern for those endeavouring to preserve St Pancras, given that nearby Euston station and 
its Doric arches had been demolished in the early 1960s, to be replaced by a modern station. 
St Pancras Railway Station was rescued by Sir John Betjeman who championed the 
safeguarding of the station and the hotel, with the buildings achieving Grade One listing in 
1967 (St Pancras International, 2013a). 
 
This listed status is critical in the acknowledgement of St Pancras both in terms of its ‘historical 
and structural significance’ (Lansley et al., 2008, p.12). However, this listed status impacts on 
the physical alterations to the building and this includes the siting of security measures such 
as CCTV and barriers. Up until the mid-1980s, British Rail used the St Pancras Chambers as 
office space, thereafter the building was unoccupied becoming almost derelict by the 
1990s (St Pancras International, 2013a) 
 
Figure 6.3: Statue of Sir John Betjeman located in SPIRS in recognition of his dedication in 
saving the station from demolition in the 1960s. (Source: Stone, 2010) 
 
6.2 Privatisation to Nationalisation to Privatisation 
Competition between railway companies is not a modern phenomenon, where TOCS are 
competing for their share of the railway passenger market. Approximately one hundred and 
twenty companies operated before the 1923 streamlining, the competition was intense and 
could be seen in larger cities and towns where more than one company operated routes and 
thus resulted in there being more than one station often in close proximity (Biddle, 1986). 
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Therefore, railway stations were not general stations like today, with multiple railway 
companies operating services out of them, rather they were route and operating railway 
company specific (Biddle, 1986, p.30). However, although rarely, at this junction in the 
construction and operation of railway stations, some railway companies operated joint 
stations (Biddle, 1986). This situation can be compared to the TOCS of today; however, the 
current twenty-four, (these are listed in Appendix 6.1) TOCs lease and manage the railway 
stations from Network Rail which are on their routes, rather than owning the physical buildings. 
 
During the expansion of the railway, the Government saw it as a state asset that was for the 
benefit the public rather than as a means of making a profit for the railway companies. The 
subsequent rafts of operational and safety legislation steadily over time saw the 
Government take more control over the railways from the railway companies, as these 
operations were highly disjointed and disparate. This process of acquisition culminated after 
the First World War, when the Government took over through the Transport Act 1921 (Biddle, 
1986) the assets of the one hundred and twenty railway companies, therefore creating a 
nationalised railway service (InfoBritain, 2010), with the justification of a more efficient 
service as there was now interoperability between the services and routes. However, 
between 1918 and the start of World War II, the Government relinquished control over the 
railway network and the one hundred and twenty-one railway companies which were 
operating on the railway network, had merged into the below four companies: 
• Great Western (GWR) 
• Southern Railways (SR) 
• London Midland and Scottish (LMS) 
• London and North Eastern (LNER)  
(InfoBritain, 2010) 
 
In addition, during this period the railway companies closed three hundred and fifty rural 
stations due to lack of financial investment (InfoBritain, 2010). 
 
Railway nationalisation was again seen at the outbreak of World War II, and the Government 
in1939 again take over complete control of the railway network, as petrol was rationed and 
the country heavily relied on steam power to transport freight and troops during the war 
years. Larger city railway stations during the war were frequently appropriated by the 
military as operational bases for military transport (Biddle, 1986, p.195). Thus, the concept of the 
railway station at risk from human malign security threats is not a modern one, historical 
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threats to the rail station were examined in greater detail in Chapter Four. Even those railway 
stations not used by the military were still targets for German bomber crews, with their aim 
being to destroy and damage the railway infrastructure. It was through the absolute 
determination and hard work of staff which saw many of the damaged railway stations 
operational within hours, or ‘at most a day or two’ (Biddle, 1986, p.195), a spirit which was 
echoed after the 7/7 bombings in London in 2005. 
 
Lastly, the final four railway operating companies were amalgamated, and the railway 
network was nationalised in 1948 (Biddle, 1986 and Wolmar, 2007) and consequently 
created British Rail. The process of rationalising the four TOCs was a response by the 
Government to a lack of investment in the railway infrastructure and the competition 
created by lorries for haulage and coaches for passengers (Biddle, 1986). 
 
The 1960s was a notable period of controversy for the railways and saw yet another 
restructuring of the railway network, which had a significant impact on railway stations across 
the country. Dr Beeching, the Chairman of the British Transport Commission from 1961 to 
1965 rationalised the railway network, it is estimated that from the 1960s to the mid-1980s, that 
over four thousand stations were closed (Richards and MacKenzie, 1986, p.4). Through Dr 
Beeching’s process of rationalisation, London was the only city to have multiple stations, with 
no cities having more than two railway stations (Biddle, 1986, p.19). Furthermore, the 
electrification of the West Coast mainline route from London to Glasgow from the mid-1950s 
to the mid-1970s saw the next period of major investment by British Rail into the railway network 
and the stations along the route (Biddle, 1986). Euston and Birmingham New Street stations 
were both redeveloped as part of the project (Biddle, 1986). Property development 
companies partially funded New Street station, leading to the now common relationship of 
larger city railway stations incorporating a shopping centre/leisure facility (Biddle, 1986, 
p.206) which can be seen today in SPIRS. 
 
Under the Conservative Government’s policy of revoking nationalised industries in the 1980s 
and 1990s, the railway network moved again from a nationalised to a privatised industry. The 
privatisation of British Rail commenced with the 1993 British Rail Privatisation Bill, in the same 
year Railtrack was floated on the London Stock Exchange as a Public Limited Company 
and its role to manage the signalling, tracks and stations. The operation of the routes was given 
to twenty-five TOCs through franchises and Railtrack granted them access to the lines for a fee. 
Hawkins (2008) notes the privatisation of nationalised railway networks and the routes being 
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operated by franchisees were successful in some European countries and Japan. Yet in 
Britain, the lack of competition on the routes once the franchises were awarded to the TOCs 
was considered one of the major critical failings of the privatised rail network. Furthermore, 
another contributing factor to the failings of Railtrack was the uncertainty of ‘where the 
responsibility lay for the many operational shortcomings on the railway network’ (Hawkins, 2008, 
p.6). 
 
However, a proposed benefit of the privatisation of the railway network was the ageing 
rolling stock was heavily invested in (Hawkins, 2008), something which British Rail was criticised 
for not doing. Nevertheless, the seriousness of Railtrack’s lack of success led to the company 
being placed into administration in 2001 and the responsibility of the railway network was 
handed over to the DfT, and Network Rail replaced Railtrack as the management company 
of the railway infrastructure (Hawkins, 2008). 
 
6.3 Network Rail Company Structure 
In 2002, Network Rail took over from Railtrack the management and operation of the rail 
infrastructure in Britain and is divided into nine routes. Network Rail is a private non-profit 
making company, limited by guarantee and answerable to its members for the 
management of the company. Network Rail’s members are composed of two distinct 
types, public membership, and rail industrial company membership (Network Rail, 2011 b). 
There is an additional membership which is taken up by the DfT, who has the right to select the 
Director of Network Rail if necessary, and offers financial assistance ‘to the debt funding’ 
(Network Rail, 2011b) of the company. Members do not receive any remuneration or 
financial benefits from their Network Rail membership. Furthermore, they operate under 
license enforced by the ORR. Network Rail has been described as a ‘quasi-public sector 
company’ (Green, 2010, p.33). Conversely, Butcher et al. (2010) state in their House of Commons 
research paper that the infrastructure of the railway, which is the stations, track and signalling 
as being ‘publicly owned’ (Butcher et al., 2010, p.8). This discrepancy in understanding and the 
definition of the ownership of the railway infrastructure between one Government office 
and Network Rail highlights the complexities of the railway network in the UK and it presents 
a lack of distinction and ambiguity in terms of the accountability for its processes and 
procedures, and the legal framework that surrounds it (Hawkins, 2008). 
 
Network Rail is operated to the same standards as a public limited company and the ORR 
is the regulatory board that Network Rail must operate under (Network Rail, 2011a). The ORR 
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was created through statute and it operates as an independent economic and safety rail 
regulator in the UK, with their objective to improve rail services for all users. Their jurisdiction 
covers the mainline network, underground railway, light rail, tramways, and minor heritage 
rail.  The ORR is the enforcing authority of the Railways Act 2005 and the Health and Safety 
at Work etc. Act 1974. 
 
6.4 Network Rail and Railway Stations 
Network Rail owns all the railway stations in England, Scotland, and Wales. However, they 
only operate eighteen railway stations in the UK; seven of these are national stations, while the 
remaining eleven stations are located throughout London. The locality and scale of these 
Network Rail operated stations can be appreciated when over half of passengers either 
commence or terminate their travel at one of them (Network Rail, 2011d). Moreover, SPIRS is 
owned by HS1 and operated by Network Rail High-speed. The remaining two thousand five 
hundred railway stations in the UK are leased to and operated by the TOCs. A full listing of 
the current TOCs that operate in England and Wales is listed in the appendices. The 
Strategic Rail Authority controls the franchise agreements that permit the TOCs to operate 
on the railway network (Morgan and Cornish, 2006). The ATOC is the trade association to 
represent the interests of the TOCs (Morgan and Cornish, 2006, p.1). Despite this, Network 
Rail is currently responsible for the actual railway station buildings and their subsequent 
upgrading and refitting (Network Rail, 2011e). By 2015 Network Rail estimates it will have 
invested £3.25 billion, secured from the DfT, the Welsh Assembly, Transport for Scotland, their own 
funds plus those of third parties, to operate, maintain and improve railway stations in Britain, 
with over two thousand stations benefiting from the investment (Network Rail, 2011e). 
 
It should be noted that Network Rail additionally operates and maintains the following 
components of British railway infrastructure: 
• 40,000 bridges and tunnels 
• 20,000 miles of track and associated infrastructure 
• 8,200 commercial properties 
 
However, the recommendations of the 2011 McNulty Report proposed some significant 
changes to the operation of railway stations. The focus of the report was how the railway 
network in Britain could increase its value for money, with Sir McNulty believing that it is 
possible from 2014 to save £1 billion per year. This has been estimated to represent savings 
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of twenty percent of the public subsidy that is put into the British railway each year (Railnews, 
2011). Network Rail announced in May 2011 to meet some of the savings required in the 
report, the TOCs would be permitted to redevelop stations with ‘financial incentives’ 
(Gardiner, 2011) and they will be awarded longer leases, with one hundred years being given 
on railway stations. Network Rail also indicated they wish to operate, control, and redevelop 
further major city stations (Gardiner, 2011). 
 
6.5 SPIRS Today 
As examined in Chapter Three, the functions of railway stations in England and Wales today 
have moved on from the practical issues of the movement of passengers and they now 
play a crucial part in the passenger’s travelling experience. The communities where railway 
stations are being redeveloped currently and in the future, will benefit from the substantial 
investments being made (Railstaff, 2013). Larger railway stations, with investment, are 
becoming significant structures in our cities. Since many of them like SPIRS have multi-
functions, retail, and hospitality, and are therefore not just the entrance to the network 
(Railstaff, 2013). It is suggested that given these functions, the redeveloped railway station 
makes ‘them ideal locations for office and residential developments, especially in city 
centres…by taking advantage of the inbuilt sustainable transport provision’ (Railstaff, 2013). 
 
As discussed in Chapter Five, as a unique single case study SPIRS is a magnifying glass to 
focus on the interdependencies of the political, legal and operational boundaries of the 
complex and multiple stakeholders in a Category A railway station and how these can 
impact on the current and future resilience of the space against human malign security 
threats. The findings of the research could be applicable to the resilience of ‘Category B: 
Regional Hubs – stations generally serving important cities and towns’ (Network Rail, 2011, 
p.15). However, there is little value to the research by comparing the security requirements 
of smaller stations, given their security requirements will be vastly different to larger nationally 
important stations. 
 
6.5.1 Refurbishment and Regeneration of SPIRS 
In recent years, SPIRS and the neighbouring station of Kings Cross have been at the centre of 
extremely high value regeneration projects. It was decided in the mid-1990s that St Pancras 
Railway Station would be redesigned and refurbished to become the terminus for the 
Eurostar. Platforms were extended to the north of Barlow’s great glass roofed train shed, roads 
were rerouted, gasholders were demolished, along with most of the viaduct that brought 
trains into the station was replaced for the extension project (Thorne, 2003, p.174). The 2004 
to 2007 refurbishment of SPIRS cost approximately £800m, the focus of the station has 
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changed from being a terminus and part of the London Underground network to a high-
class retail and hospitality venue. It has become the focus of consumers and not just the 
travelling public, given ‘twenty five percent of its visitors never going near a train’ (Railstaff, 
2013). The St Pancras Renaissance Hotel was opened in 2011, with two hundred and forty-
four lavishly appointed bedrooms. The hotel has open public access to the SPIRS platform 
through The Booking Office Bar. The refurbishment of SPIRS and the opening of the hotel has 
reinforced it as an icon ‘as one of the greatest Victorian Buildings in London’ (St Pancras 
International, 2013a). Thorne (2003, p.176) states the redesign and refurbishment of SPIRS 
was 
 
conceived as a way of reusing what already exists rather than starting afresh. It knits 
together and extends the infrastructure that is already available. 
 
Therefore, the refurbishment of SPIRS was not merely the case of renovating a grade one 
historically listed building ‘but it had to include and seamlessly interface with a modern 
international travel hub’ (Lansley et al., 2008, p.57). 
Figure 6.4: One of the opulent staircases in the St Pancras Renaissance Hotel, which illustrates 
the refurbishment of the gothic grandeur of the hotel.  (Source:  St Pancras International, 
2015). 
 
Furthermore, ‘architecture appears to have become the semiotic tool of choice for cities 
seeking to enhance their economic and cultural status’ (Jenkins, 2006, p.195). This is a feature 
of ‘new urbanism’ (Jenkins, 2006, p.197) where communities are at the center of planning, 
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which should induce a sense of incorporation and the ‘projects…fit in with existing urban 
contexts’ (Jenkins, 2006, p.197). The regeneration of SPIRS incorporated the existing station 
buildings and meshed it with the newer station extension. The area around Kings Cross and 
SPIRS have been regenerated by integrating existing buildings and creating new public 
spaces for passengers and the local community. 
 
As discussed in Chapter Four, railway stations in England and Wales have been viewed by the 
public and the media as dangerous spaces, which has created a fear of crime around 
them. The area around St Pancras and Kings Cross stations by 2000 were suffering from a 
lack of investment in regeneration; it was neglected and was associated with anti-social 
behaviours (Lansley et al., 2008, p.28), such as street sex workers, drugs, and vagrancy. 
Therefore, one consideration of SPIRS’ regeneration and redesign were ‘to construct (and 
defend) [a safe] space’ (Jewkes, 2008, p.36). Moreover, these defendable spaces were 
constructed with two interrelated practices being considered, that of ‘state sponsored 
urban renewal and the…more market-driven processes of gentrification’ (Jewkes, 2008, p.36). 
Raco (2003, p.1870) supports this stance and explains that many regeneration projects are 
additionally being based on ‘consumption-based economic activity’. 
 
When looking at the retail and hospitality stakeholders within the space (see Figure 6.9), 
SPIRS has been redeveloped to attract the wealthier sections of society, those who can be 
classed as ’legitimate patrons’ (Atkinson, 2003, p.1829), with ‘urban spaces are habitually 
imaged’ to tempt and charm these users (Massey, 2011, p.191). The rebranding of SPIRS has 
been fundamental in the marketing of the space to specific groups of ‘legitimate’ users 
and subsequently making it attractive to investors and retailers alike. 
 
6.6 Observational Analysis of the Current Functions of SPIRS  
As discussed in Chapter Three, the role of SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in 
England and Wales can be defined through Zemp et al., (2011) framework of five functions, 
which to recap are: 
1. linking catchment area and transport network 
2. supporting transfer between modes of transport 
3. facilitating commercial use of real estate 
4. providing public space 
5. contributing to the identity of the surrounding area  
(Zemp et al., 2011, p.446) 
 
Therefore, through the contextual observations and analysis of SPIRS around five elements 
156  
of function framework (Zemp et al., 2011); it highlights the critical and multifaceted nature of 
the station and how this leads to greater operational and security complexities for the 
multiple stakeholders within the space to process and resolve. 
 
1. Linking catchment area and transport network 
 
SPIRS provides a space for passengers to transfer between different modes of the transport, 
below are the forms of transport which can be accessed via the station, hence making it a 
multimodal transport hub. The research has found that in SPIRS each of the TOC’s has its own 
security policies that must work alongside and dovetail into Network Rail High- speed once the 
trains enter the station: 
 
East Midland Trains, - SPIRS is a terminal station which offers a direct link to large cities in the 
Midlands and the North of the country. Located on the upper level of the station, platforms 
one to four serve East Midland Trains. 
 
South Eastern Trains – SPIRS is a commuter station for passengers travelling on the UK’s only 
domestic high-speed rail service, ‘Hitachi bullet trains running at speeds of up to 300kmph 
to destinations in East London and Kent’ (St Pancras International, 2015b). Located on the 
upper level of the station, platforms eleven to thirteen serve South Eastern Trains. 
 
Thameslink, SPIRS is also a commuter station for passengers travelling from ‘Bedford and 
Luton through London and down to Brighton’ (St Pancras International, 2015b). Located on 
the lower level of the station, platforms A and B serve Thameslink. 
 
Eurostar – SPIRS is the terminal station for the Eurostar, where high- speed trains depart for Paris, Lille, 
and Brussels (St Pancras International, 2015b). New routes have added in 2015 to include Lyon, 
Avignon, and Marseille. The Eurostar arrivals and departures are located on the lower level of 
the station, while platforms five to ten are located on the upper level. 
 
London Underground - the Kings Cross St Pancras Station has ‘more underground connections 
than any other station in London’ (St Pancras International, 2015b). 
 
London Transport (buses and taxis) – bus stops are situated on the Midland Road, St Pancras Road 
and the Euston Road. Taxis ranks are located on the St Pancras Road and outside of the 
Eurostar Arrivals (St Pancras International, 2015c). 
 
2. Facilitating commercial use of real estate 
 
157  
Despite it being obvious that SPIRS provides a public space for passengers and members of 
the public looking to utilise its retail and leisure facilities, it should be reiterated that SPIRS is not a 
public space, as it and other railway stations in England and Wales are privately owned 
spaces which the public has seemingly free admittance to. Subsequently, they cannot be 
considered as public spaces; rather this research maintains that they are ‘pseudo-public 
spaces’ (Copper et al., 2007, p.14), or a hybrid area (Raco, 2003 and Newburn, 2007).As 
already discussed, the retail facilities within SPIRS lend themselves to creating a higher end 
shopping experience, the brands which occupy units are critical in upholding the image of 
premium quality which is driven by HS1, with food chains such as MacDonald’s and Burger 
King not being seen to promote a premium shopping and leisure experience. Retailers such 
as Fortnum and Masons, John Lewis and Cath Kidston capture classic English luxury shopping 
in the space. Thorne (2003, p.171) maintains during the planning stages of the redesign and 
refurbishment of the station and the hotel the ‘designated shopping centre…was crucial to 
helping the financial restoration’. 
 
3. Contributing to the identity of the surrounding area 
4. Providing public space 
5. Contributing to the identity of the surrounding area 
 
The refurbishment of SPIRS and its role as an international travel hub has played an important 
stepping-stone in the regeneration project of the surrounding Kings Cross area. Lansley et al. 
(2008, p.178) proposed for the future that the regeneration of the areas would ‘deliver a 
fundamental change to the economy and environment of this key part of central 
London…and producing substantial benefits for the community, locally and across 
London’. Below is a breakdown of the basics of the project and just what the impact has been 
in the locale: 
• 50 new buildings 
• 2,000 new homes 
• 20 new streets 
• 10 new public squares 
• 67 acres 
• 8 million square feet 
• 3.4 million sq. ft. of workspace 
• 500,000 sq. ft. of retail 
• 26 acres of public space 
(Kings Cross, 2013) 
158  
 
As well as considering the space of SPIRS in terms of the five functions described by Zemp et 
al. (2011), Network Rail designates the physical space of the station into three specific zones, 
each with its individual functions. Network Rail (2011, p.5 and p.34) defines the zones as 
follows and the photographs collected from SPIRS during the data collection phase of the 
research are used to illustrate these areas: 
 
The Access Zone 
This is the area of (and surrounding) SPIRS where departing passengers arrive at the railway 
station, or where people who have just arrived by train commence the next leg of their 
journey, and can include access to: 
Public transport 
• Domestic: TOCs, East Midland Trains, Thameslink, South Eastern Trains 
• International TOC, Eurostar 
• Check in and passport control facilities 
• Transport for London, London Underground 
• Transport for London, Taxis 
• Transport for London, Buses 
 
Figure 6.5: Upper Level platforms in SPIRS. Three Eurostar trains waiting in the terminus. 
(Source: Gregson-Green, 2012) 
 
 
Pick-up/drop off 
• Outside the St Pancras Renaissance Hotel 
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• International departures on the east side of the station 
 
Figure 6.6: Vehicle drop off zone and parking to the front of St Pancras Renaissance Hotel 
(Euston Road). (Source: Gregson-Green, 2012) 
 
• Car parks 
o Underground NCP carpark on the lower level of the station to the north of the 
building 
 
• Walking routes 
o Passengers and the public walk through SPIRS to access Kings Cross Railway 
Station, Kings Cross St Pancras London Underground Station, and to traverse 
through the station to access major routes. 
 
• Works of art 
o Sculptures 
o Art installations 
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Figure 6.7: The Meeting Place sculpture on the upper level and the art installation of the 
Olympic Rings. (Source: Gregson-Green 2012). 
 
The Facilities Zone 
This is the area of SPIRS where passengers and the public collect information, make 
purchases, or use the facilities on offer in the space. The Facilities Zone includes facilities such as: 
 
• Ticket sales 
• Waiting areas 
• Information areas 
o Are located near the entrances to the platforms. The station reception is 
located on the lower level past the Circle area 
• Public conveniences 
o These are located on the lower level of the station in the Arcade area and 
past the Circle area. 
• Left Luggage 
o is located on the lower level of the station past the Circle area 
• Retail and eatery units 
o Are located on the upper level, and the lower level, Arcade and Circle areas. 
 
Figure 6.8: The Upper Level of SPIRS – East Midlands Trains. The picture highlights the entry 
and exit barriers to platforms one to four; it shows the passenger information screens for 
train information and the information desk for East Midlands Trains. (Source: Gregson-Green, 
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2012). 
 
 
The Platform Zone 
In these areas of SPIRS, passengers leave domestic and international trains, they also wait 
for and to get on board trains, or interchange between trains, it includes facilities such as: 
• Seating facilities 
• Information zones and facilities 
• Access to and from the domestic and international platforms 
 
On the next page is a station map of SPIRS as at 04.04.15. This map was current at the date of the 
download, however, given the fluid nature of the retail units the station the map will be subject 
to change. 
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Figure 6.9 Map of SPIRS as at 04.04.15 (St Pancras International, 2015d) 
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6.7 Crime, Commodification of SPIRS 
SPIRS is located within the London Borough of Camden, Somers Town. Historically, SPIRS and 
Kings Cross and their outlying marginal areas where infamous for criminal activities, street sex 
workers, vagrants, and drug users, and like many stations of the time, it was typified by 
neglect, and a poor opinion of the area (Raco, 2003). Therefore, it was crucial for investors, 
owners and the public that the redeveloped station and areas around SPIRS conquered 
these undesirable and harmful opinions. As examined in Chapter Four, railway stations in 
England and Wales are continuously under surveillance and governance, however, larger 
city based stations face another challenge as they are becoming ‘commodified and newly 
regenerated areas are viewed as valuable, and thus individuals and corporations fight for a 
presence there’ (Massey, 2011, p.191). 
 
Therefore, from the observations made during the data collection phase, not all members 
of society are welcomed in these newly gentrified spaces, vagrants, and drug users are 
discouraged from spending time in or around the margins of the station. However, 
interestingly, at the point of data collection, the Boots store in SPIRS was the local registered 
pharmacy to dispense Methadone. These regenerated and gentrified spaces such as SPIRS 
are designed, developed, and operated for prosperous and frequently middle-class 
consumers and consequently do not cater for the surrounding local community, ‘who are 
often culturally and even physically excluded’ (Raco, 2003, p.1871). 
 
Moreover, the regeneration and gentrification of SPIRS could lead to the space becoming 
contested. Jewkes (2008, p.37) states the process of gentrification of spaces can be viewed 
‘as a byword for middle class takeover, with local people being forced out by social and 
economic pressures’. Therefore, Atkinson (2003, p.1834) proposes ‘the rights conferred by 
citizenship are increasingly predicated on being a consumer, consumers of private and 
government services’. Consequently, it is critical for HS1 and Network Rail High-speed to 
ensure their legitimate customers feel secure in the environment of the station and its 
surrounding margins, ‘as flows of income are easily disrupted by changing perceptions of 
fear and the threat of crime’ (Raco, 2003, p.1869). Hence, the policing, the securitisation, 
and resilience of the space are entangled with the perceptions of SPIRS and economic 
drivers of the management and owner companies. 
 
6.8 Current Terrorist Threats Facing SPIRS 
The 2005 terrorist attacks on London’s transport infrastructure is just one example which 
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demonstrated how a critical infrastructure can be viewed as ‘vulnerable and brittle’ 
(Schulman and Roe, 2007, p.42) to disruption. Despite the death of fifty-two people in the 
July 2005 terrorist attack on London’s transport system, the infrastructure was, in fact, resilient 
because the destruction and disruption were ‘localised’ (London Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry, 2005, p.5). The Royal Mail exemplifies this proposition since they could 
commence their operations in London by the afternoon of the attack (London Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, 2005). This act of terrorism and similar events such as the 2007 
terrorist attack at Glasgow airport have resulted in the resilience of Britain’s CNI making 
headlines in the media. The Government stated, ‘we are entering an age of uncertainty… 
our objectives are ensuring a secure and resilient United Kingdom’ (The Guardian, 2010) 
and funding of £500 million will be deployed for the protection and prevention of the UK’s 
CNI. Therefore, it is this era of insecurity concerning the resilience of the UK that is the 
fundamental principle behind the 2011 National Security Strategy. 
 
The Government maintains the current and indeed the future threats faced by the country 
are not the traditional hazards of war and invasion, rather the threats of modernity, such as 
conventional terrorist attacks, cyber terrorism, terrorist actions using weapons which are 
chemical, nuclear or biological, and natural hazards and accidents (Home Office, 2011d). 
It is acknowledged these threats are due to the highly networked and open nature of the 
country and threats faced currently will be different in fifty years’ time. The potential human 
malign security threats to the UK are defined as both state and ‘non-state actors: terrorists, 
home-grown or overseas; insurgents; or criminals’ (Home Office, 2011d, p.3). However, in 
2015 the Government states 
the terrorist threats we face now are more diverse than before, dispersed across a 
wider geographical area, and often in countries without effective governance. We 
therefore face an unpredictable situation, with potentially more frequent, less 
sophisticated terrorist attacks. 
(GOV.UK, 2015a) 
 
The threat level in the UK at the start of 2015 was at the highest level it had been in seven years 
(Sky News, 2015). Terrorism threat levels indicate the risk to the UK of attack, against an 
international led attack; the current level is severe (Gov. UK, 2015b). Below is the 
categorisation of the threat levels to the UK as ‘set by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre and 
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the Security Service (MI5)’ (Gov.UK, 2015b). 
 
There are five levels of threat: 
• low - an attack is unlikely 
• moderate - an attack is possible but not likely 
• substantial - an attack is a strong possibility 
• severe - an attack is highly likely 
• critical - an attack is expected imminently  
(Gov. UK, 2015) 
 
As examined in Chapter Three there are multiple methods of terrorist attacks that could be 
launched against SPIRS, which is an iconic building and a significant Category A railway 
station in London. The concept of the resilience of CNI and SPIRS being a part of the wider 
transport CNI is acknowledged as being not just the responsibility of the Government, but 
additionally that of the public and the private sector. The Government maintains that 
resilience will be achieved through reinforcing defences, preparation for the worst-case 
scenarios and the ability to recover quickly to ‘keep Britain moving’ (Home Office, 2011d, p.5). 
 
6.9 The Key Stakeholders Involved in the Operation of SPIRS 
Since the privatisation of the railway network in the 1990s, the complexity of the railway 
network can be seen in the numerous key institutions, stakeholders, and forums that are 
involved in deciding on policy, strategies, the operational capacity, and future of the 
railway network. A critical contribution to the knowledge surrounding how the complex and 
multiple stakeholders affect the current and future resilience to security threats in SPIRS is the 
completion of the Stakeholder Map. The creation of a Stakeholder Map is an important 
contextual analysis of information that maps the relationships and power of the stakeholders 
within SPIRS. 
 
As demonstrated in this chapter and Chapter Three, SPIRS’ operational complexities are 
exacerbated by its size, location, and importance (Zemp et al., 2011). Thus, it has numerous 
stakeholders who affect or are currently impacted on by resilience and security policies, 
strategies, at both a local and national level. Stakeholders in SPIRS are ‘any group or 
individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the institution’s objectives’ 
(Freeman, 1984, p.46). The unique and innovate SPIRS Stakeholder Map aids and increases 
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this understanding of the complex and interconnected of both compulsory and voluntary 
relationships and the diverse forms of relationships which exemplify the space. Furthermore, 
Appendix 6.2 provides extensive details regarding the role and responsibilities stakeholders of 
SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and Wales. 
 
The map demonstrates a complex and disparate group of stakeholders who are involved or 
affected by the operational and legal processes and operations of SPIRS. Moreover, it 
distinguishes the relevant ‘stakeholders and maps out their relative power, influence, and 
interests’ (Aligica, 2006, p80). Therefore, the stakeholders within SPIRS can be categorised 
as organisations (Blue-primary, yellow-secondary, and green-external stakeholders on the 
map) with an interest in the space, but can be seen also in a wider context of the public 
and passengers (Blue-primary stakeholders on the map). Thus, reinforcing that ‘any group of 
people, organized or unorganized, who share a common interest or stake in a particular issue 
or system’ (Grimble and Wellard, 1997, p.75). Moreover, when analysing and mapping the 
stakeholders of SPIRS, the research has used a holistic standpoint of Stakeholder Theory which 
have widen the established view of the stakeholders beyond their relationships based on 
conventional contractual and monetary associations. Therefore, the stakeholders of SPIRS 
have analysed and mapped as seen in the below table, whichever process of mapping is 
used; stakeholders are fluid and dynamic, and temporal and spatial and therefore must be 
considered as social constructs. 
Colour Key Role Stakeholder 
Blue Primary stakeholders who are 
directly affected positively 
or negatively, by a project 
or operations 
BTP, MET, TOCS, Passengers, 
Public, Network Rail, Retailers, 
ORR, RSSB, HS1 
Yellow Secondary stakeholders have a 
transitional function and can 
have a key impact on the 
project or operations 
DfT, ATOC, Trade Unions, 
NACTSO, CPNI, SO15/S020, 
FOCs, Freight-Operating 
Association, Local 
Authority Emergency 
Planners Green External stakeholders do not 
directly participate, yet can be 
impacted on by a project or 
operations 
Home Office, The Treasury, 
Local Communities, 
Passenger Watchdogs, BTPA, 
ACPO 
Table 6.1 SPIRS Stakeholder Categories and Roles for Mapping (Adapted from Freeman 1984 
and Jepson and Eskerod, 2008). 
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The stakeholders listed in the above table and on the map, can add value to resilience and 
security strategies, operational processes, and their opinions should be valued and used to 
inform these. However, in terms of a practical application, active participation from all 
levels of stakeholders within SPIRS when dealing with issues of resilience to security threats 
would be extremely difficult to get all the stakeholders to agree ‘what 
legitimates…participation’ (Clarke 1997, p.211, cited in Anderson and Nielson, 2009, p.309) 
and how this could be managed. As discussed in Chapter Four, the legitimacy of 
stakeholders is highly subjective and extremely dependent on the agendas and values of 
the individual stakeholders undertaking the consideration. The SPIRS stakeholders 
categorised on the map are legitimate as they all have a form of power and influence ‘to 
affect the direction’ of the institution...regardless of the appropriateness of their demands’ 
(Freeman, 1984, p.45), in terms of resilience to security threats within the space. 
 
Therefore, the research proposes that stakeholders within SPIRS must consider criminals and 
terrorists as legitimate stakeholders when considering resilience and security policies and 
strategies as they can influence the institution. Those SPIRS stakeholders such as the DfT and 
Network Rail High-Speed establish and operationalise resilience and security policies and 
strategies must account for all the stakeholders affected and to assess their backing or 
opposition and to highlight their interconnected relationships (Aligica, 2006, p.79). 
168 
 
 
Figure 6.10 Stakeholder Map of SPIRS (Gregson-Green, et al., 2013) 
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Importantly, the research participants validated the map during their interviews, alterations, 
and additions. The map portrays the critical stakeholders within SPIRS who can influence the 
resilience of the space to security threats and their complex interdependencies (Aliciga, 
2006). Therefore, this a comprehensive and precise listing of the stakeholders and the 
category to which they belong to when considering resilience to security threats in terms of 
policy, strategy, and operational procedures. Moreover, this form Stakeholder Analysis is 
relevant to other Category A railway stations in England and Wales, and to other pseudo-
public spaces who operate with multiple stakeholders, such as shopping centres and who 
need to be aware of the sizeable and complex range of stakeholders, policies, strategies 
and individual organisational agendas that influence the resilience of the space to human 
malign security threats. 
 
The purpose of the map is to capture ‘the essential elements of the strategic space: the 
actors, the rules of the game, the processes set into motion within those rules’ (Aliciga, 2006, 
p.82-83). However, it should be noted there is no one correct method of ‘mapping a social 
space or phenomenon’ (Aligica, 2006, p.81). As with all forms of analysis, Stakeholder 
Mapping can be subjected to the creator’s biases and knowledge. Therefore, it can be 
considered as subjective, dependent on who is devising the map and the policy, strategy, 
or operation being considered. 
 
However, as a direct comparison to the Stakeholder Analysis and mapping carried out for 
this research, Network Rail has a stakeholder engagement strategy, which the stakeholder 
relations code of practice advocates a transparent process to encourage confidence and 
fairness (Network Rail, 2013a) when dealing with stakeholders. Moreover, this code 
additionally facilities the fulfilment of condition eight of Network Rail’s network license, 
which obliges them to disseminate how stakeholders will be treated. Thus, Network Rail 
describes stakeholders who are connected to the railway network 
• Any person providing services relating to railways 
• Any person providing a railway facility or a network, including one which is 
proposed for, or in the course of, construction 
• Any funder 
• Any other person who’s expressed, in writing to the licence holder, a credible: 
• Interest in providing or intention to provide; or 
 
170 
 
• Interest in providing or intention to provide finance for, or in connection with either 
or both of: (i) services relating to railways; and (ii) a railway facility or a network, 
including one which is proposed to be constructed or is in the course of, construction 
• The Mayor of London and Transport for London, in respect of their functions relating 
to railway services (this includes, but is not limited to, services for which the Mayor of 
London and Transport for London have responsibility) 
• The Rail Passengers’ Council and the London Transport Users’ Committee, in respect 
of their statutory functions. 
(Network Rail, 2013a, p.3) 
 
Interestingly, in this document, there is an absence of passengers and the public being 
defined as stakeholders, they are depicted as ‘rail users and…customers’ (Network Rail, 
2013a, p.3) and being the beneficiaries of the service provided by Network Rail and the 
aforementioned defined stakeholders. Network Rail extends a feedback system for 
stakeholders, who in the code of practice are encouraged to strengthen their working 
relationship with Network Rail by responding to their engagements with the Network Rail 
working practice (Network Rail, 2013a). 
 
Network Rail (2011, p.5) defines other members of the public and groups/stakeholders as 
• those meeting people off trains 
• those bidding farewell to passengers 
• those seeking information about rail services 
• railway staff 
• other public transport staff 
• taxi-drivers 
• employees of retail or catering outlets 
• customers of retail or catering outlets 
• contractors providing goods or services to the station 
• emergency services 
• railway enthusiasts 
• criminals (illegitimate stakeholders) 
 
Therefore, for the purpose of this research, the creation of the Stakeholder Map of SPIRS 
was critical in this conceptualisation and visualisation as this is not provided by Network Rail. 
The map represents a snapshot of the stakeholders within SPIRS, who can or are impacted on 
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by the resilience to security threats. Consequently, it must be acknowledged that the 
relationships and interactions between the stakeholders are fluid and dynamic and will 
change over time. Moreover, the map provides a framework for understanding that SPIRS as 
a space is dynamic and as such, it must be considered so in its governance and operations. 
Initially, the map was created to aid the researcher analysis and understand the complex 
interconnected stakeholder relationships within the space of SPIRS. However, as the data 
collection phase progressed and following the systematic abduction process, the map was 
altered as participants viewed it as part of the semi-structured interviews. Therefore, there 
have been numerous versions of the Stakeholder Map. 
 
6.10 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has provided a contextual study of the temporal, social, and political dynamics 
of SPIRS, in advance of Chapters Seven and Eight, which present the findings, and discussions 
of the qualitative research undertaken. Moreover, it has demonstrated that SPIRS is currently 
one of the most significant termini railway stations in London and the UK, given its 
exceptionality is defined its importance as an international and multimodal transport hub. 
Additionally, it is the setting of a luxurious and historic five-star hotel, with notable apartments 
located above it and additionally SPIRS is a space for prestigious leisure and retail facilities. 
Thus, this makes SPIRS a highly complex and interconnected space which consists of a mix of 
both public and private stakeholders which demand considerable degrees of organisation 
to ‘legislate, regulate, implement, and police’ (Loukaitou-Sideris et al., 2006, p.737) to 
successfully safeguard resilience against current and prospective human malign security 
threats. The following two chapters bring together the research findings and examine them in 
terms of current and future security threats and the resilience of SPIRS and its complex and 
multiple stakeholders to withstand these. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: SPIRS AND THE RESILIENCE TO CURRENT HUMAN MALIGN SECURITY THREATS.  FINDINGS AND 
DISCUSSION. 
 
7.0 Chapter Introduction 
This and the subsequent chapter examine and present the extensive and substantial 
analysis of the data collected from the research phase of the thesis. These chapters will 
address the research question presented in Chapter One of the thesis.  
How do the interdependencies and governance of the complex operational, and 
policy boundaries of SPIRS’ stakeholders influence and impact the space’s current 
and future resilience to human malign security threats?  
 
To answer this question, the unique and single case study of SPIRS was undertaken with 
thirty-four semi-structured interviews, see Table 5.3 for a full list of participants, conducted 
between 2012 and 2013 with the following research participant’s data being analysed: 
 
British Transport Police (8) Three Senior Level Policy Officers Counter-terrorism 
Security Advisor 
Four Operational Officers, PCs, Sargent, and 
Inspector 
Camden Borough Council Emergency Planner 
International Police Officer Counter-terrorism Expert – Crowded Place/Mega Events 
(data not used in analysis) 
Academic Professor (2) Professors of Criminology and Crime Prevention (data 
from one not used in analysis) 
Transport for London (2) Community and Crime Prevention Manager 
Infrastructure Manager 
Network Rail (5) Three Operational Managers Emergency Planner 
Senior Policy Maker 
Retailers (SPIRS) (2) Store Managers 
High-Speed One Security Manager 
Private Practice Security 
Consultants/Advisors 
Three different consultancy firms 
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CrossRail Security Consultant 
Passenger Focus (Now Transport 
Focus) 
Passenger Safety Officer 
Eurostar Head of Security 
London Fire Brigade Emergency Planner 
RSSB Senior Manager 
Serco Crime Prevention Manager 
Security Services (2) Counter-terrorism Service Advisors 
Table 7.1 Research Participants (2012-2013) 
 
These interviews approximated sixty-five hours’ worth of recorded data, which the 
researcher transcribed verbatim. The subsequent transcripts were analysed using NVivo 
software and then coded into the below overarching parental themes; 
 
• Barriers for resilience 
• Built environment 
• Communication 
• Design stage 
• Emergency 
• Financial implications 
• Futures 
• Infrastructure 
• Operational complexities 
• Policy & guidance 
• Railway station 
• Resilience 
• Security threats 
• Stakeholders 
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Subsequently, as the analysis drilled down into these, deeper sub child themes emerged 
as per the thematic analysis framework (see Appendix 5.7). This thematic process has been 
examined in greater detail in Chapter Five (section 5.10.3) of the thesis. Therefore, the 
researcher coded data as it accumulated (Bell, 2010) and through constantly comparing 
the data, and could visualise emerging categories. The emerging themes and the 
subsequent discussions in the next two Chapters of the thesis are interconnected and 
overlap each other and cannot be considered or written about as isolated themes. 
 
This Chapter and the next support the research’s epistemological position of interpretivism 
and the ontological stance of constructionism. To recap from Chapter Five, this has been 
achieved using verbatim quotations from the participants, thus producing the narratives of 
the participant’s own experiences and to highlight to the reader how they ‘make sense of 
their social world and act within it’ (May, 1997, p.129). Hence, the data which emerged 
must be considered that at the time of interview it was the participant’s version of reality 
(Bryman, 2004). Consequently, the discourse and language of the participants will have 
been affected and prompted by their experiences and even organisational bias regarding 
the resilience of SPIRS to human malign security threats. The following discussions of the 
findings have been framed by current and innovative debates around Resilience, 
Governmentality and Stakeholder Theory that are relevant to the context of SPIRS and other 
Category A railway stations. The research findings have been used to inform this chapter, 
which examines the current resilience of SPIRS to human malign security threats, and 
Chapter Eight, which also considers the future resilience of the space in terms of the 
discussion and the lessons learnt from the research. 
 
The concepts of Resilience, Governmentality, and Stakeholder Theory within the space of 
SPIRS direct the discussions around the obligations and ‘responsibilisation’ (Garland,1996) 
for resilience, crime and terrorism (security) prevention strategies for multiple stakeholders 
who are positioned at a local and national level. Stakeholder Theory specifically analyses 
how SPIRS’ complex and multiple stakeholders operationalise and communicate strategy 
and policies to maximise the resilience of the space to human malign security threats. As 
discussed in Chapters Four and Six, the previous literature has highlighted that there are a 
number of significant elements which can affect and compel the security measures 
undertaken in SPIRS which safeguard the resilience of the space to current human malign 
security threats, these are; 
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• CPMs (Crime Prevention Measures) 
• CTMs (Counter-terrorism Measures) 
• Operational and functional complexities 
• The Design of Railway Stations 
• Stakeholders 
• Resilience and Security Strategies 
• Future Policies and Requirements 
 
These elements have been investigated through the literature review and consequently 
integrated into the research design for the thesis (see Table 5.5 and Appendix 5.5 for the 
areas of questioning and semi-structured interview schedule). Moreover, given the 
abductive nature of the research, it allowed for the new and emerging topics and elements 
to be further researched and incorporated into the semi-structured interview schedule. 
 
A number of findings have emerged, and which revealed the complexities of the 
operational concepts of resilience, responsibilisation and governance of the multiple 
stakeholders initiating measures against human malign security threats within the space of 
SPIRS. Furthermore, the analysis of the data has illustrated there are many influences that 
affect both positively and negatively on the resilience of SPIRS to security threats. This 
includes the disconnections and tensions between resilience policy and governance from 
a national level to the stakeholders at a local level charged with implementing resilience 
within the space of SPIRS. The research has also investigated the two forms of human malign 
security threats, crime, and terrorism, facing SPIRS’ current resilience. To recap from Chapter 
Three and the subsequent research findings define security threats to SPIRS ‘as any human 
malign action from terrorist activity to low level crime such as anti-social behaviour’ 
(Gregson-Green et al., 2013, p.35). However, it is important to acknowledge from the 
research findings is they do not stand in, nor can be viewed in isolation from each other; 
they are entangled and interconnected, linked through their complexity. 
 
PART ONE - RESILIENCE 
7.1 Contested Definitions and Understanding of Resilience in SPIRS 
The concept of resilience, in terms of its definition and use, which is open to a wide field of 
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interpretation by academics, rail industry professionals and the Government, was examined 
at length in Chapters Two and Four of the thesis. Moreover, a substantive area and theme 
of discussion which arose from the participant’s semi-structured interviews were around 
resilience and how it was applicable, governed, ‘responsibilised’ and operationalised within 
SPIRS. The sub-resilience themes which emerged from the thematically analysed data are 
detailed in Table 7.2. The participants discussed the resilience of SPIRS to security threats in 
two temporal spaces, the present day which is analysed in this Chapter, and the future 
threats examined in Chapter Eight. 
 
As discussed in Chapters Two and Three, the concept of resilience is frequently used in 
different forms and arenas of discourse, yet there is considerable agreement (Chandler and 
Coaffee, 2017, Joseph, 2017, Rogers, 2017 and Coaffee and Fussey, 2017) that it lacks clarity 
as it is interpreted by different schools of academic thought, rail industry professionals, and 
the Government. To examine if these differences in the definitions of resilience existed within 
the space of SPIRS the researcher deemed it was an essential question to ask the 
participants. Therefore, they were asked during the beginning stages of the interview to 
define what they thought was meant by the concept of resilience, “what does resilience mean 
to you?”. 
 
As already mentioned in Chapter Three, the Government does outline an overarching 
definition of resilience for CNI, yet through the analysis of the participant’s data, it was 
apparent that the overall space of SPIRS does not have or operationalise a cohesive 
definition of resilience. Moreover, the researcher found the multiple stakeholders all had 
their own organisational definition of resilience, which reflected and influenced the wider 
SPIRS overall resilience strategies at a local level and how it should be operationalised in 
terms of their organisation’s agenda and the wider space of the station. Thus, the reality of 
the ‘responsibilisation’ (Garland, 1996) of a cohesive resilience agenda at the local level 
within the space of SPIRS is disputed as in reality it does not correspond with the 
Government’s resilience rhetoric. It is contended within the space of SPIRS that conflicts, or 
tensions occur when the complex and multiple stakeholders are ‘responsibilised’ by the 
Government to keep the space resilient to existing human malign security threats. Therefore, 
it is the participant’s definitions of resilience that are used as the starting point to explore the 
connections and tensions between the theoretical and practical standpoints of resilience 
within SPIRS, which in turn provides an original contribution to knowledge.  
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The below table (7.2) illustrates the emerging (child nodes) themes of resilience from 
analysing the interview data and how the participants defined the overarching concept of 
resilience in the context of SPIRS. The full coding matrix (Parent, child, subthemes) for the 
analysis of the data collected can be viewed in Appendix 5.7. 
 
Name 
RESILIENCE 
BUSINESS CONTINUITY 
CONTINGENCY PLANS 
RESILIENCE CHALLENGES 
RESILIENCE FORMS OF 
RESILIENCE DEFINITION 
RESILIENCE OF RAIL 
Table 7.2 Resilience (parent and child) themes that emerged from the research data 
collection. 
 
Thus, the below chart (Figure 7.1) highlights the number of (coded child) references made 
in the transcribed interview data to the resilience themes as noted in Table 7.2. 
 
Figure 7.1 Percentage of coded references for resilience themes. 
 
The below extracts empirically establish how the research participants defined the concept 
resilience in their own terms, whether that was from a theoretical position, organisational 
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and or their own general definition, and what it meant in relation to the wider space of 
SPIRS. However, not all the stakeholders interviewed had the same perception or concern, 
scale of risk about security threats or the resilience against them. Whilst the literature 
highlighted that the ambiguity of the term and definition of resilience has a part to play and 
‘facilitates communication across various disciplines and it often creates a perception of a 
shared vocabulary’ (Chmutina et al., 2016, p.78). Yet, the research findings have revealed 
the complex and multiple stakeholders in SPIRS do not necessarily share this collective 
vocabulary. Within the space of SPIRS, the research has exposed there are numerous 
and often fragmented competing policies surrounding resilience and how to secure this has 
created ‘multiple competing ‘logics of resilience’ (Coaffee and Fussey, 2015, p.87). For 
instance, for the retailers within SPIRS who were interviewed, perceived the greatest risk to 
the resilience to their daily businesses was shoplifting rather than from the threat of a terrorist 
attack. Whereas, the BTP Officers interviewed acknowledged from their perspective that 
the greatest risk to the security of SPIRS was a terrorist attack.  
 
The literature (Coaffee and Fussey, 2017) and the research findings has shown within the 
space of SPIRS there is little chance of finding a consistent explanation for resilience, with 
many of the below examples being principally centered around adaptability and 
redundancy. Given the complexity and number of stakeholders within SPIRS who form 
resilience is operationalised in diverse ‘organisational and spatial settings’ (Coaffee and 
Fussey, 2017, p.294), the concept should be considered ‘normative…a goal rather than a 
final state if being…measured as a comparative or relative quality’ (Chandler, 2012, p.217). 
It was ascertained from the operational participants that their overarching understanding of 
the concept of resilience was focused on the practical and functioning considerations of 
resilience, rather than from a theoretical or rhetorical perspective advocated by the 
Government. Thus, the analysis of the data has revealed that within SPIRS there are currently 
three classifications of practical and operational resilience, which is argued are interlinked 
to each other. The below table highlights how the stakeholder’s opinions of resilience 
correspond to these three categories: 
 
Category of resilience Academic reference Research 
participants 
agreeing 
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Resistance/robustness/absorption Errington,1953; 
Godschalk, 2003; 
Holling, 
1973; Salagnac, 
2013 
BTP, Network Rail, 
UK Government 
Police and 
Security Advisor 
Recovery/ ‘bouncing back’ Lindell and Perry, 
1992; 
Rose, 2004; 
Wildavsky, 1988 
BTP, Security 
Design 
Consultant, 
Security Advisor, 
Network Rail 
Government 
Emergency 
Planner 
Planning/preparing/protecting Bosher, 2008; 
Manyena, 2006; 
Wildavsky, 1988 
BTP, Security 
Design Consultant 
and Security 
Advisor, Home 
Office Police 
Advisor, Network 
Rail 
Table 7.3 Categories of resilience in SPIRS. Adapted from Bosher (2014, p.242). 
 
7.1.1 Resilience:  Resistance/robustness/absorption 
As to be expected the findings exposed from a UK Government policing security 
perspective, the concept of resilience, which naturally mirrored the Government’s stance, 
was about being as robust as possible at the time of the incident to ensure the best chance 
of the space and people surviving. This means 
“relying on the best possible business continuity measures, to allow the space to 
recover and to be up and running as soon as possible, preferably the next day” 
(Government Policing and Security Advisor). 
 
There is little surprise that this definition is very close in mirroring the Cabinet Office’s stance 
on how resilience should be able to predict, endure, modify, and quickly return to business 
as usual after a serious, human or natural, interruption to normal service conditions. 
 
Resilience is the ability of assets, networks and systems to anticipate, absorb, adapt 
to and/or rapidly recover from a disruptive event 
(Cabinet Office, 2011, p.15). 
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The resilience of SPIRS was also considered by participants in terms of a cascading impact of 
security situations, and how events and impacts have a knock-on effect on the overall 
resilience of the space to security threats. However, building in spare resilience capacity for 
contingencies, was very much subjective to the specific stakeholders being interviewed, as 
reflected in the above quote, and it can lead to conflict between the various stakeholders 
if others perceive such measures an inappropriate to the space of SPIRS. 
“Whenever things wrong in a spectacular way, there is a number of dominoes that fall 
over and they just happen to fall over in a certain sequence. So, the whole thing falls 
over. What we try to do is separate the distance between those dominoes. If one 
falls over, the other one remains standing…Just a bit of a wobble! But it should remain 
standing. So, we try and building those extra spaces, sometimes that causes conflict 
because of others thinking there is such a low possibility.” 
(Emergency Planner, Emergency Service) 
 
7.1.2 Resilience:  Recovery/ ‘bouncing back’ 
An overarching opinion of resilience in SPIRS was the capability of surviving a terrorist act or 
another form of disaster, to bounce back, and to be ready to continue working as soon as 
possible, thus having processes and strategies to deal with the incident and to recover. 
SPIRS and its stakeholders would need  
 
“the ability to operate and function under duress and rebound from an adverse 
event. The ability for systems to function… fall over, fall back into place.” 
(Security Design Consultant) 
 
“It’s the ability of a system or set of systems to withstand some sort of external impact 
to resist it and if it doesn’t resist it to bounce back as quickly as possible…I think it is 
resisting and then the bounce back which is the important thing.” 
(BTP Officer) 
 
Moreover, from the perspective of a stakeholder who is responsible for local Government 
emergency planning, resilience in a space such as SPIRS should not only consider the 
bounce backability of the physical space and individual organisations which are located 
there, but the community and the public who use the space should also be considered 
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when thinking about the wider resilience of railway station. 
“the community’s kind of ability to bounce back and to get over what has 
happened. And they come out the other side without crumbling completely. And 
how they keep going.” 
(Emergency Planner) 
 
The practical application of the concept of resilience was additionally seen in terms of 
SPIRS’ ability to deal with a security incident and to be up and working in some form of 
capacity the next day. One participant stated that this capacity could be broken down 
into segments such as people, products, businesses, and assets, all of which needed 
investing in to ensure the resilience of SPIRS to human malign security threats.  
 
Network Rail High-speed operational management considered that regardless of the 
emergency whether it was a fire, or a major human malign security threat causes the loss of 
all or part of SPIRS, the immediate consideration is to get it functional and operational as 
quickly as possible. Operational management staff would be immediate responders and 
would take decisions if the whole station would need to be evacuated or just a section for 
instance; they are well versed in the emergency plans for SPIRS. 
“Resilience is being able to identify exactly what's the problem is, can it be solved 
quickly, and if yes-do it right! And as soon as possible. We have to get things back to 
normal and make sure there are no delays. Because if there is a delay due to a 
station issue then, of course, we have to pay a penalty to the train operating 
companies because they can't operate.” 
(Operational Manager, Network Rail) 
 
Other participants felt that the resilience of SPIRS could be seen in terms of how quickly the 
station could be up and operational, even if at a reduced capacity. However, business as 
usual relies on not only physical measures but also the mentality of passengers and the 
public. 
“It boils down to the fact, just how quickly can we get the wooden hoardings up and 
say we're still open. But that this is mentally not just physically. That to me is this business 
as usual piece, which is very important. Accepting we're brittle but as long as 
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everyone understands we are fairly brittle and doesn't whine and whinge.” 
(Security Design Consultant) 
 
7.1.3 Resilience:  Planning/preparing/protecting 
So, for example, the participants discussed resilience in terms of a prevention plan; this was 
considered crucial in terms of resilience and the operational function of SPIRS. Participants 
further maintained that resilience against human malign security threats in relation to SPIRS 
could be seen in terms of planning processes, planned for security threats and being able 
to “sustain as much as possible for what you've planned for” (BTP Officer). An Emergency 
Planner for one of the Emergency Services reinforced this standpoint and included that 
having the right people and enough of them with the right training and with the right 
equipment being able to respond rapidly to incidents was paramount to increasing 
resilience which therefore “facilitates the restoration of normality in a speedy and 
professional way” (Emergency Planner, Emergency Service). 
 
Moreover, a retired BTP officer, who had previously worked as a high-level operating officer 
within the force, proposed from a practical perspective within the space of SPIRS resilience 
needed to be graded. This is because they perceived resilience as a fluid and moveable 
criterion and not static. Thus, it is proposed the resilience plans of the multiple and complex 
stakeholders within SPIRS could be dynamic and alter in accordance with the security threat 
levels. This could be a temporarily increased threat of perceived lower lever crimes within 
the space of SPIRS, such as a gang who are stealing mobile phones to the national terrorism 
threat levels. Hence, resilience is within SPIRS must be recognised as ‘not a set of 
predetermined qualities…but as a temporally and contextually informed process’ 
(Bourbeau, 2013, p.7).  This research contends that SPIRS and the other Category A railway 
stations in London will always be at a greater risk of a terrorist attack in comparison to other 
Category A railway stations located in other English and Welsh cities. 
“Resilience can get better if contingency is improved. Rail as an infrastructure is 
good at dealing with moveable objectives and challenges. Threat levels of terrorism 
in the UK are moveable and are dependable on intelligence.” 
(BTP Officer retired) 
 
However, the BTP has historically played a role in keeping London’s railway stations moving 
in the threat of terrorism; which was particularly highlighted during the IRA’s campaign of 
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bomb threats to the capitals stations. The BTP devised and relied on their HOT protocol, 
which is based on dealing with threats quickly and to keep the railway network moving. The 
HOT protocol is discussed in detail later in this chapter. 
 
Interestingly, one retail participant within SPIRS did not have a clear understanding of the 
concept of resilience and articulated his understanding more around the terms of day-to-
day operations. They felt that given their High Street branding and placement combined 
with their positioning within SPIRS that the unit was as much a target as any other within the 
space, 
“we are as open as everyone else. And in fact, we are probably more of a target 
[because of who we are]. And the site is open…when somebody comes into one of 
the quiet units on the station, the staff are aware of them straight away. You know 
30,000 customers, come into this site every week alone. Any percentage of them can 
drop a bag and hide a bag...bang...  And the place is gone. So, we are as open as 
anybody, do we have a process in place to try and limit issues which could arise.” 
(Retail Manager) 
 
7.1.4 Resilience:  Adaptive Capacity 
Whilst the literature was clear in stating the concept of resilience should not just be capacity 
to ‘‘bounce’ back but as a process of learning and adaption’ (Joseph, 2013, p.39). 
However, as it can be seen from the above extracts none of the stakeholders within SPIRS 
discussed resilience in terms of an adaptive capacity. As discussed in Chapters Two and 
Three the contemporary processes of governmentality and ‘responsibilisation’ of resilience 
and security are concerned with the governance of accountable behaviour (Joseph, 
2013). However, emergent findings challenge commentators such as Joseph (2013) and 
Garland (1996) as on a day to day basis and operational stakeholder level (local), the 
concept of resilience is not affected by ‘adaptability…reflexive understanding…[or] 
responsible decision making’ (Joseph, 2013, p.40). Nonetheless, the researcher maintains 
that the process of the semi-structured interview permitted operational stakeholders within 
SPIRS the freedom to reflexively consider how the concept of resilience could be adaptable 
if the Government/policymakers actually permitted the ‘responsibilisation’ of resilience to 
occur within the space. 
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7.2 Resilience and Design 
SPIRS and the vast majority of other Category A Railway stations were designed and 
constructed in the mid to late nineteenth century; these spaces are exemplars of resilience. 
These railway stations have endured successions of unavoidable disturbances, such as the 
World Wars and the modifications of their usage throughout their existence; yet the builders 
of these spaces could have never foreseen the nature and scope of these changes (Hassler 
and Kohler, 2014). Moreover, the analysis of the research data highlights that the resilience 
within SPIRS to current human malign security threats has been constructed by the multiple 
stakeholders, through ‘social ontology’ (Joseph, 2013, p.40), as an evolving concept, 
particularly with changes to UK terrorism threat levels, and practice which has been 
decentralised by the Government, making them responsible for security of the space (a 
local level) but still enacting ‘state level control’ (Coaffee and Fussey, 2015, p. 87). 
 
Thus, resilience is a process of governmentality through ‘responsibilisation’ with it being 
espoused by policymakers and commentators as the basis of the devolution of the 
Government’s crime prevention strategies, with discourses of “'partnership', 'inter-agency 
co-operation', 'the multiagency approach', (Garland, 1996, p.452) between the planners, 
security advisors, owners, operators and the BTP being at the forefront of designing, 
retrofitting or building a new station with prevention measures. Therefore, the findings have 
exposed in respect to the design and planning of security measures within SPIRS and other 
Category A railway stations, the concept of resilience is as a neoliberal vehicle for 
governmentality, with stakeholders such as designers and planners, Network Rail and 
retailers within spaces such as SPIRS responsibilised to make their own choices regarding 
CPTED and SCP and they are ‘expected to follow competitive rules of conduct’ (Joseph, 
2017, p.162). Revealing that responsibility for resilience and security measure has shifted to 
‘agencies, organizations and individuals which are quite outside the state and to persuade 
them to act appropriately’ (Garland, 1996, p.452).  
 
Yet, as the research findings have revealed and commentators such as Chandler and 
Coaffee (2017, p.7) recognise that resilience is not a fix all or one size fits concept. 
Policymakers should make it clear to the multiple stakeholders within SPIRS and other 
Category A railway stations that resilience strategies cannot prevent human malign security 
threats or be ‘cured in traditional ways’ (Chandler and Coaffee, 2017, p.7). Rather, the 
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debate around how resilience is operationalised in complex spaces need to be 
reconsidered in terms of alterations at a national, organisational and social level of ‘policy 
development, [stakeholder] engagement, feedback…and interactive relationships’ 
(Chandler and Coaffee, 2017, p.7). 
 
Moreover, in terms of designing and planning in resilience when retrofitting or carrying out 
a new build project for a railway station, the designers and advisors interviewed preferred 
not be pigeonholed by a one size fits all definition of resilience given there is no clear 
definition of the concept. Additionally, their clients often had very different ideas of what 
security features were required for a project and that security and prevention measures 
must be considered as just one part of the resilience of a business. Thus, contributing to an 
element of resilience. 
“It is very subjective and can mean different things to different clients. In terms of 
business continuity that offers resilience, given it covers everything from HR., to supply 
chain, financial and operational strategies.” 
(Security Advisor) 
 
Yet, one of the security design consultants who was interviewed stated in terms of resilient 
designs, they considered that their firm was being predominately asked by their clients to 
“arrive at standalone security systems which is not located as part of a wider 
resilience framework. There is value in standalone security measures; physical 
buildings are robust, with CT design. Cost effective and risk-based – well that’s 
debatable.” 
(Security Design Consultant) 
 
Coaffee et al., (2008, p.107) contend there has been ‘a shift towards more integrated 
approaches to managing risk, one that requires more inclusive conversations with different 
stakeholders to develop a sense of collective responsibility’. Yet, the reality of the political 
rhetoric and for the participants of SPIRS there is not just ‘one security resilience’ (Randalls 
and Simon, 2017, p.39) but there are numerous types of operational resilience which have 
various impacts for the multiple and complex stakeholders and with diverse ‘political 
implications’ (Randalls and Simon, 2017, p.39). However, this research has discovered that 
this is considered an unresolved issue when considering resilience and the security measures 
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in the redevelopment and retrofit of SPIRS and other Category A railway stations as they are 
extremely complex, and the stakeholders involved in the project may not all know or be 
aware of the whole security risk or understand how these evolve over time.   
 
Moreover, the research has revealed that the security designs and specifications can be 
lost in reams of complexities of the project documentation and as members of staff move 
on to new roles during the project, their goodwill and knowledge can be lost. Thus, the 
‘responsibilisation’ of resilience in such cases can be impacted on the nuance of such 
intangible elements of stakeholder relationships. Therefore, this reality in respect to SPIRS 
differs from the political and Garland’s (1996) ‘responsibilisation’ rhetoric as managing such 
intangible factors which can impact of the resilience and security of SPIRS to human malign 
threats is challenging and problematic. Tensions can occur at a local level as the 
governance for resilience implies a ‘top down’ approach for this shared ‘responsibilisation’ 
(Garland, 1996) yet the reality is the Government retaining a lot of control over this agenda 
with little practical consideration for the operational complexities of managing such a 
responsibility. 
 
A Security Advisor stated this is a common occurrence on such projects and some of the 
earlier decisions concerning the requirements for security measures are not discovered until 
the Home Office Police visit the site and ask to see the prevention measures which they have 
requested be installed. If this happens it can impact on the initial resilience of the space to 
security threats and can be very expensive to the owner if prevention measures such as a 
Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM) ramps needs to be installed when the roads have been 
laid, 
“that of course then entails digging up the road, throwing all of the services, messing 
the traffic around, losing access to your understory logistics area. Plus, it is not very 
sustainable and early resilience is compromised!” 
(Security Advisor) 
 
The Security Consultants and Advisors, and the BTP participants maintained that when 
looking at designing in security measures to ensure the resilience of railway stations to security 
threats, these needed to be considered on a project by project basis, thus “there isn’t a one 
size fits all, security plan for prevention measures”.  
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Moreover, the research has exposed the reality of resilience and security policies strategies 
are informed by retrospective security incidents. In terms of threats to SPIRS and other 
Category A railways stations, a terrorist incident is a threat which has problematic 
prevention (Chandler and Coaffee, 2017). The Government seek measures to responsibilise 
stakeholders to ensure spaces such as SPIRS will ‘[bounce] back to normal functioning 
should major infrastructural facilities be damaged’ (Chandler and Coaffee, 2017, p. 5). 
Moreover, terrorist incidents such as 7/7 have seen the rhetoric and governance of 
resilience challenge security practices and measures and move rapidly forward to become 
a complex ‘central organising metaphor within the expanding multiscalar institutional 
framework of national security’ (Coaffee, et al., 2008, cited in Coaffee and Fussey, 2017, p. 
294) 
 
The research has revealed that 7/7 has driven security and resilience measures relevant to 
the railway station (Coaffee and Fussey, 2017), thus creating a space where policies and 
strategies present resilience as ‘responding within the boundaries of the current…and/or 
social structure’ (Bourbeau, 2017, p.29). To meet the demands of public expectations 
regarding their security and safety, institutional and organisational policymakers have 
responded by making alterations which policies, meaning some measures, which are now 
embedded and considered crucial to the security and resilience of a space were once 
considered ‘marginal’ (Bourbeau, 2017 and Clarke, 2017).  
 
One Security Advisor spoke in detail about the resilience measures that are required for new 
build and retrofit projects like SPIRS and the neighbouring Category A railway station, Kings 
Cross and that in terms of their work the terrorist incidents on 7/7 have defined and 
subsequently impacted on ‘security-driven resilience’ (Coaffee and Fussey, 2017, p. 293). 
“It will have a set of standards of every aspect of the safety and security of the 
passenger, staff, and the continuity of the actual system. So, it goes through the 
whole resilience spectrum. And those standards will be developed by the likes of 
ourselves to match the risk space. We try to look to see where there is already good 
standard practice and analyse whether it would work for the specific project…7/7 is a 
critical watershed…projects after that started with an inception plan and tend to take 
security fairly seriously. There were projects which spanned before and after 7/7 like 
HS1/SPIRS. Then suddenly they have to accommodate these new risks and have to 
deal with it. There is a lot of retro planning; you're suddenly trying to imagine what you 
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would have planned for had 7/7 occurred back then! So, in other words, you're 
having to accommodate and deal with planning constraints in a fairly mature 
project, which is a challenge!” 
(Security Advisor) 
 
However, what was interesting was this statement did not discuss the connection between 
security and resilience agendas. It is contrary to commentators such as Coaffee and Fussey 
(2017) and Bosher and Chtmutina (2017) who propose that security and resilience agendas 
are interwoven. Yet, many of the designers, operational BTP and Network Rail High Speed 
staff failed to discuss or allude to this connection, and security measures were understood 
and directed at a local and middle level of governance. While resilience strategies were 
directed and ‘responsibilised’ at a national level. However, Bosher and Chtmutina (2017) and 
Coaffee and Fussey (2017) acknowledge this interconnection yet argue both agendas are 
‘responsibilised’ by different levels of actors. The threats of terrorism and events such as 7/7, 
which are acknowledged to be ‘difficult to prevent’ (Chandler and Coaffee, 2017, p. 5) and 
see the resilience agenda pushed from a top level down, with the state being ‘a ‘facilitator’ 
instead of a ‘builder’ of resilience’ (Bosher and Chtmutina, 2017, p. 268). While, local level 
stakeholders within SPIRS, are responsible for enacted ‘the security agenda [which is] 
centralised’ (Bosher and Chtmutina, 2017).  Thus, the ‘responsibilisation’ (Garland, 1996) of 
resilience and security are enacted through neoliberal governance. 
 
7.2.1 Resilience and the Secure Station Scheme (SSS) 
As well as the fortification of designs to maximise the resilience of a space to security threats, 
it is possible to design in measures which can prompt a social resilience from passengers 
and other users of SPIRS. How people feel and react in spaces should be understood, how 
they are designed and configured should offer the users a sense of understanding of how 
the space works, for instance, exits, emergency exits which should utilise good clear way 
finding in an emergency situation. The space can also be designed to maximise 
“the space light and airy to simple stuff like provisioning of good information services. 
So that social, that softer resilience.” 
(Security Design Consultant) 
This softer and centralised form of social resilience can be used at a local level alongside 
CPMs and CTMS which ‘target harden’ to prevent crime and terrorism ‘through real and 
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symbolic features’ (Coaffee et al., 2009, p.8). The design and fortification of SPIRS comprises 
of both this softer resilience and the obviously executed measures such as HMV’s and some 
overt CCTV cameras, and which endeavour to reassure passengers and public fears over 
their personal safety and that terrorist activities are ‘likely to be in vain or at least will require 
a significant degree of effort’ (Coaffee et al., 2009, p.8). 
 
Moreover, this research proposes that a current and practical application of this ‘softer’ 
form of resilience is the Secure Station Scheme (SSS), which has been in operation for 
seventeen years and is implemented at a local level by the BTP; governed at the state level 
by the DfT. Thus, this scheme to enhance resilience to human malign security threats is being 
directed by processes of neoliberal Governmentality, a top down approach promoting and 
advocating the responsibility to the multiple stakeholders to create a resilient space. At first 
glance, the resilience to human malign security threats have been decentralised by the 
Government to the multiple stakeholders, and yet concurrently they retain control of the 
overarching security policies.  Hence, the SSS is an example where resilience has been 
incorporated from a national level to the encouragement and enforcement of individual 
stakeholder, in this case, TOCs or Network Rail, responsibility for crime prevention measures. 
It is a national incentivised and accredited security scheme for all railway stations in England 
and Wales. The scheme aims to offer passenger reassurance of safety and to tackle the fear 
of crime while using the railway and underground stations, by the TOC’s and Network Rail 
enhancing and developing their railway station security measures. The SSS is a further 
indication of good practice within the specific railway station. Accreditation is received 
when singular railway stations have worked in conjunction with agencies such as the BTP to 
put into operation improved security measures (Morgan and Cornish, 2006, p.22). For railway 
stations to achieve the SSS accreditation they must conform to four criteria; 
1. Station design must be consistent with the standards deemed by the BTP to prevent and 
reduce crime and improve passenger perceptions; 
2. Station Management must facilitate the processes to prevent crimes, react to 
incidents, and the effective interconnection and communication with passengers; 
3. Management of Crime, during the previous twelve months before inspection, the 
recorded crimes statistics must indicate the issue is being adequately managed. 
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4. Passengers feel secure within and utilising the station, this is information should be 
gathered in the format of a survey. 
(Source: adapted from the DfT no date and Morgan and Cornish, 2006, p.22). 
 
The duality of the CPMs used within the SSS is examined later in this chapter. One research 
participant suggested that any successes from the SSS are more about the actual 
management of the station rather the physical assets in place as CPMs. 
“The greatest achievement of the scheme is to reduce the fear of crime that is greater 
than the actual figure of reductions in crime” 
(BTP Officer, Retired) 
 
Furthermore, in terms of security design, the resilience of a space such as SPIRS is not a single 
consideration; rather it should be seen as a collection of issues, which all must be addressed 
and considered to ensure the ‘whole’ space is resilient to security threats. Moreover, CPMs 
and CTMs were seen to have an integral part in this prevention plan. 
“Not having the incident in the first place. Key to preventing disruption is a plan. Have 
deterrents such as patrols and greater manpower.” 
(Network Rail Operational Manager) 
 
The enhanced visible presence of staff in SPIRS, whether they were actual security staff and 
police officers, or uniformed members of station staff is a strategy for the prevention of crime 
and terrorism. This works on the principles of RAT in terms of prevention measures in the form 
of a visible presence of staff. This can be seen to have a cost saving benefits when members 
of staff to carry out a different role and become a form of (un)intentional prevention 
measures. The intangible and tangible aspects of resilience (Bosher, 2014, p.240) can be 
enhanced in spaces such as SPIRS and other Category A railway stations if both ‘structural 
and non-structural approaches’ if they are built in from the conceptual stages of a project 
(Bosher et al., 2007 and Bosher and Dainty, 2011). 
 
However, the political rhetoric of the underlying ‘responsibilisation’ (Garland, 1996) 
resilience strategy of the SSS, provides an important opportunity to engage with 
stakeholders of the railway station. However, one apprehension surrounding 
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Governmentality, through ‘responsibilisation’, is it uses the resilience to security threats as a 
mechanism to control the behaviour of both stakeholders, the public and potential criminals 
(Rogers, 2017). The SSS is based on the principles of CPTED designs out the potential of 
human malign threats, at all ends of the crime continuum.  
 
7. 3 Issues of Resilience 
As the views of the participants and academics have been examined thus far in this 
chapter, the research findings clearly demonstrate that the concept of resilience within the 
space of SPIRS is extremely complex and frequently lacking clarity by those who choose to 
use it. It is proposed the obscure nature of the term could be simplified if those in industry, 
academia and in politics could create a cohesive and combined series of expectancies 
(Vale, 2014) for the understanding and operationalisation of resilience within a Category A 
railway station. Therefore, the research has brought to light the lack of clarification 
regarding resilience policies and its implementation in SPIRS is highlighted by the findings 
and as such, it can conceal  
internal tensions and contradictions, as it [moves] from a narrative of national 
protection to one of localised prevention and self- organizing responses. 
(Coaffee and Fussey, 2015, p.95) 
 
This research argues that both resilience and the specific railway station (SPIRS) and how it 
manages security threats, depends both ‘on the scale and on whether the focus is on physical 
spaces or social communities’ (Vale, 2014, p.191). Therefore, the larger and more complex 
railway station, such as SPIRS, is undeniably in terms of both its space and the stakeholder 
communities is multifaceted in how resilience against security threats are dealt with. As the 
significance and size of railway stations in England and Wales reduce so too does the 
complexity of managing the space, the stakeholders, and the subsequence resilience to 
security threats. This research has shown that the concept of resilience is interpreted and 
understood differently by the multiple stakeholders who are involved in securing SPIRS from 
human malign security threats. There is an increased expectation by the Government that 
both the public and private sectors are obliged and expected to be responsible for the 
resilience of the built environment, and in this case specifically SPIRS against human malign 
security threats. Yet, within the complex space of SPIRS, the rhetoric of ‘responsibilisation’ 
(Garland, 1996) of resilience is handed to the multiple and disparate stakeholders to 
operationalise and the findings have shown there are tensions because of divisions and 
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blurred boundaries. This is examined in more detail in sections 7.9 and 7.12 of this Chapter. 
 
Moreover, it is contended that stakeholders in both the public and private sphere of SPIRS 
experience frequent complications and hindrances when endeavouring to enhance 
resilience in the space (Bosher, 2014). The findings of this research call for the resilience 
towards security threats to be improved and utilised by multiple stakeholders, in a space 
such as SPIRS, in a consistently cohesive manner (Bosher, 2014 and Bosher and Coaffee, 
2008), which at the time of undertaking the research, the strategies were competing and 
disparate. It was expressed by one participant that the greatest threat to the resilience of 
SPIRS was that private companies frequently owned CNI. 
“There is an awful lot of brittleness in our processes, it's the fact that the majority of 
our infrastructure is owned by private companies and not by the Government, there 
is an awful lot of stuff that we just don't seem to have any real control of anymore. I 
think they are part of the issues around resilience.” 
 
The research indicates that resilience does not just challenge the physical structure of SPIRS, 
it also presents challenges to the multiple stakeholder’s operational policies, and individual 
and corporate perceptions and comprehension of the concept and the actual 
responsibility of the specific railway station. This research suggests this could be achieved 
through a logical, primary strategy, however, how this is achieved in practice is open to 
deliberation. The operational concept of resilience in SPIRS needs to be transformed from the 
tenuous and vague definitions as discussed in Chapter Two to a consistent and clearly 
defined understanding of what ‘resilience essentially denotes and how it can be accurately 
applied or measured’ (Bosher, 2014, p.241). The participants suggested that an overarching 
concept of resilience could be customised specifically for SPIRS and other Category A railway 
stations in England and Wales. Conversely, this could be one of the greatest challenges to 
the resilience of SPIRS is the stakeholders do not become ensnared in endeavouring to 
create one overriding definition of resilience (Rogers, 2017) which is operationalised by the 
multiple stakeholders. Furthermore, the resilience of the space must be able to adjust to 
current and future nascent security threats, thus the conceptual and operational resilience 
of SPIRS to security threats should be fluid and temporal. In ‘an age of uncertainty’ (Rogers, 
2017, p.22) developing space to establish new ways to consider and undertake resilience 
and security is an ever-evolving consideration. 
 
Therefore, to endeavour to achieve this, the research validates that involving the multiple 
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and complex stakeholders of SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and 
Wales in discussions around the issues of resilience to security threats will enhance and 
develop a mutual understanding of the concept (Sicar et al., 2013). Moreover, it is proposed 
there are potentially several options to tackle the current and future resilience to human 
malign security threats of spaces such as SPIRS (Bosher et al., 2007). Firstly, there could be a 
change of cultural practice where stakeholders at all levels completely support and adopt 
a unified resilience agenda for the space in question. Resilience measures (prevention or 
recovery) whether built-in or at the retrofit stage could be devised to handle numerous 
threats. However, this research has revealed that although resilience can be included in the 
design stage of building or refurbishment projects, there is uncertainty and tension from 
local level stakeholders concerning how this holistic stance translates into the reality of 
practice and are actually contained within in the final project (Bosher et al., 2007, p. 245). 
 
PART TWO:  COMPLEXITIES AND RESILIENCE 
7. 4 Operational Complexities and resilience in SPIRS 
Rather than focusing on theoretical definitions of resilience, a strong emergent theme from 
the participant stakeholders was that resilience must be practical and be able to be 
operationalised within the space of SPIRS. The primary constituent of any railway station, not 
just SPIRS or other Category A railway stations in England and Wales, is the necessity to keep 
the trains running through them and passengers being able to embark and disembark. 
Network Rail High-speed as the management company of SPIRS will do everything possible 
during an incident to keep the station running or to get it up as quickly as possible. Network 
Rail High-Speed has an incident strategy that mirrors that of CCA (2004), Gold, Silver, and 
Bronze levels of responders within the space of the railway station. The overarching 
operational resilience is managed by a Network Rail control centre, which in the case of a 
security incident the staff will strategically overview and control the situation with the desired 
outcome is to keep the trains running in and out of SPIRS. 
 
As discussed in the previous sections of this Chapter, the findings of the research have also 
identified a further complication in the operationalisation of resilience to current security 
within the space of SPIRS, which is the multiple stakeholders who operationalise these 
strategies have their own lexicons when considering the concept of resilience. 
“Step outside of this room and speak to one of my colleagues, they will have a 
different take on it. So, you can see that the lexicon in of itself is very much, were your 
own background will force you towards it and interpret in your own way. Now what I'm 
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not in the game is being able to necessarily shackle myself to quasi-numeric ways of 
quantifying that, I have real difficulties with quantifying resilience.” 
(Security Design Consultant) 
 
Moreover, within the space of SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and 
Wales it is contended that resilience to security threats as a concept and more importantly 
as an operational practice cannot be considered in isolation (Bosher, 2014 and Bosher and 
Dainty 2007). Theoretically, there should be a pre-emptive, combined and united concern 
by the multiple stakeholders who are accountable for the operation of the space. The 
research has highlighted those common operational activities surrounding the resilience of 
SPIRS, which is a relatively small area, overlap and yet there is a lack of a cohesive resilience 
strategy which sees the multiple stakeholders operationalising their strategies in their 
individual silos. Thus, within these silos, there is replication in prevention measures and 
resilience strategies. That is not to say that some roles such as the policing of the space are 
not to be carried out by the BTP, or the overall management of SPIRS should not be 
managed by Network Rail High-speed. To improve the resilience of a space to human 
malign security threats such as SPIRS, the complex and multiple stakeholders must be 
prepared to understand the importance and scope of each other’s roles (Cole and Marzell, 
2010, p.7). 
 
The research findings indicate that resilience does not just challenge the physical structure 
of SPIRS, rather it also presents challenges to the multiple stakeholder’s operational policies, 
and individual and corporate perceptions and comprehension of the concept and the 
actual responsibility of the specific railway station. Thus, this research recommends that this 
can be achieved through an overarching cohesive resilience and security strategy which 
is directed at the national level but informed and operationalised at a local level. 
Consequently, utilising the rhetoric of Garland’s (1996) ‘responsibilisation’ to actually 
empower the multiple stakeholders operationalising resilience in SPIRS. In addition, the 
researcher proposes that in the current operational and legal boundaries of SPIRS that the 
concept and agendas surrounding resilience could be shifting, with it being enacted in the 
space through a process of governance and ‘responsibilisation’, progressing from a 
national level to a local level of adaptable understanding and operationalisation of security 
and resilience practices. Thus, ‘security-driven resilience’ (Coaffee and Fussey, 2017, p.294) 
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could be considered an ideal vehicle to engage in ‘a range of policy discussions’ (Chandler 
and Coaffee, 2017, p.7).  
 
Therefore, the research presents a stance that within the space of SPIRS the concept of 
resilience is a vehicle to operationalise governmentality and ‘responsibilisation’ and it is not 
an absolute ‘state… it, therefore, can only be measured or calculated as a comparative or 
relative quality’ (Chandler, 2013, p.217). Thus, the researcher contends that the resilience of 
SPIRS to human malign security threats must move away from resilience definitions which 
are static and unchanging and to think of them as means to reconsider the established 
policy discourses which address security and resilience. 
 
7.4.1 The Built Environment 
Many of the participants, when interviewed, referred to the resilience of the built environment 
and the planning and design stages that create it. The term ‘built environment’ has been 
prominent since the 1970s and can be defined as ‘the man-made landscapes that provide 
the setting for human activity, ranging from the large-scale urban entities to personal dwelling 
places’ (Hassler and Kohler, 2014, p.158). Therefore, SPIRS and other railway stations in 
England and Wales can be considered as a constructed setting for the purpose transport 
and as a retail and leisure destination. The built environment of SPIRS, given the number of 
complex stakeholders involved, must thus be considered as a ‘social construction’ (Hassler 
and Kohler, 2014, p.158). 
 
When considering the security systems and prevention measures when planning new build 
railway stations or the retrofitting of historic stations such as the case study station of SPIRS 
there must be an understanding of ‘how the design choices impact on the objectives of 
multiple stakeholders’ (Borrion et al., 2014, p.175). Gregson-Green et al. (2013) highlight the 
number of complex stakeholders in a Category A railway station in England and Wales 
which could be impacted on by operational and design challenges are approximately 
twenty-seven. However, depending on the Category of the railway station this number can 
increase or decrease. One Security Advisor felt, on the whole, they were endeavouring to 
work with stakeholders to address security measures and systems which are innovative, 
creative and acceptable to all those within the space and the public realm. 
 
This research has found that the processes when retrofit projects or new railway stations are 
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constructed are highly complex, due to the disjointed nature of the processes. This is 
because there can be numerous parties involved from the conception to the completion 
of the project, from consultants, architects, through to contractors. The disjointed nature of 
the sector does nothing to enhance relationships with Governmental agencies and 
departments, which has the potential to lead to conflict and misunderstanding on issues 
such as resilience and implementing security measures. The importance of the construction 
sector is highlighted in terms of the impact both positive and negative it can have on ‘the 
nation’s economy...quality of people’s lives and the ability of government to achieve many 
of its policy aims’ (Bosher et al., 2007, p.238). 
 
7.4.2 Functions of the Space 
The functions of the space of the railway station must be planned and controlled in terms of 
their ‘poly-functionality’ (Foucault, 1978, p.19) as discussed in Chapter Two and Six. SPIRS and 
other Category A railway stations in England and Wales have multiple functions which 
increase in complexities in relation to the size and location of the railway station. Therefore, 
when considering a new build railway station or a retrofit project, questions need to be 
raised about what makes a ‘good’ railway station. What functions does the space need to 
fulfil? 
• Passenger movements 
• Retailers will need access to the front and rear parts of the space 
• Mass movements of passengers and the public and retail outlets will also 
encourage thieves 
 
Thus, the positive and negative impacts the railway stations functions must be taken into 
consideration when they are being planned. It is argued that future considerations need to 
be accounted for when the purpose of the space is formulated (Foucault, 1978, p.20). 
Therefore, the ‘security-driven resilience’ (Coaffee and Fussey, 2017, p.294) plans for the 
space should allow for future occurrences and needs, approximating the possibilities, ‘is 
pretty much the essential characteristic of the mechanisms of security’ (Foucault, 1978, 
p.20). Thus, the security of SPIRS is fluid and dynamic, and spatial, with its functions having 
to account for these improbabilities. 
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PART THREE:  PREVENTION MEASURES 
7.5. Security and Prevention Measures 
As examined in Chapter Three, advocates of CPMs and CTMs state they are founded on 
effecting behaviour through the modification of the social and built environment. The 
political rhetoric behind the ‘responsibilisation’ of these measures maintains the 
Government withdraws to allow public and private stakeholders to develop and put in 
place measures to tackle human malign security threats. These processes strengthen the 
concept of ‘governmentality from a distance’ (Joseph, 2013, p.43). through 
Governmentality that the concept of resilience has become a vehicle to address security 
issues and as such develop ‘the growth of security-driven resilience’ (Coaffee and Fussey, 
2017, p.294). 
 
Thus, to minimise the opportunities for security threats to take place in a space such as SPIRS, 
a variety of procedures and practices need to be in position and activated. The control of 
public spaces has been greatly influenced by Wilson and Kelling’s (1982) theory of ‘broken 
windows’, where a space must foster feelings of security and safety, with users not neglected 
and good maintenance is upheld. I t was found that many of the security and prevention 
measures within SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and Wales are not 
only concerned with managing the physical environment of the specific space but also the 
behaviours of those who use these spaces also. Policymakers advocate such measures 
maintain resilience against security threats and create a normalised social order resonating 
down from the Government, enacted by public and private stakeholders at a local level. 
 
Two operational BTP participants discussed the merits of applying Broken Windows theory to 
managing the physical appearance of railway stations, and that it is a founding principal of 
the SSS. Moreover, SCP is based on this principle which locates ‘physical barriers between 
the opportunistic criminal and the object of the crime’ (Cochrane and Talbot, 2008, p.16). 
The refurbishment of existing station buildings or new railway stations, which aim from the 
planning stage to design out crime is demonstrated in the SIDOS guidance, and is discussed 
in greater detail in section 7.12. 
 
7.6 Prevention Measures, Policy and Guidance, and the Design Relationship 
The research data has exposed that designing in CTMs, within spaces such as SPIRS can be 
frequently fraught with issues due to a lack of Governmental support and guidance. RIBA 
198  
and guidance such as SIDOS merely recommend and do not legislate that security advisors 
and consultants must work in tandem with the owners and architects to ensure that CTMs 
are included into the design of the new build railway station or as in the case of SPIRS the 
retrofitting of measures. One Security Consultant felt that as a profession, the architects and 
designers often treated them negatively because of the often limited or ‘tight’ budget 
needed to include CTMs. 
“We are essentially saying to them, 'you know that fancy atrium you were planning, 
you might want to have to rethink the finishes, less marble because actually, you may 
need some more slate because outside you've just burnt all of your fee on that and 
having to put in a bollard line. So, in other words, the cost consultants and architects 
can get fairly tense when they see us, because they know oh dear it's the Security 
Consultants! “ 
(Security Consultant) 
 
Security Consultants can be recommended and endorsed to the owners of properties, 
Network Rail and architects through the Counter-terrorism Security Advisors (CTSAs) from the 
BTP and the Home Office Police Forces. A number of the research participants felt that the 
CTSAs were very professional but extremely overworked and very difficult to reach. 
However, when they did work with the Security Consultants, the owners of the railway station 
and architects did appear to take on board their recommendations for CTMs. CTMs in SPIRS 
and other railway stations in England and Wales are necessary because they are 
“a privately owned space but publicly accessible. You have a duty of care. You also 
have a duty of care to the building occupants, users, passengers, public.” 
(Security Consultant) 
 
Therefore, it would appear from the research participants interviewed that CTMs are viewed 
by the owner and architects as a necessary cost for the project. However, at an operational 
level, one BTP officer felt that their voice of experience and understanding the nature of 
policing a space such as SPIRS could be overlooked and ignored both by designers and at 
a later operational date by Network Rail (High-speed One). The example discussed below 
was concerning another Category A railway station in London, 
“there are lots of examples where CPO [Crime Prevention Officer] recommendations 
on retrofit measures or new builds have been ignored. Like for areas of repeat 
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victimisation, CCTV was recommended, the TOC did not agree to spending any 
money. Very often the CPO will have to become friendly with station maintenance 
staff – informal networking again. This helps get figures to justify to the TOCS to spend 
money on prevention measures.” 
(BTP Sargent) 
 
Moreover, in terms of planning and design, the Security Consultants and Advisors who were 
interviewed felt that designing in CPMs was far more difficult than designing in CTMs. This was 
because the Secure by Design guidance for CPMs is very patchy and highly dependent on 
the type of development it is being applied to. The Secure by Design guidance was criticised 
by the research participants as they felt it needed to be much more robust and demanding 
in terms of the CPMs that need to be implemented for railway stations retrofit projects. In 
addition, it was suggested that the guidance could present more specific indicators for 
performance for the measures. Participants maintained there needs to be a greater 
emphasis on endeavouring to see how specific measures improve or have no impact 
on reported crimes. This would be an aid for the design of future CPMs. 
“We would like to see for instance the numbers of reported contact crime. So, are 
they stabilised or do they tail off 8 years after the station has been commissioned?” 
(Security Consultant) 
 
This form of metric could add value to owners and designers of future new build or railway 
station refurbishment projects who are looking for demonstrable evidence that the CPMs 
they are being advised to design has value and impact. 
“We need evidence that what you are doing will achieve the right effect, I think there 
is still this sense of 'well we're doing this, a bit of a grudge purchase, we're not quite 
sure why we're doing it!” 
(Security Consultant) 
 
The role of the Security Advisor/Consultant is to get the owner/client of the project to think 
about the security risks that could be viable by the completion of the project. Thus, it is 
essentially trying to get the client to understand prevention measures and the practical 
application of them and what the completed project would like in terms of good security 
risk management. The client 
200  
“will freely admit from the outset that 'you're going to have to tell us that, you're going 
to have to almost create an image of what good likes and then give us the roadmap 
of how we get there." 
(Security Advisor) 
 
Furthermore, there are the financial impacts and implications on the security measures that 
are designed into a new build or retrofit of a railway station. This has been particularly 
noticeable since the global recession of 2007; one Security Advisor stated that the resilience 
of a railway station to security threats could be impacted on by financial agendas of both 
owners and architects. 
“I’ve noticed my first projects when I was appointed had very reasonably well 
furnished fee bases. We were given plenty of time to sit down, think and to produce 
good reports, to review designs thoroughly. So, in other words, to provide a good and 
reasonable service. Now people just want more for less which means something has 
got to go, and that could be the fact you’re skating too quickly through architect’s 
drawings and not necessarily picking up on absolute design details.” 
(Security Advisor) 
 
7.7 The Duality of Prevention Measures 
It was found much of the literature reviewed which surrounds prevention measures, deals with 
issues of crime and terrorism in isolation. However, it is widely accepted by both academics 
and practitioners that CTMs are principally based on traditional methods of CPMs. Within the 
UK, prevention measures are ‘responsibilised’ by developing and deploying it through 
multiple levels of stakeholders, at national, local, institutional, and international levels. 
However, the disputed nature of the debate, which surrounds terrorism, will affect how the 
complex and multiple stakeholders in SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England 
and Wales ‘tackle something that these agencies cannot define’ (Fussey, 2007, p.184). 
Hence, it is maintained that CPMs and CTMs are located in political, economic, and cultural 
discourses and are not neutral concepts. It is contended that CPMs and vice versa CTMs 
are not automatically suitable to deter and prevent the ‘other form of transgression’ and as 
such ‘do not necessarily and easily translate to the other’ (Fussey, 2007, p.180). Moreover, 
both criminological theories of situational (rationality - crime) and dispositional (emotionality 
- terrorism) should be merged in prevention measures as neither theory wholly accounts ‘for 
201  
the decision-making process’ (Hoch and Lowenstein, 1991, p.504, cited in Hayward, 2007, 
p.241) in transgressive activities. 
 
One emergent theme from the interview data collected was the concept of the duality of 
prevention measures. As mentioned above, much of the literature on CPMs and CTMs are 
distinct and separate, occasionally within some research such as that of Clarke and 
Newman (2006), the association between the two forms of measures is recognised. As 
previously discussed in Chapter Three, the research has revealed that the crime prevention 
strategy of target hardening is being rapidly utilised for the prevention of terrorism. However, 
the basis of using CPMs to combat terrorism is restricted as they fail to account for the factors 
(emotional, religious, fiscal, political) lying behind decisions made by terrorists (Fussey, 2011). 
Moreover, this research contends that within the space of SPIRS and other Category A 
railway stations, CPMs and CTMs should be individually considered in terms of their potential 
impact, conflict, and benefits because duality does not necessarily indicate they are 
suitable to for both purposes (Kappia, et al., 2009). 
“We’re trying to look and work with industry to come up with innovative but also 
creative and the planners’ systems and schemes that will be accepted in the public 
realm. Do the job for us from a security perspective but again, not impact onto the eyes 
and concerns of the public because the last thing we want to live in is a fortified city 
when there’s no need to.” 
(Security Advisor) 
 
Furthermore, the research has revealed that there are distinct and separate agendas and 
funding for CPMs and CTMs. Since 9/11, there has been a direct political shift from ‘security 
to resilience’, with primary security worries being dealt with by expansion of ‘security-driven 
resilience’ policies predominantly those around measures to prevent terrorism (Coaffee and 
Fussey, 2017, p. 294). However, participants felt that if policy and decision makers both at a 
national and local level did not appreciate the bigger picture, and they needed to 
understand there is also a duality of benefits for both types of prevention measures. 
“If you look at what deters terrorists, it's actually pretty much what deters criminals. 
So, CCTV, "people say you won't deter a suicide bomber" but actually you will 
because you will deter the hostile reconnaissance. It won't stop them, but CCTV 
won't stop...it will just record them, what's happened and make it less likely. So, if you 
look at the issue of staff presence and role of patrolling stations, if you look at the use 
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of better lighting, clear lines of sight, CCTV, that kind of thing. If you're building that 
in, if you wanted to you could flag that as a CT measure or an ordinary crime 
prevention measure.” 
(BTP Senior Officer) 
 
“There are some things which are CT specific, which are improvements to glazing, to 
stop fragmentation. The litter bins issue is CT specific, but actually, an awful lot of the 
other stuff is just sensible, you make the space easier to manage.  And take away 
the dark dingy bits where druggies shoot up or where people get mugged, do away 
with that and you are reducing the likelihood of a terrorist attack.” 
(BTP Senior Officer) 
 
Conversely, when considering the CPMs and strategies implemented in SPIRS, one senior 
operational BTP Officer stated that there was a definite positive impact on CTMs, 
“I look at measures and assess them in terms of well we're killing two birds with one stone 
here...because I look at terrorism as being a crime…So everything has got a knock on 
effect, so if you make it harder for the person who is intent on stealing a Mars bar then 
that is also going to make it difficult for who is loitering in the station or is looking at 
carrying out a terrorist attack”. 
(BTP Operational Senior Officer) 
 
Moreover, at a local level within, participants expressed resentment and tensions over the 
disconnection between the two different security agendas, crime and counter-terrorism 
prevention. The research highlighted that some BTP participants believed there is a 
significant lack of recognition from many of their colleagues over the benefits of the duality 
of prevention measures that come from the understanding of both crime and terrorism. The 
Government’s concept of operationalising ‘security-driven resilience’ (Coaffee and Fussey, 
2017, p.294) through the processes of Governmentality implies a ‘top down’ approach for 
the shared ‘responsibilisation’ (Garland, 1996) for resilience and security within SPIRS and 
other Category A Railway Stations. However, tensions occurred in SPIRS when these 
stakeholders had to balance the national level security and resilience primacies originating 
from the Government and those security and resilience priorities of local stakeholders within 
the space. Thus, strains arose at a local level given that at a national level the Government 
controlled spending and budgets, which meant that the multiple stakeholders had limited 
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powers to contest the priorities of national security and resilience which took precedence 
over local crime prevention issues.  
“There are only so many tactics to deal with both of them and these generally lead 
back or heavily influence by prevention, intelligence and operations. Money is 
invested into these strands of policing but not enough is invested into prevention. 
There is a clear imbalance as much more is invested into intelligence and 
operations.” 
(Retired Senior BTP Officer) 
 
Hence, the research has highlighted contradictions between the rhetoric of 
‘responsibilisation’ of resilience and its actual operationalisation by the multiple stakeholders 
within the space of SPIRS. The evidence has shown that although all the stakeholders should 
have a role in the resilience of the space against human malign threats, this, is played out 
with differing levels of importance.  Some stakeholders had a greater level of responsibility 
placed on them, the BTP and Network Rail High Speed, and had to cascade this 
responsibility down via operational levels to their own grassroots staff. Moreover, the 
research revealed that despite the top down approach for the ‘responsibilisation’ of CPMs 
and CTMs, there was a level of grassroots apprehension that the costs of CTMs would impact 
and divert fiscal and manpower resources, which could potentially be utilised for CPMs for 
‘non-terrorist crimes’ (ATOC, 2010, p.1). 
 
Yet, the research has also shown that some participants maintained there is frequently a 
duality between CPMs and CTMs. Arguably, these methods can be interconnected and do 
not need to be exclusively used for the prevention of specific transgressions (Fussey, 2007). 
Since 9/11 and 7/7 acts of terrorism, the protection and control of public spaces through 
technical and human surveillance are now considered legitimate, acceptable and 
standardised forms of dealing with ‘both crime and terrorism in the public domain’ (Fussey, 
2007, p.174).    
 
Furthermore, some of the research participants, specifically those working at an operational 
level in SPIRS for either the BTP or Network Rail, proposed that stations such as SPIRS and other 
Category A railway stations in England and Wales being patrolled by the BTP offers both a 
deterrence and prevention in both terms of criminal and terrorist activities, equating to 
duality of usage. However, other participants felt that regardless of the duality of some 
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measures each form of measure should be considered in terms of its potential impact, conflict, 
and benefits to SPIRS and to other Category A railway stations in England and Wales. 
“Think criminal, and this isn't good for terrorism, but it's complimentary to counter-
terrorism, but it's not a substitute! People think 'if I get enough CPTED stuff in, surely that 
must help me with CT?' No, it doesn't because certain types of terrorism are simply not 
going to be put off by these layers of psychological cues, physical measures which 
are stopping crime from occurring because frankly they aren't motivated in the same 
way. And they may not be interested in their own personal safety, or survival or what 
happens to them after an attack because they want to be in kit form! Pull the button 
and away they go!” 
(Security Consultant) 
 
7.7.1 CCTV as a Dual Prevention Measure 
Moreover, CCTV is a form of ‘security-driven resilience logic largely controlled by the state 
and implemented by the police and national security agencies’ (Coaffee and Fussey, 2015, 
p.91). Prevention measures such as CCTV have acceptable and normalised features of the 
daily routine in cities and urban areas. Moreover, it is proposed ‘being observed is a 
ubiquitous part of everyday life’ (Massey, 2011, p.189) and as such, it is intrinsically linked to 
controlling crime and policing. Surveillance systems “creep” into society and pseudo-public 
spaces such as SPIRS, and “surge” during and after critical incidents such as the 7/7 London 
bombing on the transport system “when public resistance is reduced” (Fussey, 2007, p.173). 
The utilisation of surveillance systems has become ‘an integral feature of practical, target-
hardening, situational antiterrorist measures’ (Fussey, 2007, p.174). Furthermore, surveillance 
systems are multifunctional, providing a form of ‘deterrence, raising alarms and assisting in 
postevent investigation’ (MI5, 2005, cited in Fussey, 2007, p.174). CCTV footage was used as 
part of the postevent investigation after the 7/7 suicide bomber terrorist attacks on the 
London Transport system.  However, the highly visible surveillance system did not deter nor 
prevent the suicide bombers plan and accomplish their attacks (Fussey, 2007). 
 
Therefore, the claims, which state surveillance systems, are successful methods of 
preventing and countering attacks of terrorism must be viewed with prudence (Fussey, 
2007). Moreover, a Retail Manager within SPIRS felt that their business predominately used 
CCTV to monitor shoplifting rather than prevent terrorism, 
“it’s about stock security rather than national security, if you know what I mean 
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because theft is going to happen a lot more than terrorism! …We also have lost 
prevention teams in the business. But again, that's more about the company and stock 
security, not national security-not the terrorism side of things.” 
 
A now retired Senior BTP Officer stated that using post 7/7 CCTV in and around the railway 
stations and underground stations was very difficult to actually track with accuracy the 
bombers with the technology which existed at the time of the attack. However, he 
maintained that today the technology is far more advanced and capable than the BTP 
need it for. An example of how the BTP have used CCTV successfully to track a target was in 
the case of Tia Sharp – a child who went missing in London during the Olympic period, and 
was subsequently found murdered. Images of her step-grandfather where circulated and 
the BTP traced him through the London Transport CCTV system. 
 
The research found through the emerging research themes and the observations of SPIRS 
that methods of surveillance can be divided into two forms, technical surveillance, such as 
CCTV and ‘human surveillance (police officers, PCSOs)’ (Massey, 2011, p.189) and this also 
includes the passengers and the public. However, despite CCTV being considered to be 
technical surveillance, it currently still requires human operators to direct and use it make 
decisions over the behaviours of the public. Therefore, CCTV ‘involves a process of selective 
and discriminatory decision making from...operators’ (Hughes, 1998, p.69), thus it cannot be 
considered as a ‘neutral technology’ (Hughes, 1998, p.69) given individuals biases and 
believes.  
 
A Network Rail Manager discussed that in their experience of working and talking to 
passengers in SPIRS, they would expect CCTV to be in operation in SPIRS and all railway 
stations as a CPM. They believed this expectation of having CCTV in place was more so 
than in any other public or private space. They described CCTV and surveillance as having 
become an acceptable and expected part of the experience of travelling by rail. 
However, it can be contended CCTV systems/measures are not a long-term fix to lessen the 
public’s fear of security threats and a reduction is possible through the revival ‘of informal 
networks are likely to...be the most effective way of tackling the public fear of’ (Furedi, 2006, 
p.7) security threats. 
 
Thus, being under continuous surveillance and the governing of behaviours has become 
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normalised and is expected in both public and private spaces, especially since the fear of 
terrorist attacks in such spaces has reinforced and justified their control via surveillance. ‘The 
main element of social control is self-regulation and refers to a set of practices that ensures 
people conform and contribute to social order’ (Massey, 2011, p.189). However, the 
research has illuminated that such ‘responsibilisation’ when decentralised to the local level 
stakeholders, raised issues of tensions as responsibility can be open to interpretation and 
exploitation.  Contrary to Garland’s stance on ‘responsibilisation’ the research has exposed 
this ‘responsibilisation’ for the resilience against security threats within the space of SPIRS was 
frequently implied and is inadequately documented, with a lack of, understanding, 
participation and enthusiasm from many of the stakeholders within the space. Tensions can 
be exacerbated when stakeholders at a local, non-governmental have been tasked 
through ‘security-driven resilience’ (Coaffee and Fussey, 2017, p.296) strategies for the 
everyday operation of spaces such as SPIRS, with the governance of resilience being 
enacted from afar.  
 
One senior operational BTP Officer discussed that measures such as CCTV are listed as being 
needed for the security of stations, for the SSS standards, but conversely, nothing was stated 
in the guidance about the quality, features of the actual CCTV system. He believed that 
this ambiguity is frequently capitalised on by the TOCs, given that profit drives their agendas. 
Moreover, another BTP participant expressed their opinions that the decision in the choice 
of the CCTV system installed in stations such as SPIRS was down to the operating company 
or the TOCs, 
“how, you know, rail companies want to store their barriers and fences and CCTV 
and pass systems on doors and things is very much a matter for them. We’re happy 
to guide them, particularly in terms of CCTV where there’s a really close counter-
terrorism crossover.” 
(Senior BTP member of staff) 
 
Hence, the SPIRS empirical research has highlighted that the competing discourses 
concern resilience, the nuances of the reality of operational ‘security-driven resilience’ 
(Coaffee and Fussey, 2017, p.236) are complex and changeable. The ‘internal tensions and 
contradictions’ are observed within the space as the multiple stakeholders must mobilise 
and reconcile internal business agendas ‘localised prevention…responses’ against a 
‘narrative of national protection’ (Coaffee and Fussey, 2017, p.299).  
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7.8 Fear of Crime and Terrorism – Security Measures 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the threat of insecurity and the search for security (Cochrane 
and Talbot, 2008, p.2) are interwoven concepts along with the ‘responsibilisation’ of 
resilience and security measures in terms of perceptions of the multiple stakeholders when 
responding to the public’s fear of such incidents. The research has found that this 
endeavour is a response to global and national issues of security threats, and these are 
interpreted temporally into national and local level ‘responsibilisation ’policy schemes. The 
findings highlight this stance, a Network Rail Senior Operational Manager states that he must 
be able to respond quickly to changes in the national security threat level,  
“I just make sure I'm conversant with what would happen if we were to go up a 
security level. The moment, it's substantial, if it goes up to severe than I am closing left 
luggage and I am then closing down delivery yards and things like that. So that's how 
different it can be the moment, I can be told.” 
(Senior Manager) 
 
A further example of how prevention measures within SPIRS have been altered when looking 
at historic threats from the IRA to the new types of threats faced by the terrorist groups. The 
researcher discovered that the BTP investigate past and current threats to UK railway 
stations, as well as global railway targets, and terrorist methods. 
“When something dreadful happens in some far flung region of the world which has 
a railway, I generally try and go and have a look, either to try and establish is there 
anything we can learn from it or to dispense what we've learnt but within our context. 
So, people understand not what just what we're telling them but why we are telling 
them this. And how it works for us but how it may not work for them.” 
(Senior BTP Officer) 
 
The research has shown that some stakeholders and members of the public see the issue of 
being a victim of criminal activity a more personal and localised issue, thus ‘personal security 
(feeling safe from threats of violence or incivility)’ (Cochrane and Talbot, 2008, p.3). 
Therefore, policies are expected to deal with the issue at a local level, such as CPMs in SPIRS 
to keep the public safe from crime. Yet the threat of being the victim of an act of terrorism 
is frequently viewed by the public at a distant level of uncertainty and insecurity. A Senior 
BTP Officer reiterated this stance as they felt the public were aware of potentially being the 
victim of a crime, yet the possibility of being a victim of a terrorist attack was distanced by 
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the fear of acknowledging the risk. 
“People will happily talk about what we do to deter criminals but what we do 
specifically to deter terrorist, that's considered far more sensitive information. So, you 
will find people far less willing to talk about it. And therefore, having a sort of publicised 
scheme on those measures, I'm not sure it would serve a purpose to publicise it. I think 
the public like to know basically it is being managed so they don't get mugged or 
pickpocketed. But when you start talking about terrorism you hit the arousal 
disassurance paradox. Because they question and worry why we need these CT 
measures in place? "are we at risk?" My view is quite critical on that sort of thing; I 
probably wouldn't tell them anything about terrorism.” 
(Senior BTP Officer) 
 
Nonetheless, the research participants have shown that the concepts of ‘security-driven 
resilience’ (Coaffee and Fussey, 2017, p.299) and insecurity are intrinsically interconnected 
in the everyday and specifically when considering the resilience of SPIRS. However, the 
inescapable implementation and operation of overt prevention and surveillance measures 
in a railway station could well proliferate ‘public anxieties and contribute to the image of 
public spaces as dangerous places’ (Jewkes, 2008, p.51). Yet regardless of this, the 
resolution in many pseudo-public spaces such as the refurbishment of SPIRS and other 
Category A railway stations is to enhance the existing and add more surveillance measures. 
“I’m trying to design out against the fear of crime as well; because of course if you don't 
have places which don't feel safe people won't use them. So, if you're talking about 
mass transit interchanges, that's bad news! Because they could end up using cars or 
not wishing to use parts of the city at certain parts of the night because they feel under 
threat. So those sorts of pieces are now starting to appeal to a lot of architects yet it’s 
not new concepts.” 
(Security Consultant) 
 
209  
Figure 7.2 Source Gregson-Green (2012) Examples of covert CCTV in SPIRS. 
 
Moreover, it is ‘important that all travellers should feel safe and confident in the railway 
station, rather than just passing through’ (Lansley et al., 2008, p.57). This viewpoint is 
reinforced by the BTP, 
“you want the public to be comfortable yet have the confidence when they're not 
to tell somebody. But you want, it's their judgement. I mean, I get, every time I go with 
their judgement with what is suspicious.” 
(Senior BTP Officer) 
 
7.9 Prevention Measures and Resilience Responsibilisation 
This research has revealed that the responsibility for the resilience of SPIRS to human malign 
security threats falls under the remit of the many complex and multiple stakeholders who 
have a stake in the space. Through the process of Governmentality and subsequent 
‘responsibilisation’ and decentralisation of ‘security-driven resilience’ (Coaffee and Fussey, 
2017, p.296) the Government through various departments, such as the DfT through 
TRANSEC, set directives and legalisation via the National Railway Security Programme 
(NRSP), which set the levels of security within the space of the railway station. These levels 
of security are dependent on the category of the station in question and the national threat 
level for terrorist threats. A Senior Strategic BTP member of staff stated they felt this 
‘responsibilisation’ of setting the security standards in SPIRS is primarily the role of TRANSEC, 
at a sub-national level, and not that of the BTP, at a strategic national level. This is a prime 
example of a decentralised strategy, which at first suggests ‘responsibilisation’ through a 
top down approach to ‘security-driven resilience’ (Coaffee and Fussey, 2017, p.296).  
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However, through TRANSEC controlling and disseminating the NRSP, the Government 
preserves its ‘trump card’ status, potentially overriding local concerns, liberties and rights in 
areas it defines as the higher national interest (Coaffee and Fussey, 2017, p.297). 
“In terms of the ordinary securing the railway…, we do not see that as a primary role for 
the Police Force. We’ll give guidance, but it’s really for TRANSEC to determine what 
the railway standards are and then, if there are blips, to work out what should 
happen.” 
(Senior BTP Officer) 
 
Garland’s (1996) concept of ‘responsibilisation’ is one of the cornerstone principles which 
underpins crime and terrorism prevention measures (Coaffee and Fussey, 2015). However, 
the SPIRS empirical unique case study has revealed there are blurred boundaries and 
tension within the space of SPIRS as the control of prevention measures is seen in terms of 
‘devolv[ing] responsibility for crime prevention onto agencies, institutions, and individuals 
which are quite outside the state and to persuade them to act appropriately’ (Garland 1996, 
p.452). An example in SPIRS of this devolution of responsibility, control of behaviours and the 
subsequent persuasion to ensure prevention and security measures are carried by 
stakeholders, such as the retailers, is the HOT protocol and the wider security plan for the 
space. The HOT (Hidden, Obvious, Typical) protocol is based on the principles of human 
surveillance and capable guardians. Moreover, the HOT protocol is an operational example 
of a holistic ‘security-driven resilience’ (Coaffee and Fussey, 2017, p.294) strategy driven by 
the BTP to compel stakeholders with SPIRS to ‘take ownership of, and act upon, feelings of 
suspicion’ (Coaffee and Fussey, 2017, p.298). 
 
One BTP research participant claimed it relies on a common-sense approach and allowed 
the railway network and stations during the IRA mainland bombing campaigns during the 
1970s, 1980s, and 1990s to keep moving despite bomb threats. Under the NRSP Network Rail 
must ensure that hourly security checks are carried out in each of the retail units and other 
areas in SPIRS. A senior Network Rail Operational Manager stated he ensured that the 
retailers understood the importance of carrying out the hourly security checks and where 
this directive was being driven from (DfT, via TRANSEC). The NRSP is discussed in more detail 
in the subsequent section of the Chapter. 
 
Moreover, the Category of the railway station governs the standards of the security checks 
required, thus SPIRS being a Category A railway station means that it has the highest level of 
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security checks. However, the research has found that SPIRS has too many retail units for the 
Network Rail security team to be able to carry out the hourly security checks and hence the 
responsibility of these checks being devolved to the individual retailers and their staff. Within 
SPIRS Network Rail High-speed are very forthright when dealing with the retailers and that they 
have to adhere to the HOT protocol and wider station plan. This is because if one retail unit 
does not adhere or consistently refuses to, the DfT can close the whole station. 
Consequently, Network Rail High Speed will not risk the whole station being shut down, so they 
are tough on retailers regarding security matters. 
 
Therefore, the Network Rail operational and security managers will shut down retailers if they 
believe they are not sticking to the HOT protocol and the wider SPIRS security plan. This is 
the case until the team has proven they can operate safely and securely and they believe 
that this makes their security regime robust enough to aid the resilience against security 
threats. Thus, the concept and operationalisation of resilience measures in SPIRS are clearly 
interconnected with security policies, thus creating ‘security-driven resilience’ (Coaffee and 
Fussey, 2017, p.294). The research has highlighted that within spaces such as SPIRS, the 
resilience and security symbiotic relationship is enacted at the local policy level, driven by 
national strategies, with resilience ‘fully embedded as a policy metaphor’ (Coaffee and 
Fussey, 2015, p.101). 
 
PART FOUR:  SECURITY AND RESILIENCE POLICIES 
7.10 Policies Surrounding SPIRS and Other Category A Railway Stations in England and Wales 
As discussed throughout the thesis, it is the very nature of the railway station, their open nature 
and thus their architecture which appeals both to passengers and the public and to a wide 
spectrum of offenders from pickpockets, sexual offenders, through to terrorists (Borrion et al, 
2014, p.174). Over recent years’ terrorists have attacked different facets of global railway 
infrastructure, for instance, trains (Madrid 2004), an underground network (London 2005), a 
main railway station (Mumbai 2008) and a metro (Moscow 2010). Therefore, a traditional 
and significant railway station environment such as the case study station, SPIRS is a 
potential terrorist target with the objective of causing ‘mass panic, disrupt daily life of a city, 
adversely affect transport infrastructure for several days and cause a significant symbolic 
impact’ (Borrion et al., 2014, p.174). It is important to remember that security and resilience 
policies are interconnected with each helping the other to achieve their goal. 
 
This research contends that the pursuit of security and the perceived continued threat of 
insecurity is a preoccupation and prerequisite of our current society (Cochrane and Talbot, 
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2008). This is highly evident from the research findings gathered from the case study station, 
SPIRS, as security and resilience policies which are enacted by the multiple stakeholders 
within the space, are translated from both the local and the national agendas. SPIRS is a 
Category A railway station and as such has the highest and most stringent security policies in 
place, directed by the DfT, via TRANSEC through National Railway Security Programme 
(NRSP), which is a secured document and is not available to view by the general public. It is 
important to note that it was not possible for the researcher to access this document during 
the data collection period. A Network Rail Senior Operational Manager explained how the 
NRSP is a key national policy, which influences the local security plans for SPIRS. 
“The National Railway Security Program, which is what we have to abide by. So that’s 
built within our security plan and has to be conversant with it and is, therefore, that's 
what we use against people. If we have to give them a non-conformance is, you're 
not complying with the station security plan and the NRSP.” 
(Senior Manager) 
 
The NRSP determines the mandatory daily security standards for Network Rail and the TOCs 
to abide by. In the case of SPIRS, which is owned by High-speed One but managed by 
Network Rail High-speed, Network Rail uses the DfT’s edicts and communicates these to their 
employees, who subsequently cascade these obligations down to retailers in the station, this 
procedure is similar for all Category A railway stations in England and Wales. Hence, National 
security and resilience strategies such as the NRSP take priority over those at a local station 
level, with the National Threat Levels impacting on the category of prevention measures 
being operationalised within the space of SPIRS. Thus, through Governmentality, the 
‘responsibilisation’ (Garland, 1996) of resilience and security strategies the Government has 
augmented its sovereign power.  
 
Therefore, security and resilience of SPIRS is an ideal platform to appreciate some elements 
of Garland’s (1996, p.452) ‘responsibilisation strategy’ where ‘active action’ by non-
Governmental stakeholders is crucial to deal with human malign security threats by 
convincing and motivating them ‘to act appropriately’. Yet, despite this simplistic and 
holistic rhetoric provided by Garland (1996). Those research participants who were 
employed at an operational level within SPIRS appeared to have far more knowledge of 
local, railway station- specific Category A regulations and policies, than the national level 
policies which overarch the local level regulations. The participants who are employed at 
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a higher strategic level gave the impression that national security policies greatly influenced 
organisational policies and thus subsequently the security policies which were implemented 
at a local level within SPIRS. 
“So, you've got the DfT specifying the policing act on the railway, you've Network Rail 
who finesse that message and push it out to the bits of the railway which Network Rail 
are responsible. But then you've got the TOCs and retailers on the station who then 
have to enact these messages at the local level and try and integrate their own 
corporate security policies. So, it can get diluted and muddled at times!” 
(BTP Senior Officer) 
 
One part of the NRSP outlines the mandatory and enforceable requirement for retailers and 
TOCS within SPIRS to carry out hourly checks for hidden or suspicious items. 
“The Station Manager will make sure that their staff, will be going around to Sock Shop, 
Tie Rack for instance and saying show me your hourly check, for your search 
regime…its good practice to make sure things aren't being left behind, so there's a 
bit of deterrent activity there. There's a bit of reassurance activity and if there is a bomb 
threat, for example, to know that the whole station has been searched in its entirety 
within the last hour is a very useful piece of information to use when you are trying to 
decide whether to stop trains and evacuate people.” 
(BTP Senior Officer) 
 
Moreover, a Senior Manager from Network Rail High-speed, the management company 
which operates SPIRS for HS1, reinforced the critical nature of the hourly search national and 
local security strategy for the station. Yet, the resilience of SPIRS to human malign security 
threats is could be comprised by a lack of financial investment in human resources. 
“We don't have enough staff to do all of the retailers, so the retailers as part of their 
tenancy agreement must do hourly searches, or for every hour that they are open. If 
they don't then I work on the three-strike system, one missed or one not logged- that's 
a first warning. Second time they get a written warning and the third time I close them. 
If, however, I think it's warranted that they've not been good enough, I just close them 
straight away temporarily, while they sort themselves out-we are very strict with them.” 
(Senior Manager) 
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However, it should be noted that the number of security obligations to be adhered by the 
managers of railway stations decrease as the significance and size of the station decreases. 
The categories of railway stations in England can be found in Appendix 2. SPIRS is a Category 
A railway station which denotes its important location, role, and capacity, thus meaning the 
security standards that Network Rail High-speed and the retailers operate are located in the 
uppermost tier of measures within the NRSP. Furthermore, a fundamental and imperative part 
of the tenancy agreement to be located within SPIRS is that the retail unit tenants will have 
in place a security plan, which corresponds to the prerequisites of the NRSP. 
 
However, the research findings highlighted more security and resilience operational 
complexities. Network Rail participants have described how tensions and disagreements 
can develop when these obligations must be dovetailed into the tenant’s corporate 
strategies and procedures and are cascaded to their employees in SPIRS. Operational 
security participants concurred that Network Rail High-speed One should take in hand the 
security meetings with the tenant’s employees; since they have found that the retail unit 
managers can dilute the interpretation of security plans. It was unknown whether this was a 
deliberate act on the part of the retailers. Furthermore, they agreed any corporate 
primacies of the tenants could have a bearing on the realisation of Network Rail High 
Speed’s security measures and the hierarchical NRSP. Hence, the research findings have 
highlighted within the space of SPIRS that there is a disconnection between Garland’s 
(1996) ‘responsibilisation’ rhetoric and the reality of operational practice. This is because 
‘responsibilisation’ (Garland, 1996) for ‘security-driven resilience’ (Coaffee and Fussey, 2017, 
p.294) in SPIRS is frequently implied and is inadequately documented, with a lack of, 
understanding, participation and enthusiasm from many of the stakeholders within the 
space. 
 
Additionally, operational BTP officers located in SPIRS regularly worked together with the 
retail unit tenants, Network Rail High-speed One, and the DfT Land Security to assist and 
endorse security and awareness strategies. However, it was found that a lot of the 
communication and meetings, which were conducted in SPIRS, were non-compulsory and 
were initiated by individuals who were trying to understand the complex and multiple 
stakeholder relationships and to enhance and further the communication of security plans. 
One example, given by a senior operational Network Rail High- speed One Manager, was a 
discretionary meeting between the multiple stakeholders is the Police and Communities 
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Together (PACT) briefings. These are held regularly in SPIRS, with the BTP, Network Rail High-
speed One, TOCs, tenants and the public to increase knowledge and to discuss the problems 
relating to the security of SPIRS and to come to an agreement on any measures that need 
to be taken. A drawback of these briefings is the turnout by some of the stakeholder 
organisations in SPIRS can frequently be scant. One participant rationalised this lack of 
attendance by suggesting the themes of the briefings and information communicated 
could be repetitive and tedious. It was felt that their time would be better spent handling 
security issues relating to their own tenanted unit. 
 
In addition, it was implied these briefings are regularly exploited to express differences in 
relation to other stakeholder’s corporate and operational agendas. On the other hand, 
participants agreed if there were a serious mutual concern, corporate agendas would be 
set aside for the greater good of SPIRS. The BTP and Network Rail perceive these briefings as 
crucial to uphold and sustain beneficial stakeholder interfaces and communication; 
nevertheless, it is up to the specific employees of the multiple stakeholders involved in SPIRS 
security to keep up the associations, rapport, and communications. 
 
This research has highlighted contradictions between the rhetoric of resilience and its actual 
operationalisation by the multiple stakeholders within the space of SPIRS, hence creating a 
key contribution to knowledge. The evidence has shown that although all the stakeholders 
should have a role in the resilience of the space against human malign threats, is played out 
with differing levels of importance. Some stakeholders had a greater level of responsibility 
placed on them, the BTP and Network Rail High Speed, and had to cascade this responsibility 
down via operational levels to their own grassroots staff and retail and TOC stakeholders 
within SPIRS. Thus, this indicates that Garland’s (1996) ‘responsibilisation’ occurs at a national 
level which is dispersed and disseminated down a hierarchical structure to higher level 
stakeholders within Transec, which in turn is distributed to senior level teams within the BTP 
and Network Rail High Speed One, who in turn expect their operational teams to 
operationalise these strategies with the other stakeholders within SPIRS. This indicates a lack 
of equality between the stakeholders in operationalising resilience and security strategies, 
thus ‘responsibilisation’ happens at a rhetorical level rather than at an operational level. 
 
This, in turn, reveals the issues of multiple agency/stakeholder working at an operational level 
within SPIRS are compounded by the paradoxical roles enacted by the Government. In 
relation to SPIRS the Government devolves responsibility for security and resilience to the local 
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level, yet, they retained a vast amount of power and control over this agenda. 
 
7.11 National Security Strategies 
Upon first consideration, Garland’s (1996) ‘responsibilisation’ is appropriate at a theoretical 
and rhetorical position to consider resilience and security within SPIRS. However, interestingly 
while conducting the semi-structured interviews little was discussed by the research 
participants about the CONTEST strategy or other national security strategies. However, in 
reality, the ‘responsibilisation’ (Garland, 1996) of ‘security-driven resilience’ (Coaffee and 
Fussey, 2017, p.294) operates at the local level within SPIRS in a diluted and piecemeal 
fashion. Furthermore, senior level Network Rail security policymakers did discuss CONTEST but 
in terms of how it informs the NRSP. The Government proposes that the alignment of the 
CONTEST strategy and the Critical Resilience Program endeavours wherever it is able to 
‘provide a coherent and consistent approach to building resilience across sectors to all risks 
and threats’ (Cabinet Office, 2010b, p.11). However, to date, within England, there is not a 
collective or multi-hazard approach to reducing the vulnerability against these risks. Little is 
written which discusses the future adaptation and mitigation of the railway network to both 
natural and security threats, currently, these issues are dealt with separately within current 
policies and strategies. Moreover, the administration of the CONTEST Strategy is generally 
uncontended, as under the Protect strand, it is clear crowded places, such as Category A 
railway stations require protection against terrorist attacks (Gregory, 2009, p.1). However, the 
participants did express that conflict arises between local and national level stakeholders 
when the financing of such protective measures is questioned, whether these costs are 
wholly met by the operator or partially subsidised by the Government (Gregory, 2009, p.1). 
 
7.12 Security and Resilience Policy Disconnects in the Design Stage  
The research findings have uniquely exposed how ‘security-driven resilience’ (Coaffee and 
Fussey, 2017, p.294) is conceptualised and operationalised and how this can impact on 
resilience to human malign security threats at the planning and design stage of building or 
refurbishing SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and Wales. The BTP 
participants, both at a strategic and operational level, have revealed that there are 
significant policy disconnects around Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which 
surrounds the participation and contribution of police CPOs at the planning stages of 
building and refurbishment projects, including railway station developments. Presently, the 
Home Office Police Forces are required at the outset of building projects, to contribute and 
to work with an array of accountable stakeholders to guarantee CPMs are deemed as 
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critical as other legislative duties in the addressing of their design. 
 
Conversely, when railway stations are designed or refurbished, the BTP is not included in 
Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, nor do they have any other supporting 
legislation that gives them the authority to be consulted in the planning or any other stage 
of such projects. The participants stated that BTP CTSA and Principal Architectural Liaison 
officers (ALO) must be dependent on an unofficial network of industry associates to advise 
and update them on impending developments or they have to wait for the designers seek 
to their advice. However, if the BTP CTSA’s/ALO’s ‘are asked for involvement once the first 
brick has been laid, then they have been involved too late on the project’ (Gregson-Green 
et al., 2013, p.36). This voluntary association between the BTP and designers and the paucity 
of regulation is perceived to be extremely challenging to deal with and even tougher to 
sustain, as security measures are frequently considered as a second thought or resented 
purchase. A Security Advisor articulated the following concerning regulations and security 
measures. 
“If you speak to architects, planners etc. they like a level playing field. They’d like to 
see a change in Building Regs that says we want this to happen so they all 
understand what the guidelines are. But at the moment, there’s no appetite within 
Government to include any additional legislation and all they’re referring back to is 
Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act which basically says if you build something, 
you must consider crime. And Lord West’s view when he was in that position was, 
“Terrorism’s a crime.” 
(Security Advisor) 
 
Such policy disconnects surrounding the security measures installed in refurbished railway 
stations or new build will have a knock-on effect on fiscal pressures. Given the economic 
demands that determine the fiscal costs of new build and refurbishment projects of railway 
stations, there was a sense of the inevitability by the BTP participants and Security 
Consultants that there will be unavoidable compromises with the installation and 
specification of security measures. The operationalisation of ‘security-driven resilience’ 
(Coaffee and Fussey, 2017, p.294) through the processes of Governmentality implies a ‘top 
down’ holistic and collegiate approach for the shared ‘responsibilisation’ for resilience and 
security within SPIRS and other Category A Railway Stations in England and Wales. However, 
the research has exposed strains and pressures occurring at a local level given that at a 
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national level the Government control spending and budgets, meaning stakeholders such 
as the BTP have limited powers to contest the priorities of national security and resilience 
strategies which without doubt take a precedence over localised crime prevention issues 
with SPIRS. 
 
However, if unsuitable security measures are built-in during the construction, the view of the 
participants is that these will have to be retrofitted at a future point in time, consequently 
having future monetary and commercial repercussions for Network Rail and or the TOCs if 
they are managing the railway station in question. One Security Consultant discussed the 
lack of regulations for security practitioners to be involved in railway station refurbishment 
or new build. 
“There is no mandatory/obligation for a developer to call in a security practitioner at 
a set time and be of a sufficient quality! Theoretically, they could go out to the market 
and come back with an individual that is reasonably credible but may not have the 
back up in terms of expertise and understanding history. And this is where we are 
getting back to the idea of grudge purchases and may have simply been appointed 
merely on price! A case of buyer beware!” 
(Security Consultant) 
 
Moreover, the research has exceptionally found that there are definite policy disconnects 
between the building or refurbishment of railway stations and other pseudo-public spaces, 
such as shopping centres, as there are no Secure by Design standards for Railway stations. 
These disconnections do have the potential to impact on the ‘security-driven resilience’ 
(Coaffee and Fussey, 2017, p.294) of SPIRS. Network Rail managed stations do have 
standards of security measures that have to be built into the refurbishment or new build 
plans. However, there are different standards for the TOC operated stations in terms of 
measures and strategies that are operationalised within the space, one senior operational 
BTP officer claimed that these were very much influenced by different types of funding 
streams. 
“TOCs take advantage of the ambiguity of guidance documents, measures are only 
enacted if they have to and then at a minimum cost.” 
(Senior Operational BTP Officer) 
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Hence, the research has clearly exposed contradictions between the rhetoric of 
‘responsibilisation’ (Garland, 1996) of resilience and its actual operationalisation by the 
multiple stakeholders within the spaces such as SPIRS. The research evidence has shown 
that although all the stakeholders need to have a role in the resilience of the space against 
human malign threats. Yet is played out with differing levels of importance and authority of 
the complex stakeholders. Some stakeholders had a greater level of responsibility placed 
on them, and despite a top down approach for the ‘responsibilisation’ of CPMs and CTMs, 
there was a level of stakeholder apprehension that the costs of CTMs would impact and 
without clear mandating from the state, local level stakeholders can divert resources and 
manipulate the ambiguity in the guidance to suit their own financial and security agendas. 
 
Network Rail does offer some form of guidance on the Secure by Design for railway stations. 
The Security Consultants and Advisors who were interviewed felt that designing in CPMs was 
more difficult than designing in CTMs. This was because the Secure by Design guidance for 
CPMs is very patchy and highly dependent on the type of development it is being applied 
to. BTP participants at a strategic and operational level stated that more regulation and 
powers are needed to be granted to the BTP and for them to be involved at the very start 
of the design process, rather than the ad hoc/haphazard approaches which are in place 
currently. 
 
However, to address the legislative disconnection between the involvement of the BTP in 
planning stages of new build or refurbishment projects, the DfT in 2012 released the SIDOS 
guidance, which endeavours to ensure security measures are designed in and the BTP are 
involved from the earliest stages of projects. The DfT, BTP, and the CPNI have written the 
guidance. The aim of the guidance is it provides ‘generic security recommendations’ (UK. 
GOV, 2015) that it is used by planners, designers and architects ‘on how to design effective 
and proportionate physical security for new and major redevelopment railway stations’ 
(UK.GOV, 2015). 
“The SIDOS document has had BTP input, which is a major step forward. However, 
the SIDOS is just guidance and not advice on how to design secure stations.” 
(Retired Senior BTP Officer) 
 
SIDOS is attempting to safeguard the railway station from future costly retrofitting of 
inadequate security measures. Although the SIDOS guidance does make suggestions to 
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tackle the concerns raised above; nevertheless, Security Consultants and BTP participants 
have conveyed their apprehensions that even though the document advises that 
CTSA/ALOs are included at the primary stages of projects, “it is not a statutory requirement 
and therefore does not guarantee their involvement” (Gregson-Green et al., 2013, p.36-37). 
One Security Consultant discussed the lack of mandatory regulation for designers of railway 
stations to consult with the BTP, 
“It’s not mandatory, and it should be. I think actually that will cost most projects dear, in 
terms of if then someone else comes in and scrutinises what has been done. However, 
if the measures aren't being scrutinised you never know… well nothing happens! They 
got away with it! Security is a complete negative process, 364 days a year everything 
and everyone was perfectly safe, then one day it didn't work!” 
(Security Consultant) 
 
This is devolved ‘responsibilisation’ (Garland, 1996) from the state by trying to make Network 
Rail, the BTP and planners responsible at a local level for CPMs and CTMs. This an issue of 
security becoming the primary worry ‘of resilience practice while national security 
[becomes] played out in the local realm under the aegis of resilience’ (Coaffee and Fussey, 
2015, p.92). However, participants felt that it becomes very complicated for guidance such 
as SIDOS to be given on the security measures needed for refurbishments or new builds, as 
the entire complex and multiple stakeholders must be considered. They also stated that the 
implementation of security measures in projects is always impacted on by the implications 
of budgets. At the time of the research and writing up of the thesis it was too early to know 
whether SIDOS will be adequate to ensure the multiple stakeholders are included at the 
primary stages of projects, ‘thereby providing a strategically planned, defined and co-
ordinated approach at the design stages of new build and refurbishment projects’ 
(Gregson- Green et al., 2013, p.38). 
 
A further security strategy that can be operationalised by Network Rail and devolved 
responsibility given to the TOCs and BTP is the SSS, which was discussed in greater detail in 
section 7.2.1. However, as with the SIDOS guidance, the SSS is not a mandatory obligation 
for TOC’s and Network Rail to comply with; it is a voluntary accreditation for railway stations 
to achieve. Interestingly, in 2006 the Labour Government proposed that it would be too 
expensive to make the SSS a compulsory requirement for the TOC’s and Network Rail and 
suggested to make the “accreditation of more stations a franchise requirement” (House of 
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Commons, 2006). Thus, this shifts the responsibility of financing security and subsequent 
resilience to security threats from the state to the local level. 
 
7.13 Chapter Summary 
Without a doubt, the open and crowded nature, and functions of SPIRS creates an attractive 
target to those wishing to carry out malicious actions within the space and the boundaries. 
The literature review undertaken at the start of the research project and the subsequent 
qualitative data collection for the thesis has established there is a clear need to increase the 
understanding of the complexities of the multiple stakeholders who are charged with 
upholding the current and future resilience of the Category A railway stations in England 
and Wales to security threats. Therefore, the findings in this chapter have recognised that this 
thesis has been the starting part of research which has sought to address the significant lack of 
current research into the potentially conflicting agendas of the complex and multiple  
stakeholders, operating within the space, which has shown to create operational difficulties 
and the unintentional consequences from trade-offs in terms of the ‘responsibilisation’ of 
prevention measures against security threats devolved to a local level from the state. It is 
argued the planners, designers, and operators of SPIRS and other Category A railway stations 
in England Wales need to fully understand and account for current and future security 
measures in either retrofitting or new build projects. Consequently, this research has 
examined which stakeholders benefit from and are empowered by resilience and security 
strategies in SPIRS, and in turn how this can impact on the types of ‘security-driven resilience’ 
(Coaffee and Fussey, 2017, p.294) measures, ‘co-ordination and…affect the variation of 
resilience being mobilised’ (Rogers, 2017, p.21).  
 
This research has highlighted that within the space of SPIRS and other Category A railway 
stations in England and Wales that the resilience to human malign security threats is not a 
linear process, that the elements analysed above are interconnected and entangled with 
each other. Thus, each element has a critical part in the process of operational resilience 
and if one element is removed or not considered fully when designing new or retrofitting 
railway stations, or indeed in their day-to-day operations, the resilience of the space to 
security threats is compromised and weakened. The findings have demonstrated that to 
maximise the resilience of SPIRS to human malign security the state has devolved this 
responsibility to the complex and multiple stakeholders, ‘institutions, professions, 
communities and individuals’ (Coaffee and Fussey, 2015, p.95). The first part of Chapter 
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Eight continues to look at the current resilience of SPIRS to human malign security threats 
and examines the how the stakeholders and their communications can affect this. The 
second part of Chapter Eight brings together the findings and looks at what the research 
participants perceived to be the future threats SPIRS and its resilience to these. 
  
223  
CHAPTER EIGHT: SPIRS AND THE RESILIENCE TO CURRENT AND FUTURE SECURITY THREATS 
 
8.0 Chapter Introduction 
This chapter will continue to build on the findings and discussion of the research and those in 
the previous chapter. To recap, the participants focused on the current and future resilience 
of SPIRS to human malign security threats, this was discussed in two temporal spaces, 
present-day threats and those that could occur in the future. The first part of this chapter 
will examine the how the complex and multiple stakeholders of SPIRS and their 
communication strategies can impact on the current resilience of the space to human 
malign security threats. The second part of this chapter looks at what the research 
participants perceived to be the future threats SPIRS and its potential resilience to these. 
 
PART ONE - STAKEHOLDERS 
8.1 Stakeholder Analysis and Mapping in Terms of Resilience 
The Stakeholder Map produced during the research was topological, meaning that the 
actors in SPIRS were mapped including critical decision makers who are involved in 
operational policies and strategies, or impacted on by security threats. This is different to the 
topographic mapping which focuses on the relationship between a variable such as age 
or gender and a social issue (Aligica, 2006, p.82). By asking the participants as stakeholders 
within SPIRS to discuss and review the map, it uses a cognitive technique to provide a map 
constructed on ‘meta theories’ (Aligica, 2006, p.79). The research maintains this Stakeholder 
Analysis and mapping could be readily used at a national/state and local level for policy 
and operational reviews of the stakeholders and their interconnections and their subsequent 
responsibility for the resilience of SPIRS against current and future security threats. Therefore, 
when undertaking policy reviews or the planning of refurbishment or new build railway station 
projects this research argues it is critical for strategic purposes to undertake the process of 
Stakeholder Analysis to catalogue and determine those who will be involved or could 
impact on the project, policy, or strategy. Thus, when the Government is devolving 
responsibility to the local level stakeholders in SPIRS and other Category A railway stations 
in England and Wales, their points of view should be sought and accounted for in the 
policies and strategies which affect them (Freeman, 1984). Moreover, the participants used 
the Stakeholder Map to create new empirical knowledge through the confirmation of the 
ambiguous and variable boundaries within the space of SPIRS. Thus, the research findings 
support those of Anderson et al. (2009, p.307) that as a space, SPIRS is ‘centric…within 
geographical boundaries’. Yet also the space of SPIRS can be perceived as fluid and 
dynamic, which is socially constructed with complex interconnected relationships and 
224  
multiple understandings of these. 
 
The Stakeholder Map highlighted primary, secondary, and external stakeholders within 
SPIRS, allowing for the interdependencies and importance of relationships to be highlighted 
to the reader. It is at this point the behaviours of stakeholders historical and future should be 
examined in how these could impact positively or negatively on specific goals of the 
institution – railway station (Freeman, 1984) and the external influences, pressures and 
susceptibilities of the complex stakeholders can be recognised (Freidman and Miles, 2006, 
p.85). Therefore, these relationships have been analysed ‘according to economic, 
technological, social, political, and managerial effects’ (Freidman and Miles, 2006, p.85). 
Consequently, these factors have a significant impact on the stakeholder’s agendas and 
strategies when considering prevention measures and resilience to human malign security 
threats. 
 
With any operational or security policy or strategy changes, it is critical for the ‘non-state 
agencies and organisations’ (Garland, 1996. p.452) stakeholders, such as Network Rail High-
speed One, and the BTP, within SPIRS to propose the alterations and subsequently to 
account for all the stakeholders concerned to appraise their probable co-operation or 
resistance and to consider their interconnected and entwined organisational connections 
and relationships (Aligica, 2006). Consequently, this research proposes Stakeholder Analysis 
can be used for the many specific and complex ‘security-driven resilience’ (Coaffee and 
Fussey, 2017, p.294) projects or strategies within SPIRS and other Category A railway stations 
in England and Wales, given that it distinguishes the relevant stakeholders and visibly 
highlights their relationships and ‘their relative power, influence and interests’ (Aligica, 2006, 
p.80). Moreover, Stakeholder Analysis can be utilised in such projects and strategies to 
denote the significance of the complex and multiple stakeholder’s interests and how can 
influence the completion of the project. Hence, it is a method which can be utilised to 
recognise the stakeholders concerned in a specific policy or strategy and ‘for identifying 
potential coalitions for support…and for assessing the relative risks entailed’ (Aligica, 2006, 
p.80). As discussed in Chapter Six and Chapter Nine the research proposes this form of 
enquiry and mapping is very appropriate to other types of pseudo-public spaces who 
operate with complex and multiple stakeholders, for example large, shopping centres and 
which need to be conscious of the considerable and complex range of stakeholders, 
policies, strategies and organisational agendas that intersect and influence the resilience 
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of the space to security threats. 
 
The participants stated that involving the complex and multiple stakeholders in SPIRS is an 
important process in project management and the operational day-to-day management 
of the space. The research contends that if Stakeholder Analysis is undertaken within SPIRS 
to maximise the resilience of the space to human malign security threats it will be an invaluable 
tool in maximising decision making in projects and operational activities. This will ensure the 
entire cohort of complex and multiple stakeholders are accounted for when considering 
the resilience of the space to current and future security threats (Jepson and Eskerod, 2008). 
Therefore, Stakeholder Analysis needs to be carried out at the start of a ‘security-driven 
resilience’ (Coaffee and Fussey, 2017, p.294) strategy or project, so issues and opportunities 
can be identified. This is a critical element in the planning stage of either building new 
railway stations or refurbishing existing ones, and the research has highlighted that it is 
currently not fully considered in all such projects. Thus, this would mean that all of SPIRS’ 
complex and multiple stakeholders who can affect the resilience of space to human malign 
security threats are consulted from the outset of a project. As already discussed in Chapter 
Seven, the BTP and Security Consultants/Advisors frequently felt they were not always 
consulted and excluded at the start of design projects. 
 
8.2 Stakeholder Relationships and Resilience 
Therefore, the findings of this research maintain that within SPIRS and other Category A 
railway stations, and the utilisation of prevention measures, these should be operated on 
the principle of ‘stakeholder fairness’ through Stakeholder Analysis and Mapping helps to 
clarify the responsibilities and roles of the complex and multiple stakeholders. Thus, individual 
stakeholders or groups of individual stakeholders will be able to have a clear understanding 
of the advantages of a reciprocal arrangement of collaboration and assistance, which 
necessitates input and potential costs to other stakeholders (Phillips, 1997, p.57). 
 
Additionally, Stakeholder Mapping by consulting and encouraging the complex and 
multiple stakeholders to be part of projects within SPIRS can contribute to ‘building 
legitimacy and policy ownership’ (Aligica, 2006, p.80) of such projects. Furthermore, it was 
felt that by building and maintaining strong relationships with other stakeholders within SPIRS 
this went some way to ensuring the resilience of the space in terms of security threats, 
“we have good relationships with all the key stakeholders that would help with the 
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business continuity. The resilience and the bounce backability. We could bounce 
back quicker because we actually have good strong relationships with people.” 
(Senior Operational BTP Officer) 
 
A Retail Manager in SPIRS described the positive relationship they had with the BTP, 
“they come in. Often, there is a lot of interaction between the retailers and the BTP, 
the PCSO's on the station, which makes for a healthy relationship and ease of calling.” 
 
The participants maintained in theory that the process of constructing and operating a 
space such as SPIRS requires an understanding of the multiple stakeholders involved and an 
efficient good practice in terms of communication. This is consistent with the viewpoint of 
Hassler and Kohler (2014) who argue that for effective communication to be achieved the 
stakeholders must endeavour to achieve a proficient framework. However, in reality, the 
research participants have stated that the processes for communication between the 
stakeholders can be very ad hoc and is heavily reliant on the goodwill of individuals, which 
can be easily lost when they change roles or leave the organisation. These findings impact 
on the notion of governmentality and ‘responsibilisation’ (Garland, 1996) at a national ‘top 
down’ approach to resilience fails to account for such intangible factors which can impact 
of the resilience and security of SPIRS to human malign threats and it can be problematic 
at an operational grassroots level. Yet again the research findings have revealed that 
tensions can occur at a local level in SPIRS as the governance and the ‘responsibilisation’ 
(Garland, 1996) for security and resilience implies a shared approach.  However, the reality 
is the Government is holding on to control of these agendas and yet demonstrates it lacks 
the practical consideration for the operational complexities of managing such a 
responsibility. 
 
The following section leads to the research to contend that despite Garland’s (1996, p.453) 
rhetoric of national and local stakeholders have a responsibility for ‘preventing and 
controlling crime’, the actual day to day approach is less than holistic with blurred 
operational boundaries and real confusion over what ‘a state function is and what is not’. 
Thus, it is recommended that there needs to be a greater sense of regulation and obligation 
driven by the Government, the DfT, which can be filtered down through the levels of 
stakeholders within SPIRS. 
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One emergent and critical finding from the research data is that to get to grips and control 
the multifarious and complicated difficulties that are inherent in tackling and delivering a 
railway station’s conceptual plan, operational and legal obligations, it is crucial that the 
multiple stakeholders involved in these processes accept they must improve and enhance 
their understanding of such issues. Therefore, to achieve this in theory within the space of 
SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and Wales there is a requirement for 
the complex and multiple stakeholders to gain “an appreciation of the necessity for a 
collaborative and integrated resilience strategy against security threats” (Gregson-Green et 
al., 2013, p.38). Yet as discussed in Chapters Two, Three, Four and Seven, this is not as 
straightforward in practice as it would at first seem because as  
beyond simplistic building-specific guidance, ‘resilience’ remains an intangible 
aspiration and, significantly, there is no distinction between equilibrist and 
evolutionary understandings. Resilience, therefore, is commonly viewed as a vague, 
singular whole. 
White and O’Hare, 2014, p.5-6 
 
One criticism, which arose from the research findings, was how SPIRS manages the resilience 
of the space to current security threats, as some participants felt it was frequently delivered 
through a silo mentality and approach, with the complex and multiple stakeholders only 
aware of their own security and resilience policies. They had little or no understanding of 
the UK national security guidance, strategies or policies.  
 
The research has highlighted contradictions between the rhetoric of resilience and its actual 
operationalisation by the multiple stakeholders within the space of SPIRS.  Garland’s (1996) 
‘responsibilisation’ rhetoric claims of the stakeholders in SPIRS should have a role in the 
‘security-driven resilience’ (Coaffee and Fussey, 2017, p.294) The reality is it is played out in 
SPIRS and other Category A railways stations in England and Wale with differing levels of 
importance. The research has exposed there is inequality between the stakeholders within 
SPIRS, as some had a greater level of responsibility placed on them, TRANSEC direct the 
NRSP through the BTP and Network Rail High Speed, and who in turn had to cascade this 
responsibility down via operational levels to their own grassroots staff and retail and TOC 
stakeholders within the space. Thus, indicating that Garland’s (1996) ‘responsibilisation’ 
occurs at a national level which is dispersed and disseminated down a hierarchical structure 
to local level in SPIRS. 
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Furthermore, one Security Consultant for HS1 also felt that the resilience of the space to security 
threats was undermined by the lack of consistency in qualifications and requirements of 
experience for the TOC’s and Network Rail High-speed operational security managers. They 
felt this was compounded further because there is no industry standard or professional body 
or awards for railway station security. Thus, they maintained any strategies and co-operation 
from the complex and multiple stakeholders across the space was very ad-hoc and 
dependent on the individuals. Again, this was a clear example of a lack of communication 
and understanding about the complex resilience requirements at a Governmental level 
needed to ensure the security of SPIRS against human malign threats. 
 
An example of the devolved local and multiagency ‘responsibilisation’ (Garland, 1996) from 
the Government to the multiple stakeholders for the resilience of SPIRS to human malign 
security threats are the stakeholder meetings to discuss security strategies and prevention 
measures. These stakeholder meetings can be seen as a form ‘social crime prevention’ 
(Cochrane and Talbot, 2008, p.16). Therefore, demonstrating that ‘security-driven resilience’ 
(Coaffee and Fussey, 2017, p.294) can be ‘a valuable political strategy facilitating…shifts in 
the responsibilities for… governance from the state toward the private sector’ (White and 
O’Hare, 2014, p.7). Moreover, the concept and operationalisation of resilience in a space 
such as SPIRS should encourage national and local level stakeholders to focus on the actual 
problem space, rather than focus on theoretical propositions of security and resilience. Thus, 
the multiple stakeholders should when operationalising resilience within the space must 
consider  
subjectivity…adaptability…reflexive understanding…risk assessments…knowledge 
acquisition and, above all else…responsible decision making 
(Jones, 2013, p.40). 
 
The research has found that many of the security meetings and communications that are 
held in SPIRS by the multiple stakeholders are instigated by individuals, and are not a direct 
organisational strategy, and therefore they are not mandatory to attend. The stakeholders 
from the BTP, Network Rail and the retailers who did take part in these meetings believed 
that they were ‘trying to improve the complexities of stakeholder interfaces and to improve 
the communication of security strategies.’ (Gregson-Green et al., 2013, p.38). An example 
of such a voluntary meeting held in SPIRS is the PACT meetings, with attendance from the BTP, 
Network Rail, the public, the TOCs and the station’s retailers. The overarching aim of these 
meetings is to increase awareness, co-operation and agree on strategies concerning 
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security issues and threats to SPIRS. However, the research found that attendance by the 
TOCs and the retailers was often poor. One Site Retail Manager felt it was more important to 
send their junior supervisors to these meetings because 
“they talk a lot about security, so you know. No disrespect to the police but if 
you've been to one, you've been to them all, you know? Because they are from a 
script and they are very much- you know, standardised? But it is probably key that 
my guys go, I'm not always front of house. So, I'm not always the guy who is on the 
shop floor, I'm just one who is reviewing my manager’s performance and targets 
around shoplifting.” 
 
Another participant claimed those attending to vent about other disagreements and their 
own agendas frequently used the PACT meetings. However, they did feel that if there was a 
serious problem that would affect all of the stakeholders, ‘commercial agendas would be 
put to one side for the greater good of the station’ (Gregson-Green et al., 2013, p.38). 
 
A number of the BTP and Network Rail research participants saw these PACT meetings as a 
fundamental part of creating and sustaining communications and relationships between 
the complex and multiple stakeholders within SPIRS. However, maintaining and 
encouraging attendance at these meetings was frequently up to the individual 
operational officers and managers. This indicates that positive and collaborative 
stakeholder relationships are essential for operational resilience and strategies are 
imperative as in theory they make for effective approaches and outcomes (Jepson and 
Eskerod, 2008). Moreover, the research found that Network Rail High-speed One delivered 
fortnightly security briefings to the management of the retail units within SPIRS, and there was 
a dedicated section that named and shamed retail units, which have breached security 
protocol during the period. Yet moving forward the Network Rail High-speed One 
Operational Security Management team stated that they wanted to do fortnightly security 
the briefings to the actual retail staff themselves. This was because they strongly felt that by 
delivering these briefings to the retail managers, the Network Rail High-speed One security 
message could be diluted or misunderstood by individual retailer’s corporate agendas 
when the briefing was cascaded down to their shop floor staff. 
 
Moreover, the research has exposed the contradictions between the rhetoric of the 
‘responsibilisation’ (Garland, 1996) resilience and its actual operationalisation by the 
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multiple stakeholders within the space of SPIRS. Some tensions were alluded to by one Local 
Authority stakeholder, who felt there was a lack of clear communication strategy and 
inclusion for those stakeholders who have a stake in SPIRS but were located outside of the 
space of the station. Therefore, this could lead to a feeling of social exclusion from the 
community of stakeholders within SPIRS, where they do not feel valued or are actively 
encouraged to participate (Anderson and Nielson, 2009, p.309) in discussions, or strategies 
around ‘security-driven resilience’ (Coaffee and Fussey, 2017, p.294). 
“It does feel like actually the station almost need their own opportunity for us to all 
get-together and understand what everyone does. And we need to repeat it 
regularly; so that newbies can understand and there are new people who come and 
change the sort of situation.” 
(Local Authority Emergency Planner) 
 
Furthermore, there appears to be a disparity between Network Rail and Network Rail High-
speed One’s policies around stakeholder meetings in SPIRS, given the Local Authority 
Emergency Planner had only been involved in actual emergencies in SPIRS and not in any 
scheduled meetings. A Senior Security Manager for Network Rail stated it was the national 
policy for the company to hold regular security meetings, several times a year, where the 
following stakeholders are invited to attend: 
• TOCs 
• Retailers 
• BTP 
• Local communities 
• Local authorities” 
 
Furthermore, a Senior BTP Officer described how fragmented and disparate the 
communication strands could be in SPIRS and other Category A railway stations, especially 
when considering and comparing how communications were handled historically when 
the railway network was a nationalised industry. 
“Having lived through privatisation of the railway, where you were dealing with BR 
[British Rail], which for all of its faults it was actually a very good organisation to deal 
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with as it was so well structured. You wanted a message to go from BR to every station 
in the country, click gone done! You want to get a message to every station in the 
country now; well you know it doesn't quite fit the corporate plan. Lots of different 
agendas and stakeholders (TOCs), you know all doing something very slightly 
different. So, it’s harder to co-ordinate, there are groups to hold it together, but they 
haven't got that natural grouping, you know under BR it was natural for the railway 
companies, you know to stick together, because they were the same company. 
Now, the natural inclination is for them to…do their own thing, but they need to pull 
together.” 
 
The RSSB is another stakeholder who facilitates meetings and lines of communication 
between railway station stakeholders, such as the TOCs, Network Rail and the BTP. However, it 
does not necessarily arrange meetings specifically around issues in SPIRS; it deals with wider 
security problems across the English and Welsh railway network. A Senior Manager described 
his role and the wider safety and security role of the RSSB, 
“we don't design railways; we don't do anything of that kind of nature. And all I do 
from my point of view is arrange meetings, facilitate. I aim to get people together to 
sit down. I aim to get people together who can these things out and talk about 
them… the RSSB has nothing to do with looking at terrorism. It's crimes on the station and 
to station personnel.” 
 
Interestingly, the participant from the RSSB felt that when security/crime prevention security 
meetings were held that there was a lot of positive uptake from the TOCs, but they felt that 
Network Rail did not contribute fully to these meetings. 
“The Network Rail uptake is, they come along to the meetings, but they don't properly 
engage…We do wish that they take more of an active role or give a more positive 
contribution both in what they tell us and how they react and what they are told. I think 
it's a cultural thing, they may be seeing the meetings as more of a train operating 
company thing because Network Rail only has a few of the larger stations to manage. 
So, they definitely should be involved because they do manage those bigger 
stations, but perhaps they just send the wrong person to the meeting. But we do wish 
they would engage more.” 
 
Furthermore, the participant indicated similar opinions about the lack of participation from the 
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DfT in attending meetings. They found that once a contact at the DfT had left or changed 
to a different department it was a struggle to find a relevant replacement to attend the 
meetings. 
“We wish they would say and try and find the right person in the organisation! But 
given the size and importance of them and the role they play within the railway 
network we don’t have anyone come from the DfT. We did use to have somebody 
come from the Home Office to the meetings, but he retired and has never been 
replaced. No, nobody from the DfT no not now.” 
 
8.3 Stakeholders in SPIRS and Responsibilisation for Resilience 
The research findings examined in Chapter Seven and this chapter demonstrates that within 
the space of SPIRS, both the formal and informal stakeholders introduce crime and security 
measures and thus subsequently social control measures into the everyday. These regulations 
operate in a way, which are mirrored and enhance ‘the social controls of ordinary life’ 
(Garland, 2001, p.6). Thus, the space of SPIRS and wider society and its issues do not stand still, 
and consequently, the different practices that are the informal and formal methods of 
control cannot either. It is critical when looking at crime control in SPIRS that the informal 
processes of control are not overlooked. A Senior Manager from the RSSB shared their opinion 
about the issues of how the informal and formal ‘responsibilisation’ (Garland, 1996) of the 
public who will use SPIRS in the future could be addressed by the railway industry as a whole. 
“It's all about how people behave, as individuals or groups. And we have to think 
about how much responsibility do we take on about how to educate people how to 
educate people how to behave? If somebody is misbehaving, why is he misbehaving? 
Is it because of a family situation? Or unemployment or education? We cannot as an 
industry, address society's ills. We can lobby the Government etc., or carry out our own 
research, but we can only try and address the issues on the railway. We can't say go 
and get a job, or education-whatever. So, we do have to draw the line somewhere. 
So how do we address these things, how do you move forward? We just have to look 
at the assets and the people who travel on the railways and work on the railways as 
best we can.” 
(RSSB Senior Manager) 
 
Through ‘security-driven resilience’ (Coaffee and Fussey, 2017, p.294) strategies such as 
CONTEST, which feeds into the security requirements of the NRSP, the Government expects 
that the complex and multiple stakeholders within SPIRS take responsibility at a local level to 
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operationalise security measures to ensure the resilience against human malign security 
threats. Therefore, through the process of Governmentality, the Government infers that the 
multiple stakeholders within the space of SPIRS must 
take responsibility for their own [security measures], and in policy terms is associated with 
a series of economic and social incentives and disincentives aimed at reinforcing 
appropriate behaviour. 
(Cochrane and Talbot, 2008, p.12) 
 
Moreover, this research has highlighted that the responsibility of security prevention 
measures within the space of SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and 
Wales has been decentralised and ‘made a key contribution’ (Fergusson and Muncie, 2008, 
p.118) of the multiple stakeholders who operate within the boundaries of the space. 
Through ‘governance-at-a-distance’ (Garland, 1996, p.454) ‘responsibilisation’ (Garland, 
1996) see the Government ‘creating active citizens’ who have had some form of devolved 
responsibility for prevention measures passed down to them ‘by agencies, organisations 
and individuals which are quite outside the state and to persuade them to act 
appropriately’ (Garland, 1996, p. 452). An example of this in SPIRS and other Category A 
railway stations are mass media campaigns which aim to raise consciousness, create a 
sense of duty, and thus change practices’ (Garland, 1996, p.452). Moreover, the analysis of 
the findings found that frequently, passengers and the public using SPIRS are exposed to 
subtle security measures from the stakeholders in the space, such as Network Rail High Speed 
and the BTP, which aim to instill in them a sense of responsibility for their own safety. One 
example of this actual ‘responsibilisation’ (Garland, 1996) given by a Senior BTP officer was a 
poster used in 2012 to make passengers and the public think about the impact of leaving 
their bags unattended in railway stations; he stated that the overarching message of the 
poster was 
“there are 6,300 unattended bags at this station in the last month, delaying trains by 8 
million minutes. If you want to get to your journey on time don't leave your bag 
unattended. If you do see a bag unattended then report it to staff.” 
(Senior BTP Officer) 
 
However, the BTP officer maintained that the public’s perception of this action would result 
in them thinking that unattended bags as an inconvenience to their journey rather than 
thinking of it in terms of potentially preventing an act of terrorism. Yet they also maintained 
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that some passengers would be frightened into thinking every left item of luggage was a 
bomb and this then increased their fear of being a victim of a terrorist act. Political messages 
and spin often depend ‘on imagery and mythology with a strong emotional resonance’ 
(Dean, 2010, p.25). Thus, the examples of the poster campaigns in SPIRS around CP and CT 
can be drawn on to support an underlying political discourse around security threats posed 
to the space. It was felt that a challenge to the resilience of SPIRS to human malign security 
threats both currently and in the future, was the increasing pressures and expectations 
of the commuters and those using the space. One Senior Network Rail Policy Manager 
believed that commuters are often oblivious to the area and their own safety and 
maintained that public education and ‘responsibilisation’ (Garland, 1996) was important. 
“People should be prepared to live with a small level of risk. We live in a risk adverse 
culture. How the rail culture operates the system will never be totally secure against 
terrorism.” 
(Senior Network Rail Policy Officer) 
 
Furthermore, the RSSB propose that the ‘responsibilisation’ (Garland, 1996) of stakeholders 
in terms of looking at the resilience of SPIRS through CTMs and CPMs could be encouraged 
and supported through a programme of the three E’s, education, engineering and 
enforcement. 
“We talk about the three E's. Which are education, engineering, and enforcement. 
So, you tell people how you want them to behave, you educate them how you want 
them to behave, so then you have the engineering, so we have infrastructure, then we 
expect you to behave now, but the important thing is the enforcement! But you 
can't do it all by education, you can't do it all by engineering because would still jump 
over the barriers, and you can't do it all by enforcement. So, for it to be a sustainable 
campaign, you need a bit of all of them.” 
(RSSB Senior Manager) 
 
The three E’s described by the Senior Manager from the RSSB is comparable to a crime 
prevention strategy based on the four ‘E’s’ principles (Morgan and Cornish, 2006, p.12) 
1. Engineering 
2. Enforcement 
3. Education 
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4. Enabling 
 
These principles can be a response and an implementation of processes, ‘with the need to 
develop avenues of co-operation and partnerships with the community and its agencies’ 
(Morgan and Cornish, 2006, p. 12-13). These elements of co-operation and partnership were 
apparent between some of the stakeholders within SPIRS, as a Retail Manager who was 
responsible their stores security stated, 
“the retailers do what they can but then it’s also making sure passengers and 
customers take some responsibility themselves- awareness of potential crimes, 
keeping themselves and their property safe and secure. But if there was an umbrella 
for the role, it's with regard to helping Network Rail, it's training staff about is the HOT 
protocol and the general criminality aspects of the business, it's ensuring daily 
everyone has their ID badge and have got their passes, and that comes under 
checks and obviously under reviews etc. I support the station initiatives, whether it be 
a forum, whether it be as the British Transport Police briefing that they hold regularly.” 
 
PART TWO – FUTURE CHALLENGES TO RESILIENCE 
Burnard and Bhamra (2011, p.5583) maintain that ‘within organisations, resilience resides in 
both the individual and organisational responses to turbulence and discontinuities’. 
Therefore, to examine how the complex and multiple stakeholders of SPIRS perceive the 
future resilience to human malign security threats, the participants were asked to explain in 
their opinion what they believed to be the greatest threats. 
 
8.4 Future challenges of policing SPIRS 
The railways of England, Wales, and Scotland are policed by the BTP with approximately four 
thousand members of staff. A senior BTP member of staff stated that this should be seen in 
perspective when the Metropolitan Police force, police the Greater London area with 
about forty thousand members of staff. As the capacity of the railway network increases in the 
future, more people will use SPIRS in one of its many functions and there will a greater 
opportunity for crimes to be committed within the space. Thus, this research argues that as 
issues surrounding human malign security threats are raised in the future there will be a greater 
need for more BTP officers. One such future issue that was identified by four BTP participants 
was that of how currently the policing of the railway and for the foreseeable future was 
funded differently to how the Home Office Police Forces are funded. At present, the financing 
of the BTP is sourced from the TOCs, via DfT. If the TOCs declined to pay the DfT and as such 
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could organise alternative methods of securing and policing the railway, for example 
through private security firms or Home Office Policing, this could affect directly on the future 
policing of spaces such as SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and 
Wales. The BTP are highly specialised in the policing function they provide the railway 
network. It is this expertise, which during a security incident allows them to play a pivotal 
role in getting the railway network or specific station up and running. Moreover, they have 
a dual role in preventing crime and terrorism. However, one senior BTP Counter-terrorism 
Specialist stated that given the numbers of BTP officers, it is extremely difficult to prevent 
acts of terrorism, but they have a significant amount of knowledge and past expertise in 
helping to bounce back from such incidents. 
“I don’t think that policing the railway prevents much terrorism because, you’re 
talking about seven million journeys a day and we’ve got 4,000 people and anyone 
day of those 4,000, probably 2,000 of them aren’t available anyway…So, you know, 
you’re probably trying to police…our railways…with 1,000 people. We’re not going to 
stop terrorism, what we can do though, and we can do very, very effectively, is when 
the wheel does come off, we can get the wheel back on far more quickly than 
people who aren’t knowledgeable about the environment…we can deal with those 
far more quickly because we understand the environment in exactly the same 
way…One of the things that is abundantly clear from other parts of the world is as soon 
as you do away with your Railway Police, you do away with railway policing, because 
[the] Police are more concerned with Mrs Wiggins being mugged, I’m not saying 
that’s a bad thing, but it’s just…what will direct them?.” 
(Senior Strategic BTP Staff Member) 
 
The BTP participants described how their limited financial and manpower resources, and the 
strains on their time would need to be considered now by the DfT in terms of being able to 
cope with future demands on SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and 
Wales to be resilient spaces to human malign security threats. 
“I think one of the things in your future worlds; you need to almost consider just what is the 
security structures are going to look like in that time? Are we going to be talking about 
what sort of policing? Or will be talking about a far more private security company?” 
(Operational BTP Officer) 
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The RSSB has conducted research into the future of complementary policing, and are 
looking at resources further than the BTP to secure the future railway station. They have 
investigated how the TOCs look after their passengers and staff from a security perspective. 
The Senior Manager interviewed stated that they felt in the future the BTP would not be able to 
offer enough of a presence in stations such as SPIRS and they 
“are just one answer obviously. A lot of the train operating companies employ private 
security staff or have their own employees dealing with security and I think this is good 
practice now and for the future in having extra people going back to visibility and 
presence on stations.” 
(RSSB Senior Manager) 
 
A further factor in the future resilience of SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in 
England and Wales, which could influence and impact on the policing of these spaces, is 
the changes in technologies and the use of social media, which arguably can be used by 
members of the public in both positive and negative ways. It can be a quick tool for the 
public to reporting suspicious behaviours in a railway station or the wider network to the BTP. 
Moreover, the BTP can use it keep the public up to date with incidents or issues within the 
space. However, one BTP participant felt that social media could additionally have a 
possible negative impact on the policing of SPIRS as it can be used to organise deviant 
social movements, such as directing protestors or rioters to specific areas. 
 
One Security Consultant believed that one of the greatest future challenges to the resilience 
of SPIRS to human malign security threats was the policing and surveillance of the margins of 
the station. In their opinion at present, there is a blurring of boundaries in terms of securing the 
margins of SPIRS; passengers are unaware of the boundaries of the BTP, the Metropolitan 
Police, Network Rail High-speed, and private security. 
“I think this will remain a constant unless someone comes up with a wonderfully unifying 
plan in 50 years’ times and says the whole blob around a station is owned by this entity. 
But I really don't see that happening…the margins need to be considered and not just 
the box of the station. But actually, the dependency on the adjacent is quite 
important. Everything from security, through to traffic, HMV measures and how these 
affect pedestrian permeability and traffic calming measures.” 
 
This research has found that policing and the security of SPIRS is entrenched in national 
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policing and security legalisation and guidance. However, the actual operation and 
enactment of these can be and are altered by the current multiple stakeholders responsible 
for the securitisation of the station. Therefore, such operations ‘can only be understood in 
and through the local contexts in which they are developed’ (Raco, 2003, p.870). Hence, 
the security strategies, which were in place in SPIRS during the data collection phase of the 
research, may now not be relevant or applicable to other Category A railway stations in 
England and Wales. However, the research has shown that the stakeholders believe the 
good practice achieved in SPIRS can and should be shared with other railway stations to 
ensure greater future resilience to security threats. One Senior Operational BTP described the 
positive stakeholder engagement surrounding counter-terrorism scenarios prior to the 
Olympics. 
“A lot of good work was done in the pre-Olympic period and the Network Rail 
Operational Security Manager at SPIRS pulled together a number of tabletop 
exercises, which he and his team ran, and I think for several months leading up to the 
Olympics.” 
(Senior BTP Officer) 
 
However, another BTP participant felt the role of the Olympics was an excellent but 
challenging situation for their colleagues to reinforce their role within SPIRS and would 
influence the future of policing of such a complex space. 
“If you give a cop a job…to do football duties, then they will focus on football and 
forget about the drug dealers and anything not connected with the football. We're 
going to have the same for the Olympics; one role is to prevent terrorism. Another 
one is to smile and make people feel welcome…. Another one is to prevent crime. 
Another one is to ensure long-term stakeholder relationships; there are a million 
functions, not just the function of policing.” 
(BTP Officer) 
 
In SPIRS, the operational BTP senior officers advocated a ‘problem solving process’ style of 
policing. According to Morgan and Cornish (2006, p.29) this type of approach is based on 
a clear identification of the source of a persistent recurring problem and the targeting of 
resources to provide a long-term, sustainable solution to the problem, rather than a short-
term ‘quick fix’. The model, which the BTP use is called SARA, Scanning, Analysis, Response 
and Assessment and is an uncomplicated tool that is used to problem solve crime issues 
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(Morgan and Cornish, 2006, p.29). One BTP officer described how this form of problem 
solving policing highlights a number of benefits to the multiple and complex stakeholders 
within SPIRS and could be applicable to similar operations within other Category A railway 
stations in England and Wales. Tilley (2009) supports these findings and Morgan and Cornish 
(2006). The research proposes there could be future benefits of utilising this form of policing 
and which would be further reinforced by using the Stakeholder Map and analysis for SPIRS. 
Therefore, this would ensure that all the relevant stakeholders within the space were consulted 
and communicated and would benefit from; 
• Knowledgeable, committed, engaging and encompassed policing leadership 
• Practical problem-solving resources 
• Data analysis, providing statistics for metric results 
• Good practice to be shared and cascaded throughout the railway station and 
other sites 
• Improvements and developments in problem solving practices and structures 
• Specific operations to be operationalised in the station 
 
However, another Senior BTP Officer discussed how new recruits are briefly taught about CP 
but the overall emphasis of their training is on the catching of criminals on the railway network 
and within the railway stations, thus which could have a long-term impact on the future of 
policing spaces such as SPIRS. Therefore, regardless of problem based policing, there needs 
to be a change in the culture of BTP policing, with trainers being retrained to place a greater 
emphasis on CP from the beginning. 
 
8.5. Ageing Infrastructure 
The thematic analysis of the research data has found that many of the participants 
considered there were numerous challenges to the future resilience of SPIRS to human 
malign security threats. One such threat, which was a repeated theme from the data, is the 
age of the railway infrastructure and the pressures on operating these spaces. Moreover, a 
senior blue light responder also felt the issues of the ageing infrastructure was compounded the 
economic situation of the country at the time of interview. 
“The pressures brought to bear-the ageing infrastructure, the amount of money 
required to bring it to, keep it running, the pressures on managers to operate and 
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keep it running as effectively as possible… that's no bad thing, but there is a balance 
there, I think those are interesting issues. It's also again a personal view, is that lots of 
standards have been developed over recent years because there was so much 
money invested in safety, and now we're left with the legacy of very high levels of 
safety, which now have to be implemented in more challenging times and how is that 
managed through.” 
(Senior Blue Light Responder) 
 
Therefore, the security measures and policies that are implemented today in SPIRS will have 
a legacy in the future. The complex and multiple stakeholders considering the use of security 
measures and policies in SPIRS must be mindful of how these systems work in tandem with 
other emergency procedures. The senior blue light responder was concerned with the 
stakeholders within SPIRS relatively high turnover of staff; they felt that knowledge and 
awareness of procedures need to dovetail with those of others within the space. 
“Maintaining a high standard of management and understanding of how safety 
systems work within railway stations, for example, ventilation control, emergency 
procedures, you know, so looking at the turnover of staff-the pressures on training and 
the pressures on, there's a whole range of pressures, that still means it’s serviceable, 
appropriate and safe for the demands of delivering a service for the customer.” 
(Senior Blue Light Responder) 
 
One Senior BTP participant felt that because of the age of the railway network in England 
and Wales there would always be significant limitations in terms of being able to implement 
more rigorous security measures such as airport security-style scanners in SPIRS and other 
Category A Railway Stations in England and Wales. 
“A lot of the stations are over 100 years old, look at Paddington or Waterloo-you've got 
to look at that we trying to run a 21st-century railway with very much 19th century 
assets-infrastructure. The stations, you are stuck with the building that you've got. 
Even if you knock it all down it. You've got to do something in the meantime-how 
can you totally rebuild or refurbish a station? I mean they have done remarkably well 
with St Pancras and Manchester Victoria a few years ago, so it can be done, 
but…stations can be expanded but there are huge problems there.” 
(Senior BTP Member of Staff) 
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One Security Consultant discussed how far into the future security strategies concentrated 
on when new railway stations are designed.  They stated that such buildings are designed to 
have a sixty to seventy-year lifespan. Therefore, it is exceptionally difficult to predict societal 
issues over the life of a building, without even trying to consider the developments in future 
technologies. Thus, in terms of future security threats to buildings, designers and security 
consultant attempt to look at terrorist capabilities rather than intent. 
“Working with the client it is decided which major terrorism capabilities they want to 
protect against. They will look at measures which offer some form of bomb resilience, 
blast proofing, which have to be built and considered for the life of the building (with 
an occasional facade upgrade). Whereas electronic systems are more flexible and 
generally are upgraded every five years during the life of the building.” 
(Security Consultant) 
 
8.6 Future Capacity 
A further theme that reoccurred from the data surrounded the future resilience of SPIRS to 
the demands created by the increased numbers of passengers who will be passing through 
the station. More people use the railway now than ever, even during the peak the peak of 
railway journeys in the 1920s. The participants felt that it key will be to try to manage the 
future expectations of the public of travelling and using the railway network. 
“I think this is a critical time in terms of the railways, national and as well as London 
Transport. In the last few years, the number of passengers has gone up and up and 
it just can't continue. Because, although trying to increase capacity, you can only 
run so many trains along the same bit of track.” 
(Senior BTP Officer) 
 
The increase in capacity and as such the footfall through SPIRS will only increase in the future, 
and several participants believed that this would also bring with it an increase in security 
problems from anti-social low-level crimes to more assaults and thefts occurring. 
Furthermore, it was felt that the projects like CrossRail will have an impact on how London's 
railway network operates and its capacity. The extra stations will permit more journeys and 
subsequently passengers using SPIRS and other stations in their crisscrossing across London. 
One Security Consultant, who has been involved in the CrossRail project, believed that 
approximately ten to twelve percent of the total project budget has been spent on the 
implantation of security measures. Moreover, they mentioned that CrossRail is being 
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developed with a lifespan of one hundred and twenty years and it is critical for the designers 
and consultants to get it right now. This opinion on the lifespan of the building contradicts 
those of another security consultant interviewed during the research. Many of the security 
measures, which have been utilised for CrossRail, are covert and part of the fabric of the 
buildings, thus they are not add-ons, and as such, costs will have been reduced. 
 
8.7 Future Policy and Resilience 
One Senior Network Rail member of staff stated that they felt the future resilience of SPIRS to 
security threats could be improved now through the greater co-ordination between the 
multiple stakeholders through mandatory station security meetings. Regulation to attend 
such meetings would embed the process into acceptable station procedures, attendance 
should be compulsory by the retail unit managers. As discussed in Chapter Seven, the DfT 
through the NRSP could extend their powers through Network Rail High-speed to ensure 
compulsory attendance at security meetings and to temporarily shut retailers down if they did 
not attend and failed to comply with the provisions of the NRSP. A Security Manager from High-
Speed One stated that these changes in future institutional practice need to be instigated 
and championed at a higher level, Network Rail’s CEO for instance and ATOC must support 
these initiatives to 
“change the hearts and minds from a top down approach, the DfT should drive these 
changes through Network Rail as leverage for getting the TOCs and retailers on board.” 
(High-speed One Security Manager) 
 
However, One Senior Network Rail member of staff shared their opinion of how far into the 
future that the overall Network Rail resilience and security strategies looked. 
“as far as a crystal ball allows us to do so’ – two years’ max, anything beyond that is 
not realistic as changes in methods, groups, threats will be considerable.” 
(Senior Network Rai Member of Staff) 
 
A senior BTP senior officer who discussed the BTP’s security policies that they worked with and 
developed in terms of how far into the future they looked echoed a similar position. 
“In terms of policy, I would and being able to look back to 1993, I would suggest that 
typically we are looking five years into the future.” 
(BTP Senior Officer) 
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However, it was also felt that in terms of more specific future prevention strategies and 
measures for the railway station that they did not really look too far into the future and that 
if they did they were not communicated down to operational level stakeholders. 
“Well, I think not very far into the future, if I'm honest. There are certain things that they 
can plan for such as cup finals, or the Olympics. Obviously, but I don't think they look 
terribly far into the future. But if they do they don't show it with the rest of us as much 
as we would like them to! Perhaps they are planning the future. I don't know, but it 
doesn't come across like that.” 
(RSSB Senior Manager) 
 
Nonetheless, the RSSB do look to review the policies and the actions of the security group, 
which need to be carried out over the next two to three years. This review also incorporates 
new changes to national security and crime legislation and keeps stakeholders from the 
railway security group updated and informed. The RSSB security group also lobbies the 
Government on issues that affect the security and resilience of the railway network. 
“The new legislation, which deals with anti-social behaviour, we’ve been looking at 
that, in consultation since it came out about 18 months ago, we been tracking its 
progress, it's gone into the Queen's speech. However, it won't become legislation for 
the next 15 to 18 months. We just keep an eye on it and the group is commenting on 
how they think it will work and then we might feed that back to the Home Office and 
whatever to see how we can pursue that.” 
(RSSB Senior Manager) 
 
The findings of the research highlight that the resilience of SPIRS to human malign security 
threats is supported by the findings of Chmutina et al., (2016) and Cole and Marzell (2010), that 
as a nation the UK’s resilience is highly disjointed, with piecemeal strategies being 
undertaking by disconnected agencies and Government departments. At a local level, 
operational resources and resilience strategies sit within ‘the private and voluntary sectors’ 
(Cole and Marzell, 2010, p. 3). There are policies which do support increasing resilience 
through collaborative actions such as the CCA (2004), but the Local Resilience Forums 
which come under the remit have few legal powers and are inadequately funded and 
supported (Cole and Marzell, 2010). However, the benefits of the CCA (2004), such as the 
transfer of good practice and knowledge and the joint planning of stakeholders should be 
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recognised and incorporated into the resilience strategies of SPIRS. These should be 
replicated within SPIRS and this will allow designers and operational staff to come ‘out of their 
silos to think collectively about the task in hand and the resources required’ (Cole and Marzell, 
2010, p.3). Yet the multiple and complex stakeholders within the space of SPIRS must not rely 
on others to ensure their resilience against security threats but must work and communicate 
effectively and efficiently to mitigate the risks they face. Often for simple day-to-day issues, 
stakeholders can work together to respond to small-scale incidents, however when the 
situation or space becomes more complicated ‘the ability to respond collectively starts to 
break down’ (Cole and Marzell, 2010, p.3). 
 
There is little doubt that neo-liberal governance through some form of ‘responsibilisation’ 
(Garland, 1996) will play an increasing role in the resilience of spaces over the forthcoming 
decades; it will affect the operational procedures and policies within SPIRS. However, if the 
piecemeal and fragmented natures of the resilience strategies of the stakeholder continue 
without redress the replications and differences in these at worst will have repercussions on 
the lives of passengers, the public and staff in the event of a terrorist attack. Cole and Marzell 
(2010, p.4) state 
the weakness at these interchanges might themselves present weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities that can be exploited. Risks that appear to be no-one’s responsibility 
have the potential to affect everyone. 
 
8.8 Future Railway Station Design and Resilience 
As discussed previously in Chapter Four, SIDOS is a guidance document that should be 
considered when looking at the ‘design physical security for new and major redevelopment 
railway stations’ (Gov.UK, 2015). Regardless of the generic security recommendations that 
the SIDOS document suggests to designers and planners, several operational and senior BTP 
officers felt that there would never be a generic prefabricated standard station design. This 
was because of the different planning regulations and standards for the various regions in 
England and Wales. New build and refurbished stations should also follow the principles of 
the Secured by Design guidance. By following these principles, the (re)design of railway 
stations has changed significantly over the last few years. A Senior Manager from the RSSB 
stated that more could be considered when looking at the design of future railway stations 
“they should be designing for all sorts of things, environmental things to reduce 
emissions, whether they should try and design out crime-so don't have done 
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corners dark areas, have plenty of lighting or try and block off those dead ends 
and the station. And don't have, say waiting rooms with just one entrance, give 
people an escape strategy and again barriers to stop people from going where 
they shouldn't-to prevent trespass or suicides. The whole point about designing 
stations has changed enormously.” 
 
However, the analysis of the data has shown that at present planning regulations are 
minefields and that the guidance available maybe appropriate in some areas but not 
others. A Senior BTP Officer and Security Consultants both argued that when planning 
permission is sought for refurbishments and new builds for railway stations in the future 
common sense must prevail. They maintained that it becomes very complicated for 
guidance to be given on the security measures needed for refurbishments or new builds 
given all of the different stakeholders who need to be considered. They maintained that the 
security measures in projects will always be impacted on by the implications of the budget. 
A retired BTP officer stated that in the future regulation and powers are needed to be granted 
to the BTP so they can be involved at the very start of the design process, rather than the 
ad hoc/haphazard approaches which are currently in place. This stance was reiterated by 
a Security Design Consultant who has been involved in a number of railway station 
refurbishments and claims and believes they too should be involved at the start of the project 
as at present there is a very piecemeal approach to security measures and systems on such 
projects. 
 
8.9 Future Resilience to Terrorist Threats 
On the other hand, one participant felt that the designers, operators and the BTP will never 
be able to accurately assess what the future threats to resilience by terrorism are or when 
and where railway stations will be targeted. Thus, meaning it is extremely difficult to 
calculate the risk of a terrorist act. Another participant saw the West and subsequently the 
UK as a target for terrorist activity for the foreseeable future as international politics and 
religion cannot be avoided. One Security Consultant stated within the context of SPIRS and 
other Category A railway in England and Wales 
“whether we like it or not, we're always fighting the last terrorist incident. Or we're 
always countering the last terrorist incident. But whether we like it or not the fact of life is 
we do live in a history.” 
(Security Consultant) 
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According to one Security Consultant, the analysis horizon for terrorist threats is actually very 
close, thus it is very difficult to come up with a range of designs based on terms of threat 
from effective attack methods, as the sort of devices used by actual terrorists is often variable. 
“We still believe the enduring aims of any particular extremist group would be served 
by a specific set of design based threats…30 years doesn't mean a great deal in terms 
of intent, but it does a great deal of difference of capabilities, so you could the terrorist 
still wanting mass casualties but how's that going to be achieved? Or the terrorist still 
wants mass disruption of the critical national infrastructure but how is that going to be 
achieved? A low yield weapon of mass effect or conventional HME or high explosive 
or even gun and knife attack?” 
(Security Consultant) 
 
It was the opinion of one BTP retired senior officers that the BTP has done as much as possible to 
mitigate against mass causalities in railway stations such as SPIRS with the resources and 
technology which they have available. It has looked at the different methods that terrorists 
can use to inflict mass casualties. The operational capacity and expertise of the BTP 
developed predominately in a terrorist climate, the IRA, needed to continually reassess 
methods and capabilities of the terrorist threats to the nation’s railway network and stations. At 
present, the BTP gathers and shares information which feeds into the bigger counter-
terrorism plan for the UK and internationally. 
 
An operational Network Rail participant stated that security threats need to be constantly 
reviewed and policies amended to deal with it, so the future landscape is only very short. 
Regular security bulletins are issued by the DfT, detailing any new methods of criminal or 
terrorist activities, intelligence in terms of what SPIRS should be looking for is always 
changing. Therefore, the security policies relevant to SPIRS and other Category A railway 
stations need to be an evolving process based on the perceived level of risk and not static. 
Nevertheless, the research has found that during the London 2012 Olympic Games this was 
a primary example of how a multi-stakeholder co-ordinated response in SPIRS was necessary 
to assuage the risk of terrorism ‘and integrates the protection of critical infrastructures’ (Bosher 
et al., 2007, p.242). 
 
8.10 Resilience, Future Technology and Investment 
It is widely known that the numbers of passengers undertaking railway journeys are increasing 
year on year; therefore, it is key for railway stations to receive investment to update their 
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facilities and make them more appealing for the wider community to use. Demographical 
changes in the population, especially in the South East of England and London will affect 
transport infrastructure, hence demand and capacity of the railway network will be 
stretched. The ageing population transport needs in these areas must be considered now, 
what type of transport they will need and the type of areas they will be living in (The 
Parliament Office of Science and Technology, 2010). 
 
Developers and Network Rail should appreciate these benefits and make ‘the principle of 
station refurbishment an enticing and attractive proposition’ (Railstaff.co.uk, 2013). Yet with 
the undoubted future investment in many of the railway stations in England is to make them 
multifunctional and appeal to a greater number of people will increase issues of the space 
being resilient to security threats, whether this to low-level crimes or to a terrorist attack. 
However, overall it was felt that the general consensus from the research participants was 
that despite technological advances the nature, function and physical limitations of historic 
railway stations it would be difficult to have systems such as sensing technologies and more 
advanced CCTV which reliably worked in such a busy environment and did not interfere 
with the concept of mass transit. One Senior BTP Officer stated 
“I mean if you want totally safe railway, don’t move trains, don’t let people on, easy, 
but that fails the mass transit test, fundamentally, and part of the, the issue with the 
railway is you accept that, that there are opportunities for things to go wrong.” 
 
To meet both current and future terrorist threats and attacks to metro railway systems and 
arguably, in the case of SPIRS, there is a requirement to incorporate all-inclusive security 
systems (Borrion et al., 2014). These can be utilised for the exposure of and to interrupt the 
actions of terrorists the disruption of terrorist activities (Bocchetti et al., 2009), specifically 
security checkpoints like those found in airports. Yet the literature review and the research 
have found that experts in both the railway industry and its security argue this type of 
security screening is not a viable form of prevention in the vast majority of Category A 
railway stations in England and Wales and SPIRS given the physical and frequently historical 
limitations of the buildings. Some Network Rail members of staff and operational BTP officers 
felt that by the very nature of the railway and expectations of the use of stations such as 
SPIRS that the security would never be as stringent. A participant from the RSSB had mixed 
opinions on the future use of airport-style scanners in SPIRS: 
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“They have flirted with sort of knife detectors-arches in railway stations, and they are 
the portable one, so they can be taken to different railway stations. But I don't think 
currently society would accept that kind of fixed security at stations. I think that 
everybody realises or accepts it is necessary in airports and on airplanes-so if terrorism 
was to begin or increase on trains or stations…I don't know would society accept 
that in stations? but if the risk grew I think it might have to go that way.” 
(RSSB Senior Manager) 
 
However, another Network Rail participant was of the opinion that airport-style security 
would never be a feasible measure in the future due to the legacy of the building stock. 
“the amount of money, in my mind, I’d imagine it would take to make a fundamental 
difference to the railway, I can’t see anybody investing in the railway because they 
wouldn’t get the return. The return is pretty much what the return is, so what you’re 
looking at are people trying to cut costs, not make massive investments on the hope 
of recouping it over 2050, 40 years, and of course, the Government is not giving 
franchises for 40 years.” 
(Network Rail Member of Staff) 
 
As discussed in Chapter Four, airports operate security processes to restrict the access and 
flow of passengers navigating the space.  It is noted that the Eurostar Hub within SPIRS does 
use airport style security screening of passengers that is successful. Kappia et al. (2009) maintain 
CTMs would be likely to gain acceptance from passengers and the TOCs if their ingress and 
egress were not obstructed through the railway station. However, within a space such as 
SPIRS, these types of measures are not practical in for the environment (Jenkins et al., 2010). 
The whole nature of how passengers use the railway network would have to change with 
passengers having to arrive sometime in advance of their train to allow time to pass through 
security checkpoints. 
 
Without a doubt security and specifically in the context of the railway station is a highly 
sensitive political issue, yet it is important to recognise the difficulty in being able to envisage 
how relevant and significant how current security measures in railway stations such as SPIRS 
will be in the future (Borrion et al.,2014). The appropriateness of security measures fluctuates 
in the eyes of the public given the length of a last terrorist attack or in publicly 
acknowledged threat levels (Davis and Silver, 2004) and ‘the perceived need to act against 
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future ones’ (Borrion et al., 2014, p.190). 
 
8.11 Stakeholder Communications and the Future Resilience 
A theme that developed from the data regarding the future resilience of SPIRS to security 
threats was the complex multiple stakeholder boundaries and how these affect the 
communication between the stakeholders. One participant discussed how current good 
practice regarding security measures in SPIRS could be shared among the stakeholders 
moving forward in the future. 
“There is a lot of good practice. Bad practice, we do try to tell the train operating 
companies … we don't just want to hear about the good things, we do want to hear 
about the bad practice. We want to share good practice. But then also we don't 
want people to repeat mistakes…But people are very reluctant to tell us about 
things which haven't worked. So, the knowledge about bad practice isn't as good 
as it should be.” 
(Senior Network Rail Operational Manager) 
 
The Government distributes security strategies, policies and directives through Network Rail 
(High-speed) and the BTP, however how the research has found that these are not always 
necessarily communicated with their staff at an operational level effectively to then be able 
to disseminate these with the multiple stakeholders, of SPIRS who have to operationalise 
security and resilience within the space. Consequently, adequate, and appropriate 
information must be shared with stakeholders for them to be able to reach decisions around 
security policies and agendas and the subsequent impact on resilience which are 
intentional and informed (Chmutina et al.,2016, p.78). 
 
Another operational participant believed the current operational complications of SPIRS 
and also other Category A railway stations in England and Wales would merely worsen in 
the future as more and more stakeholders will become involved in the operations of the 
spaces and the decision-making processes. This included the multiple stakeholders within 
the actual physical space of the railway station, but also others “who are on the margins of 
the station and who can influence the resilience of the space to security threats” (Gregson-
Green et al., 2013, p.38). Therefore, resolutions need to be pursued now as ‘anything we do 
with technology is just going to be a waste of time unless we sort out the fundamental 
communication issues’ (Gregson-Green, et al., 2013, p.38). 
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Stakeholder analysis of the stakeholders with SPIRS shows given the number complex how 
difficult it is to communicate information efficiently and effectively to all the stakeholders who 
are responsible for the resilience of the space to human malign security threats. This research 
proposes that the stakeholders of SPIRS can impact the resilience of the space to security 
threats and that when decisions are made they can impact on future generations, who 
must be considered as stakeholders now (Friedman and Miles, 2006, p.9). 
 
8.12 Chapter Summary 
The findings of the research have provided substantial empirical evidence that resilience is 
not just a concept but that it can actually be an attribute which with careful consideration of 
the resilience of the total space, such as SPIRS, and not merely of the individual but the 
multiple stakeholders who have an involvement and investment. Furthermore, resilience 
must be considered in terms of being operationalised successfully on a day-to-day basis and 
which is able to handle security threats automatically and instinctively. However, the 
research has highlighted that SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and 
Wales are extremely complicated spaces and that for resilience to move from an idealised 
concept to a fully fluid and dynamic process, there must be a greater cross-organisational 
understanding and interactions. 
 
Regardless of the existing position of institutional ‘responsibilisation’ (Garland, 1996) for 
resilience and the devolution of this from the Government, there must be greater regulation 
and direction for the multiple stakeholders who are required to accomplish this. This research 
has determined that in a complex space with numerous intersecting stakeholders such as 
SPIRS and other Category A railway stations there are no straightforward models or metrics for 
measuring the resilience of these spaces. However, what has emerged from the data and 
analysis is that a resilience strategy for railway stations can be found in known or anticipated 
security threats. Therefore, current resilience can be increased by minimising susceptibility 
and improving flexible and responsive capacity to respond to human malign security threats 
to the space. 
 
Yet the future threats to SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and Wales can 
only be considered in small timeframes, participants felt that trying to horizon scan for 
anticipated threats in thirty to forty years’ time is an unrealistic and impossible expectation. 
Gregson-Green et al. (2013, p.37) propose to improve the resilience of SPIRS to security 
threats, the stakeholders and their interfaces and agendas need to be stressed and 
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addressed ‘during the (re)development stages of projects and its subsequent operation 
should be established at an early stage to ensure the effective assimilation of policies and 
strategies’. Regardless of the interdependencies between stakeholders and their 
intersecting agendas and legislative requirements, there is a distinct lack of a co-ordinated 
approach to both design and operational phases. The findings highlight a need for changes 
in institutional practices if threats to the future resilience of railway stations are to be 
lessened. The conclusions and recommendations made from the research are discussed in 
the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER NINE: RESEARCH CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
9.0 Chapter Introduction 
This research is timely given the level of existing and future investment in the railway network 
within England and Wales, and it is critical to conduct research into the little-known areas 
of resilience and security. The research provides an original and novel contribution to 
knowledge, as through contemporary empirical evidence it has established that resilience 
and security policies and their ‘responsibilisation’ (Garland, 1996) are at odds with the reality 
of how these transpire in an ambiguous operational and legal space such as SPIRS. 
 
To demonstrate the completion of the aim and objectives of the thesis, this closing chapter 
reports on the conclusions drawn by the research. It stresses the key findings and contribution 
to knowledge, with the validity and reliability of the research itself also being examined. 
Recommendations for further research and practical recommendations will then be 
presented, followed by the ultimate thoughts that emanate from the research. This research 
set out to examine, understand, and to drill down into the interdependencies and interfaces 
of the numerous and complex stakeholders within specifically SPIRS and other Category A 
railway stations in England and Wales, and to analyse how their operational and legislative 
requirements and agendas influence both the existing and future resilience to human 
malign security threats. 
 
SPIRS and other significantly located Category A railway stations that allow passengers and 
the public unrestricted access to them are extremely vulnerable to terrorism and other forms 
of crime. Consequently, there is a clear requirement to acknowledge and catalogue the 
sizeable and complex range of stakeholders, policies, strategies, and individual 
organisational agendas that influence the resilience of railway stations to security threats. A 
unique case study of SPIRS was undertaken to examine at an institutional level, through the 
concepts of Stakeholder Theory and Resilience, the multiplicity of the 
agencies/stakeholders, their policies, and agendas, and how this may impact positively 
and negatively on the current and future resilience of the space to security threats. 
Therefore, the purpose of this research was to understand how this enacted and understood 
currently within SPIRS and how this relates to the body of theory and the implications of this. 
This concluding chapter: 
• examines the extent to which the aim and objectives of the research have been 
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met, 
• discusses the statements of contributions, 
 
• presents the key findings of the research, 
 
• examines the limitations of the research, 
 
• provides recommendation and guidance for future research. 
 
9.1 Addressing the Research Aim and Objectives 
The research has successfully addressed the important research question that was set out 
in Chapter One: 
How do the interdependencies and governance of the complex operational, and 
policy boundaries of SPIRS’ stakeholders influence and impact the space’s current 
and future resilience to human malign security threats?  
 
The aim of this programme of research was to 
determine and examine the interdependencies and boundaries of the multiple 
stakeholders within St Pancras International Railway Station, and to analyse how their 
governance, operational and legislative requirements, and agendas influence both 
current and future resilience of complex Category A railway stations to human 
malign security threats 
 
This has been achieved by holistically understanding and unpacking the interdependencies 
and boundaries of the multiple stakeholders within a Category A railway station, and to 
analyse how their operational and legislative requirements and agendas influence both 
current and future resilience to security threats. This has been accomplished by undertaking 
a qualitative unique single case study of SPIRS. The above aim has been achieved through 
the fulfilment of the four research objectives, each of which is discussed in the below sections. 
 
9.2 Research objective one 
The first aim of the research was to critically examine the literature and policy concerning 
counter-terrorism and crime prevention measures within the context of railway stations and 
infrastructure. The researcher had access to a range of electronic and traditional media 
sources and sought peer-reviewed journal articles published from 1980 until 2014 by using 
the search words “resilience”, “railway stations”, “crime”, “terrorism”, “crime and counter-
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terrorism measures” and “Stakeholders”. The primary searches produced a large number of 
articles, which were screened by the title and then by the abstract. This process allowed 
only the articles and chapters that were considered relevant to the research aim to be 
included in the literature review chapters of the thesis. Furthermore, the literature review 
examined the theoretical standpoints, discussed within Chapters, Two, Three and Four, 
which have shaped and steered the initial semi-structured interview schedules for the data 
collection and subsequent analysis. 
 
Moreover, the literature and policy review additionally assisted in the initial draft of the 
Stakeholder Map, the methodology of which was examined in Chapters Five and Six. The 
literature review has played an important role in the scoping of the unique case study (SPIRS) 
and it aided with understanding the context of the case study. It facilitated this awareness 
by highlighting to the researcher the entangled physical, legal and operational boundaries 
of the railway station. Such literature was examined in Chapters Three and Four and it 
identified the human malign security threats which impact on the resilience of railway 
stations in England and Wales and how to withstand and bounce back from such 
occurrences. 
 
Furthermore, the literature review highlighted the ambiguous nature of the concept of 
resilience and how it has become entrenched in security policies at a national level, yet with 
the acknowledgement that assets such as SPIRS ‘can never really be future-proofed to be 
totally resistant’ (Bosher and Dainty, 2007, p.2) against human malign security threats. 
Moreover, the research has documented the disparate and complex nature of SPIRS is 
mirrored by both the current system of multiple stakeholders and is further seen in the 
patchwork of national and organisational resilience and security strategies, policies and 
agendas which surround it. Therefore, this research proposes that these policies cannot be 
viewed in isolation from the multiple, complex and often seemingly disparate stakeholders 
who enact and operationalise policies and strategies within the space of the railway station. 
 
9.3 Research objective two  
The second objective of the research was to identify those stakeholders within the case study 
railway station, SPIRS, who (in) directly influence the current and future resilience to human 
malign security threats, and to develop a unique and innovative stakeholder map of the 
space. To understand fully the role and resilience of SPIRS, the complex and multiple 
stakeholders within the space were identified through a process of Stakeholder Analysis and 
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Mapping, through the literature review and participant interviews. This process allowed for 
the examination their policies and strategies with security interests which (in) directly affect 
the resilience of SPIRS, some of which can be applicable to other Category A railway stations 
in England and Wales. The Stakeholder Map produced and presented in Chapter Six is a 
result of the analysis of the SPIRS stakeholders was verified by the research participants 
during their interviews. The Stakeholder Mapping process was analysed and presented in 
Chapter Five. 
 
9.4 Research objective three 
The third objective of the research was to examine the SPIRS stakeholder’s security, 
resilience, and operational policies, strategies, and agendas which (in) directly affect the 
current and future resilience of the space to human malign security threats. This was 
achieved through the unique case study of how SPIRS ’complex and multiple stakeholders 
encounter and/or engage with both current and future social based resilience and security 
related policies and strategies, and operational procedures. This was reached through the 
collection of qualitative interview data and the subsequent qualitative thematic analysis, 
which is “a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data” 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 78). This is a well-regarded qualitative methodological approach 
used in the Social Sciences as it permits the researcher to develop overarching themes 
which reflect the content of the participant’s discourse and their socially constructed 
perceptions of reality. 
 
9.5 Research objective four 
The final objective of the research was to analyse the tradeoffs, (un)intended 
consequences, and impacts of security and resilience policies and agendas which operate 
in the space of SPIRS, and to make recommendations to address the emerging themes from 
the research. This objective was devised to provide a robust theoretical and empirical 
contribution that addressed the current gaps in the knowledge which surround the 
conceptual impact of the complex multiple stakeholders enacting policies and strategies 
for the current and future resilience of the railway station to human malign security threats. 
The research findings have clearly identified and acknowledged the effects of the complex 
and multiple stakeholders, and how they can have constructive and detrimental impacts, 
and compromise the resilience of the railway station to current and future human malign 
security threats. This contribution has been achieved by using the theoretical lenses of 
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Resilience and Stakeholder Theory and has been presented in the discussion and findings 
Chapters Seven and Eight. Moreover, the thesis has produced a body of work that has a 
number of practical recommendations which can be used by key decision-making 
stakeholders within SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and Wales to 
assist them in producing future guidance, strategies and day-to-day operations. The 
publication that was an output of this research is in Appendix 7.0. 
 
9.6 Key Findings and Recommendations 
The primary focus of this research has concentrated on the resilience of the complex and 
multiple stakeholders within SPIRS to current and future human malign security threats. It has 
emphasised some of the susceptibilities faced by SPIRS and potentially other Category A 
railway stations in England and Wales to these risks and the subsequent resilience of the 
space. The empirical data from the research participants have highlighted these 
susceptibilities are ‘exacerbated by intricacies of controlling and overseeing the 
operational boundaries between the multiple stakeholders in SPIRS’ (Gregson-Green et al., 
2013, p.38). Moreover, despite the concept of resilience and its application being 
embedded in national security and contingency policy and strategy, the research has 
found that at an operational grass roots level, the multiple stakeholders within SPIRS are 
often unaware of higher organisational and subsequent national resilience policies and 
strategies. Therefore, the findings of the research, in line with those of Chmutina et al. (2016), 
Bosher (2014) and Bosher and Coaffee (2008), call for the understanding and application of 
resilience policies and strategies concerning human malign security threats, and which must 
be improved and utilised by multiple stakeholders of a space such as SPIRS in a consistently 
cohesive manner. Thus, SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and Wales are 
planned, built/refurbished and operated ‘in a transdisciplinary way; incorporating a wide 
range of stakeholders involved with the structural and non-structural approaches’ (Bosher and 
Coaffee, 2008, p.145-146). However, the research findings deem that in order to safeguard 
the participation and contribution of strategic stakeholders in the development and 
planning of projects a greater governing methodology other than just guidance is necessary 
to facilitate change. 
 
The research has examined for the first time the multifarious and complicated difficulties that 
are inherent in tackling and delivering SPIRS and other Category A railways station’s 
conceptual plan, operational and legal obligations surrounding resilience and security. A 
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key finding from the data is it is crucial that the complex and multiple stakeholders involved 
in these processes accept they must improve and enhance their understanding of resilience 
and security issues from the ‘whole’ perspective of SPIRS and not just in standalone 
organisational silos. However, this thesis has demonstrated that this is complicated in 
practice because despite of specific guidance such as SIDOS for building in resilience to 
new build railway stations, the actual concept and understanding of resilience is a nebulous 
ambition of the Government and other Primary Stakeholders (Network Rail and the BTP) the 
research has shown that there is little demarcation between theory and practice. 
  
In line with the aim and objectives of the research, and specifically surrounding research 
objective four, the research has presented a robust theoretical and empirical contribution 
that addresses the current gaps in the knowledge that surrounds the conceptual impact of 
complex multiple stakeholders enacting policies and strategies on the current and future 
resilience of the railway station to human malign security threats. Therefore, the key findings 
are presented in the below section. These cannot be viewed in isolation from the multiple, 
complex, and often seemingly disparate stakeholders who enact and operationalise policies 
and strategies within the space of the railway station. Moreover, these key findings of the 
research have additionally exposed a number of areas that necessitate further 
consideration and as such, make practical recommendations as well as recommendations 
for further research in sections 9.10 and 9.12. 
 
9.6.1 Resilience and policy 
The examination of the literature and the empirical data of the research have shown there are 
different types of prevention measures, planning, construction, detection, and operational 
procedures. The research has highlighted the ambiguous nature of the concept of 
resilience has become entrenched in security policies at a national level. Yet at the local 
level of (SPIRS), the research has evidenced the disparate and complex nature of resilience 
and this is highly evident in the piecemeal approach of strategies, policies, and agendas 
that surround it. This research has concluded that in spaces such as SPIRS, the security and 
resilience relationship is symbiotic and executed by local level policy, driven and 
‘responsibilised’ (Garland, 1996) by national strategies. 
 
Moreover, the considerable number of definitions of resilience that are espoused by 
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academia and the Government further exacerbates this confusion. The Government has 
‘responsibilised’ (Garland, 1996) stakeholders, such as the DfT through the NRSP, Network 
Rail High-speed and the BTP to meet the obligation of ensuring the security and resilience 
of the space to human malign threats. Critically, the research has found that there are 
opposing and fragmented policies which surround resilience, for instance at a retail 
stakeholder level, day to day resilience to threats of minor crimes such as shoplifting were a 
far greater concern than the threat of terrorism. Whereas, the BTP and Network Rail High-
speed perceived resilience to be achieved through strategies that devise plans that help 
to prepare for and prevent security threats. Moreover, through the alignment of the Critical 
Resilience Program and the CONTEST strategy, the Government attempts to deliver a clear 
and constant method for creating resilience across the CNI to security threats. However, 
irrespective that resilience and its use are entrenched in national security and contingency 
policies, the research has found that at an operational level, the multiple grass root level 
stakeholders within SPIRS are often unaware of higher organisational and subsequent 
national resilience policies and strategies. Their own company / organisational security and 
resilience policies are generally held in higher regard. 
 
Hence, the research has revealed the inconsistencies between the rhetoric of the 
‘responsibilisation’ (Garland, 1996) of resilience and its actual operationalisation by the 
multiple stakeholders within the spaces such as SPIRS. Stakeholders need to have a role in 
the resilience of the space against human malign threats. Yet the findings have shown it is 
played out with differing levels of importance and authority from the complex stakeholders. 
Some stakeholders such as the BTP and Network Rail had a greater level of responsibility 
placed on them, and despite a top down approach for the ‘responsibilisation’ of CPMs and 
CTMs. There was a level of stakeholder apprehension that the costs of CTMs would impact 
and without clear mandating from the state, local level stakeholders such as TOCS and 
retailers can divert resources and manipulate the ambiguity in the guidance to suit their 
own financial and security agendas. 
 
9.6.2 Resilience and Policy Recommendations 
The research findings have highlighted a need for changes in Governmental and 
institutional practices if threats to the current and future resilience and of railway stations 
are to be mitigated. Therefore, the complex interdependencies and responsibilities 
between the multiple stakeholders within SPIRS and their intersecting agendas and 
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legislative requirements need to be accounted for and understood from national strategies 
such as CONTEST to the NRSP enacted in a specific location such as SPIRS. This calls for a 
coordinated and flexible approach. Thus, the resilience plans of the multiple and complex 
stakeholders within SPIRS need to be dynamic and alter in accordance with the security 
threat levels. Without a doubt, SPIRS and the other Category A railway stations in London 
will always be at a bigger risk of a terrorist attack in comparison to other Category A railway 
stations located in other English and Welsh cities. 
 
It is proposed that a collective assessment of resilience be undertaken which highlights what 
security threats pose the greatest current and foreseeable risk to SPIRS. It can be used as a 
project that aims to change, progress, and advance the overall resilience of SPIRS to 
security threats. A combined resilience project can have the ability to encourage 
collaborative co-working, which highlights similarities in policies and strategies (individual 
company and Governmental), spare capacity and where preventions measures and 
resources can be shared. The combined resilience projects could encourage one rational 
and collective tactic, a co-ordinated interagency platform, of tackling the resilience of 
SPIRS which intersects and joins the boundaries of the multiple and complex stakeholders. 
Resilience is reliant on these stakeholders being experts in their own area, but they must fully 
understand the capabilities and expertise of their fellow stakeholders and how their own 
expertise can be fully utilised to increase the resilience of the space to security threats. 
Therefore, the resilience of SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and 
Wales does not have to be a knee-jerk reaction if it can be understood and managed 
accordingly. 
 
9.6.3 Resilience of current and future design 
At present during the design phase of retrofitting or building new stations, the 
operationalisation of ‘security-driven resilience’ (Coaffee and Fussey, 2017, p.294) does not 
provide ‘top down’ holistic and collegiate approach for the shared ‘responsibilisation’ for 
resilience and security within these spaces. Moreover, the research has revealed the strains 
and pressures occurring at a local level given that at a national level the Government 
control spending and budgets, meaning stakeholders such as the BTP have limited powers 
to contest the priorities of national security and resilience strategies which without doubt 
take a precedence over localised crime prevention issues with SPIRS. 
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Concerning how resilience is embedded in current and future designs for railway stations, the 
research has found there is a definite need to understand and improve the application of 
resilience policies in a consistently cohesive manner. Hence, when SPIRS and other Category 
A railway stations in England and Wales are planned, built, refurbished, and operated, 
planners and designers must acknowledge the need for a multiple disciplinary stance to 
involve as many of the key stakeholders responsible for prevention measures.  
 
However, the research findings deem that in order to safeguard the participation and 
contribution of strategic stakeholders in the development and planning of projects a 
greater governing methodology other than just guidance such as SIDOS is necessary to 
facilitate change. The SIDOS guidance devised by a collection of Governmental agencies, 
Network Rail, BTP and design agencies endeavours to ensure that prevention measures 
which increase resilience to security threats are considered and agreed to, from the starting 
stages of refurbishment or new build railway stations projects 
 
9.6.4 Resilience of Current and Future Design Recommendations 
It is maintained that at the time of collecting the research data and the writing of the thesis, 
it is too soon to state whether the SIDOS guidance will be appropriate and adequate to 
guarantee that the strategic stakeholders, such as the BTP and Security Advisors are 
participating in the initial phases of projects, thus being able to provide a measured, 
definite, strategic, and co-ordinated methodology at the preliminary phases of new build 
and refurbishment projects. The findings of the research call for this guidance to be 
strengthened by a purposeful and collective promotion of education aimed at the 
‘decision-makers’ exposed on the Stakeholder Map. It is also essential the complex and 
multiple stakeholder interfaces which occur during the routine daily operations are 
understood and recognised in the railway station in order not to negatively influence the 
current and future security policies and strategies. It is maintained that if these concerns are 
challenged now, it will assist and make certain that consistent security policies and 
strategies are put into practice, 
‘to maintain the resilience of SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England 
and Wales against a wide range of security threats for our future generations of 
passengers, the public, employees and organisations’ 
(Gregson-Green, et al., 2013, p.38) 
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It is contended that it is the highly complex mix of both public and private stakeholders within 
SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and Wales which demand a substantial 
degree of organisation to ‘legislate, regulate, implement, and police’ (Loukaitou-Sideris et 
al., 2006, p.737) effectively the space against existing and future security threats. Therefore, 
it is arguably SPIRS’ complex and multiple stakeholders with differing and frequently 
conflicting agendas and standpoints, which can create considerable difficulties from both 
the perspectives of the operation of the space to the societal consequences of their choices 
(Zemp et al., 2011). 
 
9.6.5 Stakeholders, operational complexities, and communications 
The research strongly advocates the need for the primary and secondary stakeholders 
(public and private) of SPIRS to communicate formally, consistently, and clearly, especially 
if they are responsible for the resilience of the space to human malign security threats. 
Therefore, it is proposed that by connecting with and including the complex and multiple 
stakeholders within the space of SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and 
Wales in deliberations and planning around the issues of resilience to human malign security 
threats can develop and boost a mutual working understanding of the concept of 
resilience. 
 
This research found there was a greater need to involve the multiple stakeholders in 
discussions around the concerns of resilience given it can improve a mutual understanding of 
resilience. Moreover, resilience to security threats and more significantly as a day to day 
operational practice cannot be considered in isolation, but it should be a pre-emptive, 
combined and united concern for the ‘security-driven resilience’ (Coaffee and Fussey, 
2017, p 294) by those stakeholders are responsible for these functions. Moreover, the 
research ascertained the participants believed that by building and maintaining strong 
relationships with other stakeholders within SPIRS this went some way to ensuring the resilience 
of the space in terms of security threats. The procedure of building and operating Category 
A railway stations necessitates an appreciation of the stakeholders concerned and an 
effective communication. 
 
Many of the meetings and communications in SPIRS are not a direct organisational strategy, 
and are not mandatory to attend and are often initiated by individuals. The research has 
found those participants from the retailers, Network Rail High-speed and the BTP, Network 
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Rail who attended these meetings believed the objective was attempting to overcome the 
complications of the stakeholder boundaries and to enhance the communication of 
resilience and security strategies. The PACT meetings were voluntary and usual attended 
by the retailers, TOCs, public, the BTP and Network Rail High-speed, with the purpose being 
to create, co-operation, awareness and decide on strategies concerning security issues and 
threats to SPIRS. Yet, the research found that attendance by the TOCs and the retailers was 
often poor and representatives from other stakeholder organisations not be recognised or 
invited to these meetings. 
 
9.6.6 Stakeholder, Operational Complexities and Communication Recommendations 
It is proposed from the research findings that in order for SPIRS and other Category A railway 
stations in England and Wales to be effective and in making policy changes, strategies and 
projects, or day to day operations, it is critical that the complex and multiple stakeholders within 
the space must be analysed and mapped. Therefore, within SPIRS the process of 
Stakeholder Mapping must be undertaken to expose those who are significant to the 
problem area, interconnections, and requirements. When considering issues around the 
resilience of SPIRS to security threats, this will encourage ownership of strategies amongst 
the stakeholders and validity. Moreover, to develop and enhance the potential of SPIRS 
and other Category A railway stations in England Wales to pre-empt and react to security 
threats, there is a need to coalesce the experiences and opinions of the multiple 
stakeholders and others who define and operationalise the concept of resilience. 
 
The research recommends the voluntary meetings in SPIRS such as the PACT meetings and 
the BTP and Network Rail High-speed could proactively drive security briefings. They could 
enhance awareness and foster stakeholder relationships, leading to security advantages for 
SPIRS. This would ensure that some stakeholder groups are not disregarded, their 
representatives are identified, and voices are heard in collaborative sessions when the issues 
of security and resilience is debated. Key and central stakeholders who can influence the 
resilience of space to security threats could achieve this, or for specific security operations 
and initiatives, being identified by the project lead but also those stakeholders on the 
margins need to be recognised in order to achieve a fully rounded and holistic understanding 
of the network. 
 
Moreover, the research suggests considering the assimilation of these meetings into the 
obligatory NRSP as this would assure the stakeholders’ compulsory attendance and would 
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produce controlled and well-defined instances to improve and develop the 
communication of security directives and strategies in SPIRS. However, the research advises 
there must be a directive and requirement from the Government, which the DfT filter down 
through the levels of stakeholders within SPIRS. 
 
Furthermore, it was recognised by the participants that the existing operational 
complexities and issues of miscommunication would worsen in the future as additional 
stakeholders are incorporated into SPIRS. Therefore, a recommendation of this research 
that the key stakeholders of Category A railway stations in England and Wales, and the 
Government ought to immediately search for and take up an open practice of 
‘inclusive communication measures and strategies, which will facilitate the 
understanding of the complex stakeholder interfaces, which influence the current 
and future resilience of the railway station to security threats’ 
(Gregson-Green et al., 2013, p. 38) 
 
Irrespective of the interdependencies between the multiple stakeholders in SPIRS and their 
interconnecting agendas and legislative obligations, there is a marked lack of a co-
ordinated method in the design and operational phases. The findings of the research have 
highlighted a necessity for alterations in institutional practices if risks to the current and future 
resilience of railway stations are to be mitigated. 
 
9.7 Addressing Contributions 
As previously discussed, the research has supported the position that Category A railway 
stations in England and Wales are particularly vulnerable to human malign security threats 
because they are extremely open places that are habitually congested with passengers, 
members of the public and those who are employed by the rail industry. Regardless of this, 
thorough exploration of the existing academic literature it brought to light there is little 
known or researched about the multifaceted interdependencies of the stakeholders within 
these railway stations and how resilience and security policies and strategies are enacted. 
Moreover, the research has determined there is a scarcity of in the knowledge surrounding 
how the complex stakeholder interfaces and the Governmental and organisational security 
policies and strategies influence CPMs and CTMs in the railway station. Therefore, this 
research has significantly contributed to knowledge by challenging this dearth of 
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knowledge and under-researched area by recognising the broad range of strategic 
stakeholders and policies that influence the security and resilience of SPIRS, and considering 
how these can challenge their current and future design, operational and legal 
requirements. 
 
9.7.1 Theoretical contribution 
The thesis has provided an innovative and original contribution to knowledge. It has 
established there are significant gaps in knowledge, explicitly relating to how the 
multifaceted and interdependent stakeholders and policies within Category A railway 
stations in England and Wales affect its design and operational resilience, and current and 
future resilience to security threats. The research through the data collection and analysis 
has enriched and furthered to two areas of theory which are cross-disciplinary, those of 
Stakeholder Theory, and Resilience. 
 
9.7.2 Stakeholder Theory 
By using Stakeholder Theory, the research has been able to analyse, map and therefore 
conceptualise the multiple and complex stakeholders within the space of SPIRS. Therefore, 
this has been a key contribution to the knowledge as the current literature available fails to 
provide a useful and applied method for recognising and categorising stakeholders in 
complex spaces. Thus, research objective one of this research has been met, as through 
the literature and policy review, the analysis and subsequent mapping of the multiple 
stakeholders of SPIRS, who influence or are influenced by the security to human malign 
threats and the subsequent resilience of the space. The process of Stakeholder Mapping 
which was undertaken permitted the conception of the stakeholder’s influence and control 
within the space of a Category A railway station institution. 
 
In relation to SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and Wales, this research 
has moved beyond the accepted traditional classification of a stakeholder as being any 
individual or faction who can influence or is influenced by the realisation and or success of 
an institutions ideals and purpose (Freeman, 1984). Therefore, through the undertaking an 
analysis the stakeholders within SPIRS primarily and which may be pertinent to other 
Category A railway stations in England and Wales, the research has developed a holistic 
and innovative standpoint of Stakeholder Theory. Thus, when applied to these railway 
stations it has expanded the established view of stakeholders beyond their interactions and 
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connections based on contractual and fiscal involvements. The research has taken this 
notion even further and demonstrated that the complex stakeholders within SPIRS can be 
categorised as those who directly affected positively or negatively, by a project or 
operations, primary stakeholders. Secondary stakeholders have a transitional function and 
can have a key impact on the project or operations and finally external stakeholders do 
not directly participate, yet can be impacted on by a project or operations. 
 
Furthermore, the research findings have added to Stakeholder Theory by demonstrating that 
SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and Wales must acknowledge in 
their operational and prevention strategies that illegitimate stakeholders have an interest and 
as such a stake in the space. Thus, in line with the recommendations of Laplume et al., (2008, 
p.1152) this research has fully understood the benefits of Stakeholder Theory through the 
analysis of SPIRS and hence has addressed the absence of knowledge through empirical 
qualitative research to support how organisations must understand and account for 
stakeholder’s relationships, influence, and expectations. 
  
9.7.3 Resilience 
Moreover, the research has additionally contributed to theoretical debates which surround 
resilience. The research has clearly demonstrated that the concept of resilience within the 
unique case study of SPIRS is frequently used in different forms and arenas of policies, 
strategies and discourse. However, Chapters Seven and Eight highlight that there is a 
definite disparity between SPIRS stakeholders and the concept significantly lacks clarity as 
it is interpreted by different rail industry professionals, stakeholders, and the Government. 
There is a Governmental overarching definition of resilience for CNI, however, analysis of 
the stakeholder’s interview data, it is evident that the overall space of SPIRS does not have 
one definition of resilience. Thus, tensions and conflicts transpire when the complex and 
multiple stakeholders are responsibilised by the Government at a local level to ensure the 
space is resilient to existing human malign security threats. This has led to many disjointed 
and opposing policies concerning how to maintain and increase resilience to human 
malign security threats. Network Rail and the BTP’s priority lay clearly in ensuring the space 
was as resilient as possible to these threats and with business continuity plans in place to 
ensure ‘business as usual’ if an incident occurred. However, the retailers within SPIRS 
maintained that their organisational priority and threat to their business came from the lower 
end of the crime continuum, that of shoplifters. 
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Contemporary acts of terrorism against national and international soft targets have 
demanded that concept of resilience and security measures within the confines of 
Category A railway stations, such as SPIRS, are reconsidered and based on ‘more proactive’ 
(Coaffee and Rogers, 2008, p.104) rather than reactive strategies. Moreover, the research 
has added to the understanding of the theoretical contribution surrounding the physical 
(CTMs and CPMs) and intangible aspects (social) of resilience of SPIRS and other Category A 
Railway Stations and the participants have shown these can be accomplished if they are built 
in from the conceptual stages of a refurbishment or new build project (Bosher et al., 2007 and 
Bosher and Dainty, 2011). 
 
Therefore, resilience within spaces such as SPIRS should be a holistic and incorporate a suitable 
design (CTMs and CPMs), emergency responses which are effectual and efficient, planning 
comprehensive business continuity and incident recovery preparations. The research has 
emphasised the design of new and the retrofitting of railway stations to increase resilience to 
security threats rely on stakeholders such as Network Rail and the BTP being able to 
effectively communicate with security planners, designers and the construction industry to 
realise ‘an in-depth understanding of the expertise and knowledge on avoiding and 
mitigating the effects of the hazard’ (Bosher, 2008, p.3). 
 
9.7.4 Empirical contribution 
The research has provided a substantial empirical contribution which has delivered original 
and uncollected data on how complex and multiple stakeholders in the unique case study 
station, SPIRS, influence or are influenced by the current and future resilience of the space 
to human malign security threats. Therefore, the research provides a considerable body of 
original empirical knowledge as result of the abductive research of the complex and multiple 
stakeholders within the space of SPIRS who are responsible for its operational resilience and 
also to those who are accountable for the planning, construction of future new build and 
refurbishment of existing stations to ensure prevention measures are appropriate and 
incorporated at the earliest possible stages of the project (research objectives Three and 
Four). Moreover, this research is additionally pertinent to those more broadly to pseudo-
public spaces who build and operate with multiple stakeholders and who must be mindful 
of the considerable and multifaceted collection of stakeholders, policies, strategies and 
distinct organisational programmes that affect the resilience of such spaces to security threats. 
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9.8 Practical contribution 
As well as the findings of this research providing a contribution to knowledge it also provides 
an enhanced practical knowledge to the multiple stakeholders within SPIRS and other 
Category A railway stations in England and Wales with an insight into how resilience can be 
practically operationalised within a complex structure. The practical beneficiaries of the 
research will be those listed in Chapter Six who are responsible for policy and strategy and 
operational stakeholders in the railway station, as they will be able to attain an in-depth 
knowledge and understanding of the processes and dynamics that influence and regulate 
the resilience of railway stations to security threats. Furthermore, it is anticipated the diverse 
range of stakeholders will gain a greater appreciation for the need to have a collaborative 
and integrated strategy towards resilience that addresses conflicts and tensions at the 
planning stages of projects and the subsequent day-to-day operations within the railway 
station. A significant practical contribution from this research has been the Stakeholder Map 
of those who can influence or by influenced by the resilience of SPIRS to human malign 
security threats. As discussed in Chapter Six and Seven, the process of Stakeholder Analysis 
and Mapping developed by the researcher when undertaking the case study of SPIRS has 
the ability to be transferable to other Category A railway stations in England and Wales, who 
share a similar network of complex and multiple stakeholders. It is further argued that the 
practical process of Stakeholder Analysis and Mapping developed through this research 
could also be applicable to other pseudo-public spaces. Particularly those which operate 
with multiple stakeholders, such as shopping centres and who need to be aware of the 
sizeable and complex range of stakeholders, policies, strategies and individual 
organisational agendas that influence the resilience of the space to human malign security 
threats. 
 
9.9 Reflections of the limitations of the research 
This section establishes the limitations of the research and endeavours to pre-empt the 
questions that may be raised given the abductive and qualitative nature of the study. It is 
maintained that the greatest limitation of the research was the issue of participant or 
stakeholder support. Consequently, not all the stakeholders who are involved or who impact 
on the current and future resilience of SPIRS to security threats participated in the data 
collection. The stakeholders who were contacted but did not participate in the research are 
listed in Appendix 5.3. For example, the researcher despite having numerous points of 
contact and emails of recommendations could not secure an interview with a participant 
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from the DfT. A potential reason for the lack of participation from some of the stakeholder 
groups could have been the lack of motivation to take part in the research. It is maintained 
if a Governmental department had sponsored the research it is expected it would have 
received more of a positive response from the stakeholders especially from the civil service 
and the TOCs. 
 
Moreover, given the sensitive nature of the area of research, it is maintained this could have 
significantly influenced the decision of some stakeholder’s. A further factor which the 
researcher speculates could have contributed to the lack of participation, particularly the 
DfT, is the research has found there is often a quick turnaround of staff posts and contacts 
are lost. The case study protocol has accounted for these barriers to the research. Therefore, 
to obtain the Government’s and other stakeholders who did not participate in the research 
position on the resilience of SPIRS to current and future security threats, reports and documents 
have been located and analysed. Thus, providing evidence that is not only generally 
specific to SPIRS, but it can be applied at a group level when considering Category A 
railway stations in England and Wales. 
 
As noted already in Chapter Five, had the researcher had utilised different research 
strategies it would have undoubtedly created different types of results. If the research 
strategy had taken on an epistemological position of positivism, then a quantitative 
research strategy would have provided a methodology that would have addressed a set 
hypothesis by using structured questionnaires and statistical analysis. However, the research 
has used qualitative research strategies and methods that supported the epistemological 
position of interpretivism and the ontological stance of constructionism. The collection of 
qualitative research data, observations and documentation was part of an abductive 
process and consequently evolved throughout the eighteen-month collection period. 
However, the masses of thick and rich data created made analysis extremely time-
consuming. 
 
Moreover, it was not possible to revisit the research participants for them to validate the 
research findings. In addition, during the writing up phase, five of the participants have 
subsequently retired or moved positions. It is maintained that the validation of the research 
findings could have provided further substantiation into the emerging themes. A further 
consideration in terms of limited resources was that research data was collected and 
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coded by a single researcher and did not permit various other positions from academics to 
be considered which would have been applicable to a larger funded research project. 
 
9.10 Dissemination and impact of the research 
The participants involved in the data collection phase should be informed of the research 
findings which demonstrate how the future resilience of SPIRS and other Category A railway 
stations to security threats can be enhanced by considering the current interdependencies 
of the complex operative, physical, and legal boundaries of stakeholders who are 
interconnected through the space. Moreover, they should be informed of the barriers to 
current and future resilience and recommendation how to overcome these. A significant 
future conceptual impact of the research could be the composition of a guidance 
document which could be delivered to stakeholders to inform future guidelines and 
strategies when looking at the resilience of the space to human malign security threats.  
 
Table 9.1 highlights those stakeholders who should be informed as part of this process. 
Stakeholder Role 
BTP, MET, TOCS, Passengers, Network 
Rail, Retailers, ORR, RSSB, HS1 
Primary stakeholders who are directly 
affected positively or negatively, by a 
project or operations 
DfT, ATOC, Trade Unions, NaCTSO, CPNI, 
SO15/SO20, FOCs, 
Freight Operating Association, Local 
Authority Emergency Planners 
Secondary stakeholders have a 
transitional function and can have a 
key impact on the project or operations 
Home Office, The Treasury, Local 
Communities, Passenger Watchdogs, 
BTPA, ACPO 
External stakeholders do not directly 
participate, yet can be impacted on by 
a project or operations 
Table 9.1 SPIRS Stakeholder categories and roles for dissemination programme (Adapted 
from Freeman 1984 and Jepson and Eskerod, 2008). 
 
The research has created and achieved economic and societal, and academic impact 
from the findings. The RSSB participant requested that researcher present the findings of the 
research at one their stakeholder meetings and that the Stakeholder Map of SPIRS and the 
more generic map of Category A railway stations in England and Wales could be used as 
part of their policy and strategy reviews. Moreover, the London Fire Brigade and BTP have 
both requested permission from the researcher to use the Stakeholder Map for operational 
planning and future franchise requirements. Finally, the researcher has published the 
preliminary findings of the research and the Stakeholder Map in a peer-reviewed journal 
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article for The Institution of Engineering and Technology, in a special interest publication for 
Infrastructure, Risk and Resilience: Transportation (ISBN 978-1-84919-696-3, 2013). 
 
9.11 Future Research 
This section will focus on recommendations for future research and which could continue the 
academic understanding of the relationship between stakeholders, resilience and security, 
and the symbiosis of such. These recommendations lead from the above sections and can 
form a programme of research. It is proposed that a program of future research is required 
as this initial research has proved challenging given the number of complex and disparate 
areas which have emerged in terms of both theory and practical application which can 
influence a space such as SPIRS and other Category A railway stations in England and 
Wales. 
 
This research set out to examine the interdependencies and boundaries of the multiple 
stakeholders within a Category A railway station, and to analyse how their operational and 
legislative requirements and agendas influence both current and future resilience to 
security threats. As the analysis of the research progressed, it was evident that resilience is 
a disparate concept to the multiple stakeholders within SPIRS, created by the often-
fragmented competing policies which surround it. Consequently, the challenge of how to 
secure this has created the numerous multiple challenging ‘logics of resilience’ (Coaffee 
and Fussey, 2015, p.87) which require future examination.  
 
9.12 Future research using other case study category A railway stations in England and Wales. 
Due to the nature of the qualitative research methods generalizability to all Category A 
railway stations in England and Wales would be impossible to defend. However, if additional 
resources were available in the future, it is suggested that the unique single case study of 
SPIRS could act as a pilot case for a larger multiple case study of other Category A railway 
stations in England and Wales. Thus, in order to fully address the gaps in the literature which 
surround the future resilience of these stations to security threats through examining the 
current interrelated complexities of the stakeholders who are located in the space, further 
empirical research should be carried across a range of broader stakeholders in Category 
A railway stations. 
 
Thus, it is suggested that a multiple case study could be conducted to aid the 
understanding of the stakeholders in a wider number of Category A railway stations and 
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to examine them in terms ‘of individual, group, organisational, social, political and related 
phenomena’ (Yin, 2009, p.4). There would be no difference between the case study 
protocol framework (discussed in Chapter Five) used by multiple or single case studies. 
Moreover, there are ‘analytic benefits from having two or more cases’. However, there is 
a disadvantage of conducting a number of multiple case studies given the number of 
resources and time that would be needed. Therefore, it is recommended that this research 
would have to be a full-time project over a number of years and preferably be carried out 
by a team of transdisciplinary researchers who could examine a large and complex 
dataset. 
 
Moreover, the researcher maintains that future research would benefit from a partnership 
with Network Rail and or the BTP. It is believed this would increase the legitimacy of the 
research in the eyes of the stakeholder participants, especially in the cases of those who 
would not buy into the participation of this research study. One set of stakeholder voices 
which was absent from this current research was those of the public, whether they be 
passengers, users of the retail space or the local community. This inclusion of this stakeholder 
group in the proposed multiple case study would provide policy makers, Network Rail, and 
the BTP with an accurate view of how the public perceive and acknowledge the current 
and future security threats to the case study stations. This could be achieved if a mixed 
strategy of both quantitative and qualitative methods is used to collect data from the 
public. Quantitative methods such as questionnaires could provide a Likert Scale of the 
public’s opinions. However, this would be extremely resource intensive, so it is proposed if a 
partnership was formed with a passenger watchdog group such as Passenger Focus; these 
questions could be incorporated into their quarterly rail survey. Passenger Focus could ask 
the public two questions regarding their perceptions of safety when using the railway 
station. It would be delivered to a specified sample population in order to make 
generalisations to the population which use and travel through Category A railway stations 
in England and Wales. Moreover, it is suggested that future research would benefit from a 
formal partnership with Network Rail and or the British Transport Police. The researcher 
believes this would increase the legitimacy of the research in the eyes of the stakeholder 
participants, especially in the cases of those who would not buy into the participation of 
this research study. 
 
The case studies could be broadened to include Kings Cross and Euston railway stations, 
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both neighbouring stations to SPIRS but operated by Network Rail rather than Network Rail 
High-speed, and to expand the range of perceptions and experiences other Category A 
railway stations in England, such as Birmingham New Street and Liverpool Lyme Street. As 
with the single unique case study of SPIRS, the aim is not to attain statistical significance 
through a mix methods strategy. Rather it would be to investigate the cases in-depth, and 
given the complexity of the current research problem, the cases would be ‘directed 
towards the analysis of a number of interdependent variables in a complex structure’ 
(Dubois and Gadde, 2002, p.557) like a Category A railway station. Moreover, this research 
could be expanded and strengthened by studying a number of comparable railway 
stations globally. These case studies could potentially illustrate the international highly 
complex and significant railway stations acknowledge and manage the 
interdependencies and boundaries of the multiple stakeholders in the space and to analyse 
how their operational and legislative requirements and agendas influence both current and 
future resilience to security threats. Finally, the process of Stakeholder Analysis and Mapping 
has proved to be an important tool when structuring the qualitative interviews with the 
participants as it allowed them to visualise the boundaries, importance, interconnections of 
the all of the stakeholders who could affect or be affected by the current and future 
resilience of the space to security threats. It is suggested that this process is also suited to 
other research contexts such as, pseudo-public spaces with multiple stakeholders, such as 
shopping and leisure complexes, and must be conscious of the considerable and 
multifaceted range of stakeholders, policies, strategies, and agendas that influence the 
resilience of the space to security threats. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Railway policies in England and Wales 
 
Act/Regulations Date Government 
Department 
Summary 
Railways Act 1993 DfT Primary superseded by the 2005 Railways Act. The 
ORR under the Act can issue licences to operating 
companies. Station and Light Maintenance 
Services access contracts are regulated by this 
Act. 
Transport Act 2000 DfT Largely superseded by Railways Act 2005. 
Permitted ORR, if required to request 
operators/owners of stations/facilities upgraded 
or build new ones. Has an impact on the SRA, 
outlines role and discretion for it carrying out 
designated duties. 
Railways Act 2005 DfT Primary purpose of the Act is to deal with historic 
structural issues of the railway. Permits the Secretary 
of State to provide monetary aid for any purpose 
regarding railways grants Scottish Ministers to 
develop and create a railway strategy for Scotland. 
Abolished the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) and 
replaced with the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR). 
Permits the TOCs, subject to the approval by the 
Secretary of State, to create bye-laws which aid 
them and the BTP to control the actions and 
behaviour of the public using the rail system. 
Amends 1993 Act, ' relating to the   provision and 
regulation of railway services; and for connected 
purposes' 
Railway and Transport 
Safety Act (RATs) 
2003 DfT Office of Rail Regulation supersedes the Rail 
Regulator in this Act. Section 
31 details the jurisdiction of the BTP, throughout 
England, Wales and Scotland. Further allows BTP to 
purse suspect/deal with railway related crimes 
outside the boundaries of the railway infrastructure 
Health and Safety at 
Work etc. Act (HSWA) 
1974 Health and Safety 
Executive 
The Act is the framework for regulation of health and 
safety at work in Great Britain. The ORR is 
responsible for upholding the act in relation to the 
railways 
Management of Health 
and Safety at Work 
Regulations 
1999  Ensures operators have a duty of care to manage 
the health and safety of their employees and to 
ensure all staff receive proper training to carry out 
their duties safely. 
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Health and Safety 
(Enforcing Authority for 
Railways and Other 
Guided Transport Systems) 
Regulations (EARR) 
2006 DFT Allow the ORR to enforce the HSWA on the railway 
network, grant the power to issue enforcement 
notices and prosecutions 
The Railways and Other 
Guided Transport Systems 
(Safety) Regulations 
(ROGS) 
2006 DFT Creates a regulatory framework for rail safety, for rail 
operators and infrastructure operators to adhere to 
a Safety Management System and hold the 
relevant licence before they can be operational  
Railways (Access to 
Training Services) 
Regulations 
2006 DfT When operators apply for a safety certificate, it 
also allows them the right to have staff and train 
drivers trained 
The Railways 
(interoperability) 
Regulations 
2006 
/201 0 
DFT Issues of railway safety and interoperability are very 
closely linked. Interoperability is concerned with the 
criterion that all rail assets are designed and built, 
and latterly upgraded. It additionally ensures 
these criterions are complied with, and finally the 
Safety Authority authorises it before it can go into 
operation 
The Railways 
(interoperability) 
(Amendment) 
Regulations 
2007   
Consolidated 
High-speed 
Directive 
(96/48/EC) 
1996 EC Two European Interoperability Directives, additionally 
covers issues of safety. Enables a legal framework 
for the operation railway criteria of the European 
transport strategy. Member states are legally 
bound by these directives and therefore must 
translate them into their own law 
Consolidated 
High-speed 
Directive 
(2001/16/EC) 
2001   
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Rail Vehicle 
Accessibility 
(Interoperable Rail 
System) Regulations 
2008 EC Permits compliant heavy rail vehicles from being 
regulated from Railways (interoperability) 
regulations 2006 and RVAR 
Railways (Access and 
Management) 
Regulations 
2005  Generally, a 5-10 yea access contract issued to 
operators, terminal owners and or logistics 
companies 
Railways (Licensing of 
Rail Undertakings) 
Regulations 
2005  The regulations states majority of railway operates 
(TOCs and FOCs) must hold a European licence. 
Also required under the regulations is a Statement 
of National Regulatory Provisions (SNRP) 
Railway Group 
Standard Codes (issue 3) 
2008 Office of Rail 
Regulation 
Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB), and 
developed a cross industry group defined safety 
code. 
The Railways 
(Accident Investigation 
and Reporting) 
Regulations 
2005 DfT Defines the working remit (role and powers) of the 
RAIB 
The Railways Safety Levy 
Regulations 
2006 ORR Authority is granted to the ORR to raise revenue for 
safety functions by placing a levy on all rail service 
operators 
Reporting of Injuries, 
Diseases, Dangerous 
Occurrence 
Regulations (RIDDER) 
1995 Secretary of 
State 
Major and important health and safety incidents 
must be reported by railway services providers to 
the ORR 
Cross Rail Act 2008 DFT New southern counties east-west rail link. 
Objective is to help provide relief from congestion 
on the established rail and underground systems, 
allowing in transport growth for future generations. 
Crossrail extensions, and the use of rail facilities for 
the purpose of Crossrail exempt to the Planning 
Act 2008 
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The Rail Passengers' Rights 
and Obligations 
Regulations 
2010  Statutory Regulation which is concerned with 
passenger rights and the obligation of service 
providers. Section 26 of the Regulation 
necessitates that rail operators 'to adequate 
security measures'. The majority of railway 
operators must have a formal agreement with the 
BTP concerning 'the policing of railway services 
and assets' The ORR is responsible to enforce the 
regulation, as stated in the regulation. The 
regulation set outs the role and power London 
TravelWatch and Passenger Focus as the 
authorised bodies to handle passenger complaints 
Transport and Works Act 1992 DfT Under the Act, the Transport and Works Act Orders 
Unit, makes decisions concerning the operation 
and construction of railways, tramways and other 
guided transport systems 
Greater London 
Authority Act 
1999 GLA and TfL Section 175 states there must be co- operation 
between the Transport for London, the Secretary of 
State/DFT 
The Network Rail (Hitchin 
(Cambridge Junction)) 
Order 
2011 DFT The order permits Network Rail for the purpose of 
creating a new separated junction at Hitchin, to 
compulsorily attain land and the rights to it, to build 
and maintain the works. NOTE: There are numerous 
other Network Rail Orders relating to works at other 
sites in the UK, this is just one example. 
Incorporation of 
Railways Clauses 
Consolidation Act 
1845  The Act is now generally inserted into other 
Acts/Orders permitting the making of Railways 
Level Crossings Act 1983 Secretary of 
State 
The Act outlines orders for level crossings and the 
how users should be protected 
The Road Safety Act 
2006 
2006  The Act initiated the use of new measures at level 
crossing to improve on the safety. For instance, 
driver’s behaviour is more controlled by using kerbs 
which are built-out, rumble strips, improved signs to 
dually reduce the speed of drivers and to minimise 
the numbers going around the barriers 
The Competition Act 1998 Office of Fair 
Trade (OFT) 
The ORR can regulate agreements relating to the 
railways. Any business which conducts itself in a 
manner which could have a detrimental outcome 
on the competition and consequently the 
consumer, the Act can fine/prosecute. 
The Enterprise Act 2002 OFT ORRs power under Section 5 to review ownership of 
transport infrastructure, if it believes it will undermine 
the market 
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Local Transport Act 2008  Permitted Passenger Transport 
Executives (PTEs) greater powers, such as the right to 
rename themselves Integrated Transport Authorities  
(ITAs)  Localism Bill 2011  Bill was introduced by the Secretary of State for 
Communities and Local Government (CLG), the 
coalition endorses the concept of localism - 
building a framework for the big society by aiming 
to decentralise power and give it to local 
authorities. 
London Olympic 
Games and 
Paralympics Games 
Act 
2006  ORR has a responsibility of proffer and facilitate 
transport systems for London 2012 Olympic games 
Local Democracy, 
Economic 
Development and 
Construction Act 
2009  The part five of the Act amalgamates all regional 
strategies, transport, economic etc into one whole 
regional strategy 
Highways Act 1980  Cattle grids can be used for the protection of 
railways. Some railways will be exempt from 
contributing to private street works. Railway 
operators must come to an agreement with local 
authorities to maintain bridges/viaducts when 
used as public highways. Various other measures 
listed (LA's not permitted to place waste bins on, 
under or within 10 feet of a railway bridge, without 
the owner’s/operator’s permission) Details removing 
bridges and having level crossings, agreements 
required for expenditure. 
Planning Act 2008  The Act established the Infrastructure Planning 
Commission and make provision about its 
functions. The act defines the 'construction or 
alteration of a railway...rail freight interchange' as 
a 'nationally significant infrastructure project' 
Town and Country 
Planning Act 
1990  The Act consolidated the various enactments 
concerning town and country planning 
Natural Environment 
and Rural Committees 
Act 
2006  ORR has responsibility upholding the conservation 
of biodiversity in the context of the railway system 
Climate Change Levy 2011 Dept. of Energy 
and Climate 
Change 
Energy used in industry, business both in the public 
and private sector will be liable to taxation. The 
objective of the tax is to encourage energy 
efficiency, and for new types of renewable 
energies to be invested in 
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Climate Change Act 2008 Dept. of Energy 
and Climate 
Change 
The Act established a new framework to 
administer and respond to the effects climate 
change in the UK. The UK's railway system will be 
effected through the government being legally 
required to achieve a minimum of 34% reduction in 
greenhouse gas emission by 2020 and an 80% 
reduction by 2050, 
Civil Contingencies 
Act 
2004 Civil Contingencie 
s Secretariat 
Updated terms for Emergency – replacing 1920’s 
and 1940’s Acts. UK: one framework for ‘civil 
protection’ ‘Local Resilience Forums’ (based on 
police areas) Will  co-ordination and co-operation 
between responders at the local level  
Terrorism Act 2000 Home Office The Act replaces previous counter- terrorist 
legislation. Provides the governments definition of 
terrorism. Details count-terrorist powers, for 
instance the police can prevent vehicles from 
parking outside a station as a form of terrorism 
prevention, making it illegal to park in this cordon. 
Powers of stop and search, uniformed officers can 
stop and search for instance train drivers, 
passengers, pedestrians in or outside stations - 
under Terrorism Act 2000 (Remedial) Order 2011 
Crime and 
Disorder Act 
1998 Home Office Local authorities and the police have a statutory 
duty to co-ordinate crime and disorder 
reductionary strategies with community groups. 
Public sector organisations fall under section of the 
Act, whereby they have a duty to reasonable 
prevent crime and disorder. Covers anti-social 
behaviour orders 
Strategies and Plans    
Contest 2006 
 
and 
2009 
Home Office ‘Aim-to reduce the risk to the UK and its interest 
overseas from international terrorism, so that people 
can go about their lives freely and with 
confidence’ Strategy delivered in 4 work streams: 
Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare. The Prevent 
stream has been revised in June 2011.  
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   strategy permits the government to work with 
stakeholders to reduce the risk of terrorism to 
transport infrastructure. Delivered by The Office for 
Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT)-part of the 
Home Office 
PUBLIC SERVICE 
AGREEMENT 26 
(PSA 26) 
2007 Cabinet Office CONTEST is a priority for the government during 
the years 2008/2009 and 2010/2011, therefore the 
PSA 26 will help measures progress and deliver the 
CONTEST strategy– performance management 
framework – structured around the 4 P’s 
Strategic Defence and 
Security Review 
2010  The objectives of the National Security Strategy are 
listed in the strategy, for instance determining the 
maintenance and improvement of key counter-
terrorism measures and the development of cyber 
security measures 
Cyber Security 
Strategy 
2009  Detailed the creation of the Cyber Security 
Operations Centre (CSOC) and the Office of 
Cyber Security and Information Assurance. 
National Risk Register   Government monitors the most significant 
emergencies that the UK may face over next 5 
years through the National Risk Assessment (NRA). 
Risks are list in context (natural, malicious and 
accidental) mentions cyber-attacks on 
infrastructure, attacks on infrastructures-transport. 
Mentions failure of the National Grid. Transport 
accidents. The NRR and NRA detail possible events 
which may cause major harm to the citizens of 
Britain  
National Infrastructure 
Plan 2013 
2013 HM Treasury and 
Infrastructure UK 
Acknowledges need clear analysis of 
interdependences of critical national 
infrastructure, economic growth, new investment 
strategy (£200 billion up to 2015), reducing carbon 
targets, ensuring energy security, climate change, 
new technologies. Describes interdependences – 
floods 2007 disruption to water supply and impact 
on transport infrastructure. 
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Securing the Future – 
delivering UK sustainable 
development strategy 
2005 Department for 
Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs 
(DEFRA) 
The strategy outlines what sustainable 
development is and how it can be achieved. In 
the Rail Act 1993, the railway sector's responsibility 
to the environment and sustainable development 
were outlined. Endeavour to achieve sustainable 
development and to be aware of the 
environmental effect of the railway sector. 
Delivering a 
sustainable 
railway 
2007 DFT Governmental white paper which looks at the 
future of the railway over a 30 year period. It 
establishes the railway sector and the government 
should be aspiring to three long-term goals: railway 
capacity is increased, passenger receive a quality 
service, and realising the full environmental 
capability of the railway infrastructure 
Rail Technical 
Strategy (RTS) 
2007 DFT Wrote in conjunction with the above white paper, 
the government looks at how current and future 
technologies will affect the railway. The following 
long-term strategies were established by the RTS: 
'simple, flexible, precise control system: optimised 
traction power and energy; an integrated view of 
safety, security and health; improved passenger 
focus; rationalisation and standardisation of assets; 
differentiated technical principles and standards. 
Route utilisation strategies 
(RUS) 
2011 ORR Network Rail is obligated under its license to 
create and manage RUS for the rail network and 
endorse effect regional route utilisation 
McNulty Report 2011  Cost saving review. Estimates by 2018 
£1bn could be saved by the railway in the UK. Major 
issues with over staffing. Will create the Rail Delivery 
Group. 
Renewable Energy 
Strategy 
2009 DECC Launched in 2009 the Renewable Energy Strategy 
(RES), under EU direction, intends that by 2020 the 
UK that 15% of its energy requirements, for instance 
transport, heating and electricity will be 
generated from renewable energy sources. These 
sources of energy are naturally occurring and 
replenishable, such as solar and wind power 
(Carbon Trust, 2011) 
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Appendix 2: Categorisation of railway stations in England and Wales 
 
(Source: DfT Better Rail Stations Report 2009) 
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Appendix 3: IRA S Plan Attacks 
 
The below listed incidents are those which specifically related to attacks on railways stations in 
Britain under the S Plan: 
 
Year Month Location Details 
1939 February London, Kings Cross Two bombs 
exploded 
1939 April Liverpool Railway 
station 
Two bombs 
exploded 
1939 July Birmingham LMS 
Railway Station 
Extensive damage 
caused at due to 
bomb exploding in 
left luggage area 
1939 July London - Kings Cross 
and Victoria 
Railway Stations 
Both stations 
sustained serious 
damage, with 
one fatality and 
seven serious 
injuries. 
1940 February London-Euston 
Station 
Two mail bag 
bombs exploded- 
some damage 
sustained to 
building 
(Bowyer Bell, 1996) 
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Appendix 5.1: The various methods of qualitative data collection and the benefits and disadvantages of 
each 
 
Method of collection Options within methods Benefits of method Disadvantage of method 
Interviews (chosen as a data 
collection method) 
Internet, Skype, email 
interview 
Focus groups, multiple 
participants are 
interviewed in a group 
setting 
Interviews are carried 
via the telephone 
Face to face interviews 
Questions and schedule 
can be followed and 
regulated by the 
researcher 
Researcher can follow 
interesting lines of 
information by further 
probing 
Beneficial when 
participants cannot be 
directly observed 
Not everybody is insightful 
or communicative 
Responses may be 
influenced by the 
researcher being there 
Interview setting is normally 
predetermined by the 
researcher and is not a field 
situation 
Observations (chosen as a 
data collection method) 
Complete observer- 
researcher observes 
but does not 
contribute 
Participant observer-role 
of 
Can be used to delve 
into sensitive or difficult 
topics with participants 
Observation allows for the 
recognition of 
Some groups of vulnerable 
participants may be 
reluctant to build 
connections and affinities 
with researchers 
 observer is secondary to 
role of participant 
Observer as participant- 
researcher’s role is known 
to participants 
Complete participant-
role of researcher is 
hidden from 
participants 
atypical facets of 
participants 
Occurrences can be 
recorded as it happens 
Researcher has direct 
involvement and 
knowledge with 
participants 
Researcher may have 
poor observational ability 
Some observed data will 
not be reportable by the 
researcher 
Participants may view the 
researcher as invasive and 
disruptive 
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Documentation (chosen as a 
data collection method) 
Private-journals, letters, 
emails or diaries 
Public-articles, newspapers, 
company papers, or 
official reports 
Information is already 
accessible and saves 
time and costs in not 
transcribing 
Data is thorough as it has 
been composed with 
awareness and 
consideration 
Data can be retrieved 
opportune times for the 
Documentation may be 
inaccurate or faked 
Documentation can be 
partial 
Information be challenging 
to locate so can be time 
consuming 
Information required may 
be located outside of 
public access 
  researcher, it is a discreet 
resource 
The participant’s semantics 
and lexis can be explored 
Not all documents are 
created by people who 
are communicative or 
insightful 
Audio-Visual sources Film 
 
Social Media Software 
Objects of Art 
Visual recordings 
Photographs 
Creative as it seizes 
interest visually 
Research participants can 
immediately communicate 
their lived actuality 
Can be used as a 
discreet technique of 
gathering data 
The photographer being 
there can be disrupting 
and impact replies and 
reactions 
Could be limited access to 
the data collected 
Could be challenging and 
problematic to decipher 
and explain 
Qualitative research methods and the benefits and disadvantages. Source 
adapted from (Creswell, 2009, p. 179-180) 
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APPENDIX 5.2: Data Protection Act 1998 
The data collected for the purpose of this research covers the following aspects of the 
Data Protection Act 1998, 
 
 
Personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully 
 
Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful 
purposes, and shall not be further processed in any manner incompatible with that 
purpose or those purposes 
Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the 
purpose or purposes for which they are processed. 
Personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date.Personal 
data shall be processed in accordance with the rights of data subjects under this Act. 
Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken against 
unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or 
destruction of, or damage to, personal data. 
Personal data shall not be transferred to a country or territory outside the European 
Economic Area unless that country or territory ensures an adequate level of 
protection for the rights and freedoms of data subjects in relation to the processing of 
personal data. 
(www.legislation.gov.uk,  2013) 
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Appendix 5.3: Stakeholders who did not participate in the research 
Stakeholders who were contacted and ask to participate in the research, but either 
declined to participate or did not respond to the request for assistance 
 
Stakeholders contacted but declined or failed to respond to the participation request 
1 Network Rail  Security Manager  Contact established, and participation agreed, 
never responded to emails to arrange 
2 LandSheffifs  Private Security for HS1, for St 
Pancras, looking after 
perimeter of station 
 Emails sent but no response received 
3 Transport for 
London 
 “Transport Guru”  Email and declined to participate 
4 Metropolitan 
Police 
 TBC  Email sent but no response received 
6 CPNI  Transport Rep (  Email sent but no response received 
7 HS1  Engineering and Asset 
Manager 
 Email sent but no response received 
8 DfT  Head Domestic Land Transport 
Security 
 Email sent but declined to participate 
9 South Eastern 
Trains 
 Head of Crime and Security  Email sent but no response received 
10 East Midlands 
Trains 
 Emergency Planning and 
Security Manager 
 Email sent but no response received 
11 Camden 
Borough 
Council 
 Planning  Email sent but no response received 
12 SECURITY 
CONSULTANT 
 Worked for Nactso Helped 
created Project Argus and 
Griffin with Brian Howat. 
Current working with BBC on 
security and the Olympics 
Response 
received, 
awaiting 
telephone 
call from 
Richard 
Email contact established, agreed to participate 
but no response received to subsequent emails 
13 London 
Ambulance 
Service 
   Email contact established, agreed to participate 
but no response received to subsequent emails 
14 Transport for 
London 
   Email contact established but declined to 
participate in the research 
15 Transport for 
London 
 Transport Crime Problem Solver  Email contact established but declined to 
participate in the research 
16 University of the Arts, 
St Martins 
 Research Centre for Design 
Against Crime 
Arrange 
interview in 
the 
Jan/Feb 
2013 
Email and personal contact established but 
unable to find a suitable time to meet 
17 ORR     
18 Passenger 
Focus 
 Researcher  Email contact established, but felt was not suitable 
for me to speak to so put me in touch 
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     with a colleague 
19 Department for 
Transport 
   Email sent but no response received 
20 Transport for 
London 
   Email contact established but declined to 
participate in the research 
21 St Pancras 
Renaissance 
Hotel 
   Email sent but no response received 
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APPENDIX 5.4: Participant Information Sheet 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Lucy Gregson-Green 
Civil and Building Engineering Department 
Loughborough University 
Leicestershire LE11 3TU 
 
l.e.gregson-green@lboro.ac.uk Tel: xxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
This research (conducted between May 2011 and April 2014) will pose the question, how can 
the ‘railway station’ be designed and operated to ensure the current and future resiliency to 
human malign threats from a multiple stakeholder standpoint? How are divergent policies 
interrelated to this? 
 
Who is doing this research and why? 
This study is part of a Student research project supported by Loughborough University. 
 
Doctoral Researcher: Lucy Gregson-Green 
Supervisors: Professor Andrew Dainty and Dr Lee Bosher 
Sponsored by: EPSRC funded R-Futures project 
 
Once I take part, can I change my mind? 
Yes! After you have read this information and asked any questions you may have we will ask 
you to complete an Informed Consent Form, however if at any time, before, during or after the 
sessions you wish to withdraw from the study please just contact the main investigator. You can 
withdraw at any time, for any reason and you will not be asked to explain your reasons for 
withdrawing. 
 
Will I be required to attend any sessions and where will these be? 
Initially this is an introductory interview. Any further interview sessions will be arranged at your 
convenience. 
 
How long will it take? 
The interview will take approximately one hour 
 
What will I be asked to do? 
You will be asked to take part in an interview. The researcher will use an interview schedule to ask 
you questions. The researcher may ask you to go into greater detail on some of your responses. 
 
What personal information will be required from me? 
Name: Position: 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
The interview will be recorded using an audio-recording device, transcribed and stored 
securely in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. 
 
The transcribed data will be seen by the research student, their supervisors. It may be 
possible some of the data collected will be used for the final doctoral thesis. 
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Names and any other identifying characteristics will be anonymised. 
 
The recorded data will be kept for a period of 48 months after which it will be destroyed. 
 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
The results of the study will be used to inform the doctoral thesis. 
 
I have some more questions who should I contact? Professor Andrew Dainty: a.r.j.dainty@lboro.ac.uk Dr 
Lee Bosher:   l.bosher@lboro.ac.uk 
 
What if I am not happy with how the research was conducted? 
 
The University has a policy relating to Research Misconduct and Whistle Blowing which is 
available online at http://www.lboro.ac.uk/admin/committees/ethical/Whistleblowing(2).ht m 
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Appendix 5.5: Semi-structured interview schedule 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE: 
 
Introduction of my research – aims and objectives 
 
The future resiliency of railway stations in England to security threats: A doctoral research project 
 
What: This research (conducted between May 2011 and April 2014) will pose the question, To 
what extent can the future resilience of the railway station to security threats be ensured, when 
considering the interdependencies of the multiple operational, physical and legal 
boundaries of stakeholders which intersect the space? This research is a component of the 
EPSRC funded R- Futures project. 
 
Why: The literature review conducted to date has established crucial gaps in the research 
surrounding the current and future resiliency of English railway stations to security threats. 
Overarching issues of the multiple boundaries within the railway station in terms of 
(operational, policy/legal, physical) are considered to be a major obstacle in attaining 
current and future resiliency. 
 
Aim: The aim of the research is to holistically comprehend and unpack the 
interdependencies and boundaries of the multiple stakeholders within Category A 
railway stations, and to analyse how their operational and legislative requirements and 
agendas influence both current and future resilience to security threats. This will be 
achieved through three case studies examining the railway stations in terms of their 
stakeholders and their operational, political, legislative and physical boundaries, and 
how these affect their resilience to security threats. 
 
Objectives: To meet the aim of the research, the objectives will: 
 
Critically examine the literature and policy concerning counter-terrorism and crime prevention 
measures within the context of railway stations, infrastructure and other urban transport 
networks. 
 
Map the stakeholders with security interests in railway stations and associated 
infrastructure. 
 
Map the policies and strategies operationalised by stakeholders which (in)directly affect 
the resilience of the railway station 
 
Examine through case studies how multiple stakeholders encounter and/or engage with 
both current and future resilience-related policies, strategies and operational procedures 
 
Identify and acknowledge the effects of multiple stakeholders, and how they can have 
constructive and detrimental impacts, and compromise the resilience of the railway station 
 
Beneficiaries: Beneficiaries of the research will be the multiple layers of stakeholders within 
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the railway station who will attain empirical knowledge and comprehension of the processes 
and dynamics which direct and regulate the resiliency of the railway station to malicious 
threats. Thus, a broad range of stakeholders (Inc. public/private, government body/non-
governmental body) will gain an understanding of the importance of how current policies 
and strategies combating security risks may impact of the future resiliency of the railway 
station to such issues. Furthermore, stakeholders will gain an appreciation for the need for 
a co-ordinated strategy that acknowledges how resiliency conflicts and tensions will need 
to be addressed at the planning stages of projects within the railway station. 
 
St Pancras International Railway Station has been identified as being suitable case studies for 
the research study 
Outcomes of literature review 
 
 
What is your role within XXXXX? 
 
What are your responsibilities? 
 
In terms of your role what does resilience mean to you? 
 
In broader terms of the railway station what does resilience mean 
 
What key policies and strategies shape your role? (how are these referred to you?) 
How do you respond to security policy initiatives? (work with policy makers?) 
Are you aware of National Security Strategies (do these shape your role?) 
When stations are designed and retrofitted how are the needs of stakeholders 
accounted for? 
is insufficient research into how current policies and strategies are entrenching 
and influencing the future resilience of the railway station to human malign 
threats. Moreover, it has been ascertained there is a paucity of knowledge 
surrounding how the multiple stakeholders within the railway station enact 
security strategies and the unforeseen consequences on how this affects both 
current and future resilience to human malign actions. Thus, it is contended it is 
the overarching issues of these multiple boundaries within the railway station, 
which are considered a major obstacle in attaining future resilience against 
human malign actions. 
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When new tenants move in, how do they ensure their unit has necessary crime 
prevention and counter-terrorism measures 
In your opinion how far into the future do NWR security strategies look? 
How do you think these policies impact on the stakeholders and tenanted 
properties within the railway station? 
When railway stations are redesigned and retrofitted fitted with security measures, at 
what stages are stakeholders consulted and who are they? 
What measures are used or would you recommend to protect the inside of the retail 
units? 
In terms of public safety, what do you think their greatest fear is? (crime or terrorism) 
Do you think crime prevention and counter-terrorism agendas can be reconciled? Do 
tenants look at both threats equally? 
Do you think passengers and public opinion impacts on the crime prevention and 
counter-terrorism agendas in the railway station?  
Which stakeholders within the railway station do you deal with? (use map to tick off) 
Are there any stakeholders who are not on the map, who you think should be 
included on my map? 
Do you find any issues with communication, coordination with the other stakeholders 
on the map? 
Who else do you speak to (other agencies)? (or would like to be engaged with) 
How do you think the future resilience of railway stations to security threats can be 
improved? (What are the greatest threats faced?) 
Could you offer some advice about other stakeholders who you think it would 
be beneficial for me to speak to? 
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Appendix 5.6: Interview Transcript from R Futures Interview  
 
Interviewee:  XXX Date:  May 2011 
Recording Length:  75:42 
 
So, just to begin with, could you say a little bit about your background, your role here and 
your past experience? 
Okay. My role here is I’m head of emergency planning and business continuity for the 
council. I manage a small team, taking… looking at everything to do with resilience 
emergency planning, business continuity across the council, working with the 
departments. The key thing at the moment, really, is preparing for the Olympics stuff and 
making sure everyone is prepared for what the impact of that might be. 
Hmm. 
How our realities of getting in and out of London and moving about London and XXX will 
change next year when none of the transport links, sort of, we’ve got more pressure on 
them and the ORN and things like that, so that’s our focus at the moment. Background – 
I’ve been here since 2004. So I was here through 7/7 and various other big events we’ve 
had. Previous to that I was working for the fire brigade doing emergency planning for the 
whole of London. 
Yes. I guess that… So in terms of your sort of everyday… 
Every day is… 
Sort of role. 
Yes. On-call for anything happening in XXX, so between the team we split the on-call 
requirement anyway. Most of what we get are very small disruptiony-type things, so power 
failures, water supply issues, in housing blocks and things like that, ranging right up to bigger 
events like 7/7, and then just being the link between the council and the emergency 
services for that. Day-to-day – not on-call bits. So, the in-the-office bit is basically making 
sure that all our planning procedures are up to date and in place; training, exercising with 
council staff and with other agencies; liaising with other agencies around what they’re 
planning for various things and working on different work streams, so a whole range of work 
streams we work on that have been set across London that all the boroughs have to 
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comply, so things like mass fatality incidents, so what we would do with mortuary 
arrangements, flooding arrangements, mass evacuation, flu pandemic – you name it, 
we’ve got it on the list. 
Hmm. Hmm. 
So it’s just sort of a programme of managing those and developing plans and improving 
them [unclear]ly. 
Okay. So you’re… I mean in terms of the other agencies you’re working with… 
Mainly police, fire, ambulance, but in XXX we do also liaise quite a lot with other businesses 
– the universities, the transport sector, obviously, because XXX’s got three mainline stations. 
Hmm. 
So we have quite a lot to do with these other partners as well, but the main ones would 
probably be the police or the fire brigade. 
Okay. I mean, this is a question I’ve been asking everyone. 
Mmhmm. 
And I guess you can sort of answer it in a nutshell, really. What does resilience mean to 
you? 
(Laughs) Hmm. I suppose to me it’s XXX’s ability to bounce back from whatever faces it 
and get through and keep going. 
Hmm. 
In terms of delivering our core… So we’ve got a duty to deliver our core services, and it’s 
being able to make sure that the council can keep doing those things. 
Hmm. 
Whatever is affecting us out there and making that happen, whether that’s a small thing 
or some sort of small business disruption or a massive national thing, a bit like the pandemic 
could have been. 
Hmm. Hmm. 
And it’s making sure we’ve got… Thought about all of those things and we can keep… 
get through it and keep going. 
So maintain the water services [unclear] or… 
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Yes. Err… No. Not really. The utilities companies would do that, so our thing is more around 
supporting vulnerable people if any of those things are affected, so… And that’s our 
biggest thing, is vulnerable people. 
Right. 
The social care sort of side. So normal day-to-day, we do meals on wheels and we do 
social care visits into the council premises and other premises supporting people. It’s 
looking at if something else happens that means more people are vulnerable or, so, like 
the flu pandemic, potentially, if your main carer is ill. 
Hmm. Hmm. 
And, you know, they don’t normally rely on the council picking up that extra capacity. 
Hmm. 
And also things like when we had 7/7, can we actually get out and about in the borough, 
because the transport network is down, to deliver that service and deliver meals and 
wheels and making sure we can still do those… 
Hmm. So it’s council, local authority services are maintained within… 
Yes, yes. 
Given that there is… 
So it’s dealing with the impact of other things not happening. 
Yes, yes, yes. 
Can we still do those things? 
Yes, yes. 
And then sillier things which seem to be more upsetting to the public which are like refuse 
collection and making sure the library is open. The number of complaints we had at 7/7 
because the library was in accordant… 
Hmm. 
So I think trying to keep those things and making sure that people can still go to a different 
library. 
So people want to use the internet or something… 
Yes, yes. It’s silly. 
Well, yes. 
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We’ve got 13 libraries in XXXX. The fact that one was in accordant, 
Yes. 
It shouldn’t have been that difficult to [unclear]. They were very upset. 
Hmm. Yes. So people lose sight of things. 
Yes. Definitely. 
Yes. Okay. I mean, I think I guess it would be a good idea. Obviously I could look and find 
out about sort of the services that the council delivers. 
Hmm. 
So, I mean, looking at these scenarios, I’m not sure. I mean, if you wanted to just sort of 
position them. I mean, we can perhaps sort of look at these in turn. I’ll just explain this a bit 
more. 
Mmhmm. 
It’s probably quite sort of self-explanatory, I guess, but we’ve got… I mean, we’ve looked 
at various sort of future reports which are related to sort of engine transports that are 
produced by the government, some produced by companies like Shell or… and they have 
tended to sort of adopt quite a similar approach and sort of identify these sort of big 
uncertainties – these sort of major uncertainties about the… about the future, really, and 
we’ve, I guess, drawn upon those and sort of integrated those into our approach. So on this 
sort of horizontal axis we’ve got really sort of a sense of how globalisation is going to 
develop or not – the kind of pace of globalisation, really. 
Mmhmm. 
So are we going to be living in an even more interdependent, convergent world or are we 
going to sort of become more self-sufficient? Perhaps more sort of inward-looking? More 
independent or divergent? And this could be, I guess, a kind of response to lots of different 
things but it could… one of the things, it could be a response to sort of climate change, 
Yes. 
That we’re perhaps travelling less, looking to sort of become more self-sufficient, perhaps 
producing more of our electricity. And we’ve left it quite open. I mean, we’ve, for example, 
on here we’ve sort of… these are really metaphors, I guess, rather than necessarily saying 
that everyone’s going to be living in a village in the middle of nowhere, in the woods or 
something. 
Mmhmm. 
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I mean, our high-tech hamlet could be a sort of city region that’s more independent than 
it currently is, or it could be a small sort of self-sufficient community in mid Wales. You 
know? We left it quite open as to what that might be, but generally speaking we’re thinking 
on these… this sort of side of the matrix of these scenarios. We’re talking about lots of self-
sufficient communities. And I guess there’s already, well, technical… because a technical 
sort of [unclear] for that, in terms of embedded power. Perhaps people just generally sort 
of travelling less, travelling more on foot and by bike, and therefore sort of there’s 
perhaps… [unclear] interdependence between different parts of the country or even 
different parts of the city, and also things like the push to devolution politically. 
Yes. 
I guess you can see sort of parts of the big society stuff and the kind of localism agenda 
that’s sort of getting through [unclear] at the moment. And on the other side, we’ve got to 
extrapolate here the sort of globalisation theme that we’re going to be working more and 
more with people on a sort of global basis or on a sort of supranational basis, and the EU, 
for example, might become more powerful; the transport networks are going to be 
becoming more interdependent than they currently are, I guess. 
Mmhmm. 
Obvious things, I suppose, like the Eurostar or something… you know? Those sort of things 
and as you can imagine, you know, currently [unclear] companies are talking about 
coming in as well and if that were, you know, if we developed our own high-speed rail 
network, what might that mean? And also, I guess, we could think about it in terms of 
energy, that perhaps would be instead of going down to this sort of micro power, we might 
be building more and more big nuclear power stations; we might be sharing energy across 
Europe and there might have to be some quite draconian ways of managing that sort of in 
the home and that might be a kind of smart grid that turns appliances on and off as people 
haven’t control over their own… 
Yes. Right. 
Not generating their own power. It’s sort of subject to, I don't know, taking power, perhaps. 
I mean one of the things we were talking about there was it might be a kind of sub-Saharan 
or a Sahara solar ray that’s providing power to Europe. And then the other… I guess the 
other [unclear] on the services axis is just how much are people likely to embrace or resist 
technologies, really? 
Right. Okay. 
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[unclear] kind of solutions to kind of climate change. So, again, yes, I mean sort of one 
example might be sort of automated cars. Are people likely to want to accept that? You 
know? Even at the moment Ford are sort of developing technologies where cars brake 
themselves. You know? They park themselves and that sort of thing, so it’s something… 
Sounds great. Parks themselves? (Laughs) 
Yes. You can imagine on a kind of motorway or on sort of major roads that cars would be 
kind of packed, sort of, you know, efficiently along that road and those sorts of… those 
sorts of things and then they might be sort of anxious for doing that. And then sort of in terms 
of energy as well that people perhaps in these scenarios are more likely to accept new 
things like sort of PHP plants, those sorts of things, rather than whereas in these scenarios 
people are kind of turning to social solutions or sort of [unclear] 
Yes. 
To some of the challenges. I mean, I don't know. That in a nutshell captures what our 
approach is and where the scenarios… how the scenarios related to each other. 
Right. 
It may be, if we start, I mean if we start, perhaps, with this scenario here. 
Yes. 
I mean this… so in this scenario we’re talking about a sort of high-tech… obviously but sort 
of independent world, I mean I don't know whether you would like to sort of perhaps say 
more about the sort of resilience of these sorts of scenario, or some of the potential 
resilience consequences of this scenario or talk more generally about the sorts of 
infrastructure that might be required or how it might sort of operate or how… or perhaps 
how it wouldn’t operate. 
Yes. I suppose from my perspective, if we’re, from this side of things, there are more 
localised things. That, from my own perspective in XXX here, probably makes them a bit 
easier because localised and more focused focuses of power in the localism bill. What I’m 
sort of hoping that will come out of some of that stuff that is looking at is a sort of more 
focused community that looks after themselves and starts to take on some of the sort of 
community resilience messages that are coming out now and supports itself, so I suppose 
in that respect, I suppose my challenge with this one is actually that low technology would 
be much better than high technology. (Laughs) 
Hmm. 
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The high technology thing, I think, for me, is always a challenge, although it gives some 
options to resolve things and make things easier, I think more and more people rely on 
technology and it isn’t resilient. And that’s just where at, at the moment, if we’re looking, I 
suppose, ideally, if high-tech can also mean that it’s more resilient is built in to that high 
technology, then fine. That’s all good and well but, at the moment, my experience of XXX 
alone with energy and transport and those sorts of things is they break down regularly, they 
are very reliant on certain things and so there are often problems with them and that is, 
actually, in terms of the two things we’ve probably had the most issues with in XXX now, 
energy supplies, gas, electricity, and water as well, failures and transport failures, people 
getting stuck on the tube, people not being able to get to places because it’s all broken 
down are probably the biggest issues we deal with now, so this… anything up this end 
where we’re going to more people relying on those things. 
So more sophisticated… 
Yes. It means more challenges, I think. 
In this scenario, one of the things in this scenario is that we might… something that’s, 
perhaps, to some extent inevitable – that road vehicles will become more electrified. 
Hmm. 
I mean, could that… does that sort of… 
I suppose on the basis of the number of power failures… I don't think people realise how 
many power failures there are in London at the moment but if we are going to rely on 
being able to charge your vehicle up and those sorts of things then, yes, potentially that’s, 
you know, it’s going to… everything is going to be based on that. You know? That’s even 
more impact when it does go wrong. 
Hmm. Hmm. 
So that would be difficult. But I suppose it’s the flip of the fact that it’s very localised and 
your power base is local as well, I think that does give you some get out of jail support if 
people are more focused on what their local community needs rather than what London 
needs or what the UK needs, then it can be better. 
So thinking about, I don't know, sort of major terrorists… kind of 7/7, 
Hmm. 
If you’ve already got these sort of on-going problems with breakdowns and maintenance 
problems, that can obviously just sort of comparis… 
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Makes it worse. Yes. 
Yes. 
Yes. I suppose the terrorism one depends on obviously what the scenario is and how they 
would approach it, but the terrorism one tends to be a short, sharp hit. 
Hmm. 
Your other one, you were talking about the flooding one, which is more sort of on-going. 
Hmm. Hmm. 
And anything technology-wise, being hit by a flood (Laughs) it just makes it even worse 
and… 
Makes it more… yes. 
Yes, exactly. So it’s… I suppose my challenge would be, to any of these companies, looking 
at making our world more high-tech and more reliant on some of these different 
technologies is how do you make them as resilient as possible? And are they building that 
in? Or are they living in this fantasy that, oh, it will never happen to me. And I think there’s 
a bit of that been going on in the past. 
Hmm. 
You know? The floods we had a couple of summers back that affected the national 
infrastructure obviously were a bit of a wake-up call. But it’s whether there’s enough going 
on, or are we still not investing the money in that? Protecting things. 
Hmm. 
Because these, you know, new technology is great but only when it works. 
Hmm. Hmm. So you’d want, sort of, to make this scenario more resilient, you would…  
Yes. 
Need to think about lower tech solutions or not replacing things, kind of substitute, you 
know, 
Yes. There needs to be… I think there needs to be back-up to things, so having the lower 
tech solutions or back-ups, but also I think whatever you’re going for, I think whatever new, 
high… you know, high-tech solutions there are, as long as people are building in the 
resilience, you know? Protecting some of those things. So if we’re going down to one 
central power station that’s covering a whole massive area. Are we protecting it from 
floods? And how have we got the best security around it? And things like that, and 
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probably security, one of the things, probably one that they do take a lot of care about 
and interest, but some of the more climate-focused scenarios that might happen. 
Hmm. Hmm. Hmm. 
You know? The impact of snow and can people get into the place to do the maintaining 
and the repairing and those sorts of things. Do… 
To run the trains or… 
Yes. Exactly. So that’s where I think, you know, as a country, currently, at the moment, silly 
things like snow and a bit of severe weather would knock out the country massively. 
Hmm. Hmm. 
And we shouldn’t be… 
[unclear] likely to have more effects [unclear] (Laughs) yes. 
Yes. And if the climate change carries on going the way we’re going – we’re getting more 
severe sort of weather scenarios, then we need to be thinking about those things a bit 
more than I think it appears we are. 
Hmm. Hmm. Yes. I heard, in one of our steering group meetings, someone who’s… who 
used to be the chief science adviser for transport. 
Right. 
And he was actually speaking to the secretary of state about it and he apparently said, 
“Why… Why is our rail network not working? We’ve just got a bit of snow.” He said, well, 
you shouldn’t have gotten rid of all those railway cottages, because we… [unclear] people 
can’t get into work. That’s why it’s not working. The trains can work but if people can’t get 
onto them, and drive them… (Laughs) 
Yes. I think, you know, it has got a bit of a joke, the transport trains, particularly, you know, 
snow, they don’t run and then the other day when we had a bit of hot weather they 
weren’t running then because of the hot and it’s like you just need a sort of middle-of-the-
road, average UK day and everything is fine but the reality is…. 
10 to 20 degrees. (Laughs) 
Yes. As soon as we get any hot weather, everything stops and the tube is a nightmare and 
the trains don’t run; as soon as you get snow, everything stops as well. So… 
So you… So in this sort of scenario, I guess your concern would be that, you know, that the 
technology, it needs to have the sort of redundancy built into it or there needs… it doesn’t 
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need… you shouldn’t kind of replace perhaps what already exists, so automated cars 
might be fine but people need to be able to override them if the system is not working or 
the system fails. That there would be… And there’s been perhaps… perhaps [unclear] sort 
of increasing reliance maybe on even in sort of local energy production, that that could 
be sort of problematic if people are using… relying on that pattern more or… 
Yes. I think there are always people who are thinking about redundancy of things, 
Hmm. Hmm. 
And building in options. Then you… 
But generally, I mean if we were to sort of… I’m just trying to think of other issues that are 
around sort of level of kind of political fragmentation, does that cause… 
Erm… 
I mean, you spoke about the sort of localism… 
Yes. I think for me… 
Quite a positive thing for [unclear] 
I think for putting power back in the hands of local people and encouraging them to take 
responsibility for some of these things is a good thing because I think, definitely, at the 
moment, when something goes wrong, there’s almost… Although definitely at times you 
hear them saying, well, we don’t want a nanny state but yet as soon as something goes 
wrong, they all phone… they phone the… on a local level, if at XXX Council something 
goes wrong, people phone XXX Council and say my power is off. Well, the power supply is 
nothing to do with XXX Council. 
Hmm. Hmm. 
But they still phone us and expect us to solve it for them, and if the power is off for a long 
time during the cold weather, they still phone us and expect us to bring them a blanket 
and things like that. So anything that gives more responsibility and power back to the local 
people makes them think about that, actually, they’re together, collectively responsible 
for this and looking after each other and not expecting someone to swoop in from higher… 
[unclear] say them, it’s good for me because I think we’ve got to this point where it’s 
ridiculous – I’d never phone my council and ask them for a blanket. 
Hmm. Hmm. 
But yet I get called regularly, so can you give me a torch?  
(Laughs) Some matches. Yes. 
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Yes. Not a box of matches, no – [unclear] we’ve had too many of them. But it just shocks 
me a little bit how people are at the moment, so anything that’s going to push that the 
other way. 
So what would you… in this… so what would you like to see in this sort of, in 40 years’ time, 
what would you like to see that could make… 
I think, you know, I think people feeling like they’ve got more… This is why some of those 
localisms… People feeling that they’ve got more say and more responsibility for what’s 
happening and the decisions that are being made locally and how they… 
So… 
And so that they can’t almost bury their head in the sand. 
So more public involvement in sort of resilience forums and… 
Yes. Well, not necessarily just resilience forums but anything that might impact you, so how, 
you know, the energy and the technology stuff, more decisions locally and people getting 
involved in that. 
Hmm. Hmm. 
I think at the moment it’s very much there is local involvement in some of these things 
through your elected members and things but it’s very much the same people. 
Hmm. Hmm. 
I think it needs to be a much greater community involvement in these decision-making 
things and that happen. 
Hmm. Hmm. 
Because I think, yes, people need to take responsibility for all sorts of things. They can’t just 
sit back and moan. 
Yes. So I’m just trying to think how you’d actually… 
Yes.  
How you actually kind of operationalize that, really. 
I suppose… 
Or an example, just so I can sort of say, you know… 
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Something we’re looking at locally is, as money is being cut and services are being 
changed, we are looking at things like, on a simple level, can we give over the running of 
some of the local services to a local community group. 
Hmm. 
So they can decide how it runs, they get some funding via us, 
Hmm. 
But they’re much more empowered to shape how their local area works and… 
What are the sort of aims of that group and… 
Yes. So, rather than it being XXX, it’s an award basis of just one area, and they come 
together and I think that is… it’s quite an interesting thing for me. It’s obviously very different 
from how we are at the moment, 
Hmm. 
But it would be interesting to see how that could be pushed further, 
Hmm. 
So that you are more community-spirited, I suppose – more community-minded of what’s 
going on in your local area and how… 
And those sorts of broad issues, even if they’re not explicitly resilient, 
Hmm. 
They could sort of foster a greater sense of kind of responsibility when there is a… 
I think anything that fosters a greater sense of my community and we are lo, you know, 
together, will have an impact on how people will then respond when something does 
happen in their community; they pull together more naturally. 
So less explicitly a resilience-related initiative or… 
Yes. 
Okay. That’s interesting. Is there anything else about this scenario that you’d like to kind of 
add about how resilient it might be, or any ways in which you could kind of improve the 
resilience? Kind of a detailed… 
I don't think so. I talked about the main things. Any sort of technology stuff, there’s a 
redundancy in it. 
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What about the sort of vulnerability? I mean, one of the things here is that… well, actually, 
it’s not a scenario but what do you think of the sort of fuel property implications might be 
of sort of increased… increased sort of embedded power? Sort of more micro generation, 
for example. Is that something that, you know, not just [unclear] or is that something that 
could be quite useful? 
Yes. I think anything that, you know, anything that’s more local and will take on board the 
issue, who you’ve got in your community and how to best focus on those things, so yes. 
I’ve lost [unclear] thinking… my mind’s going mad at the moment about all the logistics… 
Sorry. There’s quite a lot in there, isn’t there? 
(Laughs) Yes. I think anything with more localised focus is going to have a better impact 
on fuel poverty and those sorts of things, because you know who’s in your area more and 
the sorts of it’s more focused on the needs of your smaller community than something 
that’s trying to focus on a whole, as the whole country, and taking an approach that works 
across the whole country when you’ve got very varied situations going on in different 
communities and different groups. So, you know, what works in London isn’t going to work 
in rural Wales, necessarily. 
Hmm. 
So anything with localised decision-making and power and things is going to have, I think, 
a better… 
Yes. 
That’s my own personal feeling. I’m sure the government doesn’t think that but, I don't 
know, they are going for localised… Yes. They are…  
Yes. (Laughs) I mean the likelihood is it will probably end up… 
Somewhere in the middle. 
Yes. (Laughs) But it’s interesting to kind of think about the implications of going further… 
Yes. It’s certainly something we’re thinking about. Some of the management meetings I’ve 
been at recently here – how far the localism stuff will go – and it’s quite interesting. 
Yes. 
Because although you like to think that XXX Council is one [unclear] 33 of London is quite 
localised. Actually, we’re pushing it beyond that to much more focused on what… it’s 
quite interesting to see what will happen with the council structures and things like that, 
whether they just go… It will be much more… 
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Hmm. Yes. 
Yes. A little… I suppose hamlet is the right term but, yes – we’re sort of looking at more 
ward-based things and how that will work. 
Hmm. Hmm. Hmm. So the sort of extreme of this sort of scenario where, you know, we’ve 
got a lot of our power being generated sort of locally but maybe not necessarily solar 
panels on someone’s roof but perhaps a sort of CHP plant that serves, I don't know, a ward, 
for example, that’s… how… Is that something that sort of community power generation… 
I think the community stuff is already starting to happen to some extent, so one… 
What would that mean for the resilience or… 
Yes. I mean I think… I think I suppose it’s good as long as you’ve got the flip in there that if 
the power is not there you can fall back on the main network, 
Yes. 
So looking at something similar here that, there’s a medical research centre just being 
given planning permission just behind St. Pancras Station, 
Hmm. 
And part of that is that their excess heat and things is going to go into energy supply for 
the community. 
Right. Okay. 
So, and there’s sort of… and the community where they’re going to serve is quite a sort of 
poor community, I suppose. 
Hmm. That’s something that the council played a role in. 
Yes. It’s one of the things we’ve put into their sort of contracted their planning permission. 
Hmm. Hmm. 
They had to do certain things for the community and one of the things was this energy 
thing, so it’s quite interesting that that… so, obviously if then something happens at the site, 
they’ve got other redundancy to switch back into the main network to… 
Hmm. Hmm. Hmm. 
But I think that’s definitely a positive thing. I think there are lots of, probably, places, like 
they were saying, that generate far too much heat and energy and things. 
Yes. Well, certainly he… I mean, most of what [unclear] heat, I guess. 
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Yes. It was quite interesting, seeing how that was going to work, and I think there’s definitely 
scope for that to go further, to be using those sort of bigger in… bigger sort of 
establishments to support your [unclear] member of the community. 
Hmm. Hmm. Hmm. 
But it is, for me, it’s the redundancy of something that goes wrong then… 
Yes. What happen to… yes. 
Yes. So it’s just not over-aligning…  
Having the ability to share. 
Yes. Back-ups to things, and that’s… I suppose the issue to that is that all cost to keep all 
the back-ups and redundancy things in there for… 
Hmm. So that’s a negligence issue you could see with that sort of embedded power or 
community power. 
Yes, yes. I think so. 
Okay. (Laughs) 
It’s an interesting, fascinating project. Don’t [unclear] thinking more than next summer so, 
like, ooh. 
I know there’s been a bit of a… I think there’s been a thing… 
The whole world ends next summer. (Laughs) 
I mean, the two reasons why we’ve done 2050, I mean, well, firstly I guess because some 
of the people we’re talking to won’t want to talk about the current day, you know, sort of 
working in the current CT sector I think where there are confidentiality issues that they can’t 
really talk about. You know? So it’s useful to get them to think beyond that and also 
because a lot of these decisions about whether we’re going to… how far we’re going to 
get [unclear] nuclear power, 
Hmm. 
How far we’re going to develop our high-speed network. They have to be taken decades 
in advance because it just takes so long to make changes. 
Yes. That’s it. Yes. You’re saying that… the high-speed link, potentially going into Euston. 
That shocked me, the timescales of that one. 
Hmm. It could be sort of 2030, ’40… 
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Yes. It’s going to be years before it’s running. So why are we talking about it and worrying 
about it now? So… 
Yes. And even by now, even by 20… well, by this hypothetical, now, 2050, we might not 
still have trains running from Scotland to… 
No. 
We could just still be developing that… 
No. Yes. 
[unclear] And by then, Scotland could be its own country. (Laughs) 
Yes. 
So just… I mean if we look, so your sort of preference for this kind of [unclear] might be 
something similar to this in terms of sort of resilience. 
Yes. I think… I suppose it obviously has its risk but for me I’m quite interested with looking at 
how… I suppose, for me, it’s looking back in history and looking at how London supported 
itself through the war and various other things that have happened and how communities 
kind of pulled together and this whole thing we’re in now where they don’t support each 
other and they’re very reliant on things being bought into them and bigger technologies 
and things and so when something goes wrong, probably it’s more of an issue than it 
probably would have been when the technology wasn’t there and the reliance wasn’t 
there and the community was more, so anything that goes back to a more localised feel 
with more local community supporting each other and making decisions, to me, seems 
like a good way to be going. 
So, really more sort of social solutions, I suppose. 
Yes, yes. And I’ve been quite interested in some of the stuff that the transition movements 
are doing at the moment. So we’ve got… Been talking to one of those locally about the 
stuff they’re working on and they’ve been doing lots of stuff on fuel poverty and things, 
so… 
Hmm. 
It’s quite interesting, sort of putting that on my normal thing that any… A lot of the incidents 
we have, if people were more supportive of each other and had more local solutions and 
weren’t relying on technology, they probably wouldn’t be as impacted. 
Hmm. Hmm. Hmm. 
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And, you know, and like the little picture when they’re on bikes but, you know, the tube 
goes down in London, it’s like a disaster, isn't it? 
No one knows what to… 
Get your legs out. A map. And walk. 
So the thing is like people buy an A to Z and, 7/7, you know, not knowing how to use them 
and stuff. 
Yes. And I think people were shocked at 7/7 of they get on a tube normally and they pop 
up at that tube but actually, in reality, to walk, it probably didn’t take that long. I know 
quite a lot of people who realised it wasn’t actually that far to walk and they’ll walk most 
days. It saves them a fortune, but… 
Hmm. So people actually learn things from these events as well. 
Yes, yes. I think, you know, we’re all so reliant on technology and the fast… everything is 
so easy now. 
Hmm. Hmm. Hmm. 
That when it’s taken away from you, it’s probably worse. 
Hmm. Hmm. So… So the Boris Bikes, would they be kind of… 
I love Boris Bikes. 
Yes. They would be a good example, I guess, of this sort of stuff. 
Yes.  
In some ways, a technical solution, but a pretty low-tech solution. 
Very low-tech. Yes. 
So they would be a useful kind of resilience. 
Yes. They are. 
I guess providing a kind of redundancy, I suppose, to… 
I think they’ll be… If, you know, if we had something like 7/7 again, I don't think there’d be 
a Boris Bike left on the stand, because everyone would be getting on one and off, so… 
(Laughs) Yes. I mean, is there anything you could do to improve that or any other 
elements… Any other things? Kind of low-tech solutions that locally could improve 
resilience in this. 
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I think, you know, some of the things, say talking to the transition movement, that some of 
their sort of local-grown food and sort of community support groups and things that sort of 
takes away some of the emphasis of relying on bringing things into your community, I think 
that’s good. 
Hmm. Yes. 
Obviously, yes, you know, most people want to be able to get the things they want when 
they’re not in season and stuff like that, but anything like that, I think, having those to fall 
back on. 
So allotments, even, I guess. 
Yes. So that’s a lot of the stuff the transition movement are doing and mending things and, 
you know, not relying on branding equipment and things like that is quite interesting. I don't 
know. I suppose my only challenge with me thinking, my lovely world, that that would be 
the great way. I can't see many people giving up their iPods and all the technology that 
exists now and going down to this road. 
Hmm. Hmm. 
Unless forced. 
Yes. I mean, obviously big events can become a catalyst for change. 
Yes, yes. 
Or the cost of food, even. 
Yes. So… Yes. I think, you know, people are so used to having things the way they are at 
the moment that it would take a big catalyst to push people down to perhaps more low-
tech. 
Hmm. Hmm. Yes. 
And local supporting [unclear] that… 
What about things like sort of more multi-generational family [unclear]. 
God. 
(Laughs) 
I was thinking about that from our own perspective. That means live-in [unclear] no thanks. 
(Laughs) 
Although people live in… you know, because 
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Yes. 
People tend to, well, the trend has been more towards people commuting further and 
further apart, people perhaps living further and further from their relatives and their family 
and friends. People are much more prepared to go and see family on the other side. What 
do they… They were… quite [unclear] can,  
Yes. 
But in this scenario, perhaps they couldn’t. What might that mean? Would that… 
I think, if you couldn’t, I suppose, again, for resilience side, if you can’t… if you don’t have 
your family support network near you, then it does put more pressure on you needing 
support from someone else. So anything that brings the family and the support groups 
closer together, 
Hmm. 
Means you’re probably less likely to need support from other agencies when something 
does happen. 
Hmm. 
So I suppose your flooding scenario or something like that, it’s easy… it’s quite nice for us 
as an organisation with our role to be able to say, “Can you go and stay with family and 
friends if you’ve got a problem in your area?” 
Hmm. 
And if they can get there, because it’s local, that’s fine. When it’s miles away, that’s not so 
good. 
Hmm. 
So… yes. I suppose any… bringing groups together. I suppose the only thing is if how close 
you bring them together at the moment, if you’re living in the same house or the same 
street, then you’re more likely… it does knock out your… the flip is it knocks out your support 
network if they’re that close. 
Hmm. Hmm. And they [unclear] affected. Yes. 
You’re all affected by… So, yes, it’s a balance between us, really. 
It depends on the event, I suppose, of how… 
Yes. How it affects you. And does it affect your home? Or is it something… 
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I’m trying to think… you could probably go back to the blitz or something, to think about 
families who were living all in one house and… 
Yes. That’s what I’m thinking. That most of my family, back in that time, were all living 
together so if the house got bombed out, it was a bit of a problem. So were several 
generations. 
Hmm. 
But then [unclear] stay with aunties and uncles. 
Hmm. Hmm. 
But even they lives quite closely to each other, so anything that was sort of more of a 
widespread… I suppose a flooding scenario would affect a wider area. 
Hmm. Hmm. 
Would affect all of us. Severe weather, sort of thing. But it is quite interesting, I think, the sort 
of support network that your family and close friends give you, and if they’re in Australia or 
miles away, 
Hmm. Hmm. 
It’s quite having… 
So in the same house it might be difficult, but maybe locally… 
Yes. Locally. 
Living more locally. 
Yes. 
Yes, yes. Okay. I mean, one of the reasons we sort of said that is because we had a… when 
we were sort of setting these things out, an economist sort of looked at these things and 
sort of said, yes, but you’re… we’re not having a global [unclear] trade, so where out 
pension funds are going to fall apart and how are we going to provide social care? And I 
said, well, how did we used to provide it? 
Hmm. 
We used to provide it because of relatives and… yes. Exactly. (Laughs) 
[unclear] God. Let’s hope this doesn’t happen in 2050. 
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We’ll have to sort out a social care to… Well, that’s one of the problems at the moment, 
isn't it? How do we pay for the aging society? I guess that was one of the things that we 
looked at… 
Yes. Yes, and I think that’s… 
Perhaps an extreme version but what we used to do, I guess… 
I suppose other cultures still have that, to some extent. 
Yes. 
You know? If you look at the aging community, they tend to all live… 
Yes. 
Grandma tends to live in the house, as does… Anyway, you got married… 
And when you’ve got bigger families, maybe you should be passed around… 
You still tend to live… yes. 
Passed around different, you know… 
Yes. 
A dozen different children. (Laughs) 
[unclear] More children. No. It’s an interesting one. 
Okay. And you think XXXX, for example, as a kind of… 
Hmm. 
Would be quite well positioned to perhaps do this? 
Parts of it. 
Parts of it? 
Yes. I think parts of it are already starting to sum… not probably as far down the line as your 
scenario has gone but are starting to think about some of those things and the small groups 
I suppose might, yes, going back to the point I made earlier. My key thing would be some 
of the communities now would take some major catalyst to push them into… 
Yes. There would be a lot of resistance to… 
Yes. People are used to being able to go into the local supermarket to get whatever they 
want; used to be able to getting on the train and jetting off wherever. 
Hmm. Hmm. Hmm. 
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To give that up would be a… 
Hmm. 
A significant thing. And sort of, it is almost going back in history, that one, I think, 
Hmm. 
Going back to the way we used to live. 
Yes, yes. 
But I think there are, you know, there are small pockets already starting to look at that and 
starting to do some of that and people starting to live in those ways and… 
Do you think different parts of London, for example, would be better positioned to sort of 
adopt this sort of… self-sufficient… almost a kind of self-sufficient sort of approach? 
Yes. I suppose so. Yes. I suppose so. I suppose you’ve got to look at the sorts of people, the 
sorts of things that go on in different parts, and whether it would work. 
Because that’s one… I mean, this is one of the things we’ve looked at. I mean, you know, 
if your [unclear] local approach are… Different parts of the country or different parts of your 
city might have different resources, 
Hmm. 
And different abilities to kind of become more self-sufficient, perhaps, than… 
Yes. 
I don't know. I’m just throwing ideas… 
I suppose… It’s hard in your mind to sort of think that, you know, a lot of people come in 
and work in XXXX and commute out from miles away, including myself. So if you take those 
people out and say we’re more… Well, they’re all staying where they live and working… 
doing things locally, it would make it a very different place. 
Hmm. Hmm. Hmm. I mean, I think there might be some level of in transport… 
Yes. 
Between different areas, but probably less, really. 
Hmm. 
Perhaps people might be working from home or… I don't know, exactly. 
Yes. That’s potentially the way we’re going anyway. I think even… That’s probably more 
of a high-tech solution than this, though, 
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Yes. 
But one of the things that we’re all looking at is we can’t afford to build this anymore in 
these organisations, so, we’re looking at a potential way of how thousands of our staff can 
work from home every day. 
Hmm. Hmm. 
So XXXXX Council staff, working from Hertfordshire and Essex and wherever. 
Hmm. Because it gives people the choice of you work at home or you lose your job… 
(Laughs) 
Well, yes. Yes. Some people, I suppose, would be quite happy to work [unclear] how much 
people [unclear] 
Yes. I work [unclear] some time. (Laughs) 
I was going to throw… It’s a bit like the technology thing. I was going to throw my laptop 
out of the window when I worked from home because it wasn’t instant. Failed me 
miserable. 
Yes. I find it… yes. I live in a village in Derbyshire. People presume I’ve got the fastest 
internet connection but I really haven’t, so it’s quite hard to do them. 
Yes. 
So, okay. I mean how are we doing for time? Are we… 
Yes. Fine. 
If we can try and have a look at these two as well, 
Yes. 
So with this sort of iWorld scenario where sort of multinational companies govern the 
supranational sort of government agencies and institutions are kind of pushing through a 
sort of quite a top-down approach to tackling sort of energy and security in climate 
change. So we’re… particularly across Europe, I mean, I guess there are already sort of 
some precursors to this. As I say, I know speaking to people in the energy industry that 
they’re looking to kind of create more interconnectors between countries and create sort 
of European energy codes and things and stuff that I don’t personally know a lot about but 
I know there seems to be some sort of movement, some sort of direction. You can kind of 
imagine, I suppose, in this scenario, that we might kind of upscale the national grid so that 
power is sort of managed across Europe. And there could be some advantages to that. 
342 
 
Mmhmm. 
For example, you know, that if the wind’s now blowing in the UK, if we’re spending a lot of 
money on wind farms, then we need some reserve somewhere else, perhaps, in Europe, 
to kind of make up for that. So maybe the sun shining in Spain or, you know. And across 
the year as well, I guess, it’s likely that there’s going to be more kind of a wind resource 
than there is in the summer and maybe it makes sense to kind of upscale these things onto 
a kind of supranational level, particularly in terms of energy production. I guess… So, in this 
scenario, yes, we’re kind of trying to kind of look outwards and kind of solve our sort of 
energy and transport problems. And it’s got… I mean, this will cost a lot of money. I guess 
this is the key thing. And this is probably not, in some ways, far off the way that the national 
grid talks about things at the moment, 
Hmm. 
And that fuel costs are going to be sort of tripled and to pay for sort of infrastructure 
improvements. And obviously [unclear] issues for sort of fuel poverty, potentially. 
Hmm. 
I mean, the other thing is that so in this scenario we’re perhaps looking at about demand-
responsive kind of vehicles, you know, that you can kind of dial into your computer and a 
car will appear and perhaps take you to your… take you to a train exactly sort of on time, 
sort of thing. I don't know how (Laughs) but some people think that that could happen. So, 
and also with the sort of European super-smart groups, [unclear] describing that 
appliances could perhaps be turned off, then, to sort of balance the load or turned on to 
balance load when it’s needed, and that could be quite useful in a… during a sort of critical 
episode, I guess. 
Hmm. 
I don't know if you want to just… And we haven’t copyrighted (Laughs) 
(Laughs) 
Hmm. I suppose, as you were saying, the interesting one with this, most of my thoughts are 
from a people point of view, because that’s where I’m sort of supporting people at the 
moment, so while it sounds nice to be able to have that sort of, in some respects, resilient 
approach, because we’ve got all these options across the whole of Europe – that the wind 
is blowing, the sun is shining and whatever’s happening, it is that cost thing of can people 
actually afford to have it? 
Hmm. Hmm. 
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I suppose the… on, you know, on the point I was making earlier about things don’t work, I 
suppose with this one I suppose it does give you that lots of options. 
Yes. 
We are joining up the world and not just focusing on the UK, but we’re not looking at a 
Europe model. I suppose there’s still that… There is still that technology thing around, is 
the… is the resilience in there in terms of the technology, getting that energy into the 
country and making it work. 
Hmm. Hmm. 
And are those links as secure as they can be?  
So they could become a target, I guess, for… 
Yes. And I think, well, yes, a target or just knocked out. If we’re sort of reliant on a limited 
number of bringing it in from Europe and the wind’s not blowing in the UK so we are relying 
on Europe is that… is how easy is it to knock those things out? 
Hmm. Hmm. 
What idea of this smart grid? Turning things off. 
Obviously that… Because that’s quite a cultural… 
There’s a very good advocate, who used to work here – she used to spend her life going 
round turning everything off behind people and going mad at people. 
(Laughs) 
Not that… you know. We are sort of… I suppose we’re sort of moving towards some of that 
already. You know? In the organisation just here, we’ve got technology. If your computer’s 
not used for so long, then it… IT, switch it off. 
The power’s down. Yes. 
Yes. 
In fact, this… it’s one of the things, like [unclear] smart [unclear] it could do that and you 
could kind of balance loads and instead of having to, you know, power up [unclear] power 
stations because everyone has a cup of tea at the end of a World Cup Final, maybe some 
people can’t do that or something. (Laughs) I don't know. 
Or I suppose kind of… the thing, I think, with that, is that if things are switching themselves 
off automatically, does it take the responsibility away from the people? 
Hmm. 
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And if there’s always an option somewhere near the sun shining, the wind’s blowing or 
whatever it is that’s happening, again, does that sort of take away that kind of message 
that we’re getting at the moment to be… 
To empower? 
To be careful and be, you know, to, yes, think about [unclear] we’re taking away that 
personal responsibility. 
So the technology is almost responsibility for the technology. 
Yes. I suppose the balance is there, if the cost is so high that you have to be careful, then 
that might push you, but for those people perhaps who can afford it then… 
Yes. I mean, I guess one thing might be… Sort of one of the things I’ve thought sort of 
thought about is that, you know, you might… okay. You can run your tumble dryer now, 
but it tells you it’s going to cost a certain amount of money. 
Hmm. 
Almost like booking a train, whereas if you run it in terms of, you know, if you run it a couple 
of hours later, then it will be 20% less or those sorts of things, I guess. 
Hmm. 
Which comes back to kind of smart metering, I guess, as well, doesn’t it, really? 
Yes. I suppose my challenge with my thinking about all of these things is that I don’t 
believe… I don’t believe technology is that [unclear]… 
Technology can… [unclear] (Laughs) 
I don’t do that. I’m so used to picking up the pieces when everything’s gone wrong and 
no one’s got any power or water or a gas and trains aren’t running and the train company 
have just decided to close the station and send them that way. It’s like, oh, yes. 
So the more… I guess, then… I mean, does it pose more of a problem the more complex 
it gets? The more… 
Yes. I think the more complex it gets, the more people rely on these things. I suppose it 
might… as long as… My challenge will always be as long as the organisations that are 
providing the backup plans and arrangements for what to do when it doesn’t go to plan, 
because as a council I think we are picking up the pieces when these companies, you 
know, that [unclear] is a good example. 
Mmhmm. 
345 
 
You know? They wanted, the last three years? We’ve had a winter disruption. No. They’re 
not running. And they wanted to close the stations several times and give us thousands of 
people who are stuck here, can the council look after them? And it’s like, well, they’re your 
customers. 
Hmm. 
They don’t live in Camden; they’ve not paid in any council tax in Camden; they pay to go 
on your train. 
And so they wanted you to kind of put them into temporary housing or… 
Yes. [unclear] us to temporarily accommodate them until they could get a train. 
Sports halls or something.  
So I suppose the more of these things we rely on, the more we are going, you know, across 
the world and travelling about more. The [unclear] scenarios and things like that, the more 
it puts that… Someone’s got to have that backup plan of what happens when these things 
fail or fall over because of a flood terrace town or whatever. The unexpected. I suppose 
the ash cloud was a good example of that. 
Hmm. Hmm. 
But, you know, that’s when people just don’t… people don’t expect them to fall over and 
therefore haven’t got a backup plan themselves and then the organisations who run these 
two generally don’t either and rely on someone else, so… 
Hmm. Certainly more potential I guess to kind of pass the buck so people become 
distanced from the… 
Yes, yes. Unless, of course, that’s all built in as we’re moving that way – recognising the 
trends, but now moving, as we go more high-tech and more reliant on these things and 
more well-travelled and stuff, it’s building in that expectation that there is a backup plan 
if it goes wrong. 
Hmm. But I guess the issue then is finding that kind of local, like you were talking about, 
where do people go when their trains aren’t running? 
Hmm. Yes. 
How do Eurostar, who’ve got their offices… I’m not sure exactly where Eurostar’s offices are 
but probably… 
Yes. 
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The people making those sort of decisions are probably quite a long way away. 
No. Exactly. 
And they’re not thinking about those sorts of things, perhaps, or… 
No. But they should be. (Laughs) 
They should be. 
Well, they’re taking their money. So… 
But when you’ve got these organisations that are kind of multinational companies or, you 
know, they’re sort of insulated some way, you know, perhaps until the media get hold of it. 
Yes. I think… And they’ve sort of lived in this… it won’t happen to us. You know? It’s 
happened three years in a row. 
Hmm. 
It won’t happen again so the, you know, for us, we’ve been saying get hotels on standby; 
get coaches on standby. You know? Get enough weather warnings [unclear] it’s coming. 
Hmm. Hmm. Hmm. So people aren’t taking the… 
But they’re not just… it seems every year we have the same problem. 
Hmm. Hmm. And you can imagine that getting worse if… 
Yes. I think so. 
The more trains, sort of… 
Yes. The more we rely on these things and travel around the world, then when you do get 
the bigger impact I think it has when you do get some of these things happen. 
I mean, I guess it’s very difficult, thinking about weather warnings, 
Hmm. 
They might say, well, it’s quite difficult to… When people are travelling from the other side 
of Europe or, you know, how you do that. 
Well, I don't know. Technology is there. (Laughs) 
We should have an app for it or something. 
Well, that’s it. If the technology is going to improve, there are already enough apps to get 
you weather warnings for god knows wherever you want. 
Yes. It’s someone taking responsibility. 
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Now, it is that responsibility thing. It’s… if it… you know, it makes life very easy in some 
respects, but in other things you’d be [unclear] you can travel around the world easily. If 
you can… if your appliance switches off if it tells you when it’s cheaper to run it and all 
those sorts of things. It makes life easy, which is great at the best of times. It’s when it goes 
wrong, that reliance and that responsibility for this is my problem to solve. It’s who picks up 
the pieces for me is the challenge with these ones. 
Okay. 
I quite like this little community looking after each other. I like it. Like the people knocking 
on doors, looking out. Global community doesn’t sound like people knocking on each 
other’s doors saying, “Are you okay?” 
No. 
It sounds like I’ll get my app out and check whether the people in my street are okay. 
Hmm. Yes. Okay. I mean, is there anything else you wanted to add about… 
I don't think so. 
No? [unclear] I mean, in this scenario, I guess, we’re sort of thinking of lower-tech solutions, 
really. 
Hmm. 
So we’re still… people are still kind of out, generally, wanting to travel quite a lot and 
outwardly looking, but they’re perhaps more prepared to sort of travel more slowly, 
perhaps. 
Right. 
We’re sort of taking social solutions as well, so banning [unclear] cars from city centres 
may be one sort of example of that. In some ways this is more probably, kind of, you know, 
we’re thinking about kind of today’s technology. The technology hasn’t moved on a lot 
but, in some ways, but we’re still wanting to travel quite a lot. I guess you’d have, I don't 
know, I find this kind of perhaps one of the more sort of challenging scenarios to think 
about, really.  
Hmm. 
Probably because globalisation has gone on hand-in-hand with sort of higher technology. 
Yes. Yes. It’s an interesting one. If we’re expecting more sort of world travel and more… 
But you can imagine… 
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But on a slower… 
Yes. People might be tele-working more. People might be more prepared to get sort of 
slower trains rather than fly. I mean, one of the elephants in the room is where does aviation 
go? Because there isn’t a sustainable… There isn’t a replacement for jet fuel. And we will 
run out of jet fuel. (Laughs) 
I’d better get my holiday in quick. 
(Laughs) 
Well, I don't know. I suppose perhaps the little window in to some of the stuff down here 
about not using the planes in teleconferences was some of the stuff that came out of the 
ash cloud and how some of the businesses have already, 
Hmm. 
Had a think about still… I still want to be dealing with those countries, but do I want to be 
sending people over there for a meeting or can we do it on that way? 
Hmm. Hmm. 
So, yes. I’m just trying to think. I like lower technology. 
(Laughs) 
I’m not a technology fan. I just think it causes more problems in some respects. She says, 
who has all the technology, with hundreds and hundreds of bits of kit. 
I guess the more you use it, the more you realise how it is dependent on that (Laughs) 
Yes. You know, after 7/7 nothing worked, so I ended up with runners to talk to people. 
Right. 
Because the radio didn’t work; the phones didn’t work. You know? People… it was easier 
just sending someone in the van or walking up the street to pass notes on post-it notes, so 
I keep saying we’re going to get pigeons next. Train a troop of pigeons. 
I guess that was one of the big things, wasn’t it? Mobile phone networking. 
Yes. 
So, you know… 
It’s a bit of an eye-opener as to how reliant people are, because that’s people’s biggest 
thing of the day. [unclear] I couldn’t talk to anyone. 
349 
 
One of the things, I suppose, in these scenarios, in these two, this idea of kind of sharing 
knowledge. 
Mmhmm. 
I mean, is that useful… How useful can that be? Sort of… I mean, if we’re sort of in terms of 
kind of learning from other events, 
Definitely very useful. I think we do the same things too many times. And we don’t learn 
from each other’s experiences. 
Hmm. 
And I think actually, in some respects, although I’ve been saying [unclear] local 
community, it’s great. Anything on a global scale in terms of sharing information and 
learning from other people’s issues I think is good. 
Hmm. 
I think we don’t do enough. I think we… I suppose the challenge is how we learn as well. 
We do a lot of listening to what’s gone on, but not necessarily putting that on our own 
overlay and saying how it will happen or how that might impact here and what we can 
do to limit that, so anything that involves sharing of knowledge and learning from each 
other’s experiences is good as far as I'm concerned. 
And that, obviously… I guess that becomes harder in these scenarios, just because people 
are travelling less. 
Hmm. 
People are sort of more inward-looking but also maybe because the sorts of systems are 
quite different. 
Yes. 
Hmm. 
And as well, you are taking that plus that we have got with technology at the moment, 
and, you know, the far extreme where you were, I think the moment where we are with 
anything, it’s so easy to find out something about what’s gone on elsewhere in the world 
and probably will only get better with apps and, you know, I’ve got… found an app the 
other day on the iPod that’s sort of a disaster alert, and it tells you if there’s anything going 
on in the world. It’s like 22 minutes ago, there was a tsunami… it’s weird, but… 
Hmm. Hmm. 
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It is… that’s a positive, I think. 
And that’s something you’d like to see more of, by… 
Yes. 
You’d imagine to see more of by… 
Social [unclear] is an interesting one – this one as well. And that’s one that’s been bubbling 
away a little bit recently. 
Hmm. Well, I think, yes, I mean, I guess sort of thinking about in a lot of these scenarios, 
we’re thinking that the sort of effects of climate change might be more… certainly energy 
and security might be involved. The cost of energy would likely be higher. And that, I guess, 
has implications for… 
Hmm. Yes. 
Sort of eco-terrorism and… 
Yes. Massive implications, I suppose. All of those things. Any… Any social… from my, again, 
from my perspective back in the local authority is going to have a big impact and anything 
that’s, you know, I suppose all of these things, looking at you’re, saying that energy is going 
up and other security measures and things is also almost dividing the population as well 
between those who are rich and can afford and those who are poor and that’s one of 
the things that’s very clear in Camden at the moment. I think for London we’ve got the 
biggest divide, I think, between our lowest earners and our highest earners. And so that, to 
get even more exacerbated by any of these [unclear] I suppose is quite interesting 
because that group at the lower end that need more support from us. 
Hmm. Hmm. 
Which is, again, I suppose, interesting, because this one I was saying, we’re back on the 
localism stuff, if you’re moving away from having the sort of local authority in those sorts of 
support networks that the localism bill seems to be pushing to then, actually, what 
happens? It does rely on people taking responsibility for their lower income poorer 
members of society and supporting each other. 
Hmm. Hmm. Hmm. Yes. Whereas this, you can [unclear] to go perhaps a bit more. 
Yes. It’s all about responsibility. I think [unclear] responsibility. Hmm. 
Hmm. 
Interesting. I’m not sure if anything I’ve said is any use for you, but it’s very interesting. 
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No, no. It’s been useful. I mean it’s useful because you’re the only person we’ve spoken to 
who has the kind of local perspective. 
Right. Right. 
I mean, we’ve got another work stream running sort of later on, sort of [unclear] to engage 
local authorities et cetera. 
Right. Okay. 
But I thought it would be really useful at this stage as well to have that. 
Yes. 
Most people have adopted a sort of, you know, quite a top-down… inherently are coming 
from quite a top-down perspective, because that’s the nature of their work, perhaps. 
Yes. 
Although perhaps they can talk about local examples. 
Hmm. I’m not sure where I… 
Okay. Okay. Is there anything else you want to add about just generally… 
I don't think so. 
For this one or… things that… things that could be kind of issues, issues for you in 2050? I 
mean, I know it’s quite difficult.  
I think I’ll be retired. (Laughs) 
Your organisation [unclear] 
Yes. 
Assuming that local authorities take this and… 
Yes. That’s the challenge. I suppose, really, it’s just that… That thing of looking at [unclear] 
the vulnerable people and anything that goes down this more community focus and 
going back to the good old days of the war and sort of where people look out for each 
other takes away some of the responsibility and the ownership of the council to step in and 
be a big brother almost looking out for people. 
Hmm. 
But anything on this high thing, I think, and I suppose for some… it’s quite interesting to look 
at whether the local authority role will change, but it’s still having someone there that, 
actually, when it doesn’t quite all go to plan. 
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Hmm. Hmm. Hmm. 
And to, you know, particularly more reliant people come on… become on technology 
and other things. 
Hmm. 
And don’t make… have the responsibility for making certain decisions themselves about 
how things work, maybe. 
Yes. Or they don’t feel they have the power to fit something that they’re not allowed to fix 
or something. 
Then I think… No, that’s it. And I think that’s when you… When something does go 
catastrophically wrong, whatever causes it, it’s almost that more… I think the impact is 
probably worse than, perhaps, where people have more responsibility and are involved in 
it because it’s that shock and then it’s, well, what do we do? And what options have we 
got? 
Hmm. Hmm. 
And probably the farther up that way you go, I think people have less and everything’s 
taken care of. 
Hmm. Hmm. So you [unclear] bigger agencies to cope with that. 
Yes. And I think, you know, the thing is, from our perspective, is most of the scenarios… a 
lot of the things that could happen are quite predictable but when you think about the 
ash cloud and probably if you’d said to someone before 9/11 that two planes would be, 
you know, flown into the towers, probably everyone would say, “Don’t be silly.” 
Hmm. 
So I think it is just building in that, what do you do when the really unexpected that people 
haven’t had the foresight to think about or look at 
Yes. And it’s like, you know, twice now. 
Hmm. 
So it’s those sorts of things that people just don’t see. I think, you know, there’s lots of stuff 
people are saying about people expect the unexpected and you should be thinking 
about those things, but I don't think anyone would have said the ash cloud example, 
previously. 
No, no. No. It seems a world away, doesn’t it? 
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Yes. 
Everyone [unclear] Iceland. 
Yes. So it’s really, I think, about having… What is the… Who are the sort of people who 
come in and help when those things happen that you don’t expect that are quite… 
Hmm. 
Have quite a dramatic impact on people’s lives. 
Hmm. Hmm. Okay. Okay. And in terms of the approach, are you happy with… There’s 
nothing you… Any comments on what we’re doing? 
No. It seems very interesting. It’s just a bit weird of trying to get your head into that space. 
Yes. I mean it’s a long… the future, really. I mean, I guess we’re just sort of collecting 
people’s opinions about these things, really. Ideas about these things. I mean, we’re 
running some workshops where this is going to be… the results of this, as we go along, the 
results of this will be disseminated to various stakeholders. I’ve got your contact details. I 
can let you know about [unclear] they’ll be at London. 
Okay. (Laughs) 
Possibly not the [unclear] the final one. I mean, obviously we’re going to end up with, like 
I said to you, these sorts of [unclear] I’m not quite sure how the models are going to be sort 
of disseminated. 
Yes. I think that would be the interesting thing – it’s how you get people to get their head 
in the right space of thinking they’re in that space and moving away from resourcing back 
to now. 
People come back to [unclear] 
Yes. But I think, you know, the projects [unclear] very good with almost the sound effects 
of… and the way they spell it out to you, it does get you kind of to think up here. 
Hmm. 
Still, it is still in the here and now, but you do some [unclear] okay. That’s where I am and 
that’s what’s going on around me, so… 
Hmm. Hmm. 
It’s finding a way to get people into that… 
Yes. Yes.  
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To then… 
Yes. I mean, the different options we could take. Some people [unclear] so produce like 
cartoons and things that you could download, like a day in the life of someone in 2050. 
Right. Right. 
Which is another way, I suppose, you could illustrate the scenarios, but… 
Yes. 
We’re trying to… We want to make it as interactive as we can. I think initially the models 
are probably going to be quite static, like that sort of thing. 
Hmm. Yes. 
This is how things might look. You know? Those sorts of things. 
Right. 
But, ultimately, we’d like to create something which is quite, sort of, interactive whether 
people can almost kind of, right, okay – I’m in this scenario. What would happen if I did 
this? 
Yes. 
How would that change things? You know? This is how I’d react now I’m in this scenario 
and I’ve kind of forgotten I’m in this scenario, and I’ve reacted how I normally would, but 
it’s caused all these problems, 
Right. 
You know? Those sorts of things, I guess. 
Yes. That’s interesting. 
Yes. It is challenging, because obviously 40 years’ time, quite a lot of people we’re 
interviewing probably won’t be in their current roles. (Laughs) 
No. I’m having enough problems getting people to think about next summer, so… 
Hmm. 
There’s the challenge. Trying to get people to put their head into… We’re in the middle of 
the Olympics. That’s not running. That’s not happening like that. 
Hmm. I guess it’s going to be a huge… 
Yes. We did an exercise last week with some people and just they resorted back to that 
was a building site. And I went, well, it won’t be a building site next year; by next year it will 
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be a major development with lots of thousands of people coming and watching TV 
screens. 
Hmm. 
Ah. Yes. So you’re trying to get people in that… 
Yes. Thinking of… Yes. 
Yes. Time [unclear] out is very challenging. 
Yes. 
It’s interesting. 
We’ve had a bid in Loughborough because they’ve got the Olympic team [unclear] 
Yes. 
 the games, really. 
Yes. 
It’s been quite interesting to see how that… Mind you, a lot of people [unclear] goes on 
behind the scenes, I don't think they… (Laughs) 
No. It is very interesting, I think. Getting closer and closer now – it’s a bit scary. But I think for 
me the interesting thing is going to be how the transport network’s going to… 
[unclear] avoid St. Pancras. 
Well, yes. And, you know, I go to all these meetings and they tell me that to make it work 
they’re going to need, you know, 30% of normal London capacity to not be coming in 
every day and I’m like, look, have you been publically saying that? Well, I’ve done a little 
bit of public… Well, you need to do a lot more because people are expecting to carry on 
working and… yes. But, you know, they’re going to have to divert trains to getting people 
to the Olympic Games and back and things, and businesses are going to have to take the 
impact and the hit, but I don't think a lot of them have realised… 
Hmm. Have people done that when they talked about how much the Olympics would 
generate in terms of the knock-on effects? (Laughs) 
Yes, yes. And, you know, the road network. You know? People are looking at the map 
thinking, well, I’m based up here so that’s fine. Well, they’re not realising that to get across 
that road, it’s going to be an absolute nightmare and they’re probably going to be 
queuing, traffic through there… where they are. So there’s still going to be a knock-on up 
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here even though they’re not thinking about it. So it will be quite interesting. I’m sort of 
intrigued to see how it all pans out, really. 
(Laughs) Hmm. I guess that’s it, isn't it? 
Yes. 
No one really knows until the… 
No. 
Until it happens. 
Yes. Part of me hopes it’s a bit of a flu pandemic and Y2K sort of washout of over-panicking, 
but I suspect not. 
Hmm. Hmm. Yes. 
We say two weeks – we can cut it. 
Yes. I guess that’s it, isn't it? Yes. (Laughs) 
I’m sure the media will make anything they can out of any kind of delay. 
Yes. Well, that’s it. That’s the thing for Camden. It’s been quite interesting. We’ve got the 
world’s media based in Camden for the Olympics. 
Right. Yes. 
So they’re all staying in the Russell Square, Bloomsbury sort of area. 
Hmm. Hmm. 
So anything that goes wrong in Camden, that’s the under spot. That’s like, oh, great. 
(Laughs) So, yes. Not 20,000 of them. That was all I need. Something happening around 
the corner. They’ll all be out there in their ‘jamas watching and reporting back, so, yes. It 
will be interesting. 
Mind you, sometimes, I mean like at Atlanta, everyone went on about Atlanta saying how 
bad, you know, it all went, and then afterwards people sort of said, oh, it was really good. 
The legacy was really good. 
Oh right? Oh. I’ve only heard bad things about it. 
Because they used the stadium and it really… it was quite cheap compared to some of 
them, 
Right. 
357 
 
Whereas if you look at, like, I don't know, even Sydney and Athens, they built the Olympic 
park so far out, it’s just kind of a rustic holt now. 
Well, yes. 
It’s just sometimes over time people look back on these things differently and, you know… 
Yes. All I’ve seen are the pictures of people queuing for… they’re trying to all get on the 
little one train and then the sort of queue goes off into the distance. (Laughs) Waiting to 
get on this train. It’s like, oh, god. I just had visions of St. Pancras looking like that. 
Yes. It could be interesting, really, to see how that… I suppose it’s just getting people to 
realise it’s going to be difficult and don’t… Try and think of options and don’t travel in or… 
Well, yes. I think they’ve sort of promoted the javelins as a way to get to the park, but it 
can only take about a quarter of the capacity it needs… people going to the park. So, 
and your train tickets, it’s including your Olympic ticket, and your travels, so lots of people 
will be trying. My fear is I think it was Toronto, the Winter Olympics, apparently there were 
reports of people queuing for up to 9 hours to go on a zip line because it was an Olympic 
experience that lasted 30 seconds. 
Oh dear. 
And I’m like, well, if people really want to go on the javelin, they’re going to queue. And 
they’re like people… We won’t let them queue more than half an hour. 
Should we call it the javelin? (Laughs) 
It’s a train. It’s a boring train. It’s no different from any other train. 
Well, can’t they… People can walk, can’t they? 
Exactly. 
It doesn’t take 9 hours to walk from St. Pancras to… 
No. So, they’ve got other routes, but… 
Yes. 
It’s a bit 
I guess it’s all communication, isn't it? 
That’s the thing. It’s Boris. (Laughs) The javelin is the only way to get there. Ooh! It’s not! 
There are other ways. Please don’t. So… 
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Appendix 5.7: Full list of nodes and number of times coded 
 
A : BARRIERS FOR 
RESILIENCE 
B : AGENDAS C : AUTHORITY 
D : BUILDING 
LIMITATIONS 
E : DIFFERENCES 
0 1 0 0 2 
1 1 0 0 0 
15 13 9 1 7 
10 7 4 0 3 
3 2 2 0 0 
22 12 4 0 8 
0 0 0 3 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
2 1 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
2 2 1 0 0 
2 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 1 0 
8 3 8 0 6 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 
1 2 1 0 3 
1 0 0 1 2 
9 6 1 3 5 
0 0 0 0 0 
 
F : FRAGMENTED G : INCONSISTENCY 
H : PIECEMEAL 
APPROACHES 
I : SILO 
MENTALITY 
J : SUBJECTIVE 
MEANING 
K : BUILT 
ENVIRONMENT 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 
4 0 1 2 0 2 
0 2 2 0 3 0 
1 0 0 1 0 0 
6 6 5 3 2 11 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 
10 12 10 2 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 7 
2 6 0 0 0 0 
1 2 0 0 0 3 
0 0 0 1 0 2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
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L : SUSTAINABILITY 
M : URBAN 
REDEVELOPMENT 
N : COMMUNICATION O : CONFUSION P : CO-ORDINATION 
0 0 5 0 5 
0 0 4 2 2 
2 1 10 1 3 
0 0 7 2 4 
0 0 2 0 0 
4 6 17 4 6 
0 0 3 0 0 
0 0 1 0 1 
0 0 1 0 1 
0 0 2 0 2 
0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 4 1 4 
0 0 1 1 2 
0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 4 1 4 
0 0 13 8 15 
0 0 3 0 3 
1 0 4 0 1 
0 0 6 4 2 
0 2 4 4 4 
0 0 12 0 11 
0 0 0 0 0 
 
Q : DISSEMINATION R : INDIVIDUAL NETWORKING 
S : INTERPRETATION OF 
INFORMATION 
T : CASCADE 
IMPACT 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 4 
0 2 3 0 
0 2 4 0 
0 1 1 0 
0 0 6 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 
0 2 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 3 4 4 
0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 2 0 0 
0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
5 0 13 2 
0 0 0 0 
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U : JARGON 
V : KNOWLEDGE 
TRANSFER 
W : LOCAL KNOWLEDGE X : SENSITIVE INFORMATION 
0 0 0 2 
0 5 0 0 
0 2 0 1 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 8 8 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 4 2 1 
0 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 2 0 
0 1 2 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 
1 1 0 0 
2 11 8 1 
0 0 0 0 
 
Y : JOINED UP THINKING Z : CRIME AA : COOPER THEFTS AB : CRIME CONTINUUM 
1 0 0 5 
1 0 0 0 
1 13 0 6 
0 3 0 0 
0 1 0 1 
12 12 0 2 
1 0 1 0 
1 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 
2 6 0 3 
0 4 0 1 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
4 2 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 2 
1 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 
7 7 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
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AC : CRIME PREVENTION STRATEGIES AD : CPTED AE : PACT MEETINGS AF : SECURE STATION 
6 0 0 1 
3 0 1 0 
11 3 0 2 
4 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 
11 9 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
5 0 1 0 
2 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 
6 0 2 1 
0 0 0 0 
 
AG : CRIME RATES AH : CRIMES IN THE STATION AI : CRIMINALS AJ : DUALITY CP & CTMS 
3 9 3 4 
1 2 0 0 
5 8 5 5 
0 2 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 2 0 5 
0 3 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 4 
0 5 2 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 3 4 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 4 2 2 
0 0 0 0 
 
AK : PUBLIC DISORDER AL : SECURE BY DESIGN AM : DESIGN STAGE AN : ASSESSMENT 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 2 8 1 
0 0 8 0 
0 0 4 0 
0 0 31 16 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 
1 0 0 0 
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0 0 1 0 
1 0 4 2 
1 0 2 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 3 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 
1 2 4 0 
0 0 0 0 
 
AO : BENCHMARKING AP : BUILDING STANDARDS AQ : DEVELOPERS AR : EARLY INVOLVEMENT 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 2 2 4 
0 2 6 7 
0 1 2 1 
0 9 16 11 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 
1 1 2 1 
0 0 2 2 
0 0 0 0 
0 6 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
 
AS : HISTORIC BUILDING AT : PROJECT BY PROJECT AU : RETROFITS 
0 0 1 
0 0 0 
0 6 0 
0 0 4 
0 4 1 
2 9 3 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 1 
2 0 3 
0 0 0 
0 0 3 
0 0 0 
2 0 2 
2 3 2 
0 0 0 
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AV : EMERGENCY SITUATION AW : DISASTER AX : EMERGENCY COMPLEXITIES 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 1 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
2 2 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
8 7 6 
1 0 0 
0 0 0 
4 0 5 
2 0 3 
8 3 4 
0 0 0 
 
AY : EVACUATION OF STATION AZ : EMERGENCY PLANNERS BA : EMERGENCY PLANS 
2 0 0 
0 0 3 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 1 1 
0 2 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 21 18 
1 4 1 
0 2 0 
1 1 9 
0 2 4 
1 7 6 
0 0 0 
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BB : EMERGENCY SERVICES BC : FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS BD : COSTS BE : FUNDING 
0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 
0 8 2 7 
0 5 4 2 
0 1 1 0 
0 12 10 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 2 2 1 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 2 0 
1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
2 1 1 0 
3 1 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
 
BF : INCOME BG : INVESTMENT BH : RAILWAY COSTS BI : FUTURES BJ : FUTURE FUEL 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 4 1 8 0 
0 4 0 2 0 
0 0 0 2 0 
0 1 0 18 0 
0 0 2 0 5 
0 0 0 3 3 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 4 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 2 0 
0 0 0 2 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 3 
0 0 0 0 0 
1 5 0 3 0 
1 0 0 10 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
365 
 
BK : FUTURE INVESTMENT BL : FUTURE RAIL BM : HIGH SPEED RAIL 2 BN : FUTURE RESILIENCE 
0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 1 
1 4 0 5 
1 2 0 1 
0 2 0 2 
1 2 0 18 
2 9 0 0 
0 4 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 2 0 1 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 
1 3 1 5 
0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
2 3 1 3 
0 9 0 12 
0 0 0 0 
 
BO : INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES BP : FUTURE TECHNOLOGY BQ : FUTURE THREATS (2) 
0 0 2 
0 0 0 
2 0 3 
1 1 1 
0 0 1 
4 0 10 
0 7 0 
0 4 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 2 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 1 2 
1 1 0 
0 0 0 
0 1 10 
0 0 0 
1 0 2 
6 3 6 
0 0 0 
366 
 
BR : FUTURES FIVE YEARS BS : FUTURES POLICY BT : INFRASTRUCTURE 
2 3 0 
0 1 0 
0 1 2 
0 3 0 
0 0 0 
5 7 1 
0 5 0 
0 1 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 2 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 1 0 
2 3 1 
0 0 0 
0 5 0 
0 0 0 
0 1 2 
2 3 1 
0 0 0 
 
BU : CRITICAL NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE BV : ELECTRICITY 
1 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
1 0 
0 5 
0 2 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
1 0 
0 0 
3 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
367 
 
BW : LOCAL CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE BX : RAILWAY SYSTEM BY : HIGH SPEED RAIL 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 1 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 2 
0 0 2 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 0 0 
 
BZ : OPERATIONAL COMPLEXITIES CA : EUROPEAN BORDERS CB : GOOD PRACTICE 
3 0 0 
3 0 1 
9 0 5 
2 0 2 
0 0 0 
7 0 5 
5 2 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 0 0 
0 0 0 
5 0 2 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
14 0 1 
1 0 0 
0 0 0 
4 0 0 
2 0 1 
13 1 5 
0 0 0 
368 
 
CC : INTERDEPENDENCIES CD : CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP CE : MULTI AGENCY WORKING 
0 0 0 
0 0 1 
5 0 2 
1 0 1 
0 0 0 
6 1 5 
0 0 0 
5 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 1 
0 0 0 
1 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
7 0 10 
0 0 0 
2 0 0 
2 0 1 
2 1 1 
9 6 8 
0 0 0 
 
CF : OLYMPICS CG : OPERATIONAL SECURITY CH : RESPONSIBILITY CI : RISK 
0 0 2 7 
0 5 5 1 
4 0 1 0 
1 5 5 3 
0 0 0 0 
2 4 5 8 
0 0 0 5 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
8 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 2 
6 7 7 7 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 3 
0 0 4 1 
1 4 1 1 
0 12 11 8 
0 0 0 0 
369 
 
CJ : MITIGATION CK : VULNERABILITY CL : POLICY & GUIDANCE 
0 2 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 12 
2 1 7 
0 0 2 
2 5 10 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 5 
0 0 1 
0 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 5 3 
0 0 0 
2 4 0 
0 2 0 
0 2 0 
2 6 14 
0 0 0 
 
CM : 2 PARALLEL LEGISLATIVE SECURITY PROCESSES CN : CCA 2004 
1 0 
0 0 
0 0 
2 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
1 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 6 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 1 
0 4 
0 0 
370 
 
CO : GOLD SILVER BRONZE COMMAND CP : CONTEST CQ : CRIME AND DISORDER ACT 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 0 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 1 
0 1 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 1 0 
2 3 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 1 
0 0 0 
1 0 0 
2 1 1 
0 0 0 
 
CR : DFT SECURITY LEGISLATION CS : EU POLICY CT : FLOOD & WATER MANAGEMENT ACT 
10 0 0 
1 0 0 
4 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 1 
0 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 0 0 
0 1 0 
10 2 0 
0 0 0 
371 
 
CU : HEALTH AND SAFETY AT WORK ETC ACT 1974 CV : HIERARCHY OF POLICIES 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 2 
0 0 
 
CW : HISTORICAL LOCK INS CX : HOME OFFICE POLICING LEGISLATION CY : LEGAL OBLIGATION 
0 6 0 
0 0 3 
1 1 1 
3 2 3 
0 0 0 
0 1 3 
9 0 0 
1 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 1 2 
0 1 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
2 0 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 2 
2 0 0 
1 0 7 
0 0 0 
372 
 
CZ : HEALTH AND SAFETY DA : LIABILITY DB : LITIGATION DC : PUBLIC SAFETY 
1 0 0 0 
0 3 0 1 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
2 0 1 3 
0 0 0 2 
0 0 0 2 
0 0 0 0 
 
DD : LOCAL DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORKS DE : NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PLAN 2010 
0 0 
0 0 
1 0 
1 0 
0 0 
1 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
1 0 
1 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
373 
 
DF : NATIONAL RISK REGISTER DG : NON-STATUTORY GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS DH : NRSP 
0 1 0 
0 2 0 
2 5 3 
0 6 0 
0 2 0 
0 8 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 1 2 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 2 0 
1 3 0 
0 0 0 
1 2 0 
0 3 0 
0 0 0 
2 4 7 
0 0 0 
 
DI : PLANNING DJ : POLICY DISCONNECTS DK : POLICY RAILWAY DL : PRIVATISATION 
0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 
2 0 2 0 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 2 0 
0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 
0 0 12 0 
0 0 0 0 
374 
 
DM : REGULATION DN : SIDOS DO : TERRORIST ACT DP : RAILWAY STATION DQ : EUSTON 
0 0 2 0 0 
2 0 0 0 0 
4 2 1 12 1 
6 0 0 11 0 
1 1 0 1 0 
3 0 0 13 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 5 0 
0 0 0 4 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 8 7 
0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 1 
10 2 0 16 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
 
DR : KINGSCROSS DS : ST PANCRAS DT : ST PANCRAS HOTEL DU : CROWDED PLACES 
1 0 0 1 
0 4 0 0 
1 3 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 2 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 2 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 0 
0 5 0 1 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
11 16 3 0 
1 1 0 0 
0 0 0 6 
0 5 0 0 
2 5 1 0 
1 4 0 1 
0 0 0 0 
375 
 
DV : LANDOWNERSHIP DW : PASSENGERS TRAVEL PEAKS DX : PLACE 
1 3 0 
0 0 0 
1 0 0 
0 0 1 
0 0 0 
1 0 7 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 0 1 
0 1 5 
0 0 0 
 
DY : RAILWAY STATION FUNCTION DZ : BRANDING EA : CAPACITY EB : DESTINATION 
0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 
0 0 4 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
0 3 0 1 
9 1 1 2 
0 0 0 0 
376 
 
EC : INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL HUB ED : MASS TRANSIT SYSTEM EE : MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT 
0 2 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 0 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
 
EF : RAILWAY STATION CATEGORY EG : TRANSPORT HUBS EH : RAILWAY STATION NATURE 
2 0 5 
1 0 0 
0 0 1 
0 0 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 2 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 2 0 
1 2 8 
0 0 0 
377 
 
EI : STATION OWNERSHIP EJ : STATION STAFF EK : ADEQUATE STAFF TRAINING EL : TRAINS 
1 1 0 1 
0 3 0 0 
2 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 2 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
0 2 1 1 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 
0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 2 1 1 
5 0 0 0 
1 2 2 2 
0 0 0 0 
 
EM : USERS OF THE SPACE EN : RESILIENCE EO : BUSINESS CONTINUITY 
1 3 0 
0 1 0 
0 8 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
11 16 4 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 3 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 1 1 
1 6 1 
0 0 0 
1 3 0 
4 0 1 
2 1 0 
6 15 2 
0 0 0 
378 
 
EP : CONTINGENCY PLANS EQ : RESILIENCE CHALLENGES ER : RESILIENCE FORMS OF 
0 0 0 
0 2 0 
1 5 2 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
3 18 4 
0 0 0 
1 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 0 0 
0 3 3 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 2 1 
3 2 2 
0 0 0 
2 0 2 
0 2 0 
1 1 0 
2 13 2 
0 0 0 
 
ES : RESILIENCE DEFINITION ET : RESILIENCE OF RAIL EU : STAKEHOLDERS EV : ACPO 
0 0 11 0 
0 0 4 0 
3 2 15 1 
0 0 5 0 
0 0 2 0 
1 2 13 1 
0 7 5 1 
2 0 1 0 
0 0 4 0 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
3 1 6 0 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 1 0 
1 0 2 0 
1 0 7 0 
0 0 0 0 
4 0 1 0 
0 0 7 0 
0 1 0 0 
1 7 18 0 
0 0 0 0 
379 
 
EW : CPNI EX : ENGLISH HERITAGE EY : EUROSTAR EZ : FOCS FA : GOVERNMENT 
3 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 2 
1 0 0 0 4 
0 0 0 0 3 
1 0 0 0 2 
1 0 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 2 0 2 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 9 
0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 2 
1 2 2 1 5 
0 0 0 0 0 
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FB : LOCAL FC : CAMDEN BOROUGH FD : LONDON PLAN FE : PLANNING DEPARTMENTS 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 2 
22 24 0 2 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 
3 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 
 
FF : NATIONAL FG : DEPARTMENT FOR TRANSPORT FH : TRANSEC 
0 2 3 
0 2 1 
5 4 0 
3 0 0 
2 2 0 
0 0 0 
0 2 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 1 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
2 2 2 
0 0 0 
381 
 
FI : GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS FJ : HOME OFFICE FK : HIGH SPEED ONE 
0 1 0 
2 0 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
3 2 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 10 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
 
FL : ILLEGITIMATE STAKEHOLDERS FM : LOCAL COMMUNITY USAGE 
0 0 
0 1 
0 1 
0 0 
0 0 
0 6 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 1 
0 1 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 4 
0 0 
0 0 
0 1 
0 1 
1 4 
0 0 
382 
 
FN : LOCAL RESILIENCE FORUMS FO : LONDON UNDERGROUND FP : MEDIA FQ : NACTSO 
0 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 2 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 
2 0 2 1 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
 
FR : NEIGHBORING ESTABLISHMENTS FS : NETWORK RAIL FT : DEVOLUTION OF NWR 
0 5 0 
0 5 0 
2 2 0 
0 0 0 
0 1 0 
4 3 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 0 0 
1 3 0 
1 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 2 0 
3 6 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
3 4 0 
0 1 1 
1 14 0 
0 0 0 
383 
 
FU : ORR FV : PASSENGER TRANSPORT EXECUTIVES FW : PASSENGERS FX : POLICING 
0 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 18 
0 0 1 2 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 7 7 
0 0 0 11 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 3 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 2 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 4 
0 0 1 1 
2 0 2 0 
0 1 4 3 
0 0 0 0 
 
FY : BTP FZ : APPROACHABLE GA : BTP ARMED OFFICERS 
16 1 5 
0 0 0 
19 0 3 
7 0 0 
1 0 0 
4 0 0 
7 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
3 0 0 
0 0 0 
6 0 0 
5 1 0 
0 0 0 
2 0 0 
7 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
4 0 1 
2 1 1 
4 0 0 
0 0 0 
384 
 
GB : COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICING GC : MET POLICE GD : POLICING GENERALIST 
3 2 5 
0 0 0 
3 2 2 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
2 3 2 
0 1 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 0 0 
0 6 2 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 1 0 
1 0 0 
1 1 0 
0 0 0 
 
GE : PUBLIC GF : DISASSURANCE GG : FEAR OF CRIME GH : FEAR OF TERRORISM 
8 3 3 4 
0 0 0 0 
4 0 3 0 
1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
10 1 4 1 
0 2 0 2 
0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
4 1 2 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 2 
3 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 
6 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
385 
 
GI : PUBLIC INFORMATION GJ : PUBLIC NEGATIVE REACTION GK : Stakeholder engagement 
2 3 0 
0 0 2 
0 0 5 
0 0 1 
0 0 0 
0 2 9 
0 0 3 
0 0 0 
0 0 1 
0 0 4 
0 0 1 
2 0 8 
0 0 0 
0 0 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 8 
0 0 1 
0 0 1 
2 1 0 
1 0 0 
0 0 19 
0 0 0 
 
GL : STAKEHOLDER ISSUES GM : STAKEHOLDER MAP GN : TENANTED PROPERTIES GO : TOCs 
1 9 5 4 
2 1 6 0 
6 0 0 8 
5 0 0 5 
0 0 0 1 
11 0 0 1 
0 0 0 3 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 
0 0 0 3 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 2 5 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 
6 5 1 2 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
9 0 0 1 
0 0 0 4 
11 0 8 5 
0 0 0 0 
386 
 
GP : FRANCHISES GQ : TRADE UNIONS GR : TRANSPORT FOR LONDON 
0 1 3 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 1 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 2 0 
0 0 0 
1 0 0 
1 0 0 
0 0 0 
3 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
 
GS : UK BOARDER CONTROL GT : TERRORISM GU : CONSEQUENCES 
0 10 5 
0 0 1 
0 14 0 
0 3 1 
0 7 1 
0 17 3 
0 12 9 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 10 1 
0 4 1 
0 0 0 
0 1 3 
0 6 1 
0 0 0 
0 13 3 
0 0 5 
1 0 2 
0 9 8 
0 0 0 
387 
 
GV : COUNTER TERRORISM MEASURES GW : ANPR GX : ATTRIBUTES GY : ACCEPTABILITY 
7 0 0 2 
1 0 0 1 
11 0 2 3 
2 0 2 1 
4 0 3 2 
13 0 3 4 
7 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 2 
1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 3 
0 0 0 1 
6 1 0 4 
6 0 5 4 
0 0 0 0 
 
GZ : ACCOUNTABILITY HA : APPROPRIATE MEASURES HB : CONSISTENCY HC : DETERRENT 
1 3 1 2 
1 0 0 0 
0 4 1 2 
0 1 0 1 
1 2 0 1 
4 4 0 1 
2 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 5 0 4 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
3 1 0 0 
0 4 1 6 
2 4 3 6 
0 0 0 0 
388 
 
HD : EFFICIENCY HE : FIT FOR PURPOSE HF : PROPORTIONATE 
0 0 3 
0 1 0 
1 2 2 
0 1 1 
3 1 2 
1 4 5 
0 0 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 1 2 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 3 
0 2 0 
9 5 2 
0 4 6 
0 0 0 
 
HG : REASONABLE CTM MEASURES HH : REASSURANCE HI : ROBUST HJ : AVIATION SECURITY 
3 5 0 1 
0 0 1 0 
1 0 0 0 
0 1 1 0 
2 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
3 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 2 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 1 
1 1 0 2 
0 0 0 0 
389 
 
HK : C 3 FRAMEWORK HL : CCTV HM : ALGORITHMS HN : POST EVENT ANALYSIS 
0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 2 0 0 
0 3 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 
0 2 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 2 1 1 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 1 
0 2 1 1 
0 0 0 0 
 
HO : CLEAN LINES OF SIGHT HP : COUNTER-TERRORIST STRATEGIES HQ : CROWD MANAGEMENT 
0 13 0 
0 8 0 
0 2 0 
1 0 0 
1 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 8 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 1 0 
0 2 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 4 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 9 0 
0 2 0 
0 6 2 
1 6 1 
0 0 0 
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HR : HOME OFFICE CT STRATEGY HS : HOT PROTOCOL HT : HIDDEN OBJECTS 
1 0 1 
0 3 1 
0 1 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 2 2 
0 1 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 1 
0 1 2 
2 3 2 
0 0 0 
 
HU : HOURLY LEFT OBJECT SEARCH HV : REPORTING SUSPICIOUS BEHAVIOURS-OBJECTS 
6 1 
4 2 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
2 2 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 1 
0 0 
3 2 
0 0 
391 
 
HW : RETAIL STAFF SECURITY TRAINING HX : STATION SECURITY PLAN HY : STOPPING PEOPLE 
3 0 0 
7 7 0 
0 0 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
2 1 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 0 0 
1 0 1 
5 1 4 
0 0 0 
 
HZ : CREEP AND SURGE IA : CTSA's IB : FORTRESS DESIGN IC : Intelligence 
0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 4 
0 3 0 0 
0 1 0 0 
0 4 1 1 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 3 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 8 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 
392 
 
ID : OVERLAY SECURITY MEASURES IE : PAS 68 IF : PROJECT ARGUS IG : SNIFFER DOGS 
0 0 0 2 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
2 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
 
IH : STAND ALONE SECURITY II : TARGET HARDENING IJ : TEMPORARY SECURITY MEASURES 
0 1 0 
0 0 0 
0 2 0 
0 1 0 
0 2 0 
0 1 0 
0 2 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 2 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 3 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 2 0 
0 0 0 
0 1 1 
0 2 0 
0 0 0 
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IK : DEFINITION IL : LEARNING FROM PAST TERRORIST ATTACKS IM : 7 7  LONDON BOMBINGS 
4 3 1 
0 0 0 
0 4 2 
0 2 2 
0 2 0 
0 4 2 
0 0 3 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 2 0 
1 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 0 0 
0 1 2 
0 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 5 2 
0 0 0 
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IN : 9 11 USA TERRORIST ATTACK IO : MADRID IP : MUMBAI IQ : TOYOKO 
0 3 3 2 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
 
IR : PUBLIC EDUCATION IS : TERRORISM PREDICTIVE IT : TERRORIST CAPABILITIES 
0 2 0 
0 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 2 5 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 0 0 
1 0 2 
0 0 0 
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IU : TERRORIST METHODS IV : CBRNE IW : CYBER TERRORISM IX : hostile reconnaissance 
5 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
5 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 2 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 2 0 
1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
 
IY : HVM IZ : PRIMARY DEVICES JA : SECONDARY DEVICES 
2 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 0 0 
0 0 0 
1 0 0 
3 1 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 1 1 
2 0 0 
0 2 1 
0 0 0 
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JB : TERRORIST ATTACK MULTIPLE SITES JC : TERRORIST TARGET JD : SOFT TARGET 
2 5 0 
0 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 0 1 
0 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 5 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 2 0 
0 0 0 
0 3 0 
1 2 0 
0 0 1 
1 5 2 
0 0 0 
 
JE : SYMBOLIC JF : TERRORIST THREATS JG : AL QAEDA JH : IRA 
0 4 0 1 
0 0 0 0 
0 3 0 0 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 5 1 1 
0 0 1 2 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 1 
0 3 1 1 
0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 
3 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 
1 4 1 1 
0 0 0 0 
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Appendix 6.1: TOC Routes 
Below is a chart outlining the routes, the train operating companies and Network Rail managed 
stations therein:
Route 
Tr
ai
n
 O
p
e
ra
ti
n
g 
C
o
m
p
an
y 
Anglia Kent London 
North 
Eastern 
London North 
Western 
Midland and 
Continental 
Sussex Wessex Western Scotland 
C2C 
Owned 
by 
National 
Express 
Group 
plc 
Eurostar Cross Country Arriva Trains Cross Country Gatwick 
Express Ltd 
Cross 
Country 
Arriva 
Trains 
Wales 
Owned 
by 
Deutsche 
Bahn Ag 
Cross Country 
Cross 
Country 
Owned 
by 
Deutsche 
Bahn Ag 
First Capital 
Connect 
East Coast 
Owned by the 
government, 
a subsidiary. 
Chiltern 
Railways 
Owned by 
Deutsche Bahn 
Ag 
East Midlands 
Trains 
First Capital 
Connect 
First 
Great 
Western 
Chiltern 
Railways 
East Coast 
East 
Midlands 
Trains 
Owned 
by Stage 
Coach 
Group 
PLC 
Southeastern East Midlands 
Trains 
Cross Country First Capital 
Connect 
First Great 
Western 
Island 
Line 
Owned 
by Stage 
Coach 
Holdings 
PLC 
Cross 
Country 
First Scotrail 
First 
Capital 
Connect 
Owned 
by First 
Group 
PLC 
Southern 
Railway 
Eurostar 
The high- 
speed 
services to 
Europe are 
operated 
under 
Eurostar UK 
Ltd, SNCB and 
SNCF trade 
under the 
Eurostar 
name. 
London and 
Continental 
own Eurostar 
First Great 
Western 
Owned by First 
Group PLC 
London 
Midland 
Southeastern London 
Overgro 
und Rail 
Operatio 
ns Ltd 
First 
Great 
Western 
First 
Transpennine 
Express 
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   UK Ltd       
London 
Overgrou 
nd Rail 
Operatio 
ns Ltd 
Owned 
by 
Deutsche 
Bahn AG) 
and MTR 
Corporati 
on (Hong 
Kong 
Mass 
Transit 
Railway 
Corporati 
on) 
 First Capital 
Connect 
First Scotrail Northern 
Eurostar 
Southern 
Railway 
Owned by 
Go-Ahead 
Group PLC 
and Keolis SA 
South 
West 
Trains 
Owned 
by Stage 
Coach 
Holdings 
PLC 
Heathrow 
Express 
Virgin Trains 
National 
Express 
East 
Anglia 
Owned 
by 
National 
Express 
Group 
plc 
First Scotrail 
Owned by 
First Group 
PLC 
First 
Transpennine 
Express 
Southeastern 
Owned by Go- 
Ahead Group 
PLC and Keolis 
SA 
 Souther 
n 
Railway 
London 
Midland 
 
 First 
Transpennine 
Express 
Owned by 
First Group 
PLC and 
Keolis SA 
London Midland 
Owned by Go- 
Ahead Group 
PLC and Keolis 
SA 
  South 
West 
Trains 
Hull Trains London 
Overground Rail 
Operations Ltd 
 
London 
Midland 
MerseyRail 
Owned by 
Serco plc with 
Ned Railways 
(Nederlandse 
Spoorwegen) 
National Northern Rail 
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Source: Network Rail (2011 c) and Fifth Dimension Associates (2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Express East 
Anglia 
      
Northern Rail 
Owned by 
Serco plc with 
Ned Railways 
(Nederlandse 
Spoorwegen) 
Virgin Trains 
Owned by 
Virgin Rail 
Group Ltd 
 Wrexham, 
Shropshire and 
Marylebone- 
Closed 28.01.11 
Network Rail Managed Stations 
Fenchurch 
Street 
Cannon Street Kings 
Cross 
Birmingham 
New Street 
St Pancras 
Internationa
l 
Gatwick Airport Waterlo 
o 
Paddingto
n 
Edinbu
rgh 
Waverl
ey Liverpool 
Street 
Charing Cross Leeds City Liverpool 
Lime Street 
 Victoria   Glasg
ow 
Centr
al  London Bridge  Manchester 
Piccadilly 
     
   Euston      
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Appendix 6.2: Key Stakeholders in the Railway Station and Infrastructure 
The below table is a supporting document to the map of key institutions, stakeholders, 
and forums within the railway infrastructure in Britain. It is by no mean and exhaustive 
list of those who are at present involved with the railway infrastructure in Britain. 
Name Role 
Secretary of State Works with the Office of Rail Regulation. The Rail Act 2005 
permits the Secretary of State to provide monetary aid for 
any purpose regarding railways. 
The Secretary of State under the Railways Act 1993 has the 
authority to give directions concerning the security of 
railways 
Department of 
Transport (DFT) 
Is granted its authority by the Secretary of State, to 
operationalise the railways long-term strategy. With regard 
to the railways, DFT ensures transport sector achieves goals 
by working with private, national and regional sector 
partnerships. Role is managing the franchise leases to the 
TOCs in England and Welsh and Scottish inter-city services. 
Works in partnership with contractors on major projects. 
Transport system should stimulate economic growth and 
safer and environmentally friendly, communities are 
improved. 
Rail Group-DFT Works with the rail industry to try to ensure railway suits the needs 
of passengers. Price efficient, sustainability. Co-ordinates UK 
strategies at EU level - safety and interoperability 
Strategic Rail 
Authority (SRA)-DFT 
Under Transport Act 2005, allows the Secretary of State to 
enable the SRA guidance in how it 'exercises 
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 its functions.' 
TRANSEC (Land 
Transport) 
The DfT Transport security and contingencies team. Primary 
objective is the protection of passengers, employees, 
physical assets of the transport sector, against terrorism. 
They aim to preserve confidence in the security of the 
transport sector without impinging on the efficiency of the 
system and passengers experience of travel. They also have 
responsibility for the DfT's contingency plans in case of 
'serious disruption of national life, actual or threatened, 
however caused'. Transec LT deal with the security of the 
underground, light rail system and the national rail network. 
National Welsh 
Assembly 
Devolved rail responsibilities, in their own 
geographical areas 
Transport Scotland Is an executive office of the Scottish Government. The Rail 
Act 2005 grants Scottish Ministers to develop and create a 
railway strategy for Scotland. 
Manages the leasing requirements of Scot Rail franchise. 
Also finances work carried out on the rail network and can 
offer funding for upgrading facilities (Stations) etc. 
Office of Rail 
Regulation (ORR) 
Is responsible for enforcing the safety aspects of the Health 
and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. Is responsible for 
Consumer protection. Compiles rail statistics. Issues 
operators of freight and passenger services, mainline 
network, maintenance depots and stations. Also is 
responsible to regulate access to stations, maintenance 
depots and tracks 
Public Transport 
Executives (PTEs) 
Are regional agencies with the duty to establish and 
maintain transport policies and spending in their 
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 areas. Objective of each is to provide an integrated and 
accessible form of public transport (not just rail). There are 6 
PTEs West Yorkshire, South Yorkshire, Tyne and Wear, 
Merseyside and Greater Manchester. 
They have a combined budget of £700m per annum and 
provide a service to over 11 million passengers. Funded is 
provided by governmental grants, revenue from council 
taxes. The PTEs are accountable to the ITAs. Role is to be 
accountable for local transport plans, publish strategies on 
how to improve the local transport system, in partnership with 
the DfT plan and manage local rail services, and provide 
investment towards local stations. Some of the PTE's have 
re- established trams in their areas. 
Integrated Transport 
Authorities (ITAs) 
Are composed of local council representatives. They 
encourage better public transport across UK regions. 
Funded by tax payer, government, EC grants and the 
private sector. Centro- West Midlands ITP 
Network Rail Income is appraised every 5 years by the ORR and operates 
under a licence issued by them. Operates 18 main 
stations, 11 in London and 6 other major UK cities. The other 
2500 stations are leased to the TOCs. Is devolving 
responsibility for maintenance to individual 
routes/operators. Owns the fixed rail infrastructure - bridges, 
tunnels, track and signals. 
24 rail operators The nine geographical areas are awarded franchises and 
they lease the rolling stock and stations. Help to fund the BTP, 
in London the Transport for London (TfL) also is a source of 
funding. The Railways Act 2005 permits the TOCs, subject 
to the approval by the Secretary of State, to create bye-
laws which aids 
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 them and the BTP to control the actions and behaviour of 
the public when using the railways (Rails Act 2005) 
Association of Train 
Operating 
Companies 
ATOC, is an industrial body which communicates 
opinions to the stakeholders, government and the public 
Freight operators FOCs transport goods via the rail network, cost 
effective with environmental benefits 
Freight Operators 
Association 
Established in 1889 and is one the largest trade 
associations in the UK, supporting freight companies who 
deliver goods by road, rail, air and sea. 
Rolling Stock 
Companies 
ROSCOs - own the actual trains, responsible for 
replacing/phasing out aging stock. 3 leasing 
companies which lease stock to the TOCs 
Rail Safety and 
Standards Board. 
(RSSB) 
Railway Standards Board only supports the mainline 
industry only. Manages Railway Group Standards 
Research 
RAIB Is the independent investigation body for dealing with 
railway accidents/incidents. Makes recommendations, 
has no powers of enforcement 
Rail Freight Group 
(RFG) 
100 members. Objective to 'promote cost effective rail 
solutions for freight' 
Passenger Focus Independent passenger group. Focus is to ensure 'the best 
deal for passengers’. Passenger Focus is the operational 
name of the Rail Passenger's Committee, which is sponsored 
by the DFT 
London TravelWatch Independent organisation, acting on behalf of London's 
public transport users - objectives improving public transport, 
through more integrated transport policies. The London 
Assembly funds the 
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 organisation. 
Transport Watch UK Independent group, interest and lobbying 
London Transport 
Community Safety 
Partnership. (LTCSP) 
A non-statutory organisation, with the primary purpose of a 
co-ordinated response to handling crime and anti-social 
behaviour on London's transport system 
National Union of 
Rail, Maritime and 
Transport Workers 
(RMT) 
Objective is to protect and better conditions and pay for 
their members 
Associated Society 
of Locomotive 
Engineers and 
Firemen (ASLEF) 
Union dedicated to train drivers train operating 
companies (TOCs, FOCs, London Underground and Light 
Rapid Transport (some). Est. 1880. 
Transport Salaried 
Staffs’ Association 
(TSSA) 
Est. in 1897, union for those employed in transport and 
travel industry 
British Transport 
Police 
Force dedicated to the policing of railways. Divided into 9 
geographical areas. The BTP is not connected to the Home 
Office but the Department of Transport is the sponsoring 
department. The British Transport Police Authority is the 
independent body responsible for ensuring the BTP is 
effective and efficient. Funded by the TOCs and TfL by 
Police Services Agreements. The ranking of BTP officers 
mirrors the forces which come under the Home Office (The 
Police Act 1996). The BTP consistently have to access private 
property as part of their duties, covered by a 
parliamentary 1949 private Act and the agreements with 
operating companies, Network Rail and SRA. Since 2004 the 
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 BTP has been responsible for policing the railways in England, 
Wales and Scotland (Morgan and Cornish, 2006). They are 
also responsible for policing the London Underground and 
Docklands Light Railway in London (Morgan and Cornish, 
2006). 
British Transport Police 
Authority 
Created by the Railway and Safety Transport (RATs) Act 
2003. The creation of the authority in the Act is generally 
reflected by the Police Act 1996. The executive board 
are appointed by the Secretary of State 
Metropolitan Police Operational area is Greater London. Joint investigation 
work with BTP, various crime prevention measures (pick 
pocketing etc) 
City of London Police 
(COLP) 
Operational area is 'the square mile' of London 
Transport for London 
(TFL) 
Operational responsibility for London Under and Over 
Ground, and London Tramlink. Funds policing activities on 
transport system, BTP predominately police the stations. 
Priority to operate a system which is 'resilient and reliable' 
Home Office Police 
Forces 
Will frequently deal with crimes in and around stations 
Centre for the 
Protection of National 
Infrastructure (CPNI) 
It is an 'interdepartmental organisation' and offers critical 
national infrastructural organisations security advice, 
primarily to decrease terrorism. 
National Counter- 
terrorism Security 
Office (NaCTSO) 
Is a police unit within CPNI. It advocates the Contest 
Strategy through the Protect and Prepare Strands.' 
Protecting the UK's most vulnerable and valuable sites and 
assets. 
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 • Enhancing the UK's resilience to terrorist attack. 
• Delivering protective security advice' 
Civil Contingencies 
Secretariat 
Is situated within the Cabinet Office, works 
interdepartmentally, Welsh Assembly, Scottish Parliament 
and key stakeholders to augment the UK's 'ability to prepare 
for, respond to and recover from emergencies' 
Local Resilience 
Forums (LRFs) 
Local Resiliency Forums were created as a response to the 
Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) 2004 and are comprised of 
local agencies and organisations which handle 
emergencies. The CCA 2004 allocates the duties of the 
LRFs into responses categories, those organisations which 
are the primary responders at an incident, (blue light 
services. NHS, local authorities and the Environment 
Agency) and secondary responders who described as the 
'co-operating bodies' don't being directly involved in the 
primary response plans but they could have involvement 
in the incident (Network Rail, Airports, voluntary groups, utility 
companies, Health and Safety Executive). The LRFs are 
aligned with policing areas, for instance Leicestershire and 
Rutland. LRFs are a co-ordinated multi-agency response to 
local emergencies, they are tasked with the following 
duties: to work collaboratively and effectively 
communicate with other local responders, risk of 
emergencies in the local will be assessed, the inauguration 
of continuity plans for businesses and advice, and systems to 
keep local citizens aware of warnings and information in 
an emergency 
   
Environment Agency 
(England and Wales) 
and Scottish 
Environmental 
Protection Agency 
(SEPA) 
Issues of biodiversity, have the power to enforce 
environmental legislation, for example they can 
request a railway body resolve issues of excessive noise, 
which can impact on the environment 
Office of Fair Trading 
(OFT) 
Role is to ensure consumers receive the best possible 
treatment from the market. As a result, sectors are open to 
fair competition. OFT endeavour that consumers/public 
have as much choice as possible. 
Infrastructure Planning 
Commission (IPC) 
Under the Planning Act 2008, the IPC was established; it is an 
independent body which reviews applications for major 
national infrastructure projects, such as power stations, railways 
- infrastructure which is important to the public and the 
economy. 
Energy providers For stations, electrification, diesel, gas 
Water For stations, and sidings 
Telecommunications For stations, control rooms, trains, retail units 
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Abstract: During the next decade, railway stations in England will be impacted by the billions of pounds being invested in 
current projects such as High Speed 2, Cross Rail and new refurbishment schemes to modernise and develop rail 
infrastructure. Railway stations are highly networked and open locations that are often crowded, which makes them 
particularly vulnerable to security threats. Hence, there is a clear need to identify the range of stakeholders and policies 
that influence the resilience of railway stations to security threats, and to understand the challenges that are inherent in 
addressing the legislative and operational requirements of their design. As part of an on-going research project, a state-of-
the-art literature review, stakeholder analysis and mapping and interviews with key stakeholders have established critical 
implications for the future resilience of railway stations. Findings reveal that there is a multiplicity of stakeholders 
responsible for the complex operational and legal frameworks affecting major railway stations. Regardless of the 
interdependencies between stakeholders and their intersecting individual operational regulations and legislative 
requirements, there is a distinct lack of a coherent consistent and collective approach to resilience, with issues being dealt 
with by separate stakeholders and policies. This paper provides a current and innovative contribution to aid the 
understanding of the complex and interconnected forms of relationships which exemplify the station. The diverse range of 
stakeholders will gain an increased knowledge and appreciation of the necessity for a collaborative and integrated strategy, 
which is essential in both addressing the design and operation of the railway station. The findings advocate changes in 
institutional practices, so these interconnections are addressed now to ensure the effective assimilation of strategies are 
cohesive and which safeguard the resilience of railway stations for future generations. 
 
Keywords: Railway station, stakeholders, resilience, security threats, communication 
 
Introduction 
The railway station is recognised as a fundamental part of the railway network in any location. The Government is investing in a 
modernisation programme of the railway infrastructure and is demonstrated in the investment in high profile and value projects such as 
the Thameslink, CrossRail and High Speed Rail 2 (HS2). However, railway stations by their nature are extremely complex systems which 
are freely accessible and at times crowded spaces, which make them particularly vulnerable to terrorism and other forms of crime and 
anti-social behaviour. Consequently, as railway stations are newly built or refurbished, there is a clear need to identify the range of 
stakeholders and policies that influence the resilience of railway stations to security threats, and to understand and incorporate these 
perspectives into the legislative and operational requirements of their design. 
 
The railway station has numerous roles, a macro approach can be used to define the function of the railway station ‘in terms of node (the 
connectedness with other places) and place (possible activities around the station)’ [1]. Similarly, the spatial ‘urban development 
potentials’ [2] can define the role of the railway station as an environment where ‘high value activity are recognised as having a positive 
impact on the city’ [3]. The operational complexities of the railway station are intensified with increasing size and importance of the 
railway station [2]. In terms of providing a public space, railway stations in England are privately owned spaces where the public have 
apparent free access. Subsequently, they cannot be considered as public spaces; rather they can be described as ‘pseudo-public spaces’ [4] 
or a hybrid area [5, 6]. As a consequence of these demands, the complexities, interconnected physical, legal and operational functions of 
the railway station and together with the concept of resilience to security threats all need to be considered by stakeholders, planners and 
designers in terms of a ‘balance between economic, social and environmental priorities’ [7]. 
 
It should be noted the emphasis of this paper is on the stakeholders within main railway stations, which are largely Network Rail operated, 
and not the railway network infrastructure such as tracks, signalling and bridges. Thus mirroring the UK official definition of the railway 
station under Section 83(1) of the Railways Act 1993 
 
‘any land or other property which consists of premises used as, or for the purposes of, or otherwise in connection with, a railway 
passenger station or railway passenger terminal (including any approaches, forecourt, cycle store or car park), whether or not 
the land or other property is, or the premises are, also used for other purposes’ [8]. 
 
The aim of the literature and research detailed in this paper through stakeholder analysis is to map and explore the interfaces of the complex 
range of stakeholders which must be brought together to address the design and operational challenges inherent in both new build and 
   
retrofit schemes for railway stations in England. By using selected examples of legislative and operational complexities collected from 
semi-structured interviews and public documents, stakeholder understanding of the processes and dynamics which influence and regulate 
the current and future resilience of the railway to security is increased. 
 
Resilience of the railway station to security threats 
The concept of resilience has increasingly ‘become embedded within...security and civil contingencies policy’ [9] and it has gained prominence 
in recent years as there has been a growing acknowledgement that ‘built assets can never really by future-proofed to be totally resistant’ [10] 
against security threats. Therefore, resilience in terms of the railway station can be considered in terms of their ‘embedded security and risk 
management [11] and ‘their ability to absorb or recover from a shock or attack’ [12]. To increase the resilience of the railway station to 
security threats, stakeholders and their interfaces, conflicts both actual and potential created by differing agendas and security vulnerabilities 
need to be highlighted during the (re)development stages of projects and its subsequent operation should be established at an early stage to 
ensure the effective assimilation of policies and strategies. 
 
Security threats 
This paper defines security threats as any human malign action from terrorist activity to low-level crime such as anti-social behaviour. The 
demarcation between terrorism and crime is extremely contested, given they have very diverse purposes and goals. However, it can be 
argued that terrorism should be perceived as a crime given both actions ‘cannot be morally condoned’ [13]. In recent years, the greatest 
threat railway stations and passenger trains have faced is being the target of a terrorist bombing [14]. Also, it is contended the infrastructure 
of the railway is less of a target than trains or railway stations [15]. Many larger city and international railway stations, arguably, during the 
rush hour periods, can be classified as ‘Crowded Places. with a transient population often unaware of the unfamiliar environment’ [16] and 
as such they present an appealing target for terrorist attacks [15]. Historically, in the UK when the Irish Republican Army (IRA) targeted 
railway stations their aims were to cause maximum fiscal and social disturbance, rather than the loss of life [14]. However, contemporary 
acts of terrorism against the railway station have shown that both nationally and internationally railway infrastructure offers the terrorists 
the opportunity to inflict mass causalities in crowded places. Therefore, the concept and fitting of resilience and security measures within 
the station need to be reconsidered and based on ‘more proactive’ [17] rather than reactive strategies. Consequently, resilience should be a 
holistic concept which incorporates a ‘good design of infrastructure networks, effective emergency response, business continuity planning 
and recovery arrangements’ [18]. Nonetheless, acts of terrorism are not the only threat posed to the railway station. In fact  passengers and 
the public who use the station, are more likely to be the victims of lower level crimes rather than the victim of a terrorist attack [14]. 
 
In the past, railway stations have been portrayed by the media as places rife with crime, which strike fear and concern for passengers [19]. 
More recently, passengers and customers using railway stations are still expressing dissatisfaction with their perceived personal safety within 
the railway station [20]. The Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) states the continued improvement and investment in the 
security and policing of the railway network is critical to sustain the increase of passenger numbers [21]. Moreover, the public’s fear of 
terrorism and crime can be reduced by ‘manipulating the physical environment to improve perceptions of personal safety’ [22]. Therefore, 
the stakeholders of the railway station must undertake initiatives in the design stage to reduce these worries over security threats [19]. 
 
Stakeholders 
Traditionally stakeholders are defined as ‘any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation’s 
objectives’ [23]. When examining the stakeholders in the railway station, the research advocates a holistic stance which widens an 
established view of stakeholders beyond their relationships based on contractual and fiscal associations. Thus, stakeholders are also ‘moral 
actors...relationships include social characteristics such as interdependence’ [24]. Also, there will be some stakeholders who an 
organisation will not consider as ‘legitimate in the sense they will have vastly different values and agendas’ [23]. Therefore, railway stations 
must acknowledge illegitimate stakeholders such as terrorists and other criminals do have an interest and as such do have a stake in the 
organisation [23]. Hence, this relationship must be managed through specific actions such as prevention strategies and coordinated multi-
agency working. 
 
Methodology 
This paper is based upon research conducted as part of a 3 year multidisciplinary project that is studying the future developments in the 
UK’s energy and transport infrastructure and the resilience of these systems to natural and malicious threats and hazards. A state of the art 
literature and policy review of English railway stations has been conducted and augmented with semi-structured interviews and 
observational field notes. The qualitative data collected were specific to a main railway station, and provided a mix of stakeholder 
perspectives on the legal, operational and physical issues which could impact on its resilience to security threats. The 26 expert research 
participants took part in semi-structured interviews and were gathered by purposive sampling [25], allowing them to be chosen on the 
premise of their significance to, and knowledge of the research area. As part of a methodological abductive approach, the interview 
schedules where developed in a cyclical manner, as each interview involved the development of ideas and influenced further data collection 
[26]. Additionally, an established method of stakeholder analysis [23], which examines the probable contribution from stakeholders in 
projects and their ‘power…and the possibility to influence them’ [28], was used to understand the roles and agendas of the pivotal 
   
stakeholders in the railway station, this process can be seen in the following original Stakeholder Map. The map permits the visualisation 
of stakeholder’s authority and impact whether in projects or day to day operations [27, 23]. The below results and discussions are an 
amalgamation of data collected. 
 
Results and discussion 
The data gathered from the interviews was evaluated using thematic analysis, proposals emerged which highlighted vulnerabilities created by 
the varying stakeholders responsible for the resilience of the railway station to security threats. It emerged from the analysis in order to deal 
the complex challenges that are inherent in addressing railway station’s design, operational and legal requirements, it is essential that 
stakeholders undertake to increase their knowledge of such issues, in order to gain an appreciation of the necessity for a collaborative and 
integrated resilience strategy against security threats. The below original stakeholder map (Figure 1 Generic London main railway station 
stakeholder map) and discussion highlight a selection of policy disconnects and communication issues for stakeholders in the railway station, 
which impact on the resilience of the space to security threats. 
 
Stakeholder map 
This original stakeholder map has been generated through stakeholder analysis of the literature and policy reviews. The map established 
the stakeholders, who are critical to the continued existence of the railway station, and should be used to inform security and operational 
strategies [23]. The interviews with stakeholders have helped to validate the structure and content of the map and have also established 
that the map can serve several valid functions; for instance, it visually highlights the magnitude of stakeholders who have an interest in the 
railway station and how these interconnect and interface with each other. It proved to be a valuable research tool during the interviews as 
it facilitated discussion points, allowing stakeholders on the map to be categorised as follows: primary stakeholders who are impacted 
constructively or adversely, by a project or operations; secondary stakeholders have a transitional function and can have a key impact on 
the project or operations; and external stakeholders do not directly participate, yet can be impacted upon by a project or operations [28]. It 
should be noted that the map can be altered specifically for individual railway stations projects. Therefore, it can be used as an important 
visual tool during the design stage of refurbishment or new projects and operational management of railway stations, maximising decision 
making and ensuring all stakeholder opinions are identified [28]. 
 
Discussion 
The interview data revealed a potential future impact to the resilience of security threats at the design and construction stage of building 
or refurbishing the railway station. Participants have contended that there are policy disconnects around section 17 of the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998, concerning the involvement of police crime prevention officers at the design stages of building and refurbishment 
projects. Home Office police forces must be involved from the design stage of building projects, and to work with a range of responsible 
stakeholders to ensure 
   
 
 
Figure 1   Generic London main railway station stakeholder map 
 
   
crime prevention measures are considered as critical as other legislative duties in the addressing of their design. However, when railway 
stations are designed or refurbished, the British Transport Police (BTP) are not included in this legislation nor have any other legislation 
which gives them power to be consulted in the design stage of the building or redesign of such projects. Participants expressed that BTP 
Counter Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSA) and Principal Architectural Liaison officers (ALO) have to either rely on an informal network 
of industry contacts to inform them of when projects are upcoming or have to wait to be consulted by the designers. One participant stated 
if the BTP CTSA’s/ALO’s ‘are asked for involvement once the first brick has been laid, then they have been involved too late on the 
project’. This voluntary relationship between the BTP and designers and the lack of regulation is seen to be one of hardest to manage and 
even harder to maintain, with security measures being perceived as an afterthought or a grudge purchase. Given the economic pressures 
which drive the financial costs of projects, it was felt it inevitable that there will be trade-offs around security measures, yet if inappropriate 
measures are fitted during the build, they will have to be retrofitted at a later date, thus having future financial implications. However, the 
Department for Transport (DfT) in 2012 released the ‘Security In Design Of Stations’ (SIDOS) guidance, to ensure security measures are 
designed in and the BTP are involved from the earliest stages of projects. SIDOS does make recommendations to address the issues raised 
above, yet participants have expressed concerns that although the document advises that CTSA/ALOs are involved at the early stages of 
projects, it is not a statutory requirement and therefore does not guarantee their involvement. 
 
One area of legislation which requires adherence to and the clear communication of are the security policies and standards in the railway 
station. The DfT specify the security on the railway and security standards are established and imposed through the National Railways 
Security Programme (NRSP), a closed access document. This document sets the day-to-day obligatory and recommended security 
standards for Network Rail (NR) and the Train Operating Companies (TOCs) to adhere to. NR takes the DfT’s directives and 
communicated to their employees, which is then cascaded down to tenants. The security requirements for tenancy in main railway stations 
are stringent, due to their significant locations, function and capacity.  
 
This type of railway station operates to the highest level of the NRSP. It is part of the tenancy agreement that tenants will have in place a 
security strategy which conforms to the requirements of the NRSP, conflicts can arise when this requirement has to be dovetailed into their 
corporate policies, and cascaded to their employees on site. Operational participants agreed NR should manage security briefings to tenant’s 
staff, given that the interpretation of security strategies can be watered down by managers, whether intentionally or not, and concurred 
corporate priorities can affect the implementation of security measures. Furthermore, the BTP frequently work with the tenants, DfT Land 
Security and NR to support security and awareness strategies in the station. However, many of the communications and meetings, which 
are held in the station, are discretionary and are instigated by individuals who are trying to improve the complexities of stakeholder 
interfaces and to improve the communication of security strategies. An example of a voluntary interface between stakeholders is the Police 
and Communities Together (PACT) meetings. These are held frequently in the station, with NR, BTP, tenants, TOCs and the public to 
raise awareness and issues concerning the security of the station and to agree on actions to be taken. A limitation of these meetings is the 
attendance in some stations is poor. Also one participant suggested these meetings are often used to air disagreements concerning others 
agendas. However, if there is a common issue, commercial agendas would be put to one side for the greater good of the station. These 
meetings are seen by NR and the BTP as key to maintain good stakeholder interfaces and communication, but it is   up to the individuals 
involved to maintain the relationship and communications. The BTP and NR could proactively raise awareness and reiterate the relationship 
building and security benefits for stakeholders participating in voluntary security meetings. However, by incorporating such meetings into 
the mandatory NRSP it would ensure stakeholders’ compulsory attendance and create structured opportunities to improve the 
communication of security strategies and regulation within the railway station. 
 
A concern which was raised regarding the future resilience of the railway station are the complexities of the stakeholder interfaces and how 
these impact upon efficient communication between stakeholders in terms of security threats and realities. One participant acknowledged 
the current operational complexities of the railway station could only worsen in the future, as more stakeholders will become involved and 
not just those within the physical space of the railway station, but those on the margins who have an impact on the resilience of the space 
to security threats. Solutions need to be sought now as ‘anything we do with technology is just going to be a waste of time unless we sort 
out the fundamental communication issues’. Therefore, key stakeholders and the Government need to urgently seek and embrace an open 
process of inclusive communication measures and strategies, which will facilitate the understanding of the complex stakeholder interfaces, 
which influence the current and future resilience of the railway station to security threats. 
 
Conclusion 
The main railway station in England is disparate and complex in its governance, and its current and future resilience is reliant upon an 
effective association between all tiers of stakeholders This paper has provided illustrations of how within the railway station there 
can be inconsistent and disparate approach to resilience against security threats. The stakeholder map clearly highlights the 
multiplicity of stakeholders responsible for the multifaceted operational and legislations of the railway station. It has briefly 
highlighted some of the vulnerabilities to current and future security threats, which are compounded by the complexities of managing 
operational interfaces between stakeholders in the railway station. The findings call for the resilience towards security threats to ‘be 
developed in a transdisciplinary way; incorporating a wide range of stakeholders involved with the structural and non-structural 
approaches’ [29]. It is also felt to ensure the involvement of key stakeholders in the planning and design of projects a more regulatory 
   
approach rather than guidance is required. It is too early to say whether the SIDOS guidance will be sufficient to guarantee key 
stakeholders are involved at the early stages of projects, thereby providing a strategically planned, defined and coordinated approach 
at the design stages of new build and refurbishment projects. It may be necessary for the guidance to be supported by a resolute and 
collaborative campaign of awareness raising, which is targeted at key ‘decision-makers’ illustrated on the stakeholder map. It is also 
vital the complex stakeholder interfaces in the day to day operations are recognised and understood in the railway station so they do 
not negatively impact on current and future security strategies and measures. If these issues are tackled now it will help to ensure 
consistent security strategies are implemented to safeguard the resilience of railway stations against a broad range of security threats 
for future generations. 
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